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STATEMENT OF REASONS UNDER SECTION 40 OF THE ARCHIVES ACT

Series 11835/2 Control symbol. 173/10/1 171 is
OPEN WITH EXCEPTION / ~~CLOSED~~ * for the reasons set out below:

* delete whichever is inapplicable

The item described above contains information that has been exempted under sub-section 33(1)(a) & (b) of the *Archives Act* 1983.

The facts on which the decision is based:

The documents contain information communicated to or shared with the Australian Government by a foreign government. It is possible that information in this file, if disclosed, could cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Reasons for the decision:

Section 33(1)(a) of the *Archives Act* 1983 provides that a record is exempt if it contains information or matter the disclosure of which under this Act could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of the Commonwealth.

International relations are dependent upon an appropriate flow of information in confidence between one country and another. If disclosure of information were to lessen the confidence of another country in the Australian Government, that is sufficient ground for a finding that disclosure could reasonably be expected to damage international relations.

Section 33(1)(b) of the *Archives Act* 1983 provides that a record is exempt if it contains information or matter communicated in confidence by or on behalf of a foreign government, an authority of a foreign government or an international organization to the Government of the Commonwealth, to an authority of the Commonwealth or to a person receiving the communication on behalf of the Commonwealth or of an authority of the Commonwealth, being information or matter the disclosure of which under this Act would constitute a breach of that confidence.

Decision maker:

Designation:

Date:

Karen Chero
APS5
30/7/04

Australian Archives
DOCUMENT REMOVAL ADVICE

Folio/s numbered Y 1/2 Y3
-has/ have been removed from this item.

Series/Accession No.: A1838/2 Item No.: 173/10/1 Pt 1

Document description: Yang - Relations with Australia - General

Reason for removal: 283(1) a & b (a WPA Y.0 Y2)

A copy/expunged copy has been inserted in place of folio/s _____

Number of folios removed: 21

Removed documents now controlled as: _____

Removed by: Karen Choo Position No. AP55 Date 30/7/04
Pink - Item copy Yellow - Document copy Blue - Register copy

173 / 10 / 1

PT. NO. T

FILE CLOSED

THIS PART OPENED ON 11.3.1948.

THIS PART CLOSED ON 17.7.1963.

SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE ON FILE.....

4859/63

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

LJH.

O. 14750.

TO:

Sent: 17th July, 1963.
1620.

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

1672. CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 1818 - PL 480, Iraq.

This proposed transaction appears to us to be a critical extension of the process which for some years has been eroding free market for wheat.

2. Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries have been very important and growing markets for Australian wheat for many years and we would resist strongly the extension of non-commercial sales in this area, unless there are adequate reasons for this policy.

3. No justification has been given as to why wheat is being offered on non-commercial terms to Iraq and we have no reason for supposing that the cash purchases of previous years could not be continued. We presume that the object of the transaction is to bolster the present regime which is strongly anti-communist. If this is so, care should be taken to avoid squeezing us out also in the process. The U.S. might be reminded we have unhappy memories of the result of non-commercial transaction in Egypt, where it will be recalled that, after the war we had a substantial and growing trade in wheat rising to a peak of 647,000 tons in 1950/51. However, as the result of PL 480 transactions the U.S.S.R. no longer sells in this market, but our trade is now relatively small and spasmodic as most wheat is imported on non-commercial terms from the United States.

4. In the absence of an adequate explanation as to why the transaction with Iraq is proposed, we must oppose it in the strongest terms.

MIN. & DEPT TRADE (C)
MIN. & DEPT PRIMARY INDUSTRY (C)
TREASURER & TREASURY.
E.A.
P.M.'s. DEPT.
P.M.'s.

17th July, 1963.

SEC A/S's ER PAC&AM AM&SP EAF&ME E AF ME

(F) 173/10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with MR. ISRAEL ELIASHIV, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, EMBASSY OF ISRAEL.
on

Officers Present

MR. R.K. GATE.PLACE: NOAH'S ARK RESTAURANT.MAIN SUBJECT(S):

File

Mr. Eliashiv, who was entertaining me at lunch prior to my leaving for Israel, said that he wanted to ask me a question - what was the attitude of the Australian Government to the situation in the Middle East, particularly the Arab-Israel dispute?

2. I said that our attitude was that we wished to remain friends of both Israel and the Arab States and that we hoped that in due course a lasting settlement, amicable to all parties concerned, would be reached.

3. Mr. Eliashiv referred scoffingly to the latter remark as "far-fetched". What was our attitude to President Nasser's recent declaration referring to the eventual annihilation of Israel?

4. I said that, as far as I knew, we had no evidence to show that Nasser's recent remarks were to be understood to mean that he was contemplating an immediate attack on Israel. If there were any evidence that he was contemplating such an attack, then Australia would be most concerned.

Mr. Stuckey

DISTRIBUTION:

Minister

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Antarctic Division

FOLLOWING POSTS:ACTION:

7748/60.

Report prepared by

(R. K. Gate)

R.L.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

173/10/1

INWARD CABLEGRAM

PJ.

I.12380.

Dated: 11th May, 1963.
1051.

FROM:

Rec'd: 12th May, 1963.
0811.

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO.

T. A. W.

106. CONFIDENTIAL.

Reference your telegram 75 from Stuart.

In the circumstances described and in the expectation that funds will be available by then, I am arranging to be in Athens on 20th May.

Please confirm this suits.

Hood.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.(1251/P)
(175/10/6)

12th May, 1963.

↓

Mr Lee = where are we a this year?

dm

SEC A/S'S PAC&AM AM&SP EAF&ME E AF ME INF ADMIN
FIN TRAV DEPT.DUTY OFFICER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE FOR FILE

In February, 1958 Egypt and Syria united to form one State under the name United Arab Republic. New files were opened to cover the U.A.R. in the 214 series and the previous Egypt files (163 series) were temporarily closed. The U.A.R. ceased to exist in its original form in September, 1961, when Syria withdrew from the Union. As Egypt continued to be known as the U.A.R., all Egyptian material was filed on this series. Material relating to Syria was placed on files in the 205 series.

In April, 1963, a new United Arab Republic was formed. This was a federation of Egypt, Syria and Iraq. At this stage only material relating to the tri-partite federation was placed on the 214 (U.A.R.) series -- other material relating to the constituent units being placed on Egypt (163), Iraq (173) and Syria (205).
April, 1963.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

IM

I.6362

FROM:

Dated: 11th March, 1963.
1039

Australian Embassy,
MOSCOW.

Rec'd: 11th March, 1963.
2105

60 CONFIDENTIAL.

Please repeat Berlin.

Reference my telegram 49 and memorandum 132.

Doctor Saj Aldin, applicant for permanent residence in Australia, called at Embassy this morning and said he had been given nine days to leave the Soviet Union. He asked if he could be given a tourist visa for Australia. He was told that this was impossible.

2. Aldin said he was proceeding to Berlin within the next few days where he has a brother. He was told that Canberra and Berlin would be informed of his application and that he should call on the Australian Military Mission in Berlin, for an answer to his request.

E&A.
IMMIGRATION
A.S.I.O. (C=M)
P.M'S

112th March, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL

SEC A/Ss MR LOOMES EAF&ME E ME INF C&P@

(P) 173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD SAVINGRAM

DW

0.4733

Dated: 8th March, 1963.

TO:

173/10/1

ALL POSTS SAVINGRAM

SAV. AP17. UNCLASSIFIED.

IRAQ.

Please refer to our AP8 of 16th February, 1963.

2. Following an intimation by the Iraqi Charge d'Affaires to our Embassy in Cairo of his government's desire to receive formal Australian recognition, the Embassy has been instructed to request the Iraqi Embassy to pass to Baghdad the following message from the Minister to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, Mr. Talib Hussein Al Shagib:

"In informing Your Excellency that the Australian Government will be pleased to enter into relations with the Government of the Republic of Iraq, I have the honour to request you to convey to the Government and people of Iraq the sincere good wishes of the Australian Government and people for their future welfare and prosperity. I look forward with pleasure to the development of mutually advantageous and cordial relations between our two countries. Please accept etc. Garfield Barwick. Minister for External Affairs."

MIN. & DEPT E.A.

8th March, 1963.

Ⓢ 173/10/1

SEC A/S's MR LOOMES UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA E.AF&ME
E AF ME@ INF DL MT C&P IC

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

:JT

I.5662

Dated: 2nd March, 1963.

1300

Rec'd: 3rd March, 1963.

0700

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO.

43 CONFIDENTIAL.

Iraq.

Your AP savingram of 16th February, 1963.

2. On a social occasion last evening the Iraqi Charge d'Affaires expressed to me his surprise that Australia had not recognised his Government. I said although the Australian diplomatic missions had been instructed to maintain relations with its representatives (as shown by our acknowledgement of his Note of 12th February) I understood a formal announcement had not been made as Australia had not yet received a request for recognition. The Charge d'Affaires said as far as he knew neither had Canada which is also not represented in Baghdad. In any case his note of 12th February had been intended to be construed as inviting recognition. He added that his Government would be pleased to have formal Australian recognition.

3. I said I would convey his views to you.

Pocock.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M's

3rd March, 1963.

SEC A/Ss MR. LOOMES UN COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA
SA EAF&ME E AF ME@ INF DL C&P

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

Embassy of the Republic of Iraq
No. 2/31/86
12/2/1963



AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
GARDEN CITY
CAIRO



The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Missions in Cairo
of Iraq reply quote No. 221.5.1.8
(th Memorandum No. 145),
6th March, 1963.

IRAQ

Please refer to your memorandum No. 67 of 27 February, 1963, paragraph 2. Attached are two copies of the Note of 12 February, 1963, from the Iraqi Embassy, and of our Note of 19 February, 1963, in reply.

E.R. Pocock
(E.R. Pocock)
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

in Strick to see *He* 15-14-63.
This Embassy is in receipt of the Declaration No. 1 which was issued by the Revolutionary Command Council of the Revolution's Committee. It has been vested the legislative power and the election of H.E. Saddam Hussein as President of the Republic during the formation of the Cabinet and the assurance that the Iraqi Government is in complete control of the country and that the Iraqi State has gone back to normal, and that tranquillity prevails all over Iraq.

The Embassy of Iraq is taking pleasure in communicating the above, availing itself of this opportunity to renew to All Diplomatic Missions in Cairo its highest consideration.

DATED

19th February, 1963.

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS
IN CAIRO.

Embassy of the Republic of Iraq.

COPY

No. 2/31/86

COPY

12/2/1963

221.5.1.8

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to the Diplomatic Missions in Cairo and has the honour to state that the Arab people of Iraq have with the help of the Iraqi Army, on 14th of Ramadan, (the 8th of February 1963), moved to rid themselves of the dictatorial oppressive regime which has deviated from the goals of the 14th of July, 1958, Revolution, a regime which confiscated liberties, violated all laws, persecuted people, and secluded Iraq from the rest of the Arab world. It ruined the country's economy, and encouraged the racial and sectarian divisions among the people of Iraq. It brought to power corrupt rulers and put Iraq under a rule of misery, persecution and Nironean oppression for the sake of self-aggrandizement and lust for power at the expense of the civil liberties, stability, peace and security of Iraq.

Because of that, the 14th of Ramadan Revolution took place to correct this abnormal situation, to bring the country's conditions back to normal, and to restore the 14th of July Revolution to its original historical path of national liberation.

In thanking the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq for this, This Embassy is please to enclose herewith (in Arabic) the Proclamation No.1 which was issued by the National Council of the Revolution's Command, the formation of the said Council in which has been vested the highest authority in the country, including the legislative power and the election of H.E. ABDUL-SALAM MOHAMMAD ARIF as President of the Republic during the transitory period, the formation of the Cabinet and the assurance that the Revolutionary Government is in complete control of the country and that the daily life has gone back to normal, and peace and tranquility prevail all over Iraq.

The Embassy of Iraq in taking please in communicating the above, avails itself of this opportunity to renew to All Diplomatic Missions in Cairo its highest consideration.

CAIRO

19th February, 1963.

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS
IN CAIRO.

Embassy of the Republic of Iraq.

COPY

No. 2/31/86

COPY

12/2/1963

221.5.1.8

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to the Diplomatic Missions in Cairo and has the honour to state that the Arab people of Iraq have with the help of the Iraqi Army, on 14th of Ramadan, (the 8th of February 1963), moved to rid themselves of the dictatorial oppressive regime which has deviated from the goals of the 14th of July, 1958, Revolution, a regime which confiscated liberties, violated all laws, persecuted people, and secluded Iraq from the rest of the Arab world. It ruined the country's economy, and encouraged the racial and sectarian divisions among the people of Iraq. It brought to power corrupt rulers and put Iraq under a rule of misery, persecution and Nironean oppression for the sake of self-aggrandizement and lust for power at the expense of the civil liberties, stability, peace and security of Iraq.

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In thanking the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq for this This Embassy is please to enclose herewith (in Arabic) the Proclamation No.1 which was issued by the National Council of the Revolution's Command, the formation of the said Council in which has been vested the highest authority in the country, including the legislative power and the election of H.E. ABDUL-SALAM MOHAMMAD ARIF as President of the Republic during the transitory period, the formation of the Cabinet and the assurance that the Revolutionary Government is in complete control of the country and that the daily life has gone back to normal, and peace and tranquillity prevail all over Iraq.

The Embassy of Iraq in taking please in communicating the above, avails itself of this opportunity to renew to All Diplomatic Missions in Cairo its highest consideration.

CAIRO

19th February, 1963.

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS
IN CAIRO.

COPY

221.5.1.8

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,

CAIRO CITY

The Australian Embassy presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq and has the honour to acknowledge receipt of the latter's Note No. 2/31/86 of February 12th last, in which it was good enough to inform Diplomatic Missions in Cairo of the revolution that took place in Iraq on the 14th of Ramadan last (February 8th, 1963), of the formation of the National Council of the Revolutionary Command, the election of His Excellency Abdul-Salam Mohammad Arif as President of the Republic during the transition period, and of the formation of a Cabinet, concluding with the assurance that the Revolutionary Government is in complete control of the country and that daily life has returned to normal with peace and tranquility prevailing.

In thanking the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq for this information, of which it has taken due note, the Australian Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of Iraq the assurance of its highest consideration.

CAIRO

19th February, 1963.

TO ALL EMBASSIES AND LEGATIONS

OF CAIRO

Embassy of the Republic of Iraq.
No. 2/31/86
12/2/1963



COPY

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
GARDEN CITY
CAIRO

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to the Diplomatic Missions in Cairo and has the honour to state that the Arab people of Iraq, in reply to No. 221.5.1.8 of the Iraqi Army, on 14th of Ramadan, (the Memorandum No. 145 of 1963), moved to rid themselves of the dictatorial 6th March, 1963, which has deviated from the goals of the 14th of July, 1958, Revolution, The Secretary, Department of External Affairs, CANBERRA, secluded Iraq from the rest of the Arab world. It ruined the country's economy, and encouraged the racial and sectarian divisions among the people of Iraq. It brought to power corrupt rulers and IRAQ Iraq under a rule of misery, persecution and Mirocean oppression for the sake of self-aggrandizement. Please refer to your memorandum No. 67 of 27 February, 1963, paragraph 2. Attached are two copies of the Note of 12 February, 1963, from the Iraqi Embassy and of our Note of 19 February, 1963 in reply. took place to correct this abnormal situation, to bring the country's conditions back to normal, and to restore the 14th of July Revolution to its original historical path of national liberation.

This Embassy is please to enclose herewith (in Arabic) the Proclamation No.1 which was issued by the National Council of the Revolution's Command (E.R. Pocock) on of the said Council in which has been vested Charge d'Affaires a.i. in the country, including the legislative power and the election of H.E. ABDUL-SALAM MOHAMMAD ARIF as President of the Republic during the transitory period, the formation of the Cabinet and the assurance that the Revolutionary Government is in complete control of the country and that the daily life has gone back to normal, and peace and tranquility prevail all over Iraq.

The Embassy of Iraq in taking please in communicating the above, avails itself of this opportunity to renew to All Diplomatic Missions in Cairo its highest consideration.

CAIRO

19th February, 1963.

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS
IN CAIRO.

Embassy of the Republic of Iraq.

No. 2/31/86

12/2/1963

COPY

COPY

221.5.1.8

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to the Diplomatic Missions in Cairo and has the honour to state that the Arab people of Iraq have with the help of the Iraqi Army, on 14th of Ramadan, (the 8th of February 1963), moved to rid themselves of the dictatorial oppressive regime which has deviated from the goals of the 14th of July, 1958, Revolution, a regime which confiscated liberties, violated all laws, persecuted people, and secluded Iraq from the rest of the Arab world. It ruined the country's economy, and encouraged the racial and sectarian divisions among the people of Iraq. It brought to power corrupt rulers and put Iraq under a rule of misery, persecution and Nironian oppression for the sake of self-aggrandizement and lust for power at the expense of the civil liberties, stability, peace and security of Iraq.

Government is in o Because of that, the 14th of Ramadan Revolution took place to correct this abnormal situation, to bring the country's conditions back to normal, and to restore the 14th of July Revolution to its original historical path of national liberation.

In thanking the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq for this : This Embassy is please to enclose herewith (in Arabic) the Proclamation No.1 which was issued by the National Council of the Revolution's Command, the formation of the said Council in which has been vested the highest authority in the country, including the legislative power and the election of H.E. ABDUL-SALAM MOHAMMAD ARIF as President of the Republic during the transitory period, the formation of the Cabinet and the assurance that the Revolutionary Government is in complete control of the country and that the daily life has gone back to normal, and peace and tranquility prevail all over Iraq.

The Embassy of Iraq in taking please in communicating the above, avails itself of this opportunity to renew to All Diplomatic Missions in Cairo its highest consideration.

CAIRO

19th February, 1963.

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS
IN CAIRO.

COPY

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CANBERRA

221.5.1.8

PM 32

8th March, 1963.

The Australian Embassy presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq and has the honour to acknowledge receipt of the latter's Note No. 2/31/86 of February 12th last, in which it was good enough to inform Diplomatic Missions in Cairo of the revolution that took place in Iraq on the 14th of Ramadan last (February 8th, 1963), of the formation of the National Council of the Revolutionary Command, the election of His Excellency Abdul-Salam Mohammad Arif as President of the Republic during the transition period, and of the formation of a Cabinet, concluding with the assurance that the Revolutionary Government is in complete control of the country and that daily life has returned to normal with peace and tranquility prevailing.

Representative of the Republic of Iraq, I have the honour to
In thanking the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq for this information, of which it has taken due note, the Australian Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of Iraq the assurance of its highest consideration.
and cordial relations between our two countries. Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration. Garfield Barwick.
Minister for External Affairs."

CAIRO

19th February, 1963.

MR LOMES ON 19/2/63
N 1000 INF DE 10/2/63

173/10/1



173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
CANBERRA.

FOR THE PRESS

Released only in Canberra

PR 32

8th March, 1963.

AUSTRALIAN RECOGNITION OF IRAQ

Statement by the Minister for External Affairs.

The Minister for External Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick, today announced that he had sent the following message to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, Mr. Talib Hussein Al Shagib:-

"In informing Your Excellency that the Australian Government will be pleased to enter into relations with the Government of the Republic of Iraq, I have the honour to request you to convey to the Government and people of Iraq the sincere good wishes of the Australian Government and people for their future welfare and prosperity. I look forward with pleasure to the development of mutually advantageous and cordial relations between our two countries. Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration. Garfield Barwick, Minister for External Affairs."

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD SAVINGRAM

DW

0.4733

Dated: 8th March, 1963.

TO:

173/10/1

ALL POSTS SAVINGRAM

SAV. AP17. UNCLASSIFIED.

IRAQ.

Please refer to our AP8 of 16th February, 1963.

2. Following an intimation by the Iraqi Charge d'Affaires to our Embassy in Cairo of his government's desire to receive formal Australian recognition, the Embassy has been instructed to request the Iraqi Embassy to pass to Baghdad the following message from the Minister to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, Mr. Talib Hussein Al Shagib:

"In informing Your Excellency that the Australian Government will be pleased to enter into relations with the Government of the Republic of Iraq, I have the honour to request you to convey to the Government and people of Iraq the sincere good wishes of the Australian Government and people for their future welfare and prosperity. I look forward with pleasure to the development of mutually advantageous and cordial relations between our two countries. Please accept etc. Garfield Barwick. Minister for External Affairs."

MIN. & DEPT E.A.

8th March, 1963.

SEC A/S's MR LOOMES UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA E.AF&ME
E AF ME@ INF DL MT C&P IC

(F) 173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

MT

0.4718

TO:

Dated: 8th March, 1963
1200

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO.

28. CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 43.

Please pass note on following lines to Iraqi Embassy:-

In response to Charge d'Affaires' intimation of the Government of Iraq's desire to receive formal recognition by the Australian Government, the Australian Embassy requests that the following message from the Australian Minister for External Affairs be conveyed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, Talib Hussein al Shagib.

"In informing Your Excellency that the Australian Government will be pleased to enter into relations with the Government of the Republic of Iraq, I have the honour to request you to convey to the Government and people of Iraq the sincere good wishes of the Australian Government and people for their future welfare and prosperity. I look forward with pleasure to the development of mutually advantageous and cordial relations between our two countries. Please accept etc. Garfield Barwick, Minister for External Affairs."

2. Text of Minister's message will be published.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (173/10/1)
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'s

(Cost £16.16.0)

8th March, 1963

SEC A/S's MR LOOMES UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME E
AF@ ME INF DL C&P IC
CAIRO

Ⓢ 173/10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

PJ.

0.4807.

Sent: 8th March, 1963.
1900.

TO:

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO.

30. UNCLASSIFIED.

Our 28. ^{*}
IRAQ.

Text of Minister's message released here today.

E.A.
P.M.'s

(* Telegram containing message
to Iraq Foreign Minister.)

9th March, 1963.

SEC
EAF&ME

A/S's
E

LA
ME@

MR LOOMES
INF

UN
C&P

AM&SP
PAC&AM

S&SEA

(F) 173/10/1

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE No 173/10/1

DATE 4th March, 1963.

SUBJECT

RECOGNITION OF IRAQ.

FOR the Minister

*Approved Rowland
10 Mr. Curran
7/3
aw*

On 12th February you approved a recommendation that, in the absence of any request for formal recognition from the new regime in Iraq, our posts should be authorised to continue dealing with Iraqi representatives, and that if the latter showed signs of interest in securing formal Australian recognition, they could be told that a request for such recognition would be favourably entertained.

2. The Iraqi Charge d'Affaires has now intimated to our Charge d'Affaires in Cairo his Government's desire to receive formal Australian recognition.

3. Attached for your approval is a draft telegram to Cairo containing a message to be conveyed by the Iraqi Charge d'Affaires there to his government informing it of the Australian Government's recognition of the new regime.

....

*aw 7/3**J.R. Rowland*

(J.R. Rowland)

Acting Assistant Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

→ (F) 173/10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

4th March, 1963.

RECOGNITION OF IRAQ.

the Minister

On 12th February you approved a recommendation that, in the absence of any request for formal recognition from the new regime in Iraq, our posts should be authorised to continue dealing with Iraqi representatives, and that if the latter showed signs of interest in securing formal Australian recognition, they could be told that a request for such recognition would be favourably entertained.

2. The Iraqi Charge d'Affaires has now intimated to our Charge d'Affaires in Cairo his Government's desire to receive formal Australian recognition.

....

3. Attached for your approval is a draft telegram to Cairo containing a message to be conveyed by the Iraqi Charge d'Affaires there to his government informing it of the Australian Government's recognition of the new regime.

(J.R. Rowland)
Acting Assistant Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

④ 173/10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

D R A F T

AUSTEMBA
CAIRO.

CONFIDENTIAL

Your 43.

Please pass note on following lines to Iraqi
Embassy:-

"In response to Charge d'Affaires intimation
of the Government of Iraq's desire to receive formal
recognition by the Australian Government, the Australian
Embassy requests that the following message from the
Australian Minister for External Affairs be conveyed
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Iraq, Talib Hussein al Shagib.

↑
A
↓
"In informing Your Excellency that the
Australian Government will be pleased to enter into
relations with the Government of the Republic of Iraq,
I have the honour to request you to convey to the
Government and people of Iraq the sincere good wishes
of the Australian Government and people for their
future welfare and prosperity. I look forward with
pleasure to the development of mutually advantageous
and cordial relations between our two countries.
Please accept etc. Garfield Barwick. Minister for
External Affairs." "

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

4/3/63

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

:JT

I.5662

Dated: 2nd March, 1963.

1300

Rec'd: 3rd March, 1963.

0700

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO.

43 CONFIDENTIAL.

Iraq.

Your AP savingram of 16th February, 1963.

2. On a social occasion last evening the Iraqi Charge d'Affaires expressed to me his surprise that Australia had not recognised his Government. I said although the Australian diplomatic missions had been instructed to maintain relations with its representatives (as shown by our acknowledgement of his Note of 12th February) I understood a formal announcement had not been made as Australia had not yet received a request for recognition. The Charge d'Affaires said as far as he knew neither had Canada which is also not represented in Baghdad. In any case his note of 12th February had been intended to be construed as inviting recognition. He added that his Government would be pleased to have formal Australian recognition.

3. I said I would convey his views to you.

Pocock.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M's

3rd March, 1963.

SEC A/Ss
SA EAF&ME

MR. LOOMES UN COMREL
E AF ME@ INF DL

PAC&AM
C&P

AM&SP

S&SEA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

:JT

I.5662

Dated: 2nd March, 1963.

1300

Rec'd: 3rd March, 1963.

0700

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO.

43 CONFIDENTIAL.

Iraq.

Your AP savingram of 16th February, 1963.

2. On a social occasion last evening the Iraqi Charge d'Affaires expressed to me his surprise that Australia had not recognised his Government. I said although the Australian diplomatic missions had been instructed to maintain relations with its representatives (as shown by our acknowledgement of his Note of 12th February) I understood a formal announcement had not been made as Australia had not yet received a request for recognition. The Charge d'Affaires said as far as he knew neither had Canada which is also not represented in Baghdad. In any case his note of 12th February had been intended to be construed as inviting recognition. He added that his Government would be pleased to have formal Australian recognition.

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Pocock.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'s

3rd March, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SEC A/Ss
SA EAF&ME

MR. LOOMES
E AF ME@

UN COMREL
INF DL

PAC&AM
C&P

AM&SP

S&SEA

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

67

27th February, 1963.

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO.

IRAQ.

Please refer to your telegram 32 of 15th
February, 1963.

2. We would be glad if you would send us copies
of the Note dated 12th February, 1963, sent to all
missions by the Iraqi Embassy, informing you of the
coup of 8th February. We would also appreciate
a copy of your reply to the Embassy's Note.

JRR

(J.R. Rowland)

Acting Assistant Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Mr. A.W. Marzook, U.A.R. Embassy
 on Wednesday, 20th February, and Friday, 22nd February, 1963
 Officers Present: J.R. Rowland

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

- (1) IRAQ
 (11) AUSTRALIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS INDONESIA.

Mr. Marzook asked me whether we had recognised the new regime in Iraq, saying that he had seen no announcement of this.

2. I told him that, although we had made no announcement, we had taken the decision to recognise; we had had no request for recognition from the new regime, (as we had had from the Yemen) so that we had no message to publish. But we had told our posts that they should continue to deal with Iraqi representatives, and that the latter could be told that if they wished for some formal statement of Australian recognition, such a request would be met.

3. I explained that our Embassy in Cairo had now received a note from the Iraqi Embassy there, not requesting recognition but stating what had happened in Iraq, and that we had asked our Embassy to acknowledge this note. This would presumably be an act of recognition.

4. Mr. Marzook asked about British policy towards the Yemen, contrasting their recognition of Iraq with their continued boycott of Sallal: I referred to British problems in Aden, and to the repeated professions of desire to interfere on Sallal's part (including the creation of a Ministry for South Arabian affairs) which were scarcely calculated to win recognition. I said that Sallal's imposition of a deadline for British recognition and threat to expel the British legation if it were not met were unwise: prestige immediately became involved, and it became more difficult, not less, for the British to recognise. Mr. Marzook expressed strong support for the regime in Iraq, saying that the revolution had been welcomed with relief by everyone: Kassem had spent his last years doing nothing but trying to stay in power.

Australian Relations with Indonesia.

5. Mr. Marzook tackled me earnestly, as he has now done on two occasions, to say that he believed that Australia was now much more conscious of its own international personality and policy than had formerly been the case; although traditional ties of sentiment and so on were still much valued, they were no longer decisive. Australia, as a prosperous country with a well developed industrial basis, was well fitted to help the developing countries which were its neighbours. But we should not be afraid of them; there was no need for fear.

6. I report this since it seems possible that Mr. Marzook

.... /2

DISTRIBUTION:

Minister				
Secretary				
A/S Div. 1	Pac. & Am. Br.	S. & S.E.A. Br.	M.T. Br.	
A/S Div. 2	U.N. Br.	E.R. Br.	Com. Rel.	Ex. Comms. Br.
A/S Div. 3	Admin. Br.	Finance Br.	Sydney Office	Melbourne Office
A/S Div. 4	E.A.M.E. Br.	C. & P. Br.	Inf. Br.	Antarctic Division
Legal Adviser				
A/S Div. 7	D.L. Br.	E. & T.A. Br.		

FOLLOWING POSTS:

Cairo, Djakarta, London

Report prepared by: *om*

ACTION:

7248/60.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

was repeating a line given to him by the Indonesian Embassy. At one of the parties which were the occasions for the conversations here recounted, Messrs. Marzook and Pranoto greeted each other cordially with thanks for mutual support and declarations that the U.A.R. was "the trouble shooter" in the Middle East, just as was Indonesia in South East Asia. (!)

Report prepared by
J.R. Rowland.

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

DW

Q.3249

Sent: 18th February, 1963.
1500

TO:

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO.16. CONFIDENTIAL.Your 32. Iraq

1. Paragraph 2. Your assumption correct. We have not yet received approach from Iraqis elsewhere.

2. Minister has approved continued dealings with Iraqi representatives and recognition in event of a formal request (our A.P. Savingram of 16th February). If Iraqi Embassy shows interest in securing formal Australian recognition they can be told request for recognition would be favourably entertained. Note may be acknowledged.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE.
P.M's.

18th February, 1963.

SEC A/S's MR LOOMES UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E
AF RE@ INF DL C&P IC

0.71

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

DW

0.3249

TO:

Sent: 18th February, 1963.
1500

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO.

16. CONFIDENTIAL.

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MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE.
P.M's.

18th February, 1963.

SEC A/S's MR LOOMES UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E
AF ME@ INF DL C&P IC

173/10/1
F 175/10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

PJ.

I.4348.

Dated: 15th February, 1963.
1315.

Rec'd: 17th February, 1963.
0032.

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO.

32. CONFIDENTIAL.

Iraq.

We have today received a note dated 12th February, sent to all missions here by the Iraqi Embassy, informing us of the 8th February revolution, formation of the Revolution Council and election of Aref to the interim Presidency. Note assures that the new Government is in complete control of the country.

2. Grateful for instructions on replying. I assume acknowledgement would constitute recognition. Before doing so, I should appreciate knowing whether you have already instructed Karachi or elsewhere to recognize.

Stuart.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'s

17th February, 1963.

SEC	A/S's	MR LOOMES	UN	COMREL	PAC&AM	AM&SP
S&SEA	SA	EAF&ME	E	AF	ME@	DL
ACCRA	CAIRO	CAPETOWN	KARACHI	LAGOS	LONDON	C&P
NEW DELHI	NEW YORK(UN)	OTTAWA	PARIS	ROME	TEL AVIV	
WASHINGTON	WELLINGTON					

173/10/1
173/2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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CAIRO.

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Stuart.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'s

17th February, 1963.

SEC	A/S's	MR LOOMES	UN	COMREL	PAC&AM	AM&SP
S&SEA	SA	EAF&ME	E	AF	ME@	INF
ACCRA	CAIRO	CAPETOWN	KARACHI	LAGOS	LONDON	
NEW DELHI	NEW YORK(UN)	OTTAWA	PARIS	ROME	TEL AVIV	
WASHINGTON	WELLINGTON					

6.
0

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL
OUTWARD SAVINGRAM

173/2/1
173/10/1

TO:

O.3188.

ALL POSTS SAVINGRAM.

Sent: 16th February, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL.

IRAQ.

Following the overthrow of General Kassem's regime on 8th February, the new Iraqi government, headed by Colonel Arif, appears to have control of the country and there is little risk of its being ousted. It has already secured the recognition of Britain, the United States, the U.S.S.R., and a growing number of other countries, including most Arab governments.

2. As yet Australia has received no request for recognition. In the absence of such a request we do not think a unilateral announcement of recognition on our part would be necessary or appropriate, though if such a request were received we should respond to it favourably. The Minister has, however, approved that (a) posts may continue to have dealings with Iraqi representatives and (b) if the latter show interest in securing formal Australian recognition for the new regime they may be informed that a request for such recognition would be favourably entertained.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE

16th February, 1963.

A/S's	MR LOOMES	UN	PAC&AM	S&SEA	AM&SP		
S&SEA	ME	E	AF	ME@	INF	DL	C&P
IC							

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

12th February, 1963.

IRAQ.

the Minister

Our latest information from London and Washington on Iraq is that the new regime in Iraq appears to have control of the country and that there is little risk of its being ousted. The new regime seems to be anti-communist and nationalist in tone; its President, Colonel Arif, is an admirer of Nasser, who was imprisoned by Kassem in 1958. Some fighting against Communist elements is believed to be in progress; the Kurdish leader (Barzani) has sent a message of support to the new regime.

2. The State Department believes that although the new regime is nationalist and pan-Arab, it is not likely to fall under Nasser's domination.

British Community.

3. We know of only one Australian in Iraq, the Reuters' correspondent reported by the press to have been shot in the leg, who is now in Beirut. British information of 10th February was that all British subjects are safe and that the situation was returning to normal.

Kuwait.

4. Although the new regime is unlikely to renounce the traditional Iraqi claim to Kuwait, it is expected that its domestic preoccupations will prevent it from actively pursuing it for the present.

Recognition.

5. British and United States recognition was granted on 11th February and recognition by the U.S.S.R., West Germany, Italy and Yugoslavia is reported today. Most Arab governments (including Kuwait, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the U.A.R., Saudi Arabia and Morocco) have recognised the new regime, and other governments are moving to do so.

Recommendation.

6. In these circumstances, it seems evident that recognition by Australia would now be appropriate. We have few contacts with Iraq, our only dealings being through our missions in London, Karachi and New York. As yet, we have received no request for recognition. In the absence of such a request, we do not think a unilateral announcement of recognition on our part would be necessary or appropriate. We suggest that our attitude should be that -

① 173/10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- (a) if such a request is received, we should submit it to you at the time with a draft reply extending recognition;
- (b) if no request is received by the end of this week (and assuming the situation in Iraq is unchanged) we should then inform posts (including New York, London and Karachi) that they may continue to have dealings with Iraqi representatives, and that if the latter show signs of interest in securing formal Australian recognition for the new regime they can be told that a request for such recognition would be favourably entertained.

(J.R. Rowland)
Acting Assistant Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

AM

TO:

0.14741

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

Sent: 21st August, 1962
2025

2933. RESTRICTED. PRIORITY.

For External.

Please present Note to Iraqi Embassy, referring to their Note No. 2/6/4008 of 29th November, 1961, which advised that the Qantas permit had been extended by the Iraqi Government for a further period of one year ending 31st August, 1962; express appreciation for extension of permit and seek renewal of permit for a further period.

MIN & DEPT E.A. (716/51/1/1/7)
MIN & DEPT CIVIL AVIATION
P.M.'s.

22nd August, 1962

(F) 173/10/1

SEC A/Ss LA MR LOOMES ER@ PAC&AM AM&SP EAF&ME E AF ME
INF IC

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

LAS

I.17461

Dated: 17th July, 1962.
1240

Rec'd: 17th July, 1962.
2330

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
TEL AVIV.

72 UNCLASSIFIED.

For Immigration.

Please cable advice whether anything known Salim Babayee-Poor from Iraq January 4th 1914, believed to have entered Australia 1959 from Italy. Have received an anonymous letter claiming that Babayee-Poor was refused permission to stay in Australia, is now attempting to re-enter under name Shlomd Eshed (Your reference N61/15254 serial N71575).

IMMIGRATION (ATTENTION)

A.S.I.O. (C.M)

P.M's

18th July, 1962.

SEC A/S (DIV.4) ME C&P

(P) 173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD SAVINGRAM

0.12000

TO:
ALL POSTS

Dated: 10th July, 1962

SAV. A.P. 93

RESTRICTED

NON-SCHEDULED FLIGHTS BY QANTAS

A new arrangement has recently been agreed upon between Qantas and the Department of Civil Aviation concerning the operation of non-scheduled flights. In the past, it has been the practice for the Department of Civil Aviation, acting in most cases through this Department and overseas posts, to obtain all foreign clearances required for Australian aircraft operating on international non-scheduled flights. This has involved both Departments in considerable expenditure of time and money, and means of improving the situation have been sought for some time.

2. Qantas is the chief operator concerned with these flights, and as it already has a wide network of offices and responsible agencies overseas, the possibility of that Company obtaining its own foreign clearances has been examined. It has now been agreed that on all Qantas non-scheduled flights (which are mainly to airports on the routes on which it operates its scheduled services) where no special circumstances apply, Qantas will obtain, through its own local representatives or agents, all necessary clearances or give necessary notification to the countries which the flight is to transit or overfly, except

Laos, Vietnam, Netherlands New Guinea, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Noumea (if traffic rights required for uplifting or setting down traffic) and Cambodia.

The present arrangements will continue to apply in the case of these countries.

Qantas will establish through its local representative whether it can take over clearances or notifications regarding Mauritius.

3. In the case of a non-scheduled flight by Qantas on a route on which it does not regularly operate, e.g. to South America, consideration would be given to obtaining clearances through official channels.

RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

(F) 173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD SAVINGRAM

- 2 -

4. The Civil Aviation Liaison Officer, London, and the Civil Air Attache, Washington, have been informed of these arrangements.

5. We assume that the governments concerned will have no objection to the new procedure of the local authorities being notified, as a matter of routine, by the Australian operator concerned whenever a non-scheduled flight is planned either to overfly or to make a technical stop for refuelling purposes. This is the procedure accepted by the Australian authorities, in compliance with Article 5 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, for the aircraft of other Contracting States operating non-scheduled flights. We should be glad of advice if there is any reason to suppose that this procedure will not be acceptable to a particular country.

For Djakarta only:

Due to the importance of minimising any possible difficulties in our civil aviation relations with Indonesia, the desirability of Qantas obtaining its own clearances there has been carefully considered. It has, however, been decided that the arrangements detailed above should apply in the case of Indonesia, at least for the present, provided that in any instance of doubt or difficulty Qantas will consult the Department of Civil Aviation; if time does not permit this, Qantas will contact you. The Qantas Manager for Indonesia has been instructed to keep in close touch with you on all flight clearance matters, and to keep you informed of action taken on applications for clearances and their results.

For Saigon and Phnom Penh:

We are anxious to extend the now arrangements, if possible, to Cambodia and South Vietnam. We would therefore be glad if

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD SAVINGRAM

O. 12000

- 3 -

you would ascertain from the appropriate
authorities their current requirements for
Australian aircraft making non-scheduled
flights through and over their territories.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT CIVIL AVIATION

10th July, 1962

RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

SEC A/Ss MR. LOOMES ERO PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA
SEA BAF&ME E AF ME INF DL IC

Sent: 29th March, 1962.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.911. CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.Arabian Gulf Trade Ship.

Leader of Trade Mission has advised that Iraq has refused permission for trade display on board Chandpara to open while vessel is in Basra where it is due midday 30th March local time, departing 2nd April. This advice contradicts terms of Iraq Embassy London note to you of 27th September, 1961 (your memorandum 1666/61).

2. Minister wishes you to approach Foreign Office urgently with request that British Embassy, Baghdad be asked to do whatever may be possible to secure reversal of decision. Glad if results of representations could be telegraphed to us and direct to leader of trade mission, Taplin, on board Chandpara. Ship is at present in Kuwait and, for your information, we suspect that its visit there may explain Iraqi attitude. We are advising Taplin that we see no reason why ship should not proceed to Basra as scheduled to unload cargo but that trade display should not be opened unless he receives advice of permission to do so.

3. Apart from a few members on board Chandpara majority of Trade Mission are travelling by air in chartered aircraft. They are at present in Kuwait from where it was intended that they would fly direct to Basra. They are being instructed not to leave Kuwait unless and until permission to land Basra is granted. Glad if this point could also be included in British Embassy's representations.

MIN.&DEPT.E.A.
A/MIN.&DEPT.TRADE(C)
P.M.'s

30th March, 1962

SEC A/Ss BR@ PAC&AM S&SEA EAF&ME E AF ME INF

⑧

173/10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CANBERRA.

26 SEP 1961 61/4822
CANBERRA 25 SEP 1961

With the Compliments
of the Secretary
Prime Minister's Department.

For your information.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra.

Mr. Gifford P.A.
his announcement

Collecting dolls in national
costume - I had written
to the Prime Minister who
kindly sent me dolls in Arab

Doll

13.

Dot 146
Dymples
Sep 17-61

may have
at I have
a from a
id, where I
he Iraqi

Kind to
me Minister.

is invitation
copy of



13.

Bot 146

Dry mpt.

Sept 17-61

pt

Honorable Sir - You may have read or heard, that I have recently returned from a visit to Baghdad, where I was the guest of the Iraqi Government -

They were very kind to me, and their Prime Minister was charming -

Indirectly, this invitation was due to my hobby of collecting dolls in national costume - I had written to the Prime Minister, who kindly sent me dolls in Arab

Cook me.

I have dolls, too, donated by Presidents, Consuls, members of Parliament, and Prime Ministers of many countries - Also one from Queen Juliana of Holland and Princess Isare of Monaco.

I write to ask if I may have the privilege of receiving a doll from our Australian Prime Minister.

I think we have not a national costume, (for which I am sorry) but I would be very honored to have a doll of some kind to represent Australia in my collection, through your agency and courtesy.

My collection has been

Oh I was on T.V. in Melbourne,
and I am constantly showing
for charities - Churches,
Schools, Redcross, Legacy,
Rotary, Hospitals etc. in
Dunedin and surrounding
districts.

Dear Sir, may I have
the pleasure of hearing
from you?

Sincerely
Mrs M. Keill

MC.MC

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

O.10755
Sent: 10th July 1961
1815

TO:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

File 173/10/1

353. CONFIDENTIAL.

Our 309. Iraqi Independence Celebrations.

Was any intimation given that we intended sending goodwill message?

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (173/10/1)
P.M.'s.

(COST £1.5.10)
13th July, 1961.

SEC A/Ss UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME
E ME@ INF IC C&P

0

CONFIDENTIAL

PA

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

12th July, 1961.

IRAQ: QUESTION OF GOODWILL MESSAGE ON THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE
REPUBLIC

THE MINISTER:

On 13th June, you approved a recommendation that we should decline an Iraqi invitation, transmitted through Mr. Crocker, to send two Australian representatives to the Third Anniversary celebrations to be held in Baghdad on 14th July, and should simply send a goodwill message. Mr. Crocker advised the Iraqi Embassy in New Delhi that we would not be sending a representative and was told for his information only that we proposed to send a message.

2. The Iraqi threat to annex Kuwait has intervened, and in view of Iraq's unfriendly posture towards the United Kingdom (and the West), we think that Prime Minister Kasseem could seek to make capital out of goodwill messages innocently sent at this time. Any publicity given such messages could, at the least, be taken as expressing sympathy with the present regime in Iraq, and at worst, condonation of its claim to Kuwait.

3. We recommend that no goodwill message should be sent on this occasion, and that we should rest on the formal communication (sent through our High Commission at New Delhi) declining the Iraqi invitation to send representatives on the grounds that it would not be practicable for us to be suitably represented.

(A.H. Tange)
Secretary.

RGH
E.A.M.E. BRANCH:
RGH:HMS

CONFIDENTIAL *PA*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper

Melb Age

File No.

123/10/1

Published at

Date

12/7/61

Melb Age 12/7

Mildura Woman for Irak



SIXTY-year-old grandmother, Mrs. Ida Neill, of Mildura, who is going to Irak because of dolls, left yesterday with no dolls and little of her voice.

Almost inaudibly she said, "I don't know whether I have lost my voice because of a cold or because of the excitement."

• Mrs. Neill is pictured receiving a good-

bye kiss from her grandson, Scott Murray, before boarding a plane at Melbourne airport.

Last year, Mrs. Neill, a doll collector, wrote to the Prime Minister of Irak, General Kassem, asking for a doll.

In September, the doll arrived, then last week, like a "bolt from the blue," came an invitation from the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hashim Jawad, to attend the Iraqi national

day celebrations in Baghdad.

Mrs. Neill said she did not know who would meet her when she arrived, where she would stay, or how long she would be there.

Among those who farewelled her yesterday were her husband and four married sons, some of whom had left Mildura for Melbourne airport at 3 a.m.

It was Mrs. Neill's first plane trip and her first time out of Australia.

PA

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE No 173/10/1

DATE 12th July, 1961.

SUBJECT IRAQ: QUESTION OF GOODWILL MESSAGE ON THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE
REPUBLIC

FOR THE MINISTER:

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3. We recommend that no goodwill message should be sent on this occasion, and that we should rest on the formal communication (sent through our High Commission at New Delhi) declining the Iraqi invitation to send representatives on the grounds that it would not be practicable for us to be suitably represented.

A.H. Tange
(A.H. Tange)
Secretary.

[Signature]
E.A.M.E. BRANCH:
RHG:HMS

CONFIDENTIAL

PA: [Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

12th July, 1961.

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(A.H. Tange)
Secretary.

E.A.M.E. BRANCH:
RIG:HMS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

I. 17279

:JM

FROM:

Dated: 11th July, 1961
1150
Rec'd: 12th July, 1961
0830

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

372. CONFIDENTIAL.

Your telegram 353.

Iraqi independence celebrations. No such
intimation given.

Kelley.

MIN.&DEPT. E.A.(173/10/1).
P.M.'s.

12th July, 1961

SEC	A/Ss	UN	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA	E.A.F&ME	E
ME@	INF	C&P						

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Austcom
New Delhi

CONFIDENTIAL

Our 309. *Happy Independence Celebrations.*

Was any intimation given that we intended sending
goodwill message?


CONFIDENTIAL

10.7.61

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD TELETYPE MESSAGE.

CANBERRA 1915

FOR MIDDLE EAST SECTION FROM MELBOURNE

THANK YOU FOR YOUR NOTES ON IRAQ.

2. WE HAVE NOW HAD AN ENQUIRY FROM THE DRIED FRUITS BOARD, IN CONNECTION WITH MRS, NEIL'S VISIT, AS TO CORRECT ADDRESS OF THE IRAQI MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. PLEASE ADVISE IF IT IS STILL HASHIM JAWAD AND WAY TO ADDRESS HIM.

(CFM 1915)

ENES

1410 10 7 61

10/10

*His Excellency Mr Hashim Jawad,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Govt of the Republic of Iraq,*

EX-COMM BRANCH

1001 JUL 10 PM 2:15

Mumukshu to Commune
is Naddimal Zahawi

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD TELETYPE MESSAGE.

TO EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE MELBOURNE 1999,
FROM MIDDLE EAST SECTION EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
YOUR 1394.

173/10/1
101 JAN 10 AM 9:36

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON IRAQ TO MRS. NEIL.

WE SUGGEST SHE CONSULT STANDARD WORKS SUCH AS THE "STATESMAN"
YEAR BOOK" OR "WHITAKER'S ALMANAC" FOR DETAILS OF
GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION, GOVERNMENT, SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS, ECONOMY
ETC.

AUSTRALIA'S RELATIONS WITH IRAQ HAVE BEEN TRADITIONALLY
FRIENDLY, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO EVEN CLOSER ASSOCIATION AS
OPPORTUNITIES FOR MUTUAL CO-OPERATION DEVELOP

IN THE SPHERE OF TRADE, WE RECEIVE REGULAR IMPORTS OF DATES
FROM IRAQ, AND EXPORT SUCH COMMODITIES AS WHEAT, SOME WOOL
AND CHEESE.

IN RECENT YEARS, A LEADING FIRM OF AUSTRALIAN ARCHITECTS
HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN THE DESIGN AND SUPERVISION OF A NUMBER OF
HOSPITAL BUILDINGS IN IRAQ.

WITHIN THE PAST FEW YEARS, AUSTRALIA HAS BEEN GLAD TO WELCOME
FOUR SCHOLARS FROM IRAQ WHO HAVE COME HERE TO STUDY UNDER ARRANGE-
MENTS MADE BY VARIOUS UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES. THEIR STUDIES
HAVE BEEN IN THE FIELDS OF VETERINARY SCIENCE, LIBRARY ORGANI-
ZATION AND ROAD CONSTRUCTION: THE MOST RECENT IRAQI
SCHOLAR TO COME TO AUSTRALIA IS IN MAHMOUD AL-MAYOOF WHO HAS
STUDIED AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE. MR. AL-MAYOOF IS LEAVING
AUSTRALIA TO-DAY TO RETURN TO IRAQ.

See
T.A. House
file
2037/10/1
for details
[initials]

ENDS

(CFM 1999 1394)

ENDS 7.7.61. JM

PA [initials]

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD TELETYPE MESSAGE

CANBERRA 1394

FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY

=====

YOU HAVE PROBABLY READ IN THE NEWSPAPERS ABOUT A MRS. NEIL
OF MILDURA WHO HAS BEEN INVITED TO VISIT IRAQ+IRAQ AT T+++
AS THE GZZZ GUEST OF THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT. SHE HAS A
LARGE COLLECTION OF NATIONAL DOLLS AND WROTE TO IRAQ TO SEE
IF THEY COULD SUPPLY ONE FOR HER COLLECTION - THE INVITATION
TO VISIT THE COUNTRY RESULTED. SHE PLANS TO LEAVE EARLY
NEXT WEEK BY AIR.

AT THE MOMENT MRS NEIL IS STAYING IN MR. HOWSON'S
VELECTORATE WITH HER SON AND HAS APPROACHED MR HOWSON FOR
INFORMATION ON IRAQ. (HE IS IN PERTH AND HIS SECRETARY
HAS PAA+PASSED ON THE REQUEST TO US). ARE YOU ABLE
TO TELEPRINT URGENTLY SOME BACKGROUND FOR MRS. NEIL AS
SHE WISHES TO BE INFORMED BEFORE SHE LEAVES. APPARENTLY
THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT ASKED IN ONE OF THEIR LETER+LETER+LETTERS
WHAT AUSTRALIANS THOUGHT ABOUT IRAQ AND SHE THOUGHT IT WISER
TO AVOID A REPLY.

(CFM 1394)

ENDS 1130 7 7 61

EX. COMM. BRANCH

1001 JUL 7 11:59

Mr. Gilmour
Mr. Phillips

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *Melbourne Herald*

File No.

Published at

Date *7/7/61*

Grandma's dolls win trip to Irak

MILDURA, Today. — Mildura grandmother Mrs M. Neill is on her way to Irak as a guest of the Iraki Government — just because she collects dolls.



MRS M. NEILL

Mrs Neill, 60, started to collect dolls in national costume during the 1936 Olympic Games in Melbourne.

Since then she has collected 230 dolls, ranging in size from a few inches to three feet. Friends brought dolls back from overseas. She got others by writing to national leaders.

One came from Mr. Bulganin, then the Soviet Prime Minister, but now deposed.

SHE WROTE

Mrs Neill wanted an Iraki doll, and wrote to the Prime Minister of Irak, Gen. Kassem.

He sent her a doll, but it was broken on the way.

When Mrs Neill wrote explaining what happened, Iraki officials sent another doll, and asked her to send them a letter setting out some idea of what the average Australian thought of Irak.

But on Tuesday, before Mrs Neill could write the letter, she got a cable from the Iraki Foreign Minister, Hashim Jawad, inviting her to Bagdad on July 14 for Irak's national celebration day.

And yesterday Qantas told Mrs Neill that the Iraki Government had contacted them, and arranged for her to be flown to Irak at the Government's expense.

The Neill household at Cardross, in Mildura Shire, rushed to get her packed and ready yesterday, and she flew from Mildura to Melbourne, where Qantas officials are helping her with passport and taxation formalities.

Mrs Neill is the mother of four children, and grandmother of 12.

Until yesterday, she had never been in an aeroplane.

Australian / Iraqi Trade

1959/60

Aust. Exports £~~7.1~~^{7.1} (million)

(mainly wheat;

some wool

fruit & jellies

cheese

railway sleepers)

Iraqi Exports £24.000 - mainly dates

1960/2 April 61

Aust Exports £6.8 million

(i.e. a proportionate
increase over 50/100 figures)


9/7

Fora, EA + ME. 173/10/1

We have taken action
on paras 1-6.

Ch. Clark.

E.R.


Mr Phillips
dm



~~E.A.M.E.~~
to retain
CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

STRAND,

LONDON, W.C.2.

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

3/12/38

Memo No. 1071

21st June, 1961

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

I.C.A.O. Mission to Iraq

We refer to your memorandum No. 370 of 15th June (file 717/2), received on 19th, in which you seek urgently some guidance on the situation in Iraq from the point of view of the posting, as leader of the I.C.A.O. Mission, of a Civil Aviation officer (and his family) to Iraq.

2. With reference to the terms of your paragraph 3, we do not, of course, have the opportunity to report as fully on Iraq as would be desirable, but we have given the Department certain information on the situation in Iraq in the course of this year and this would be available in the appropriate sections of the Department (see for example specifically our memorandum No. 647 of 18th April as well as our Saving 285, etc.). There would also be available to the Department the Foreign Office prints, including the U.K. Ambassador's Review for 1960 which would provide valuable background.

3. However, we also took up your precise query with the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office yesterday when the following was obtained in person from Maynard. There are "thousands" of British subjects in Iraq, many with families, and there is no particular reason for qualms about their safety. The Foreign Office does not discourage Britishers from going there, nor does it feel any particular worry about its own officers sent there including those with families. In this sense it is unlike the Congo, say, where reservations are felt about conditions. So far as the political position is concerned, it must be recognised, in the Foreign Office view, that Qasim is a dictator and not a popular one, and that he will not last forever. Possibly his overthrow will come by violent means. A coup could occur at any time. At the moment if one came it would more likely be a Nationalist rather than a Communist coup, and the Communists who are not strong (and for that reason inclined to pro-Qasim sympathies) would be likely to be the main sufferers.

4. Maynard agreed that for obvious reasons of self-interest the leaders of military coups these days generally like to try to keep their international record with the United Nations and so on clean, so that a mission from I.C.A.O., for example, would be unlikely to be a particular target of hostility.

5. We also asked Maynard how the British community actually fared in the Qasim coup itself recalling the ugly situations reported at that time. He said that at that time the British were unpopular for various reasons, but the situation is now different. During the Qasim

CONFIDENTIAL...2 *Phan*

*see
File 173/2/1.
These reports
taken into
account in
political assessment
passed to E.A.
at their request
prior to
moving to
London*

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

coup one Britisher was killed by a stray bullet, but there was a certain hazard of this kind in any such circumstances.

6. Maynard also said that no special advice was given by the Foreign Office to U.K. officials taking up such appointments as you describe. We ourselves feel, further, that the U.K. Post Report on Baghdad may be of assistance to you in your enquiry and we are proposing to obtain a copy from the Personnel Department of the Foreign Office and forward it to you later.

7. While on the subject of Iraq we enclose cutting from the "Times" of 20th June about the ending of the deadlock between the Iraq Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company (see our memorandum 647). Maynard had not yet seen any official reports on this but had no reason to doubt the accuracy of the attached report. This item will of course be of more direct interest to the political sections of the Department and we are including it here both as a matter of convenience and for such relevance as it may have to your enquiry.

8. We are informing the Civil Aviation Liaison Officer here of the above and sending a copy of this memorandum to Washington also.

(H. Marshall)

for Senior External Affairs Representative.

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAQ OIL TALKS TO BE RESUMED AFTER 4-MONTH DEADLOCK

From Our Correspondent

BAGHDAD, JUNE 19

The deadlock in the negotiations between the Iraq Government and the Iraq Petroleum Company and its two associates, Basra Petroleum and Mosul Petroleum Company, has ended after four months. I.P.C. has accepted the demand by Iraq that the recovery of "dead rents" be discontinued. I.P.C. paid the rents to Iraq while they tapped territories for oil pending arbitration.

The state-owned Iraq news agency, quoting an official source at the Iraq Oil Ministry, today said I.P.C. had agreed by letter to cease rent recoveries from January 1, 1960. I.P.C., the agency said, had formed a new negotiating team and negotiations were expected to resume in August.

TEAMS BARRED

The negotiations broke down on April 6 on the dead rents issue. General Kassim, the Prime Minister, then refused to discuss the other oil problems and ordered the I.P.C. exploration teams back to base. The agency did not say whether the exploration teams will now be permitted to resume their activities, nor did it name the arbitrators to whom General Kassim has promised to submit the dead rents case.

The oil companies have so far recovered 50 per cent of the rentals, which were being paid back in annual instalments. General Kassim has given a pledge to stand by the verdict of arbitration on the matter.

The agency added that there were other letters from oil companies which the Iraq side was studying "in order to secure Iraq's rights and to prevent abuse of its just demands".

The other issues mentioned in the Oil Ministry's statement after the breakdown of the talks will be tackled when negotiations are resumed in August. These are:

The calculation of oil production costs, methods of fixing prices, and the abrogation of the discount to the oil companies.

The appointment of Iraqi directors, and Iraq supervision of companies' expenses, and the gradual handover of posts to Iraqi staff.

Relinquishment of unexploited territories, allowing Iraq to use the natural gas which the companies are now, it is alleged, wasting, and using Iraqi tankers to carry the oil.

Actual participation by at least twenty per cent in the companies' capital, increasing Iraq's share in oil revenues, and the payment of revenue in convertible currency.

Removal of injustices caused to Iraq by the unfairness and vagueness of the present oil agreements.

OPEC INTEREST

The oil companies have thus averted possible concerted action by the potentially powerful Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, which at its recent meeting in Geneva heard Iraq's dispute with I.P.C. In appointing new negotiators, I.P.C. seems to have made a fresh start in the three-year-old negotiations which have been several times interrupted by alleged plots and other disturbances.

A spokesman for the Iraq Petroleum Company yesterday confirmed that Mr. G. H. Herridge, managing director of the Iraq Petroleum group of companies, had written to the Prime Minister of Iraq suggesting that it would be in the interest of both parties to resume talks.

The company has also nominated a representative group of negotiators who are ready to go to Baghdad. They are led by Mr. H. W. Fisher, a director of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and include Mr. F. J. Stephens, chairman-designate of the Shell Company and at present managing director of the Royal Dutch Shell group.

The company has agreed in writing to a settlement of the "dead rents" issue on which the talks broke down in April and further proposals have been made in writing, the spokesman said.

Times

20/6/61

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

RESTRICTED

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

EHB

0.9281

Sent: 13th June, 1961
1520

TO:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

309 RESTRICTED

Iraq Revolution Anniversary.

Your memorandum 668.

Please advise Iraqi Ambassador regret it will not be practicable for Australia to send suitable representative to 1961 Anniversary. For your information message of goodwill in name of Minister will be sent.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (173/10/1)
P.M's

(Cost - £2.15.0)
14th June, 1961

SEC A/Ss UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME@ E
ME INF C&P

*Mr Phillips - no doubt you have found I
we can prepare it any time as I doubt if
Ministerial clearance will be needed.*

dm

RESTRICTED

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

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14th June, 1961

SEC	A/Ss	UN	PAC&AM	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA	E.AF&ME@	E
ME	INF	C&P						

AUSTCOM

NEW DELHI

RESTRICTED

Iraq. Revolution anniversary.

Your memo. 668.

Please advise Iraqi Ambassador
it will not be practicable for Australia to
regret/~~Australia unable~~ be suitably represented at 1961
Anniversary. For your information ^{available} a message of goodwill
in name of Minister will be sent.

RESTRICTED

13/6/1961

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No 173/10/1

DATE 8th June, 1961

SUBJECT

ANNIVERSARY OF THE IRAQI REVOLUTION: INVITATION
TO AUSTRALIA TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES.

FOR The Minister

We have received an invitation, through our High Commission in New Delhi, to send two representatives to the ceremonies commemorating the third anniversary of the Iraqi Revolution on 14th July.

2. You agreed that Mr. Crocker should represent Australia at the second anniversary celebrations last year. On the occasion of the first anniversary we were represented by the United Kingdom Ambassador in Baghdad.

3. Mr. Crocker reported that General Kassem and his associates were clearly pleased by Australia's representation last year. He also sent us a useful account of his visit, which gave us a first-hand impression of Kassem's regime and its prospects.

4. ~~question whether~~ The same considerations prompt the ~~recommendation~~ that we send a representative to this year's celebrations.

Recommendation:

5. We should prefer not to impose on Mr. Crocker again if possible. But our Ambassador in Cairo, Mr. Quinn, would hardly be suitable in view of the strained relations between Iraq and the UAR; also his appointment would mean temporarily leaving a Third Secretary in charge of the mission. Our High Commissioner in Karachi, Mr. A.R. Cutler, V.C., will not be available. For various reasons, other candidates are also not available.

6. I recommend that we inform the Iraqis that it will not be practicable for Australia to be suitably represented at the 1961 anniversary; and that we send a suitable message of goodwill in the name of the Minister.

A. H. Tange
(A. H. Tange)
Secretary.

EAFFE.

PA

↓
M. Rowland
dm *km*

→ m. Hill
13/6/61

Mr Phillips
dm 1/2

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No. _____

DATE _____

SUBJECT

Ivagi Celebrations =
Represented by UK

1) Mr Hill 18/9/6
FOR

No, I think a message
alone wd be better,
a reflection — we
do not want to
appear to drag to
the skirts too
much.

To you ✓

2) Mr Phillips

wd you please think about
the message, when it
not go? July 14 is the
day? Terms will need a little
thought —

→ Mr Phillips
No I think not.

Mr Arnold
Pls. see recommendation -
is UK representative or our
representative in addition?
to 8/6/61
he/half

173/10/1

8th June, 1961

ANNIVERSARY OF THE IRAQI REVOLUTION: INVITATION
TO AUSTRALIA TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES.

The Minister

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4. ~~recommending~~ The same considerations prompt the recommendation that we send a representative to this year's celebrations.

Recommendation:

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6. I recommend that we inform the Iraqis that it will not be practicable for Australia to be suitably represented at the 1961 anniversary; and that we send a suitable message of goodwill in the name of the Minister.

Orig. with Minute s/c
9/

A.H.
(A. H. Tange)
Secretary.

→

EFME.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

RESTRICTED

FILE No. 173/10/1

DATE 6th June, 1961

SUBJECT ANNIVERSARY OF THE IRAQ REVOLUTION.

FOR The Secretary :

In connection with the attached submission, your exchange of correspondence with Mr. Crocker is attached.

2. We have come down in favour of giving him the option of going himself, or of sending Mr. Kevin Kelly. The latter is not a Head of Mission, but we do not think this a decisive objection, especially if the alternative is not to be represented at all.

3. Mr. Quinn would give us a useful report, but we have thought it best not to approach him, for the two reasons indicated in the submission to the Minister. Mr. McClure Smith would be another possibility, but asked to be excused from the Somalia celebrations last year on medical advice, since he could not stand extreme heat.

4. Mr. Shann might go, especially given Mr. Furlonger's presence in London. But if it were a choice between his going to Iraq or making an African tour, we should prefer that he did the latter.

5. There are funds for representation either from London or New Delhi. *Administration, and CrP, and SISEA*
Branches have been consulted.


(E. C. Hill)Assistant Secretary.EAME
JRR.

RESTRICTED

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No. 173/10/1

DATE 6th June, 1961

SUBJECT ANNIVERSARY OF THE IRAQI REVOLUTION : INVITATION TO AUSTRALIA TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES.

FOR The Minister
(Through the Secretary)

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4. The same considerations prompt the recommendation that we send a representative to this year's celebrations.

Recommendation

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6. It is, therefore, recommended that Mr. Crocker be given the option of attending the celebrations again himself or of sending his Counsellor, Mr. K. T. Kelly. A draft telegram in this sense is attached.

B. C. Hill
(B. C. HILL)
Assistant Secretary

*not
Arc /*

*6. I recommend
that, ~~as the~~ we
inform the Iraqi
that it will not be
practicable for him
to be suitably represented
at the 1961 anniversary;
and that we send a
suitable message of
goodwill as from the
in the name of the
Minister.*

EAME
LEP:JRR

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CABLEGRAM FOR DESPATCH

Austoom, NEW DELHI

RESTRICTED

CODED BY.....
 TIME SENT.....
 GROUPS.....
 COST.....
 TYPED BY.....

DISTRIBUTION

ADDRESS

Serial No.....Classification RESTRICTED.....

For Crocker from Tange

ANNIVERSARY OF IRAQ REVOLUTION.

1. Minister has approved Australian representation
 at celebrations.

2. Other possibilities having been examined we are
 obliged to ask you if you would be prepared to go to
 Baghdad again. But if you do not wish to make the
 journey glad if Kelly could attend.

COPIES

SECRETARY.....
 A.S. (DIV. 1).....
 A.S. (DIV. 2).....
 A.S. (DIV. 3).....
 A.S. (DIV. 4).....
 L. & T. (DIV. 5).....
 U.N. TA ER CR.....
 PAC & AM EA AM & SP.....
 S & SEA SA SEA.....
 E. AF & ME E AF & ME.....
 INF DL MT.....
 C & P.....
 ANT.....
 ADMIN PERS PROP.....
 FIN TRAV.....
 EX. COMMS.....

AUTHORIZED BY.....

E.A. FILE NO. 173/10/1

DATE 6/6/1961

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

173/10/1

6th June, 1961

Mr. Crocker

ANNIVERSARY OF THE IRAQ REVOLUTION.

The Secretary :

*Sent to
Secretary.*

HA

6/6/61

Mr. Kelly

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B. C. Hill
(B. C. Hill)

Assistant Secretary.

EAME
JRR.

RESTRICTED

173/10/1

6th June, 1961

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(B. C. Hill)
Assistant Secretary

NAME
LEF.JHR

→ Mr Phillips To say 1/6
dm

RESTRICTED

Austcom, NEW DELHI

RESTRICTED

For Crocker from Tange

ANNIVERSARY OF IRAQ REVOLUTION.

1. Minister has approved Australian representation at celebrations.
2. Other possibilities having been examined we are obliged to ask you if you would be prepared to go to Baghdad again. But if you do not wish to make the journey glad if Kelly could attend.

173/10/1

RESTRICTED

6/6/1961

CONFIDENTIAL

SEC.69/61

2nd June, 1961

Many thanks for your letter of May 26th about the invitation from the Iraqi Government, which I have just opened.

I think representation may prove to be a problem: we have other commitments for Cutler and Kevin during July. I am rather undecided about the desirability of sending Quinn from Cairo, but will see what our Departmental people think about it. I certainly would not want to impose this upon you again if it is avoidable - much as we appreciated your vivid despatch on the last occasion which I re-read only the other day.

I will try to get an official reply to you before the 10th June.

at
(A. H. Tange)
Secretary

His Excellency Mr. W. R. Crocker, C.B.E.,
Australian High Commissioner,
NEW DELHI.

→ *unreliable*
407

Mr D = 1 think

① ~~Cutler cannot~~
~~offer~~ Offer Cutler the
option first

② *Thomas Maclean Smith*

*Subcommittee to Min. accordingly - but then need go into
the other candidates in detail -
maybe consult for Secy discussing why not Quinn etc*

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

2 JUN 1961

CANBERRA

RECEIVED 2/6/61
AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
NEW DELHI

In reply quote No.
Memorandum No. 26 - 7 - 61

My dear Tange,

We have sent off in today's bag an invitation from the Iraqi Govt to send ^{Australian} two representatives to the Iraqi National Revolution celebrations 14-21 July.

I have also had a personal message from the Foreign Minister who says, *inter alia*, that he hopes that I will be coming again.

As I have made no comment on the Iraqi invitation in my covering memo to the Dept I might venture an opinion or two hereunder, for whatever they are worth:-

So long as Karsem's regime holds we are likely to receive these invitations each year. It will not be necessary to send a rep. each year but it would be politic to send one as often as we can manage, partly because having no mission in Iraq we can in this way show the Australian flag under inexpensive yet acceptable circumstances, and partly because Karsem having now taken a firm line against the Communists can be shown our good will.

But it is not necessary to send 2 representatives.

As for whom to send, Quinn being in the Middle East is in the region so to speak. But I suppose that the animosity between Karsem & Kasser would not make an Ambassador from Cairo very acceptable. And given the

P. H. O. →

2
Iraqi feelings towards Israel, McMillan would be up against
a similar situation. Cutler, on the other hand, is ~~just~~
about as near to Baghdad as either of the preceding, his region
is germane to Iraq, Iraqi - Pakistan relations are reasonably
good, and Cutler would be equally acceptable in other ways.

If, however, Cutler has any difficulties about getting
away and you would like me to go as the Aust. rep.
again I would be willing to go, though not particularly keen.

In any case the Iraqi ^{Ambassador} ~~govt~~ has asked on behalf
of his Govt for an early reply as considerable work in the
way of arrangements, accommodation, etc is required.
I told him I would try to let him know by or before 10 June.

Yours sincerely,

R. Crocker



DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

29 MAY 1961

173/10/1

CANBERRA

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

In reply quote No. 221/3/1/11

Memorandum No. 668

26 May, 1961.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

ANNIVERSARY OF THE IRAQ REVOLUTION : INVITATION

... I forward herewith an invitation from the
Government of Iraq sent through the Iraqi Embassy in Delhi
to the Australian Government to send two delegates to attend
the first week of the celebrations beginning from 14 July.

W.R. Crocker

(W.R. Crocker)
High Commissioner.

NO:5/9/1243

MAY 22, 1961.-

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq present their compliments to the Office of the High Commissioner for Australia and have the honour to state that on the occasion of the 3rd Anniversary of the Iraqi Revolution of July 14, the Embassy have great pleasure in extending in the name of the Government of the Republic of Iraq, the cordial invitation to the esteemed Government of Australia, and request them to name two delegates to attend the first week celebrations to take place in Iraq on this happy occasion, beginning from 14th July, 1961. The two delegates will be the state guests of the Republic of Iraq during these celebrations.

1/5
The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq should be grateful if the esteemed Embassy could intimate the names of the delegates before 1st July, 1961. The delegates are kindly requested to arrive in Baghdad a day or two ahead of the celebrations.

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq take the opportunity to renew the assurances of their highest consideration.



Office of the High Commissioner for Australia,
New Delhi.



↓
of General Kassem's regime, and any strengthening of Western
influence in them would be desirable;

Mr Hall

to Mr Anderson a
chaggy block 24/

→ The following 21/1
Please file with pps
(Am. May 21/1)

/2....

RESTRICTED

7



AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

In reply quote No. 221/9/1/11
Memorandum No. 668

26 May, 1961.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

ANNIVERSARY OF THE IRAQ REVOLUTION : INVITATION

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I forward herewith an invitation from the Government of Iraq sent through the Iraqi Embassy in Delhi to the Australian Government to send two delegates to attend the first week of the celebrations beginning from 14 July.

W. R. CROCKER

(W.R. Crocker)
High Commissioner.

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

24th April, 1961

....

I am enclosing a copy of the Crocker
despatch on Iraq which I mentioned when we last met.

A. H. TANGE

(A. H. Tange)
Secretary

Major-General T.J. Daly, C.B.E., D.S.O.,
Adjutant-General,
Department of the Army,
CANBERRA.

A possible explanation is
that despatch was
not remembered by Mr
Daly, and Records may
have not regarded it as
a despatch.

21 branch name
has been
25/4

Mr. Hall
I assume you will wish
to place the papers relevant
to this despatch on the
Iraq file in MO Section. The
despatch. H3 26/4
It is assumed that the
despatch is in the despatch
after it has been received.

Mr. Hall
The Despatch was
not received in
Mr. Bell and therefore
did not appear in
Daly's report. This
is a pity. It is now
much too late to
(9 months afterwards)
start of year and with
to become possible
to see despatches
#42
4

Despatched:
RHS 24/4

→ Mr. Marshall
File. 2 despatches

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) The Iraqi armed services are regarded as the mainstay

of General Kassem's regime, and any strengthening of Western

influence in them would be desirable;

Mr. Hall

to Mr Anderson a
chopping block 24/

21/1
Please file with PPs
(Am. may well be?)

/2. . . .

RESTRICTED

⑦

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Secretary: "A Unit to diag."

You asked to
see the despatch (from
Mr Crocker - dated 22-7-60)

As this is the
only copy in the Department
do you wish to have
a photographic copy
made. H 17/4

Secretary: Copy
collected. H 18/4.

RESTRICTED

676/2

file 173/10/1

The Secretary,
Department of Defence,
CANBERRA.

POSSIBLE INTEREST BY IRAQ IN MILITARY TRAINING IN AUSTRALIA.

Thank you for your memorandum of the 6th January, 1961,
on this subject. We have also received an independent approach
from the United Kingdom High Commission here.

2. Our comments from the External Affairs point of view
are the following :-

3. Politically, there is some case for making at least
for
a token gesture by accepting one or two Iraqis ~~for~~ training
in Australia. The main points in favour are :

(a) Since the 1958 revolution, Iraq has been under considerable

Soviet pressure and has been receptive to Communist bloc
influences. The present enquiry, however, supports other
indications of growing Iraqi disillusionment with Communist
assistance. Such disillusionment deserves encouragement;

(b) The Iraqi armed services are regarded as the mainstay
of General Kassem's regime, and any strengthening of Western
influence in them would be desirable;

↓
Mr. Hall

To Mr Anderson a
chaggy block 24/

→ Mr. Hall 25/1
Please file with pps
(Mr. May rel.?)

/2....

⑦

RESTRICTED

(c) Since the Iraqis do not wish to rely solely on the U.S. and U.K., the number of other Western countries to which they can turn for training is limited.

4. As to paragraph 3(c) of your memorandum, we feel that the U.K. authorities, through their Embassy in Bagdad, and their longstanding connections with the Iraq armed forces, should be able adequately to check the educational and linguistic qualifications of any Iraqi nominees.

5. As regards paragraph 3(d) we feel that there need not be much difficulty about refusing possible future applications from other Middle Eastern countries, if Iraqi applicants were accepted. We do not anticipate receiving such requests, but if we did, we feel that Iraq could be treated on their merits.

6. We agree, however, with the order of priorities for training in Australian service establishments indicated in paragraph 3(a) of your memorandum, and feel that other Commonwealth countries, including new African countries like Nigeria, the U.S., and South East Asian countries should receive priority over Iraq. We also think that there is much in the view in your paragraph 3(b) that spare capacity is best kept to meet anticipated demands for these countries.

/s . . .

RESTRICTED

7. In summary, therefore, we agree that the proposal should receive a relatively low priority, and if, after examination of available training capacity, you feel that it should be discouraged, we should have no objection.

Secretary.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

173/10/1

JT

I.1322

Dated: 17th January, 1961.

1236

Rec'd: 18th January, 1961.

0830

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

215. UNCLASSIFIED.

Application lodged Prague by Hussain Abdul Razzak Nuri born Baghdad 21st August, 1934 Iraqi national for three weeks business visa. Subject is General Secretary of the International Union of Students and wishes to attend annual meeting National Union of Australian University Students at Armidale N.S.W. from February 13th to February 24th. Holds letter from International Vice-President of N.U.A.U.S. to President of I.U.S. inviting representative to attend to assist in discussion of former unions policy towards latter. Applicant wishes leave Prague February 2nd to attend U.A.R. Students Congress, Cairo en route to Australia.

Please advise.

IMMIGRATION
A.S.I.O.(M)
P.M'.S.

18th January, 1961.

E.AF&ME

C&P

action

↓
Mr. [Signature]

→ Mr. [Signature] 21/1 [Signature]

Q

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

203/11/52

File No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Mr. H. K. Matthews, M.B.E., Counsellor, U.K. High Commission

on 5th January, 1961

Officers Present Mr. J. R. Rowland

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

- (i) Iraq
- (ii) Sudan

(i) Iraq

Mr. Matthews said that he had just written a letter to Mr. Herde in the Prime Minister's Department, passing on, at London's request, an inquiry from the Iraqi military authorities whether any places at Australian military training establishments could be found for members of the Iraqi forces. (I gathered that a few places for young officers at a place like Queenscliff were what the Iraqis had in mind). The U.K. saw considerable advantages in enabling Iraq to maintain the traditional British connection with its armed forces, and hoped that we might be able to do something to help: they were also approaching Canada.

2. Mr. Matthews said that he thought it possible that Mr. Costar might call on Mr. Moodie shortly to discuss this request.

3. I said that I would not, of course, make any official comment until we had seen the terms of the request. As an off-hand personal reaction, however, I thought that, although we saw the advantages of maintaining the British connection with the Iraqi armed forces, we had not (I thought) previously had anyone from a Middle Eastern country at our military training establishments, so that the Iraqi request would involve a precedent. I thought that one comment that was likely to be made here was that Iraq was rather outside our area, especially as we had had a tentative sounding from the Nigerians, and we might think it important that any spare places which did not go to Malaya or other South East Asian countries should go to Commonwealth countries, perhaps including those in Africa. I emphasized that these were purely personal and off the cuff comments.

(ii) Sudan

4. Mr. Matthews said that his information from London indicated that some concern was being felt there about events in the Sudan and General Abboud's recent flirtations with the Russians about the supply of Soviet arms and Soviet economic aid. London thought it possible that this move on the part of General Abboud might be motivated by his proclaimed desire to hold an election and return to Parliamentary Government: he might be looking for concrete achievements which he could point to as a means of strengthening his own electoral position. The provision of Soviet aid could be presented as such an achievement.

5. I commented that the State Department was also evidently somewhat concerned about what was happening in the Sudan, to judge from our recent reports from Washington, and I briefly described the action under PL480 which has been the subject of recent telegrams from Washington.

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Antarctic Division

FOLLOWING POSTS:

LONDON

WASHINGTON

CAIRO

Report prepared by

(J. R. Rowland)

ACTION:

3825/58.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

30/11/56

File No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Mr. H. R. Matthews, M.B.E., Counsellor, U.K. High Commissionon 24th January, 1961Officers Present: Mr. J. R. Neilson

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

- (1) Iraq
(11) Sudan

(1) Iraq

Mr. Matthews said that he had just written a letter to Mr. Neale in the Prime Minister's Department, passing on, at London's request, an inquiry from the Iraqi military authorities whether any places at Australian military training establishments could be found for members of the Iraqi forces. (I gathered that a few places for young officers at a place like Queenscliff were what the Iraqis had in mind). The U.K. saw considerable advantages in enabling Iraq to maintain the traditional British connection with its armed forces, and hoped that we might be able to do something to help: they were also approaching Canada.

2. Mr. Matthews said that he thought it possible that Mr. Foster might call on Mr. Neale shortly to discuss this request.

3. I said that I would not, of course, make any official comment until we had seen the terms of the request. As an off-hand personal reaction, however, I thought that, although we saw the advantages of maintaining the British connection with the Iraqi armed forces, we had not (I thought) previously had anyone from a Middle Eastern country at our military training establishments, so that the Iraqi request would involve a precedent. I thought that our comment that was likely to be made here was that Iraq was rather outside our area, especially as we had had a tentative sounding from the Nigerians, and we might think it important that any spare places which did not go to Malaya or other South East Asian countries should go to Commonwealth countries, perhaps including those in Africa. I emphasized that these were purely personal and off the cuff comments.

(11) Sudan

4. Mr. Matthews said that his information from London indicated that some concern was being felt there about events in the Sudan and General Aboud's recent flirtations with the Russians about the supply of Soviet arms and Soviet economic aid. London thought it possible that this was on the part of General Aboud might be motivated by his proclaimed desire to hold an election and return to Parliamentary Government: he might be looking for concrete achievements which he could point to as a means of strengthening his own electoral position. The provision of Soviet aid could be presented as such an achievement.

5. I commented that the State Department was also evidently somewhat concerned about what was happening in the Sudan, to judge from our recent reports from Washington, and I briefly described the action under NASS which has been the subject of recent telegrams from Washington.

DISTRIBUTION:

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Com. Rel.

Sydney Office

Inf. Br.

Ex. Comms. Br.

Melbourne Office

Antarctic Division

FOLLOWING POSTS:

LONDON

WASHINGTON

CAIRO

Report prepared by (J. R. Neilson)

ACTION:

3825/56

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM **CONFIDENTIAL**

:SRT

I.29783

Dated: 13th December, 1960.
1920

FROM:

Rec'd; 14th December, 1960.
1420

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

UN.1592

CONFIDENTIAL.

Visits to New Guinea.

You might like to consider the possibility of inviting Pachachi (Permanent Representative of Iraq) and perhaps his wife to visit New Guinea between the adjourned and resumed sessions. He is the Chairman of the Fourth Committee which will have on its Agenda at the resumed session the report of the Trusteeship Council. He is of course, anti-Colonialist in outlook but has been a good Chairman and has cast some independent votes. He would be in a position to help us in committee next March. In this case the purpose of his visit would not be a seminar. He might be told we wanted him, as chairman of Fourth Committee to talk with officers of the New Guinea administration at headquarters and in the field about the United Nations. It would be useful if Toogood accompanied him for part of the time in New Guinea.

2. If you see merit in this it would be wise to approach Pachachi here before the session ends. You might suggest a suitable time and length for visit. It is assumed fares to and from New Guinea would be paid by Australia.

Pligsoll.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. TERRITORIES
P.M.'s

SEC A/Ss MR. EASTMAN UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SEAC
E.AF&ME E ME INF C&P
G.

*UN consulted me about this man
but we had no material on him*

↓
173/10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1. The question of who ^{EGD/os} controls Iraq has been a largely one of semantics. There is a clique within the Army which the country because Kassem cannot survive without their armed support.

MEMORANDUM NO. 860/60 20th September, 1960

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

orig. on 173/2/1

IRAQ

(Reference your Memorandum
465 of 11th August, File 173/10/1)

On 13th September we spoke to Mr. Walstrom (Officer in Charge, Iraq - Jordan Affairs) regarding Kassem's present position and the stability of his regime. Without any prompting, Walstrom gave us an account corresponding almost exactly to that in paragraph 2 of our telegram 1872. Walstrom said that, apart from those Army officers closely associated with him, most Iraqis were convinced that Kassem's regime would pass, and they were just waiting for the day when this would occur in the hope that better times might follow. Walstrom emphasised that, because of the lack of unity amongst the opposition, it might be a long time before Kassem actually fell.

2. Walstrom said that one important factor was that Kassem now seemed to have lost the ability to sway the Iraqi masses. He might be unable to reply on his former popular appeal to save himself in the event of difficulties.

3. Mr. Crocker conveys much the same impression in paragraph 2 of his despatch on his visit to Iraq, where he says that Kassem's hold might be too weak to sustain the myths about him, and might prove unequal in the next year or so to withstanding the factions and tensions within Iraq. From this point of view we can see considerable similarity between the State Department views as we have reported them and those of Mr. Crocker.

4. The main difference between Mr. Crocker's views and those of the State Department (as we understand them) is perhaps in regard to the real repository of power in Iraq. In paragraph 2 of his despatch Mr. Crocker suggests that the Army, or a group in the Army, is in the saddle, rather than Kassem himself. The State Department would probably agree with this assessment to the extent that Kassem could not remain in power without the support of arms provided by the Army. Walstrom commented to us, however, that despite the decline in his popularity, Kassem was still a force to be reckoned with. First, whether through devotion to him or through apathy, no one in the Army clique surrounding him seemed prepared to defy or attempt to displace him. Second, as he had learnt more of the requirements and difficulties of his job, Kassem had concentrated more and more responsibility in his own hands. The situation, therefore, was (and had so been for the past year or so) that no decision was possible without reference to Kassem, who therefore constituted a complete bottle-neck in the Iraqi governmental and administrative machine. The most disastrous effect of this was in the economic sphere, where large-scale stagnation now existed, being reduced to almost complete dependence on its income from oil. Walstrom added, however, that because of the Iraqi people's stoical make-up and the receipts from oil sales, the Iraqi economy could suffer much havoc before the people would be provoked into revolt.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

5. The question of who really controls Iraq thus seems to be largely one of semantics. Does a clique within the Army control the country because Kassem cannot survive without ~~their~~ armed support? Or does Kassem control the country because no one will actively defy him and no decisions can be made except by him?

B. G.
(B. G. Dexter)
FIRST SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL



AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

In reply quote No. 9/1/2

Memorandum No. 1133

6th August, 1960

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

IRAQ

*shows a repeat of
del. 301 of 6th July*

Reference your telegram No. 328 of 31st July,
1960, which gave me instructions for my visit to Iraq, this
telegram did not reach New Delhi until about 11 days after
I had got back from Iraq.

2. *on 20/7* Whatever the cause of the delay I regret it
as the directions given therein would have been helpful to me.

W.R. Crocker

(W.R. Crocker)
High Commissioner.

Seen Jan 7/

*Lump
29/8*

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

173/18/1

The Senior External Affairs Representative,
Australia House,
LONDON.

16th August, 1960.

510

The Australian Legation,
TEL AVIV.

Memorandum No. 112.

The Australian Legation,
CAIRO.

Memorandum No. 223

IRAC.

On 10th June, 1960, the Iraq Embassy in New Delhi sent a note to our High Commission there extending in the name of the Government of the Republic of Iraq an invitation to the Australian Government to send two delegates to attend the first week of the celebrations on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Iraq revolution.

2. Mr. Crocker attended the celebrations as the representative of Australia, spending a week in Baghdad and two days in Teheran on the way there.

3. A copy of his report is attached for your information.

Lubb

(T. V. Holland)
for the Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

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173/10/1

The Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

11th August, 1960.

u65

IRAQ.

On 10th June, 1960, the Iraq Embassy in New Delhi sent a note to our High Commission there extending in the name of the Government of Iraq an invitation to the Australian Government to send two delegates to attend the first week of the celebrations on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Iraq revolution. Mr. Crocker represented Australia at the celebrations, spending a week in Baghdad and two days in Teheran on the way there. A copy of his report on this visit is attached for your information.

2. His impressions seem to be at variance with the views expressed in your telegram No. 1872, paragraph 2. Any further information you could obtain on Kassem's position and the stability of his regime would be appreciated.

~~reply in 20~~

B. C. Hill
(B. C. Hill)
for the Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

Seen PRH
23/8/60


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SEC.132/60


12th August, 1960

I should tell you that I have just had
back from Mr. Menzies your Despatch of July 22nd on
"A Visit to Iraq" with his notation upon it - "This
is a fascinating report".


(A. H. Tange)
Secretary

His Excellency Mr. W. R. Crocker, C.B.E.,
Australian High Commissioner,
NEW DELHI

→ Mr Holland


6613/8

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE No 173/10/1

DATE 9th August, 1960

SUBJECT

MR. CROCKER'S VISIT TO IRAQ.

FOR The Minister

(For information)

On 10th June, 1960, the Iraq Embassy in New Delhi sent a note to our High Commission there extending in the name of the Government of the Republic of Iraq an invitation to the Australian Government to send two delegates to attend the first week of the celebrations on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Iraq revolution. You approved that Mr. Crocker should be asked if he could represent Australia at the celebrations. He spent a week in Baghdad and two days in Teheran on the way there.

2. He has now forwarded an interesting report on his visit (attached). Significant points from his report are :

- (a) The army rather than General Qassim is in the saddle; he is in office partly on his own merits and partly because he is acceptable as the lowest common denominator to the army and to Iraq as a whole.
- (b) Qassim left an impression of decency and energy, but he may not have the ruthlessness or mental nimbleness to control a situation as difficult as that in Iraq. He insists that his regime is temporary, and that when conditions permit he will have a constitution drafted, call for elections, and step down.
- (c) Though the present regime is referred to in official propaganda as "the Revolution" there is in practice nothing revolutionary about it. Its socio-economic policy might be compared to that of Sir Thomas Playford, mutatis mutandis; it is a mild Labour Party policy with some industrialization (offering good terms for foreign capital).
- (d) In foreign policy the Government places the Arab world first in its thinking (its two main aims being the destruction of Israel and the elimination of French rule in Algeria), but at the same time it does not want Iraq to lose its identity in a larger Arab state. It has little respect for either the United States or the Soviet Union. Soviet equipment and technical advisers have proved of mediocre quality. In spite of anger over Suez, dismay over Israel, and hatred for Nuri es-Said and the Hashemites, the most respected foreigners are the British, particularly in military circles.
- (e) All the members of the diplomatic corps in Baghdad whom Mr. Crocker met spoke well of the Iraqis.

*This is a
fascinating
report*

*Klem
11/8/60.*

*Report has been seen by
C&P, I.C., E.R., Eur.*

/2. . . .

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

- (f) Qassim and his associates were manifestly pleased that Australia had sent a representative to the celebrations.
- (g) There is a noticeable contrast between conditions in Iraq and those in Iran, in favour of the former.

Chh.

R. L. Harry
(R. L. Harry)

Assistant Secretary, Division 11.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

9th August, 1960

MR. CROCKER'S VISIT TO IRAQ.

The Minister

(For information)

On 10th June, 1960, the Iraq Embassy in New Delhi sent a note to our High Commission there extending in the name of the Government of the Republic of Iraq an invitation to the Australian Government to send two delegates to attend the first week of the celebrations on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Iraq revolution. You approved that Mr. Crocker should be asked if he could represent Australia at the celebrations. He spent a week in Baghdad and two days in Teheran on the way there.

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- (c) Though the present regime is referred to in official propaganda as "the Revolution" there is in practice nothing revolutionary about it. Its socio-economic policy might be compared to that of Sir Thomas Playford, *mutatis mutandis*; it is a mild Labour Party policy with some industrialization (offering good terms for foreign capital).
- (d) In foreign policy the Government places the Arab world first in its thinking (its two main aims being the destruction of Israel and the elimination of French rule in Algeria), but at the same time it does not want Iraq to lose its identity in a larger Arab state. It has little respect for either the United States or the Soviet Union. Soviet equipment and technical advisers have proved of mediocre quality. In spite of anger over Suez, dismay over Israel, and hatred for Nuri es-Said and the Hashemites, the most respected foreigners are the British, particularly in military circles.
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/2. . . .

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

- (f) Qasim and his associates were manifestly pleased that Australia had sent a representative to the celebrations.
- (g) There is a noticeable contrast between conditions in Iraq and those in Iran, in favour of the former.

(R. L. Harry)

Assistant Secretary, Division 11.

CONFIDENTIAL



File 173/10

22nd July 1960

Sir,

A VISIT TO IRAQ

I have the honour to report that in compliance with your instructions I visited Baghdad as the Special Representative of Australia at the celebrations of the Iraqi National Revolution, or, to give the occasion its official designation, the Second Anniversary of the Glorious July 14 Revolution.

2. The main conclusions I drew from my week in Baghdad are best summarized at once:- The Army (or, more likely, a group in the Army) rather than General Qasim (sometimes spelt Kassem) is in the saddle. General Qasim is in office partly by virtue of his own merits but also perhaps as much by virtue of the fact that he is acceptable as the lowest common denominator to the Army itself and to Iraq at large. His hold, however, may be too weak to sustain the myths about him which have been built up by propaganda in Iraq; in the next year or so it may prove unequal to withstanding the factions and the tensions which leave Iraq in a state of unstable equilibrium. The Army itself is subject to these factions and tensions. The two great points of debate are, firstly, Iraq's relation to the theme of Arab Federation, which in practice often means the theme of uniting with U.A.R. under Nasser and in any case is, like the contemporary form of Pan Arab nationalism, one of the effects of the creation of Israel; and, secondly Iraq's relation to the Communists. Qasim's Government threads its way through a middle-of-the-road line in all things except that it is chary of Nasser and wants to preserve Iraq from losing its identity in a single Arab State, and except, again, that once chary of the Communists it is now, since the Mosul and Kir-Kuk affairs, hostile to them. The present regime is described in official speeches and propaganda as The Revolution; but in practice there is nothing revolutionary about it; its socio-economic policy might be compared with that of Sir Thomas Playford in South Australia, due allowance being made for the different milieu. When Qasim and his men carried out the coup two years ago they had no intension of killing the king and his household, - the killing was regretted by Qasim and the Army - though the intention was firm to rid the country of the Hashemite monarchy (an alien importation by the British) and to bring both Nuri Es-Said and the hated Crown Prince (formerly Regent) to book. It was the intervention of the mob which led to the atrocities. Most of those associated with the Ancien Regime have been treated generously, and some are back in official positions such as the present Iraqi Charge in London and the present Iraqi Ambassadors in Tehran and Karachi.

3. The celebrations of the Revolution lasted from the 14th to the 21st of July. Delegates were asked to get there a day, if possible two days, before the celebrations began. I left Delhi on 11th July, spending two days in Tehran on the way, waiting for a plane connection. I returned to Delhi on 20th July.

Rt. Hon'ble R.G. Menzies, O.H., M.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Australia and
Minister of State for External Affairs.

4. As I could have nothing of moment to report from so brief an acquaintance with Iraq I limit myself to some travel notes as background material for desk officers dealing with the Middle East.

5. Two days in Tehran were not a bad prelude to a visit to Iraq. Iran and Iraq are neighbouring Muslim countries with long associations. If the enemy, actual or prospective, has as much trouble in passing through this Bastion of the Free World as a Western ambassador has in passing through it, we of the West can take some comfort from Iran. It is said by Ambassadors of my acquaintance there that Iran is more or less a police state. For anyone who knew Mussolini's Italy parallels do leap to the eye, including the operative uniforms of the Army officers. Mr. Bakmat, until a few months ago Foreign Minister, and before then a colleague of mine in Delhi, was discreet but seemed unhappy about his country. Both the Thai and the Iraqi Ambassadors (men whom I had known in other posts) thought that the underground growth of the Communists and of Mousadeq's men was becoming important. They, like others I met in Tehran, spoke of the widespread corruption, the inefficiency, the outmoded social system (the bulk of the land in Iran is owned by less than a thousand families), the poverty, the inflation, and the discontent. They thought that the king was well meaning but ineffectual, and perhaps doomed. Beggars, including women with infants in arms, pestered one on the streets, as did numerous vendors of lottery tickets. The Thai Ambassador considered that at prevailing wages and prices employees could only just survive. The American presence was much in evidence. I saw on street walls chalked-up signs, "Yankee, Go Home". It did not require many hours in Iraq to point the contrast with Iran. For one thing the press in Iraq is free, or nearly so. For another there were no beggars or lottery ticket sellers or vendors of American sex-and-violence publications. The Iraqis are poor but they looked free men. One could understand their reputation under their Turkish rulers, and also under their British rulers, for being a sturdy people and unoperative soldiers.

6. As regards my official role in Baghdad, on my first day I noticed that many of the Delegates to the celebrations were bringing - or concocting on the spot - written messages to the Prime Minister of Iraq from their respective Heads of State or Heads of Government, and that these messages were being published in the local press. As I knew little about the regime in Iraq I thought it more prudent to call on the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister and, instead of presenting a written message from you, to extend verbal felicitations to them on your behalf on the occasion of the National Fete and to express the good wishes of the Government and people of Australia for the happiness of Iraq.

7. This cautious salutation ~~seems~~ to dampen no one - if the word or idea of dampness could be used in a time and place characterised by the furnace-like temperatures which rage at Baghdad in July. Major-General Abdul Karim Qasim, the Prime Minister, and his associates were manifestly pleased that Australia had sent a Representative. I was sceptical about the mission at the beginning but I left with the impression that it was worth while, and this impression was corroborated independently by the British Embassy in Iraq (perhaps the best informed), by the Indian Ambassador, by the Turkish Ambassador, and by several Iraqis of position.

8. It was a stroke of luck that the Foreign Minister, Saïyid Hashem Jawad, who is highly regarded by the British and other Embassies, turned out to be a former colleague and friend. He was with me in the pre-war I.L.O. and League of Nations Secretariat. Towards the end of my stay I had a pretty frank tete-a-tete with him. He was an Ambassador under the monarchy and was out of Iraq when the coup took place.

9. No list of delegations to the celebrations was published. Whenever the Foreign Office was asked about it was put off with some pretext or other. Likewise Delegates were not introduced to one another. The reason in both cases was to prevent embarrassment to Delegates whose countries did not recognize the countries of fellow Delegates. There are 31 permanent Diplomatic Missions, including Communist China, in Baghdad. By personal observation, which was checked against information from colleagues, one could see that the West was well represented. So too the East. Items of interest above the average as regards the Delegates were, firstly, the large number from the new African States; secondly, the representation from both sides, so to speak, as in North and South Vietnam, or North and South Korea, or West and East Germany (the latter represented by a Trade Office); thirdly, the absence of Jordan and Libya, and the representation of U.A.R. by only a Charge; and, fourthly, the status accorded to the Algerians as ambassadors of an independent sovereign state. (France has no relations with Iraq; she was attacked repeatedly in the Iraqi press as the traditional enemy of the Arabs and of Islam).

10. I had the impression that Communist countries sent full delegations and that these included "fraternal delegates" who were fairly low in the hierarchy, for instance from the Trade Unions, etc. The Russians, who sent about 6 or 7 men, looked, as usual, rather unhealthy because overworked and lacking fresh air and physical exercise; two of them looked for the world like high-powered American executives, even to the shock of white hair. The Russians were rather distant but polite to everyone. They had no dealings with other Communist Delegations, at least in public. They were polite but rather distant with them too, though the latter treated them with great respect.

11. According to an Iraqi acquaintance the Iraqi Communists are led by two non-Iraqis - one an Indian who came to Iraq as a baby with his father who in turn came with the British Army 40 odd years ago, as a sweeper (an outcaste), and the other an Iranian. The Iraqi Communists, in my informant's opinion, had no direct contacts with Moscow but were directed by the Bulgarian Communist Party. The Iraqi Communists were also in close touch with the Communist Party of Israel and with the Tudeh Party of Iran. As for Qassim's attitude to the Communists, he used to be at least tolerant of them, and at times tender to them because of their good record in fighting against Ruri Es-Said. He now watches them closely, and in public he criticizes them. He usually refers to them as the anarchists and the destroyers. As for the Communists themselves, there is an official Communist Party, which, though it controls a widely read newspaper, is not accepted as the Party by the bulk of Communists; and there is a series of Communist groups in various Trade Unions, in the ~~Peace Partisans~~ and in various Front organizations which are not called Communist but seem to be the real Communists. The organization connecting them and controlling them is apparently not fully known. What the British Embassy claims to know is that the head of the Air Force and several other Air Force officers, and that in the Army one Divisional Commander and also the Brigadier in charge of Plans at Headquarters, are at least pro-Communist. The Communist who was in the Cabinet, a woman, was dropped recently. The Chairman of the notorious People's Court, Col. Mahdawi, is said to be pro Communist. It is unlikely that he is more than a sadist. Though a kinsman of the Prime Minister he is one of the most hated men in Iraq and despised by his brother Army officers - the People's Court has been in abeyance for some time. Perhaps as good an indication as any of the relations between Qassim's Government and the Communists is the attack on him in the Communist or pro-Communist press outside of Iraq (e.g. the Indian weekly LINK of 17 July).

12. Since the coup which brought Abdul Karim Qassim to power two years ago there have been five attempts to destroy or to dislodge him. The first was in October 1958, when Colonel Arif, his closest associate in the July coup, attempted to get rid of Qassim in the interests of joining up Iraq with U.A.R. Arif was not executed but is still in prison. The second was in April 1959 when Colonel Shawaf staged a revolt in Mosul. It seems that he and his associates were precipitated into this, to some extent unwittingly, by the Communists. This affair got mixed up with racial, especially Kurdish, hatreds. At all events the mob, with or without the Communists, soon took charge and for about a week there was a reign of terror in North Iraq. The Communists lost a great deal of their former standing, both with the army and with the people at large, as a result of the Mosul affairs. Since then they have become suspect. The third attempt against Qassim was the Kirkuk Revolt of July, 1959. The Communists were also implicated in this, though so too were the pro-Nasser people, as well as old racial enmities. The fourth attempt was the so-called Nationalist Revolt, which means a right-wing movement strongly anti-communist and strongly pro-Arab Federation and probably pro-Nasser, in September 1959. The Brigadier concerned, who is spoken of as having been a possible supplanter of Qassim, together some of his associates, were tried summarily and executed. The fifth attempt was in last October when Qassim's car was waylaid one evening in Baghdad and 80 rounds were fired at him from at least four different points. His driver was killed but he, like his A.D.C., escaped with his life. Qassim was wounded in several places and did not leave hospital until December or January (the British Embassy said January; the Indian Ambassador said December). There is no doubt of the bitter personal antipathy between Nasser and Qassim or of the fact that Nasser has a network of agents in Iraq, including in the Iraqi Army.

13. The celebrations of the National Fete were arduous as well as long-drawn.

14. For instance on 14th July the Iraqi A.D.C. - each visiting Ambassador was given an Iraqi Army Officer to act as his A.D.C. (and probably too to keep an eye on his doings) - called me at 4.45 a.m. We had a light hasty breakfast and were in our places at the saluting base, some distance from the hotel, an hour later. The thermometer already stood at 102 degrees. After listening to the new National Anthem and the new March of the Revolution - (an Iraqi Marseillaise) - the score or so of new National Anthems which have burst upon the world since the war years are worth examining in detail, as also their origins - and saluting the new flag, we all stood up reverently for a ritual designated "The Call of the Revolution". Then came the army parade, this lasted about four hours. The thermometer got up to 112 degrees by then and the dust-laden flame-like wind from the Desert was laced with diesel fumes from the military vehicles. One was reminded uncomfortably that it was in this part of the world that the idea of hell had been invented. It was about 9 when one of the Scandinavian delegates got a touch of the sun and fell to vomiting. This set off a chain reaction. The Brazilian Ambassador fainted; a South East Asian lady, I think from one of the two Viet Nams, had to be carried off; and the sizeable Russian delegation moved off en bloc to near where the Iraq Cabinet so as to get under an awning. The staunch Iraqis were undismayed by these happenings, or by the heat, and the Prime Minister went on saluting the seemingly endless infantry trucks, Bren gun carriers, tanks and so on, with undaunted enthusiasm and the military band in attendance went on blasting out the old British regimental mass favourites ("John Peel" and so on) with undiminished vigour. After these four hours we moved into a traffic jam and slowly made our way to the al-Umma Garden which the Prime Minister opened to the general public and blessed in a speech. From there we got back to hotel in time to change before setting off for a luncheon given at the British Embassy. By then the thermometer had got up to 116 degrees. The rest of the afternoon was devoted to two ceremonies of laying foundation stones and to fire-works display over the Tigris. At 7.30 we motored out to the Military College, over half an hour from Baghdad, and for the next six

hours we were regaled first with speeches of welcomes, in Arabic; then with a speech from the Prime Minister lasting nearly two hours, also in Arabic; then with the presentation of two hundred odd cadets who were passing out, a ceremony which took over an hour; then a students' play, against the Imperialists and Jews, also in Arabic, which went on for about an hour and a half; and then, finally, well after mid-night, we were invited to tables to partake of what had been announced on the programme as dinner - a collation of sandwiches and coco-cola. We got back to the hotel about 1.30 a.m.

14. At 4.45 a.m., however, the A.D.C. was again on the scene and called me and we started off at dawn for celebrating July the 15th. These celebrations were designated as The Mass Celebrations. The people were to show their joy. The processions began before 6 and we did not get away until about 10.30. By this hour the temperature had got up to 113 degrees. The processions consisted of representative groups of the Iraqis - children, mothers, workers (30 different Trade Unions), nurses, doctors, lawyers, magistrates, journalists, accountants, and other professions, students, Peace Partisans, all Departments of Government, veterans, the People's Court, Peasants, the Iraqi Dates Association, tableaux displaying Iraq's ancient past, and the League of the Sons of Palestine. Two groups listed which did not participate were "the Orthodox Church" and "the Jewish Community". The joy of both the performers and the public seemed to me to be rather less than exuberant except in two cases. In those two cases there was no lack of either passion or purpose - first, the Palestine refugees; and, second, the Communist (or pro Communist) groups. The Mass Celebrations over we spent until after one in the laying of foundation stones or the inauguration of projects. - Then there was reception-cum-buffet lunch at the Indian Embassy beginning at 2.30 and lasting until 4.30. Then came more foundation stones, boat races, another fireworks display, and a buffet dinner given by the Prime Minister which began at about 11 p.m.

15. During my week in Iraq I participated in the official opening of 2 Public Playgrounds, 2 Mosques, 4 Housing Projects, 3 Army barracks, 3 Schools, 1 Hospital and 1 Public Hall; and I was present at 5 Fireworks Displays, 3 River pageants, 2 Dance and Folk lore festivals, and a ceremony in which the Prime Minister handed over land grants to 441 hitherto landless peasants. I missed only the official inauguration of a site for the Atomic Reactor, the al-Rastanish diop drainage scheme, the Nursing Institute, and the Mayor's Fireworks Display. On several nights the official ceremonies kept us until after midnight and on one occasion until 3 a.m. During the last two or three days of my stay the dust became so thick that one could not see across the Tigris. Most of the Delegates were by then near to a state of invalidism.

16. What was the purpose of the 7-day celebrations? It was firstly to whip up enthusiasm inside Iraq for the present Government and secondly to give it prestige in the eyes of the foreigner, particularly the Arabs. Baghdad, and presumably other Iraqi cities, were plastered with the photograph of General Abdul Karim Qasim and with slogans on banners strung across the streets. The most common slogans were the following:-

Immortality for the glorious Iraqi Republic
Long live Leader, the Initiator of the Glorious Revolution
Long live the Army and its faithful Leader
Immortality for the glorious Arab Race
Long live the people and the faithful Son of the People
Long live the immortal Palestine Republic
Under the leadership of the Faithful Son of the People
Abdul Karim Qasim Palestine shall be restored.

Iraw is the cradle of Arabian and Free men
 Victory for the Revolution of Algeria, Aden and Oman
 O Imperialists get out of the Arab countries
 O Workers support your Republic by increasing production
 The settlement of Palestine Refugees outside their
 Homeland is an Imperialist plot

17. This brings us to the Abdul Karim Qasim, the manner of man he is and the position he occupies.

18. In all the official statements about him, such as in the Fate programmes and press announcements, he was referred to as His Excellency Major General Abdul Karim Qasim, Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Very often to this was added the phrase "The Sole Leader" and occasionally other phrases such as "the first Teacher", "The Initiator of the Revolution", "The Saviour".

19. Qasim is said to be about 48. He is of middle height and, rather slight for an Iraqi though with strong shoulders and a broad back (if rumours are true about his now wearing a bullet-proof vest, since the last attempt on his life, all of the broadness may not be due to Nature). His colouring, like that of most Iraqis, is entirely European. His voice is rather thin, but this may be due to fatigue. His face is clean-cut and if he did not affect a small dab of Hitler-like moustache it would be handsome. In demeanour he is gentle, almost shy, and he smiles readily and most of the time. Perhaps he smiles a little too much and a little too sweetly, for occasionally it gives him a simpering air; but in repose, as I noticed several times, his look becomes preoccupied and strained and can be severe. Both in public and in private he has a good deal of natural charm. He is a bachelor, and diplomatic gossip at Baghdad whispered about sexual irregularities; but diplomatic gossip there is as unreliable as elsewhere, a medley of guess-work, exaggeration and smart knowingsness. Everyone is in agreement that he dedicates himself single-heartedly to his work, and now, since his escape from the last attempt on his life, that he is more convinced than ever that he has been spared to make his life a mission. As far as appearances are an indication, he is a puritan. My informants all made much of his general intelligence and very of his military aptitude. They say that the Iraqi column was the best operating in Palestine against the Zionists in 1947/48 and that Qasim's battalion was the best unit in the column. They also say that he is still too naïf as well as inexperienced in political matters and that he lacks to a dangerous degree in a man with as centralizing a temperament as his (he likes to sign official documents to an unpracticable extent) flair for administration. He is highly-strung and since the October attempt he is jumpy. He is always surrounded by a dozen or more body-guards and the security precautions were invariably strict. Wherever he went he was accompanied by half dozen or more cars or trucks with armed soldiers in them while other soldiers were posted along the way. He is said to be sleeping badly; he certainly has the look of an insomniac. He wears battle-dress, with pistol and lanyard, all the time. The Foreign Minister thought he would be able to arrange for me to meet Abdul Karim Qasim *tête-a-tête* before I left, but unfortunately the time ultimately fixed on would have required my staying another five days in Baghdad to catch the plane back to Delhi. But I spent many hours in his presence, at a few yards from him, and heard him speak a good deal. He left on me a clear impression of decency and energy but also some doubts as to whether he had the ruthlessness - either Nasser or the Communists would have fewer inhibitions than he - or the mental nimbleness necessary to make and keep himself master of a situation as difficult as that in Iraq.

20. How strong is he? The main source of such strength as he has comes from the fact - or the myth - that it was he who unseated the hated regime of Nuri Be-Said and the Crown Prince. As such he headed the new Government. His formal position in the Government is Prime Minister and Defence Minister, and as well he is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. But the position which he and his friends are trying to work up for him in Iraq is something well above merely formal posts. They are trying to make him into the Leader of the Nation. Yet Qasim insists that his regime is purely temporary and that when conditions permit he will have a constitution drafted, call for elections, and step down.

21. His critics in Iraq say that there is too little to show for his two years of office and that this is so because he is finding things more difficult to construct or to change than he used to think before assuming office and that instead of facing the hard truth he contents himself more and more with words and appearances. That, they go on, is why he has surrounded himself with stooges and yes-men (some of the speeches by Ministers could hardly carry sycophancy further) and that with the exception of only two Ministers (the chief exception being Hashim Jawad, the Minister for Foreign Affairs) the Cabinet is a collection of nonentities.

22. Iraq is a country of 7 millions. In spite of unemployment in its cities it is an under-populated country. In spite of much poverty it is a country of great natural wealth - millions of acres of rich alluvial soil lying between the never failing Tigris and Euphrates rivers and huge reserves of oil. And the human stock is perhaps the best in the Arab world. To weld into one nation Arabs and Kurds, and Arabs riven into Shias and Sunnites, bedouin and townsmen, is not easy but Qasim is dedicated to this principle. As regards socio-economic policy the Government is bent on a Labour Party policy plus some industrialisation (with good terms for foreign capital). As regards foreign policy it gives first priority to the idea of the Arab World, and from that its two great aims is to destroy Israeli rule in Palestine and the French rule in Algeria. After that the key to its foreign policy is neutralism. As is common throughout much of Asia, there is little respect for the U.S. and little regard for Russia. A good deal of the Army's equipment, including guns and tanks, is Russian and this has proved of mediocre quality while the Russian training staff turned out to be poor tacticians, at least in the eyes of the Iraqi officers. All Iraqi officers prefer to be sent to England for higher training, as do the doctors and engineers and teachers. In spite of anger over Suez, dismay over Israel, and hatred for Nuri and the Hashemite family as creatures of the British, the most respected foreigner is still the British. The Iraqi Army carries an undeniable, almost a comical, stamp of Britain about it - uniforms, badges of rank, foot and arms drill, ceremonial, bugle calls, and military music. Iraqi army officers have something of a hero-worship attitude for all British military things and are anxious to get more British equipment.

23. All the Diplomats I met in Baghdad spoke well of the Iraqis. Not only do they lack that air so dominant in Cairo of being descended from a long line of port prostitutes but they have physique and character. They seem to be the least Semitic in temperament of the Arab (or Arabized) peoples, just as they are the least Semitic in appearance. The average colouring, as I have already noted, is European. Auburn hair and light eyes are not rare. It would be interesting to know whether this colouring is due to European blood having been brought to Iraq in the form of Christian captives and slave women in the five centuries of Turkish rule. That the degree of Caucasian blood introduced is large is suggested by the ancient statues from Nineveh, Babylon or Ur in the Baghdad Museum. These going back about

4000 years, show that the Semitic or Jewish nose was then normal (incidentally the local museum has a variety of exhibits of great interest)- e.g. Cuneiform seals showing geometry algebra and quadratic equations going back as far as 1800 B.C., and the wheel going back still further, and good pottery going back 7000 or 8000 years).

24. I heard from several of the permanent missions in Baghdad their accounts of how and why the coup in July 1958 took place. The accounts, given independently, agreed substantially. They all spoke of the exaggerations and the speculative nature of the accounts published in the newspapers at the time. It would take too much space to recapitulate the story here but the following facts are of interest :- There was no intention to kill the king or the womenfolk in the royal palace. Fire was drawn by a soldier during a discussion in the palace grounds on the terms of abdication. The king wanted to sign them but his uncle, the Crown Prince, objected. After being wounded the king was removed to a hospital as soon as possible and efforts extending over some hours were made to save his life. The Army itself was guilty of no atrocities. These began after the coup had succeeded, when a delirious blood-thirsty mob, the drags of Baghdad slums, possibly incited by Communists, took charge. Several Europeans were torn to pieces by the mob as well as an unknown member of Iraqis. Both the ex-Regent and Nuri es-Said were shot dead; they were not alive when the mob dragged them through the streets. It took several days to restore order. What took foreign observers by surprise, but apparently should not have, was the Iraqi attitude to the Hashemite royal family - a foreign family without any connections with Iraq, imposed by the British in 1920. The young King was shy and inadequate and an awkward foreigner to Baghdad but he was regarded as well meaning. His father had been interested in nothing but racing cars. His uncle the Regent, was, in the words of one of the Ambassadors who knew him, "a vile man" - corrupt, a sordid womanizer, cruel, and so conceited as to be blind to the realities around him. Nuri es-Said was an able and experienced ruler but too compromised with a discredited regime. The prisons in Iraq had been filled for years with men who had not been given a trial and where beatings and torture were the normal practice. The amount of economic development claimed was greatly exaggerated while socially the country was backward. With the introduction over the last half century of private property in land, the land which was traditionally tribal or *shaykh* had been turned into the private property of tribal and clan heads. These moreover had become more and more absentees while the villagers were reduced to serfdom. Laws prevented a man from leaving his employer's land if he was in debt to him. Most employees were in debt to their employers.

25. Jawad, the Foreign Minister, made much of this point to me. He said that their plans now are to encourage peasant proprietorship and to break up the big estates (which run to 100,000 acres and more) but not to put any excessively low ceiling on the size of holdings. He doubted if the ceiling would be less than 2000 acres. While the agrarian reforms are being worked out Iraq, he explained, would be short of wheat, say for 3 to 5 years. That is why they are now importing wheat from Australia; I think he said about 100,000 tons a year. He also outlined their plans for limited industrialization, for urban reconstruction (slum clearance, etc.), and for getting foreign capital (in which they had had little success so far - foreign investors are afraid of the future). The Iraqi Government is asking for new oil agreements but are realistic enough to know that the changes in the international oil market have reduced their bargaining

power. Jawad also spoke about Israel, Jordan, etc. and about Iraq's policy of neutralism, and of the folly of American newspapermen misrepresenting this as a slant towards the Communist countries.

26. I am forwarding by sea bag the following documents :-

Revolution in Iraq
Abdul Karim Qassim on Objectives of the Revolution
Qassim on the Principles of 14th July Revolution
Programme of the Second Anniversary
Qassim's speech at the Military College
Iraq News Agency Bulletin for 15th July
Iraq News Agency Bulletins for 13 and for 14 July

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(W.R.Crocker)
High Commissioner



File 173/10/1

22nd July 1960

Sir,

A VISIT TO IRAQ

I have the honour to report that in compliance with your instructions I visited Baghdad as the Special Representative of Australia at the celebrations of the Iraqi National Revolution, or, to give the occasion its official designation, the Second Anniversary of the Glorious July 14 Revolution.

2. The main conclusions I drew from my week in Baghdad are best summarized at once:- The Army (or, more likely, a group in the Army) rather than General Qassim (sometimes spelt Kassen) is in the saddle. General Qassim is in office partly by virtue of his own merits but also perhaps as much by virtue of the fact that he is acceptable as the lowest common denominator to the Army itself and to Iraq at large. His hold, however, may be too weak to sustain the myths about him which have been built up by propaganda in Iraq; in the next year or so it may prove unequal to withstanding the factions and the tensions which leave Iraq in a state of unstable equilibrium. The Army itself is subject to these factions and tensions. The two great points of debate are, firstly Iraq's relation to the theme of Arab Federation, which in practice often means the theme of uniting with U.A.R. under Nasser and in any case is, like the contemporary form of Pan Arab nationalism, one of the effects of the creation of Israel; and, secondly Iraq's relation to the Communists. Qassim's Government threads its way through a middle-of-the-road line in all things except that it is chary of Nasser and wants to preserve Iraq from losing its identity in a single Arab State, and except, again, that once chary of the Communists it is now, since the Mosul and Kir-Kuk affairs, hostile to them. The present regime is described in official speeches and propaganda as The Revolution; but in practice there is nothing revolutionary about it; its socio-economic policy might be compared with that of Sir Thomas Playford in South Australia, due allowance being made for the different milieu. When Qassim and his men carried out the coup two years ago they had no intension of killing the king and his household, - the killing was regretted by Qassim and the Army - though the intention was firm to rid the country of the Hashemite monarchy (an alien importation by the British) and to bring both Nuri Es-Said and the hated Crown Prince (formerly Regent) to book. It was the intervention of the mob which led to the atrocities. Most of these associated with the Ancien Regime have been treated generously, and some are back in official positions such as the present Iraqi Charge in London and the present Iraqi Ambassadors in Tehran and Karachi.

3. The celebrations of the Revolution lasted from the 14th to the 21st of July. Delegates were asked to get there a day, if possible two days, before the celebrations began. I left Delhi on 11th July, spending two days in Tehran on the way, waiting for a plane connection. I returned to Delhi on 20th July.

Ht. Hon'ble R.G.Menzies, G.M., J.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Australia and
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4. As I could have nothing of moment to report from so brief an acquaintance with Iraq I limit myself to some travel notes as background material for desk officers dealing with the Middle East.

5. Two days in Tehran were not a bad prelude to a visit to Iraq. Iran and Iraq are neighbouring Muslim countries with long associations. If the enemy, actual or prospective, has as much trouble in passing through this Bastion of the Free World as a Western ambassador has in passing through it, we of the West can take some comforts from Iran. It is said by Ambassadors of my acquaintance there that Iran is more or less a police state. For anyone who knew Mussolini's Italy parallels do leap to the eye, including the operative uniforms of the Army officers. Mr. Hekmat, until a few months ago Foreign Minister, and before then a colleague of mine in Delhi, was discreet but seemed unhappy about his country. Both the Thai and the Iraqi Ambassadors (men whom I had known in other posts) thought that the underground growth of the Communists and of Mousadeq's men was becoming important. They, like others I met in Tehran, spoke of the widespread corruption, the inefficiency, the outmoded social system (the bulk of the land in Iran is owned by less than a thousand families), the poverty, the inflation, and the discontent. They thought that the king was well meaning but ineffectual, and perhaps doomed. Beggars, including women with infants in arms, pestered one on the streets, as did numerous vendors of lottery tickets. The Thai Ambassador considered that at prevailing wages and prices employees could only just survive. The American presence was much in evidence. I saw on street walls chalked-up signs, "Yankee, Go Home". It did not require many hours in Iraq to point the contrast with Iran. For one thing the press in Iraq is free, or nearly so. For another there were no beggars or lottery ticket sellers or vendors of American sex-and-violence publications. The Iraqis are poor but they looked free men. One could understand their reputation under their Turkish rulers, and also under their British rulers, for being a sturdy people and unoperative soldiers.

6. As regards my official role in Baghdad, on my first day I noticed that many of the Delegates to the celebrations were bringing - or concocting on the spot - written messages to the Prime Minister of Iraq from their respective Heads of State or Heads of Government, and that these messages were being published in the local press. As I knew little about the regime in Iraq I thought it more prudent to call on the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister and, instead of presenting a written message from you, to extend verbal felicitations to them on your behalf on the occasion of the National Fete and to express the good wishes of the Government and people of Australia for the happiness of Iraq.

7. This cautious salutation ~~seem~~to dampen no one - if the word or idea of dampness could be used in a time and place characterised by the furnace-like temperatures which rage at Baghdad in July. Major-General Abdul Karim Qasbi, the Prime Minister, and his associates were manifestly pleased that Australia had sent a Representative. I was sceptical about the mission at the beginning but I left with the impression that it was worth while, and this impression was corroborated independently by the British Embassy in Iraq (perhaps the best informed), by the Indian Ambassador, by the Turkish Ambassador, and by several Iraqis of position.

8. It was a stroke of luck that the Foreign Minister, Saiyid Hashem Jawad, who is highly regarded by the British and other Embassies, turned out to be a former colleague and friend. He was with me in the pre-war I.L.O. and League of Nations Secretariat. Towards the end of my stay I had a pretty frank *tote-a-tote* with him. He was an Ambassador under the monarchy and was out of Iraq when the coup took place.

9. No list of delegations to the celebrations was published. Whenever the Foreign Office was asked about it ~~it was~~ put off with some pretext or other. Likewise Delegates were not introduced to one another. The reason in both cases was to prevent embarrassment to Delegates whose countries did not recognize the countries of fellow Delegates. There are 31 permanent Diplomatic Missions, including Communist China, in Baghdad. By personal observation, which was checked against information from colleagues, one could see that the West was well represented. So too the East. Items of interest above the average as regards the Delegates were, firstly, the large number from the new African States; secondly, the representation from both sides, so to speak, as in North and South Vietnam, or North and South Korea, or West and East Germany (the latter represented by a Trade Office); thirdly, the absence of Jordan and Libya, and the representation of U.A.R. by only a Charge; and, fourthly, the status accorded to the Algerians as ambassadors of an independent sovereign state. (France has no relations with Iraq; she was attacked repeatedly in the Iraqi press as the traditional enemy of the Arabs and of Islam)

10. I had the impression that Communist countries sent full delegations and that these included "fraternal delegates" who were fairly low in the hierarchy, for instance from the Trade Unions, etc. The Russians, who sent about 6 or 7 men, looked, as usual, rather unhealthy because overworked and lacking fresh air and physical exercise; two of them looked for the world like high-powered American executives, even to the shock of white hair. The Russians were rather distant but polite to everyone. They had no dealings with other Communist Delegations, at least in public. They were polite but rather distant with them too, though the latter treated them with great respect.

11. According to an Iraqi acquaintance the Iraqi Communists are led by two non-Iraqis - one an Indian who came to Iraq as a baby with his father who in turn came with the British Army 40 odd years ago, as a sweeper (an outcaste), and the other an Iranian. The Iraqi Communists, in my informant's opinion, had no direct contacts with Moscow but were directed by the Bulgarian Communist Party. The Iraqi Communists were also in close touch with the Communist Party of Israel and with the Tudeh Party of Iran. As for Qasim's attitude to the Communists, he used to be at least tolerant of them, and at times tender to them because of their good record in fighting against Nuri Es-Said. He now watches them closely, and in public he criticises them. He usually refers to them as the anarchists and the destroyers. As for the Communists themselves, there is an official Communist Party, which, though it controls a widely read newspaper, is not accepted as the Party by the bulk of Communists; and there is a series of Communist groups in various Trade Unions, in the ~~Peace Partisans~~ and in various front organizations which are not called Communist but seem to be the real Communists. The organization connecting them and controlling them is apparently not fully known. What the British Embassy claims to know is that the head of the Air Force and several other Air Force officers, and that in the Army one Divisional Commander and also the Brigadier in charge of Plans at Headquarters, are at least pro-Communist. The Communist who was in the Cabinet, a woman, was dropped recently. The Chairman of the notorious People's Court, Col. Mahdawi, is said to be pro Communist. It is unlikely that he is more than a sadist. Though a kinsman of the Prime Minister he is one of the most hated men in Iraq and despised by his brother Army officers - the People's Court has been in abeyance for some time. Perhaps as good an indication as any of the relations between Qasim's Government and the Communists is the attack on him in the Communist or pro-Communist press outside of Iraq (e.g. the Indian weekly LINK of 17 July).

12. Since the coup which brought Abdul Karim Qasim to power two years ago there have been five attempts to destroy or to dislodge him. The first was in October 1958, when Colonel Arif, his closest associate in the July coup, attempted to get rid of Qasim in the interests of joining up Iraq with U.A.R. Arif was not executed but is still in prison. The second was in April 1959 when Colonel Shafiq staged a revolt in Mosul. It seems that he and his associates were precipitated into this, to some extent unwittingly, by the Communists. This affair got mixed up with racial, especially Kurdish, hatreds. At all events the mob, with or without the Communists, soon took charge and for about a week there was a reign of terror in North Iraq. The Communists lost a great deal of their former standing, both with the army and with the people at large, as a result of the Mosul affair. Since then they have become suspect. The third attempt against Qasim was the Kirkuk Revolt of July, 1959. The Communists were also implicated in this, though so too were the pro-Nasser people, as well as old racial enmities. The fourth attempt was the so-called Nationalist Revolt, which means a right-wing movement strongly anti-communist and strongly pro-Arab Federation and probably pro-Nasser, in September 1959. The Brigadier concerned, who is spoken of as having been a possible supplanter of Qasim, together some of his associates, were tried summarily and executed. The fifth attempt was in last October when Qasim's car was waylaid one evening in Baghdad and 80 rounds were fired at him from at least four different points. His driver was killed but he, like his A.D.C., escaped with his life. Qasim was wounded in several places and did not leave hospital until December or January (the British Embassy said January; the Indian Ambassador said December). There is no doubt of the bitter personal antipathy between Nasser and Qasim or of the fact that Nasser has a network of agents in Iraq, including in the Iraqi Army.

13. The celebrations of the National Fete were arduous as well as long-drawn.

14. For instance on 14th July the Iraqi A.D.C. - each visiting Ambassador was given an Iraqi Army Officer to act as his A.D.C. (and probably too to keep an eye on his doings) - called me at 4.45 a.m. We had a light hasty breakfast and were in our places at the saluting base, some distance from the hotel, an hour later. The thermometer already stood at 102 degrees. After listening to the new National Anthem and the new March of the Revolution - (an Iraqi Marsellaise) - the score or so of new National anthems which have burst upon the world since the war years are worth examining in detail, as also their origins - and saluting the new flag, we all stood up reverently for a ritual designated "The Call of the Revolution". Then came the army parade, this lasted about four hours. The thermometer got up to 112 degrees by then and the dust-laden flame-like wind from the Desert was laced with diesel fumes from the military vehicles. One was reminded uncomfortably that it was in this part of the world that the idea of hell had been invented. It was about 9 when one of the Scandinavian delegates got a touch of the sun and fell to vomiting. This set off a chain reaction. The Brazilian Ambassador fainted; a South East Asian lady, I think from one of the two Viet Hems, had to be carried off; and the sizeable Russian delegation moved off on blocks near where the Iraq Cabinet so as to get under an awning. The staunch Iraqis were undismayed by these happenings, or by the heat, and the Prime Minister went on saluting the seemingly endless infantry trucks, Bren gun carriers, tanks and so on, with undaunted enthusiasm and the military band in attendance went on blasting out the old British regimental mass favourites ("John Peel" and so on) with undiminished vigour. After these four hours we moved into a traffic jam and slowly made our way to the al-Ummah Garden which the Prime Minister opened to the general public and blessed in a speech. From there we got back to hotel in time to change before setting off for a luncheon given at the British Embassy. By then the thermometer had got up to 116 degrees. The rest of the afternoon was devoted to two ceremonies of laying foundation stones and a fire-works display over the Tigris. At 7.30 we motored out to the Military College, over half an hour from Baghdad, and for the next six

hours we were regaled first with speeches of welcome, in Arabic; then with a speech from the Prime Minister lasting nearly two hours, also in Arabic; then with the presentation of two hundred old cadets who were passing out, a ceremony which took over an hour; then a students' play, against the Imperialists and Jews, also in Arabic, which went on for about an hour and a half; and then, finally, well after mid-night, we were invited to tables to partake of what had been announced on the programme as dinner - a collation of sandwiches and coco-cola. We got back to the hotel about 1.30 a.m.

14. At 4.45 a.m., however, the A.D.C. was again on the scene and called me and we started off at dawn for celebrating July the 15th. These celebrations were designated as the Mass Celebrations. The people were to show their joy. The processions began before 6 and we did not get away until about 10.30. By this hour the temperature had got up to 113 degrees. The processions consisted of representative groups of the Iraqis - children, mothers, workers (3 different Trade Unions), nurses, doctors, lawyers, magistrates, journalists, accountants, and other professions, students, Peace Partisans, all Departments of Government, veterans, the People's Court, Peasants, the Iraqi Dates Association, tableaux displaying Iraq's ancient past, and the League of the Sons of Palestine. Two groups listed which did not participate were "the Orthodox Church" and "the Jewish Community". The joy of both the performers and the public seemed to me to be rather less than exuberant except in two cases. In those two cases there was no lack of either passion or purpose - first, the Palestine refugees; and, second, the Communist (or pro Communist) groups. The Mass Celebrations over we spent until after one in the laying of foundation stones or the inauguration of projects. - Then there was reception-dum-buffet lunch at the Indian Embassy beginning at 2.30 and lasting until 4.30. Then came more foundation stones, boat races, another fireworks display, and a buffet dinner given by the Prime Minister which began at about 11 p.m.

15. During my week in Iraq I participated in the official opening of 2 Public Playgrounds, 2 Mosques, 4 Housing Projects, 3 Army barracks, 3 Schools, 1 Hospital and 1 Public Hall; and I was present at 5 Fireworks Displays, 3 River pageants, 2 Dance and Folk lore Festivals, and a ceremony in which the Prime Minister handed over land funds to 441 hitherto landless peasants. I missed only the official inauguration of a site for the Atomic Reactor, the oil-historian's oil drainage scheme, the Nursing Institute, and the Mayor's Fireworks Display. On several nights the official ceremonies kept us until after midnight and on one occasion until 3 a.m. During the last two or three days of my stay the dust became so thick that one could not see across the Tigris. Most of the Delegates were by then near to a state of invalidism.

16. What was the purpose of the 7-day celebrations? It was firstly to whip up enthusiasm inside Iraq for the present Government and secondly to give it prestige in the eyes of the foreigner, particularly the Arabs. Baghdad, and presumably other Iraqi cities, were plastered with the photograph of General Abdul Karim Qasim and with slogans on banners strung across the streets. The most common slogans were the following:-

Immortality for the glorious Iraqi Republic
Long live leader, the Initiator of the Glorious Revolution
Long live the Army and its faithful leader
Immortality for the glorious Arab Race
Long live the people and the faithful Son of the People
Long live the immortal Palestine Republic
Under the leadership of the Faithful Son of the People
Abdul Karim Qasim Palestine shall be restored.

Iraq is the cradle of Arabian and Free men
 Victory for the Revolution of Algeria, Aden and Oman
 O Imperialists get out of the Arab countries
 O Workers support your Republic by increasing production
 The settlement of Palestine Refugees outside their
 Homeland is an Imperialist plot

17. This brings us to the Abdul Karim Qassim, the manner of man he is and the position he occupies.

18. In all the official statements about him, such as in the Fete programmes and press announcements, he was referred to as His Excellency Major General Abdul Karim Qassim, Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Very often to this was added the phrase "The Sole Leader" and occasionally other phrases such as "the First Teacher", "The Initiator of the Revolution", "The Saviour".

19. Qassim is said to be about 48. He is of middle height and, rather slight for an Iraqi though with strong shoulders and a broad back (if rumours are true about his now wearing a bullet-proof vest, since the last attempt on his life, all of the broadness may not be due to Nature). His colouring, like that of most Iraqis, is entirely European. His voice is rather thin, but this may be due to fatigue. His face is clean-cut and if he did not affect a small dab of Hitler-like moustache it would be handsome. In demeanour he is gentle, almost shy, and he smiles readily and most of the time. Perhaps he smiles a little too much and a little too sweetly, for occasionally it gives him a sinpering air; but in repose, as I noticed several times, his look becomes preoccupied and strained and can be severe. Both in public and in private he has a good deal of natural charm. He is a bachelor, and diplomatic gossip at Baghdad whispered about sexual irregularities; but diplomatic gossip there is as unreliable as elsewhere, a medley of guess-work, exaggeration and smart knowingsness. Everyone is in agreement that he dedicates himself single-heartedly to his work, and now, since his escape from the last attempt on his life, that he is more convinced than ever that he has been spared to make his life a mission. As far as appearances are an indication, he is a puritan. My informants all made much of his general intelligence and very of his military aptitude. They say that the Iraqi column was the best operating in Palestine against the Zionists in 1947/48 and that Qassim's battalion was the best unit in the column. They also say that he is still too naïf as well as inexperienced in political matters and that he lacks to a dangerous degree in a man with as centralizing a temperament as his (he likes to sign official documents to an unpracticable extent) flair for administration. He is highly-strung and since the October attempt he is jumpy. He is always surrounded by a dozen or more body-guards and the security precautions were invariably strict. Wherever he went he was accompanied by half dozen or more cars or trucks with armed soldiers in them while other soldiers were posted along the way. He is said to be sleeping badly; he certainly has the look of an insomniac. He wears battle-dress, with pistol and lanyard, all the time. The Foreign Minister thought he would be able to arrange for me to meet Abdul Karim Qassim *toto-a-toto* before I left, but unfortunately the time ultimately fixed on would have required my staying another five days in Baghdad to catch the plane back to Delhi. But I spent many hours in his presence, at a few yards from him, and heard him speak a good deal. He left on me a clear impression of decency and energy but also some doubts as to whether he had the ruthlessness - either Nasser or the Communists would have fewer inhibitions than he - or the mental nimbleness necessary to make and keep himself master of a situation as difficult as that in Iraq.

20. How strong is he? The main source of such strength as he has comes from the fact - or the myth - that it was he who unseated the hated regime of Nuri es-Said and the Crown Prince. As such he headed the new Government. His formal position in the Government is Prime Minister and Defence Minister, and as well he is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. But the position which he and his friends are trying to work up for him in Iraq is something well above merely formal posts. They are trying to make him into the Leader of the Nation. Yet Qasim insists that his regime is purely temporary and that when conditions permit he will have a constitution drafted, call for elections, and step down.

21. His critics in Iraq say that there is too little to show for his two years of office and that this is so because he is finding things more difficult to construct or to change than he used to think before assuming office and that instead of facing the hard truth he contents himself more and more with words and appearances. That, they go on, is why he has surrounded himself with stooges and yes-men (some of the speeches by Ministers could hardly carry sycophancy further) and that with the exception of only two Ministers (the chief exception being Hashem Jawad, the Minister for Foreign Affairs) the Cabinet is a collection of nonentities.

22. Iraq is a country of 7 millions. In spite of unemployment in its cities it is an under-populated country. In spite of much poverty it is a country of great natural wealth - millions of acres of rich alluvial soil lying between the never failing Tigris and Euphrates rivers and huge reserves of oil. And the human stock is perhaps the best in the Arab world. To weld into one nation Arabs and Kurds, and Arabs riven into Shias and Sunnites, bedouin and townsmen, is not easy but Qasim is dedicated to this principle. As regards socio-economic policy the Government is bent on a Labour Party policy plus some industrialisation (with good terms for foreign capital). As regards foreign policy it gives first priority to the ideas of the Arab World, and from that its two great aims is to destroy Israeli rule in Palestine and the French rule in Algeria. After that the key to its foreign policy is neutralism. As is common throughout much of Asia, there is little respect for the U.S. and little regard for Russia. A good deal of the Army's equipment, including guns and tanks, is Russian and this has proved of mediocre quality while the Russian training staff turned out to be poor tacticians, at least in the eyes of the Iraqi officers. All Iraqi officers prefer to be sent to England for higher training, as do the doctors and engineers and teachers. In spite of anger over Suez, dismay over Israel, and hatred for Nuri and the Hashemite family as creatures of the British, the most respected foreigner is still the British. The Iraqi Army carries an undeniable, almost a comical, stamp of Britain about it - uniforms, badges of rank, foot and arms drill, ceremonial, bugle calls, and military music. Iraqi Army officers have something of a hero worship attitude for all British military things and are anxious to get more British equipment.

23. All the Diplomats I met in Baghdad spoke well of the Iraqis. Not only do they lack that air so dominant in Cairo of being descended from a long line of port prostitutes but they have physique and character. They seem to be the least Semitic in temperament of the Arab (or Arabized) peoples, just as they are the least Semitic in appearance. The average colouring, as I have already noted, is European. Auburn hair and light eyes are not rare. It would be interesting to know whether this colouring is due to European blood having been brought to Iraq in the form of Christian captives and slave women in the five centuries of Turkish rule. That the degree of Caucasian blood introduced is large is suggested by the ancient statues from Nineveh, Babylon or Ur in the Baghdad Museum. These going back about

4000 years, show that the Semitic or Jewish nose was then normal (incidentally the local museum has a variety of exhibits of great interest)- e.g. Cuneiform seals showing geometry, algebra and quadratic equations going back as far as 1800 B.C., and the wheel going back still further, and good pottery going back 7000 or 8000 years).

24. I heard from several of the permanent missions in Baghdad their accounts of how and why the coup in July 1958 took place. The accounts, given independently, agreed substantially. They all spoke of the exaggerations and the speculative nature of the accounts published in the newspapers at the time. It would take too much space to recapitulate the story here but the following facts are of interest:- There was no intention to kill the king or the womenfolk in the royal palace. Fire was drawn by a soldier during a discussion in the palace grounds on the terms of abdication. The king wanted to sign them but his uncle, the Crown Prince, objected. After being wounded the king was removed to a hospital as soon as possible and efforts extending over some hours were made to save his life. The Army itself was guilty of no atrocities. These began after the coup had succeeded, when a delirious blood-thirsty mob, the dregs of Baghdad slums, possibly incited by Communists, took charge. Several Europeans were torn to pieces by the mob as well as an unknown member of Iraqis. Both the ex-Regent and Nuri as-Said were shot dead; they were not alive when the mob dragged them through the streets. It took several days to restore order. What took foreign observers by surprise, but apparently should not have, was the Iraqi attitude to the Hashemite royal family - a foreign family without any connections with Iraq, imposed by the British in 1920. The young King was shy and inadequate and an awkward foreigner to Baghdad but he was regarded as well meaning. His father had been interested in nothing but racing cars. His uncle the Regent, was, in the words of one of the Ambassadors who knew him, "a vile man" - corrupt, a sordid womaniser, cruel, and so conceited as to be blind to the realities around him. Nuri as-Said was an able and experienced ruler but too compromised with a discredited regime. The prisons in Iraq had been filled for years with men who had not been given a trial and where beatings and torture were the normal practice. The amount of economic development claimed was greatly exaggerated while socially the country was backward. With the introduction over the last half century of private property in land, the land which was traditionally tribal or *shaykh* had been turned into the private property of tribal and clan heads. These moreover had become more and more absentees while the villagers were reduced to serfdom. Laws prevented a man from leaving his employer's land if he was in debt to him. Most employees were in debt to their employers.

25. Jawad, the Foreign Minister, made much of this point to me. He said that their plans now are to encourage peasant proprietorship and to break up the big estates (which run to 100,000 acres and more) but not to put any excessively low ceiling on the size of holdings. He doubted if the ceiling would be less than 2000 acres. While the agrarian reforms are being worked out Iraq, he explained, would be short of wheat, say for 3 to 5 years. That is why they are now importing wheat from Australia; I think he said about 100,000 tons a year. He also outlined their plans for limited industrialization, for urban reconstruction (slum clearance, etc.), and for getting foreign capital (in which they had had little success so far - foreign investors are afraid of the future). The Iraqi Government is asking for new oil agreements but are realistic enough to know that the changes in the international oil market have reduced their bargaining

power. Jawad also spoke about Israel, Jordan, etc. and about Iraq's policy of neutralism, and of the folly of American newspapermen misrepresenting this as a slant towards the Communist countries.

26. I am forwarding by sea bag the following documents:-

Revolution in Iraq
Abdul Karim Qasim on Objectives of the Revolution
Qasim on the Principles of 14th July Revolution
Programme of the Second Anniversary
Qasim's speech at the Military College
Iraq News Agency Bulletin for 15th July.
Iraq News Agency Bulletins for 13 and for 14 July

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(W.R.Crocker)
High Commissioner

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM **CONFIDENTIAL**

FPS:HP

I.16585

FROM:

Dated: 19th July, 1960.

1615
Rec'd: 20th July, 1960.
0830

Australian High Commission,
L O N D O N.

3169. CONFIDENTIAL.

From External.

173/10/1

Your telegram 2133.

"Daily Telegraph" today carries item beginning:
"for three weeks Mr. Titold Mayginski, a Polish Diplomat
has been lurking in an old-fashioned hotel in Rashid Street,
Baghdad, after informing Iraqi authorities of orders given
him to spy, not on Western "Imperialists" but on Iraqi
officials. He has thrown himself on the mercy of the Iraqi
Government. Iraqi Security men have no doubt that the Polish
Diplomatic Mission has been serving as an espionage centre
for Russia. Meanwhile Russian Diplomats, under the Ambassador,
Mr. Grigori Zaitsev, preserve a sanctimonious attitude of
detachment. It is reliably reported that Mr. Mayginski
revolted because his wife was asked to cultivate key Iraqi
officials for espionage purposes. He now hopes to emigrate to
Australia with his wife and two children" and going on to
discuss cooling in Iraq's relations with Russia.

2. Foreign Office propose, if asked, to say that
Machezynski has applied to British Embassy in Baghdad for
permission to migrate to Australia and that request has been
forwarded to Australian authorities. We propose to handle any
follow up question by saying that Machezynski and family's
applications for migrant visas are being handled in the normal
way and that there are certain formalities involved, e.g.
health checks, before visas can be issued.

Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
" " " Immigration.
A.S.I.O.(C. & M.)
P.M.'s.

20th July, 1960.

SEC A/Ss MR.ROWLAND MR.SELLARS MR.HOLLAND MR.LANDALE

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

AH:

I.15873

Sent: 11th July, 1960.
1420
R'cd: 12th July, 1960.
0830

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

349. UNCLASSIFIED.

High Commissioner scheduled depart Delhi for Baghdad
via Teheran 1930 hours 11th July as from which time Kelly will
be in charge.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S

12th July, 1960.

SEC A/Ss S&SEA SA EAF&ME AF ME INF C&P ADMIN PERS
TRAV INV

IRAQ.

File - Celebrations

WBS

✓
[Signature]

9/10



FOLIO REMOVAL ADVICE

SERIES NUMBER A1838/2

ITEM NUMBER 173/10/1 Pt 1

...2... FOLIOS HAVE BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS PLACE IN THIS ITEM

(see Form "Document Removal Advice" at
front of file for the reason these folios were
removed)

Signature: [Handwritten Signature]

Date: 30 JUL 04

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

AH:

O.11000

Sent: 6th July, 1960.
1720

TO:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

173/10/1

301. CONFIDENTIAL.

For Crocker.

Iraq Celebrations.

The following guidance may be helpful.

The party political scene continues to be confused and the likelihood of elections taking place within the next twelve months seems to have receded. Kassem's position appears to be secure. Although for some time he swung alternately towards the Communists and the Nationalists, recently he seems to have favoured the latter.

2. The security situation is good in the towns, but there have been reports of disturbances in some rural areas. Speech seems free and the Court of Cassation appears to be independent of Government control.

3. There have been rumours of attempted nationalist coup against Kassem on 14th July which we are inclined to discount but possibility of street clashes between Communist and Nationalist demonstrators during celebrations cannot be excluded.

4. We have received conflicting reports on the economic situation: the State Department paints a gloomy picture, but the Foreign Office is more optimistic.

5. There is some evidence that Kassem is anxious to bury the hatchet with Nasser and Hussein, and the feud with Iran seems to have died down also. Relations with the Soviet Union are cooler despite Mikoyan's visit, and there are signs that Kassem would like to improve his relations with the West.

6. Earlier this year we invited the Iraq Minister for Health to visit Australia (in order to promote our trade interest in hospital development scheme in Iraq), but he replied that owing to heavy engagements at home he could not accept for the time being. If the occasion arises you may mention that the invitation still stands, but we should not wish you to press it. Invitation did not include payment of fares for Minister, as it is not Government policy to provide this.

7. We have a favourable trade balance with Iraq, our exports July 1959 to April 1960 amounting to £A6½ million.

8. We have a temporary permit for civil aviation operations through Baghdad, but Qantas is not using this route at present.

.../2

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS **CONFIDENTIAL**
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

- 2 - 0.11000

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (173/10/1)
P.M. 'S

(Cost £17.0.0)
7th July, 1960.

SEC A/Ss UN TA ER P.C&AM S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF ME
INF C&P

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

AH:

O.11000

Sent: 6th July, 1960.
1720

TO:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

173/10/1

301. CONFIDENTIAL.

For Crocker.

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5. There is some evidence that Kassem is anxious to bury the hatchet with Nasser and Hussein, and the feud with Iran seems to have died down also. Relations with the Soviet Union are cooler despite Mikoyan's visit, and there are signs that Kassem would like to improve his relations with the West.
6. Earlier this year we invited the Iraq Minister for Health to visit Australia (in order to promote our trade interest in hospital development scheme in Iraq), but he replied that owing to heavy engagements at home he could not accept for the time being. If the occasion arises you may mention that the invitation still stands, but we should not wish you to press it. Invitation did not include payment of fares for Minister, as it is not Government policy to provide this.
7. We have a favourable trade balance with Iraq, our exports July 1959 to April 1960 amounting to £A6½ million.
8. We have a temporary permit for civil aviation operations through Baghdad, but Qantas is not using this route at present.

CONFIDENTIAL

.../2

→ Mr. [Signature]

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS **CONFIDENTIAL**
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

- 2 - 0.11000

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (173/10/1)
P.M. 'S

(Cost £17.0.0)
7th July, 1960.

SEC A/Ss UN TA ER PAC&AM S&SEA SA EAP&ME E AF ME
INF C&P

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Austcom, NEW DELHI

173/10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

For Crocker
IRAQ CELEBRATIONS.

The following guidance may be helpful.

The party political scene continues to be confused and the likelihood of elections taking place within the next twelve months seems to have receded. Kassem's position appears to be secure. Although for some time he swung alternately towards the Communists and the nationalists, recently he seems to have favoured the latter.

2. The security situation is good in the towns, but there have been reports of disturbances in some rural areas. Speech seems free and the Court of Cassation appears to be independent of Government control.

3. There have been rumours of attempted nationalist coup against Kassem on 14th July which we are inclined to discount but possibility of street clashes between Communist and nationalist demonstrators during celebrations cannot be excluded.

4. We have received conflicting reports on the economic situation: the State Department paints a gloomy picture, but the Foreign Office is more optimistic.

5. There is some evidence that Kassem is anxious to bury the hatchet with Nasser and Hussein, and the feud with Iran seems to have died down also. Relations with the Soviet Union are cooler despite Mikoyan's visit, and there are signs that Kassem would like to improve his relations with the West.

6. Earlier this year we invited the Iraq Minister for Health to visit Australia (in order to promote our trade interest in hospital development scheme in Iraq), but he replied that owing to heavy engagements at home he could not accept for the time being. If the occasion arises you may mention that the invitation still stands, but we should not wish you to press it. Invitation did NOT include payment of fares for Minister, as it is not Government policy to provide this.

7. We have a favourable trade balance with Iraq, our exports July 1959 to April 1960 amounting to £A6½ million.

8. We have a temporary permit for civil aviation operations through Baghdad, but Qantas is not using this route ^{at present}.

173/10/1

6/7/1960

CONFIDENTIAL

RTH. authored
version without
para 3: chcl cons
from IC - consulted
at his request.

Sent JM 6/7

→ ① hr ltr 6/7

② (F) pb 173/10/1

15167
173/10/1
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

EDW:FPS

0.10 924

Sent: 5th July, 1960
1630

TO:

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI. 174

Repeated:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI. 298

UNCLASSIFIED.

Bag 27 addressed New Delhi via Karachi C/- pilot
BA711119 contains credentials required urgently. Please ask
B.O.A.C. arrange prompt on-carriage and advise New Delhi
details.

E.A.

(Cost: \$2.10. 0.)
6th July, 1960.

EX.COMMSO

Mr B. Bennett
JMB

File - Celebration
IRAQ
JMB

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS **SECRET**
INWARD CABLEGRAM

JT:BMW

I.15280

Sent: 4th July, 1960.
1800
Rec'd: 5th July, 1960.
0830

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

173/10/1

2923. SECRET.

From External.

Polish Embassy Official.

Our telegram 2834.

Foreign Office have received telegram from Baghdad
as follows: Grateful for early instructions. The man has
become very anxious about his future.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. IMMIGRATION
A.S.I.O. (C-M)
P.M.'s

5th July, 1960.

SEC A/Ss MR.ROWLAND@ MR.HOLLAND MR.SELLARS MR.LANDALE@

SECRET

173/10/1
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

I. 15230.

Dated: 2nd July, 1960.

2135.

Rec'd: 4th July, 1960.
0830.

PH:MP

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

334. CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

For Tange from Crocker.

Your 285. I would have preferred to avoid this honour but in view of Minister's wishes have informed the Iraqi Ambassador who requested a reply by yesterday of Australia's acceptance of invitation and my nomination as Special Representative.

2. He has shown me an outline of the programme 14th - 21st July. The first two or three days are particularly rigorous involving hours of watching ceremonial marches past while the last days tail off into more or less optional items. Day temperatures at Baghdad will get up to 115 and above. I know the Ambassador well and asked him whether it would be taken amiss if guests did not stay out the whole week. He assures me that it would not and that he expected some to stay only two or three days. I therefore requested that I be allowed to leave before the end if I judge it not inopportune (I would not leave if there was any risk of offence).

3. Regarding credentials, he had received no instructions on the point and think they are not needed. Nevertheless in case of need, I suggest you send me a letter from the Minister to the Iraqi Foreign Minister with my nomination. Helpful if done early as I might have to leave here as early as the 11th.

E.A.

4th July, 1960.

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1
CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTCOM
NEW DELHI

CONFIDENTIAL

For Crocker from Tange.

Thank you for your 334. We appreciate that this could be a fairly rigorous mission and we have no objection to you leaving early if you consider it would not be inopportune.

2. We are forwarding Credentials via Karachi by Safe Hand bag No. 27 ex Sydney 6th July.

in B. agent

was 5/7

File - Anniversary celebrations - IRAQ. 5/7

CONFIDENTIAL

*Despatched
4/7*

Mr. Lonsdale

4/7/60

4th July, 1960.

Celebration of the Second Anniversary of the
Iraq Revolution

THE MINISTER:

On the 27th June, 1960, you approved that we should accept the invitation of the Government of Iraq to send a delegate to the Celebrations which are to be held at Baghdad on the 14th July, 1960, on the occasion of the Second Anniversary of the Iraq revolution.

2. You also approved that our High Commissioner in India, Mr. Crocker, should be asked if he could represent Australia at the Celebrations. Mr. Crocker has replied that he will be available and consequently we have prepared the attached Credentials for him, for your signature if you approve.

...

(R. L. Harry)
Assistant Secretary

H.S.B.
C. & P. Branch.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to advise Your Excellency that the bearer of this Letter, Walter Russell Crocker, Esq., Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, has been designated as the Special Representative of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia on the occasion of the Celebrations which are to be held in Baghdad from the 14th to the 21st July, 1960.

Mr. Crocker is at present the High Commissioner of the Commonwealth Government of Australia in India and has been designated as Her Majesty's Australian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Nepal.

In commending Mr. Crocker to Your Excellency, I take the opportunity to express, on behalf of the Government and people of Australia, our most sincere good wishes for the future welfare and prosperity of the Republic of Iraq and its people, and to assure Your Excellency of the friendly interest with which we are following the progress of your Country.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest consideration,
Your Excellency's most obedient servant.

(R. G. MENZIES)
Minister of State for External Affairs.

CANBERRA

His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
BAGHDAD, IRAQ.

DRAFT

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to advise Your Excellency that the bearer of this Letter, Walter Russell Crocker, Esq., Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, has been designated as the Special Representative of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia on the occasion of the Celebrations which are to be held in Baghdad from the 14th to the 21st of July, 1960.

Mr. Crocker is at present the High Commissioner of the Commonwealth Government of Australia in India and ^{has been designated as} Her Majesty's Australian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary designate to Nepal.

In commending Mr. Crocker to Your Excellency, I take the opportunity to express, on behalf of the Government and people of Australia, our most sincere ~~and~~ good wishes for the future welfare and prosperity of the Republic of Iraq and its people, and to assure Your Excellency of the ~~close~~ ~~and~~ friendly interest with which we are following the progress of your Country.

I have the honour to be,

With the highest consideration,

Your Excellency's most obedient servant.

(R. G. Menzies)

Minister of State for External Affairs

Dated at Canberra the day of July, One Thousand
Nine Hundred and Sixty.

His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
BAGHDAD, IRAQ.

JG.MMc

173/1/1
I.13697

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Dated: 16th June 1960

0205

Rec'd: 16th June 1960

200

INWARD CABLEGRAM

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

297. CONFIDENTIAL.

From Kelly.

Substance of note dated 16th June from the Iraq
Embassy New Delhi as follows:

"On the occasion of the second anniversary of the Iraqi revolution 14th July, the Embassy has great pleasure in extending in the name of the Government of the Republic of Iraq cordial invitation to the esteemed Government of Australia to name two delegates to attend the first week of the celebrations in Iraq beginning 14th July. The delegates to be the guests of the Iraqi Government and are invited to arrive Baghdad about 12th July. Notification of their names requested before 1st July."

2. This seems to be an encouraging development.
3. Grateful for urgent reply.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

16th June, 1960.

SEC A/Ss LA UN COMREL PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA
SA@ SEA E.A.F&ME E INF DL INTELL C&R@

G

COLOMBO KARACHI LONDON OTTAWA

173/10/1
CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

::HP

0.10896
Sent: 4th July, 1960.
1850

TO:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.295. CONFIDENTIAL.

For Crocker from Tange.

Thank you for your 334. We appreciate that this could be a fairly rigorous Mission and we have no objection to you leaving early if you consider it would not be inopportune.

2. We are forwarding Credentials via Karachi by Safe Hand bag No.27 ex Sydney 6th July.

External Affairs.
P.M.'s.

Cost - £2.16.8.

5th July, 1960.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Austcom, NEW DELHI

173/10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

For Crocker.

IRAQ CELEBRATIONS

The following guidance may be helpful.

The party political scene continues to be confused and the likelihood of elections taking place within the next twelve months seems to have receded. Kassem's position appears to be secure. Although for some time he swung alternately towards the Communists and the nationalists, recently he seems to have favoured the latter.

2. The security situation is good in the towns, but there have been reports of disturbances in some rural areas. Speech seems free and the Court of Cassation appears to be independent of Government control.

3. We have received conflicting reports on the economic situation: the State Department paints a gloomy picture, but the Foreign Office is more optimistic.

4. There is some evidence that Kassem is anxious to bury the hatchet with Nasser and Hussein, and the feud with Iran seems to have died down also. Relations with the Soviet Union

*in walked 6/7
to my home 1/7
LH*

173/10/1

4/7/1960

CONFIDENTIAL

See order in date of 17/10/60

CONFIDENTIAL

are cooler ^{despite} ~~in spite of~~ Mikoyan's visit, and there are signs that Kassem would like to improve his relations with the West.

5. Earlier this year we invited the Iraq Minister for Health to visit Australia (in order to promote our trade interest in the hospital development scheme in Iraq), but he replied that owing to heavy engagements at home he could not ^{accept} ~~visit Australia~~ for the time being. If the occasion arises you may mention that the invitation still stands, but we should not wish you to press it. *Invitation did not include payment of fare for Minister, as it was Gov policy to provide this.*

6. We have a favourable trade balance with Iraq, our exports July, 1959 to April, 1960 amounting to £A6¹/₂ million.

7. We have a temporary permit for civil aviation operations through Baghdad, but Qantas is not using this route at present.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

../JS

O. 10708

Sent: 30th June, 1960.
1605

TO:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

173/10/1

285. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

For Crocker from Tange.

Your 297.

Minister has approved that Australia should be represented at Iraqi celebrations 14th to 21st July by one delegate and he would like you to attend as Special Representative if you are available.

2. If delegates will require Credentials please advise to whom they should be addressed.

3. Glad early reply.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (1516/145)
P.M.'s.

(COST £3/1/8)
1st July, 1960.

SEC	A/Ss	LA	UN	CR	PAC&AM	EA	AMSP	SA	EA	SA	SEA
E.A.R&ME	E	AF	ME	INF	DI	C&P	INTELL	ADMIN	PERS		
	INV										

COLOMBO KARACHI LONDON.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

I. 14793.

Dated: 28th June, 1960.
1345.
Rec'd: 29th June, 1960.
0830.

JMF:MP

173/10/1

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

325. UNCLASSIFIED.

Grateful for an early reply to my telegram 297.

✓
(Subject: Invitation of Government of Australia
to name two Delegates to attend the
Second anniversary of the Iraqi Revolution
Celebrations.)
⊗

↓
MIN.&DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s
Mr. Holland

29th June, 1960.

Telegram to Mr. Ham 26/6

SEC A/Ss LA UN COMREL PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA
SA@ E.A.F&ME INF INTELL C&P@

G

COLOMBO KARACHI LONDON OTTAWA

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

173/10/1

I. 14793.

JMF:MP

Dated: 28th June, 1960.
1345.
Rec'd: 29th June, 1960.
0830.

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

325. UNCLASSIFIED.

Grateful for an early reply to my telegram 297.

(Subject: Invitation of Government of Australia
to name two Delegates to attend the
Second anniversary of the Iraqi Revolution
Celebrations.)

MIN.&DEPT. E.A.
P.M's

29th June, 1960.

SEC A/Ss LA UN COMREL PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA
SA@ E.A.F&ME INF INTELL C&P@

G

COLOMBO KARACHI LONDON OTTAWA

File

173/10/1

23rd June, 1960

INVITATION TO ATTEND THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE IRAQ REVOLUTION.

The Minister :

The Government of Iraq, through its Embassy in New Delhi, has invited the Australian Government to send two delegates to attend a week of celebrations, beginning 14th July, 1960, on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Iraq revolution.

2. Last year, in reply to a similar invitation, we arranged for the United Kingdom Ambassador in Baghdad to represent Australia. At that time, we felt that there were reasons against our sending our own representatives; notably that -

- (i) our attendance might be considered to reflect a condonation of the brutal massacres of the revolution;
- (ii) revolutionary elements in other countries might see in our attendance a further illustration of the ease with which revolutionary governments can secure international acceptance;
- (iii) attendance might make it more difficult for us to refuse other similar invitations, particularly from friendly countries.

3. The passage of time and Kassem's relatively pro Western policies over the last year have weakened these arguments. On the other hand, there are the following arguments for attendance :-

- (i) One or two officers would be able to look at Iraq first hand and this would be valuable to the Department in terms of -
 - (a) their report;
 - (b) having available officers who had actually been to Iraq.
- (ii) The United Kingdom has been in favour of our making some gesture of support for Kassem, such as our recent invitation of the Iraqi Health Minister to visit Australia. (The Health Minister was unable to come). The sending of our own representative would be a similar gesture, and might conceivably have some good effect in Iraq.

4. The arguments for and against attendance seem fairly evenly balanced. The following two suggestions are therefore submitted for your decision :-

- (a) that our High Commissioner in India, Mr. Crocker, should be asked if he could represent Australia at the celebrations; or
- (b) that the United Kingdom should be asked to instruct their Ambassador to represent Australia as well as the United Kingdom.

(R. L. Harry)

Assistant Secretary, Division 11.

FAME Branch

173/10/1

23rd June, 1960

INVITATION TO ATTEND THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE IRAQ REVOLUTION.

The Minister :

The Government of Iraq, through its Embassy in New Delhi, has invited the Australian Government to send two delegates to attend a week of celebrations, beginning 14th July, 1960, on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Iraq revolution.

2. Last year, in reply to a similar invitation, we arranged for the United Kingdom Ambassador in Baghdad to represent Australia. At that time, we felt that there were reasons against our sending our own representatives; notably that -

- (i) our attendance might be considered to reflect a condonation of the brutal massacres of the revolution;
- (ii) revolutionary elements in other countries might see in our attendance a further illustration of the ease with which revolutionary governments can secure international acceptance;
- (iii) attendance might make it more difficult for us to refuse other similar invitations, particularly from friendly countries.

3. The passage of time and Kasseem's relatively pro Western policies over the last year have weakened these arguments. On the other hand, there are the following arguments for attendance :-

- (i) One or two officers would be able to look at Iraq first hand and this would be valuable to the Department in terms of -
 - (a) their report;
 - (b) having available officers who had actually been to Iraq.
- (ii) The United Kingdom has been in favour of our making some gesture of support for Kasseem, such as our recent invitation of the Iraqi Health Minister to visit Australia. (The Health Minister was unable to come). The sending of our own representative would be a similar gesture, and might conceivably have some good effect in Iraq.

4. The arguments for and against attendance seem fairly evenly balanced. The following two suggestions are therefore submitted for your decision :-

- (a) that our High Commissioner in India, Mr. Crocker, should be asked if he could represent Australia at the celebrations; or
- (b) that the United Kingdom should be asked to instruct their Ambassador to represent Australia as well as the United Kingdom.

(R. L. Harry)

EAHE Branch

Assistant Secretary, Division 11.

173/10/1

23rd June, 1960

INVITATION TO ATTEND THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE IRAQ REVOLUTION.

The Minister :

The Government of Iraq, through its Embassy in New Delhi, has invited the Australian Government to send two delegates to attend a week of celebrations, beginning 14th July, 1960, on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Iraq revolution.

2. Last year, in reply to a similar invitation, we arranged for the United Kingdom Ambassador in Baghdad to represent Australia. At that time, we felt that there were reasons against our sending our own representatives; notably that -

- (i) our attendance might be considered to reflect a condonation of the brutal massacres of the revolution;
- (ii) revolutionary elements in other countries might see in our attendance a further illustration of the ease with which revolutionary governments can secure international acceptance;
- (iii) attendance might make it more difficult for us to refuse other similar invitations, particularly from friendly countries.

3. The passage of time and Kasseen's relatively pro Western policies over the last year have weakened these arguments. On the other hand, there are the following arguments for attendance :-

- (i) One or two officers would be able to look at Iraq first hand and this would be valuable to the Department in terms of -
 - (a) their report;
 - (b) having available officers who had actually been to Iraq.
- (ii) The United Kingdom has been in favour of our making some gesture of support for Kasseen, such as our recent invitation of the Iraqi Health Minister to visit Australia. (The Health Minister was unable to come). The sending of our own representative would be a similar gesture, and might conceivably have some good effect in Iraq.

4. The arguments for and against attendance seem fairly evenly balanced. The following two suggestions are therefore submitted for your decision :-

- (a) that our High Commissioner in India, Mr. Crocker, should be asked if he could represent Australia at the celebrations; or
- (b) that the United Kingdom should be asked to instruct their Ambassador to represent Australia as well as the United Kingdom.

(R. L. Harry)

Assistant Secretary, Division 11.

PAID Branch

we shall need to try to
get a short briefing to
Crocker about Iraq & its
intensity as there.

had you pls watch credentials
etc with Crocker, to keep an eye?

ORA

Mr. Holland

Original to
Crocker for action

29/6

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1+3 *Done*

FILE No 173/10/1

DATE 22nd June, 1960

SUBJECT INVITATION TO ATTEND THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE IRAQ REVOLUTION.

FOR The Minister :

The Government of Iraq, through its Embassy in New Delhi, has invited the Australian Government to send two delegates to attend a week of celebrations, beginning 14th July, 1960, on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Iraq revolution.

2. Last year, in reply to a similar invitation, we arranged for the United Kingdom Ambassador in Baghdad to represent Australia. At that time, we felt that there were reasons against our sending our own representatives; notably that -

- (i) our attendance might be considered to reflect a condonation of the brutal massacres of the revolution;
- (ii) revolutionary elements in other countries might see in our attendance a further illustration of the ease with which revolutionary governments can secure international acceptance;
- (iii) attendance might make it more difficult for us to refuse other similar invitations, particularly from friendly countries.³ [The passage of time and Kassem's relatively pro Western policies over the last year have weakened these arguments.]

3. On the other hand, there are the following arguments for attendance :-

- (i) One or two officers would be able to look at Iraq first hand and this would be valuable to the Department in terms of -
 - (a) their report;
 - (b) having available officers who had actually been to Iraq.
- (ii) The United Kingdom has been in favour of our making some gesture of support for Kassem, such as our recent invitation of the Iraqi Health Minister to visit Australia. (The Health Minister was unable to come). The sending of our own representative would be a similar gesture, and might conceivably have some good effect in Iraq.

4. The arguments for and against attendance seem fairly evenly balanced. The following two suggestions are therefore submitted for your decision :-

- (a) that our High Commissioner in India, Mr. Crocker, should be asked if he could represent Australia at the celebrations; or
- (b) that the United Kingdom should be asked to instruct their Ambassador to represent Australia as well as the United Kingdom.

EAME Branch.

(R. L. Harry)
Assistant Secretary, Division 11.

DRAFT:

FOR THE MINISTER:

INVITATION TO ATTEND THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE
IRAQ REVOLUTION.

The Government of Iraq, through their Embassy in New Delhi, has invited the Australian Government to send two delegates as their guests to attend a week of celebrations, beginning 14th July, 1960, on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Iraq revolution.

Last year, in reply to a similar invitation, we arranged for the United Kingdom Ambassador in Baghdad to represent Australia. The passage of time and Kassem's performance over the last year seem to have weakened the arguments against sending a delegate of our own. However, the following considerations do still argue against attendance:-

- (i) Our attendance might be considered to reflect a condonation of the brutal massacres of the revolution.
- (ii) Revolutionary elements in other countries might see in our attendance a further illustration of the wooing of revolutionary regimes by other nations.
- (iii) Attendance might set a precedent and make it more difficult for us to refuse similar invitations, particularly from friendly countries.

On the other hand, there are the following arguments for attendance:-

- (i) One or two officers would be able to look at Iraq first hand and this would be valuable to the Department in terms of -
 - (a) their report;
 - (b) having available officers who had actually been to Iraq.

2.

- (ii) The presence of Australian representatives (which would no doubt attract considerable notice in the Middle East) might contribute something to strengthening Kassem's resolve to counter communist influence in this key Middle East nation.

The arguments for and against attendance seem fairly evenly balanced. The following two suggestions are therefore submitted for your decision:-

- (a) that Mr Crocker should be sent to represent Australia; or
- (b) that the United Kingdom should be asked to instruct their Ambassador to represent Australia as well as the United Kingdom.

(R. L. Harry)

Assistant Secretary, Division II.

G.MMc

I.13697

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Dated: 16th June 1960

0205

Rec'd: 16th June 1960

200

INWARD CABLEGRAM

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

143/10/1

297. CONFIDENTIAL.

From Kelly.

Substance of note dated 10th June from the Iraq
Embassy New Delhi as follows:

"On the occasion of the second anniversary of the
Iraqi revolution 14th July, the Embassy has great
pleasure in extending in the name of the Government of
the Republic of Iraq cordial invitation to the esteemed
Government of Australia to name two delegates to attend
the first week of the celebrations in Iraq beginning
14th July. The delegates to be the guests of the Iraqi
Government and are invited to arrive Baghdad about 12th
July. Notification of their names requested before 1st
July."

2. This seems to be an encouraging development.
3. Grateful for urgent reply.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

16th June, 1960.

SEC A/Ss LA UN COMREL PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA
SAC SEA E.A.F&ME E INF DL INTELL C&P

G

COLOMBO KARACHI LONDON OTTAWA

Mr Barnett
E. A. M. E are looking after this. They are suggesting we should be represented by either a W. Ambassador or by a W. Ambassador.
Has anything been decided? If we do not accept I assume we will send a message? W or by a W. Ambassador 22/6

JG.MMc

I.13697

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Dated: 16th June 1960

0205

Rec'd: 16th June 1960

200

INWARD CABLEGRAM

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

297. CONFIDENTIAL.

From Kelly.

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2. This seems to be an encouraging development.
3. Grateful for urgent reply.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

16th June, 1960.

SEC A/Ss LA UN COMREL PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA
SAC SEA E.AF&ME E INF DL INTELL C&P@

G

COLOMBO KARACHI LONDON OTTAWA

Mr. Rowland; This is for you I think.

It's a pity the occasion of
celebration is the murder of Nuri.

v. N.D. del. 335

(flagged)

→ Do we conveniently forget the
assassination in the interest of
drawing Iraq to the West? Please speak

TG.MMc

I.13697

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Dated: 16th June 1960

0205

Rec'd: 16th June 1960

200

INWARD CABLEGRAM

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

173/10/1

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From Kelly.

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Embassy New Delhi as follows:

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2. This seems to be an encouraging development.
3. Grateful for urgent reply.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

16th June, 1960.

Mr Holland

SEC A/Ss LA UN COMREL PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA
SAC SEA E.A.F&ME E INF DL INTELL C&P

G

COLOMBO KARACHI LONDON OTTAWA

for Rowland
This is involved to us for action but it seems to me that a decision must be based purely on political considerations
was 17/6

SECRET

173/10/1



IN REPLY
QUOTE

173.1.40

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

CANBERRA, A.C.T.

30 MAY 1960

Acting Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

DEFENCE SIGNIFICANCE OF IRAQ.

I refer to your memorandum 173/10/1 of 3rd July, 1959 in which you asked this Department to provide a brief estimate of the significance from the point of view of Australian defence of a Communist Regime establishing itself in Iraq.

2. The Chiefs of Staff Committee has endorsed, with minor amendment, a Joint Planning Committee Report on the subject, which took into account information from United Kingdom and United States sources, and the views of the Joint Intelligence Committee (Australia). Your Department was represented when the subject was taken by the Joint Planning Committee.

3. The Chiefs of Staff Committee Report, which has been approved by the Minister for Defence, addresses itself in particular to the three aspects raised in your memorandum under reference. A copy is attached.

...

Mr Moore to sec 7M 1/6

Mr Rawland 7M 7/6

to return attached if desired.

Mr. Sec. -

*retained.
2/6*

*(S) Slokes
Acting Secretary.*

(F) 2/6

SECRET



NATIONAL
ARCHIVES
OF AUSTRALIA

FOLIO REMOVAL ADVICE

SERIES NUMBER A1838/2

ITEM NUMBER 173/10/1 Pt 1

15 FOLIOS HAVE BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS PLACE IN THIS ITEM

(see Form "Document Removal Advice" at
front of file for the reason these folios were
removed)

Signature: [Signature] 04

Date: 28/12/04

173/10/1

2nd May, 1960.

The Secretary,
Department of Trade,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Attention Mr. R.L. McAuslan

Visit by Iraq Health Minister

..... Attached are copies of Memoranda Nos. 503 and 552 of 12th and 22nd April, 1960 respectively received from the Australian High Commissioner Karachi indicating that the Iraqi Health Minister will be unable to avail himself of the opportunity to visit Australia for the time being. A copy of the communication the High Commissioner received from the Iraqi Embassy on the subject is also attached.

FTH
(F.T. Homer)
for the Acting Secretary.



DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

26 APR 1960

173/10/1

CANBERRA

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
9 KUTCHERY ROAD,
KARACHI.

In reply quote No. 228/7/2

Memorandum No. 552/60

22nd April, 1960.

Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Visit by Iraq Minister for Health

Reference is made to my memorandum 503 of 12th April, and I now attach copy of a letter received from the Iraqi Ambassador in Pakistan on the above subject.

2. The Ambassador spoke to me last night and elaborated the information given in the letter to the extent that he assured me the Health Minister would have liked to have accepted the invitation but pressure of work prevented him doing so at this time. He indicated that the Iraqi Minister for Health would however like to make the visit some time in the future and would advise when he could see his way clear to be absent from Iraq for the requisite time. I personally do not think that this comment has any more significance than merely softening the declining of the invitation.

3. I assume that if you wish this matter raised at a later date you will advise me well in advance as communications seem to be delayed between the Iraqi Embassy in Karachi and Baghdad.

Copy & end sent to E.R.

A. R. Butler

High Commissioner

Mr Rowland to see.

→ *Mr Hillman*: *wd either you or dm*

Mr Harner please

tell Mr Molynaux (AKHC)

the state of play?

dm

27/4

Molynaux informed.

dm 23/5

COPY

EMBASSY OF THE IRAQI REPUBLIC
KARACHI.

21st April, 1960.

My dear Ambassador,

In continuation to my letter No.353, dated the 8th March, 1960, regarding the invitation extended to the Iraqi Minister of Health to visit Australia.

The kind invitation has been welcomed by the Iraqi authorities but owing to heavy engagements of the Health Minister at home he will not be able to avail himself of the opportunity to visit Australia for the time being. However, it shall be brought to your knowledge as to when the Health Minister will be able to visit Australia.

Yours sincerely,

sgd. Abdul Kadir Al-Gaylani

His Excellency,
Mr. A.R. Cutler,
High Commissioner for Australia,
KARACHI.



DEPARTMENT
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

20 APR 1960

173/10/1

CANBERRA

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
9 KUTCHERY ROAD,
KARACHI.

In reply quote No. 228/7/2

Memorandum No. 503/60

12th April, 1960.

Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

VISIT BY IRAQI MINISTER FOR HEALTH

Reference is made to your cable No. 71 of 2nd March and my cable 101 of 24th March regarding the invitation conveyed to the Iraqi Minister for Health and a senior official to visit Australia.

2. I have spoken to the Iraqi Ambassador on a number of occasions regarding this and informed him that we are anxious to have a definite reply to the invitation, which was originally extended for a visit commencing during the week ending 2nd April, 1960. The Iraqi Ambassador, who does not appear to enjoy the confidence of his Government, is most anxious that we keep the invitation open and, in the meantime, he informs me that he has sent a further request to Baghdad seeking an answer. As soon as a reply is received I shall inform you.

Copy sent to ER.

C. A. Butler

High Commissioner

*July
21/4*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

CONFIDENTIAL

GM/ENM

I.6431

FROM:

Sent: 24th March, 1960.
1230

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.

Rec'd: 25th March, 1960.
0830

101 CONFIDENTIAL.

173/10/1

Invitation to Iraqi Health Minister.

Your 71.

Invitation conveyed through Iraq Embassy 3rd March with request for early reply. I spoke to Iraqi Ambassador yesterday who said no reply yet received but he was advised by his Foreign Office yesterday morning that the invitation was with the Health Minister for consideration.

Cutler.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. TRADE (C.M.)
MIN. & DEPT. HEALTH
P.M.'s

25th March, 1960.

SEC.
S&SEA
CPSD

A/Ss
SA

LA

UN
SEA

TA
E.A.F&ME

ER@

E

PAC&AM
ME

AM&SF
INF

CAIRO

LONDON

WASHINGTON

Mr. Gellard

per 26/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

GM/ENM

I.6431

FROM:

Sent: 24th March, 1960.
1230

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.

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MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. TRADE (C.M.)
MIN. & DEPT. HEALTH
P.M.'s

25th March, 1960.

SEC.	A/Ss	LA	UN	TA	ER@	PAC&AM	AM&SP
S&SEA	SA		SEA	E.A.F&ME	E	ME	INF
CFSD							

CAIRO

LONDON

WASHINGTON

NOTE FOR FILE

Iraqi Health Minister.

173/10/1

Mr. J. A. Molyneux (First Secretary,
U.K. High Commission) rang me today to say that
Sir H. Trevalyan had telegraphed that in his strongly
held opinion it would be a mistake to invite the
Minister without paying his fares. He doubted if the
Council of Ministers would agree if fares were not paid.

I passed this to Mr. Homer who said he would
inform Trade. Molyneux said he proposed to tell Timbs
(P. M's Department)

J. R. Rowland

(J. R. Rowland)
18th March, 1960.

→ m. *Homer*

(*†*)

CONFIDENTIAL

Memo forwarded to -


- (1) Aust. High Commission, KARACHI 202
- (2) Austn. Legation, TEL AVIV 32.
- (3) " " CAIRO 61.

173/10/1

16th March, 1960.

VISIT BY IRAQ MINISTER FOR HEALTH AND OTHERS.

I am attaching for your information, with apologies for the delay, a copy of a record of conversation concerning proposed visits to Australia by the Iraq Minister for Health and a party of agriculturists from Iraq.



(T. V. Holland)
for the Acting Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Mr. J. A. Molyneux, First Secretary, U.K. High Commission
on 26th February, 1960
Officers Present Mr. J. R. Rowland

F. 173 / 10 / 1

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

VISIT OF IRAQI HEALTH MINISTER AND PROPOSED
INVITATION TO IRAQI AGRICULTURAL EXPERTS.

Mr. Molyneux called to ask me the latest position about the proposed invitation to the Iraqi Health Minister to visit Australia, and the proposal for an invitation to a party of agriculturists.

2. After consulting E.R. Branch I told Mr. Molyneux that a tentative schedule for the visit of the Iraqi Health Minister had now been drawn up by the Department of Trade (who were now primarily responsible for the project), and that we expected that a request to our High Commission in Karachi to deliver an invitation through the Iraq Embassy there would be sent shortly, perhaps next week. The timing of the visit would depend on the Health Minister's wishes, but our own idea was that it might take place about the middle of April, and last ten days or so. The Health Minister would be a guest of the Commonwealth Government, and would receive appropriately "red carpet" treatment, though I did not think it had yet been considered whether he should see Mr. Menzies. (Mr Molyneux asked about this).

3. I added that Sir Arthur Stephenson was returning to Iraq very shortly (if he had not already left Australia) and that he had been told about the present position, so that he would know how matters stood in any discussions with the Iraqis.

4. As to the proposed invitation to the Iraq agriculturists, I recalled my previous conversation with Mr. Molyneux, when I had told him about the complications of the proposal from our point of view. The Department of Trade, however, had shown interest in it, and they were now the Department primarily responsible for its consideration. I gathered that the proposal was more or less in abeyance for the moment, until the position regarding the invitation to the Iraqi Health Minister was clearer. Mr. Molyneux asked whether this meant that no more thought would be given to the question of the agriculturists until the Health Minister's visit was over: I said I could not answer this with any authority, but I thought it likely that Trade were waiting rather to know what the reaction to the invitation to the Minister would be.

5. Mr. Molyneux said that he might approach Trade direct to ascertain the latest position.

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M.T. Br.

Com. Rel.

Sydney Office

Inf. Br.

Ex. Comms. Br.

Melbourne Office

Antarctic Division

ER (You might like to send a copy to Trade) ✓

FOLLOWING POSTS:

London (E.A. Officer) Cairo Tel Aviv

ACTION:

3825/58.

Report prepared by
(J. R. Rowland)

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

SA:JT

O.3723

Sent: 2nd March, 1960.

1745

(via leased channel)

TO:

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI....71

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.....SAV.EA28

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....SAV.30

Australian Legation,
CAIRO.....SAV.3

173/10/1

*London were asking the
position about this and
Nazi Agriculturalists did a memo for
them please?*

Mr. Holland
for our file

CONFIDENTIAL.

In order to promote Australia's trade interest in the hospital development scheme in Iraq, the Department of Trade has proposed that we invite the Iraqi Minister for Health to visit Australia. Please therefore convey to the Iraqi Embassy an invitation along the following lines.

"The High Commission for Australia presents its compliments to the Embassy of Iraq and has the honour to request the Embassy to pass to the Minister for Health in Iraq an invitation to visit Australia for a period of two weeks as a guest of the Australian Government.

The visit would provide the Minister with an opportunity for discussions with Australian Ministers and to inspect hospital design, equipment and administration. It would also enable him to meet the principals of hospital construction and design organizations and manufacturers of hospital equipment.

It is suggested that a suitable time to commence the visit would be during the week ending 2nd April, 1960."

2. When presenting the invitation please make it clear that expenses within Australia will be paid by the Australian Government but that in accordance with normal practice we would not pay fares to and from Australia. The invitation would cover the Minister and one person (for example, and from our point of view preferably, a senior official) to accompany him.

3. We would appreciate an early reply so that detailed arrangements can be made. We would also like the Minister to indicate any special personal interests (for example theatre, racing etc.) and any people he would especially like to meet.

MIN: & DEPT: TRADE (C.H.)
MIN: & DEPT: HEALTH
P.M'S.

4th March, 1960.

= C O N F I D E N T I A L =

SEC A/Ss UN TA ER@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SLA SA E.AF&ME E
ME INT CPED

*asked the Comms. to send copy
to Tel Aviv. Done 14/3*

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. 173/10/1

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Mr. J. A. Molyneux, First Secretary, U.K. High Commission
on 25th February, 1960
Officers Present Mr. J. R. Rowland

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

VISIT OF IRAQI HEALTH MINISTER AND PROPOSED
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Mr. Molyneux called to ask me the latest position about the proposed invitation to the Iraqi Health Minister to visit Australia, and the proposal for an invitation to a party of agriculturists.

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3. I added that Sir Arthur Stephenson was returning to Iraq very shortly (if he had not already left Australia) and that he had been told about the present position, so that he would know how matters stood in any discussions with the Iraqis.

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5. Mr. Molyneux said that he might approach Trade direct to ascertain the latest position.

DISTRIBUTION:

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A/S Div. 7

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U.N. Br.

Admin. Br.

E.A.M.E. Br.

D.L. Br.

S. & S.E.A. Br.

E.R. Br.

Finance Br.

C. & P. Br.

E. & T.A. Br.

M.T. Br.

Com. Rel.

Sydney Office

Inf. Br.

Ex. Comms. Br.

Melbourne Office

Antarctic Division

ER (You might like to send a copy to Trade)

FOLLOWING POSTS:

London (E.A. Officer) Cairo Tel Aviv

ACTION:

3825/58

Report prepared by (J. R. Rowland)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The Senior External Affairs Representative,
Australia House,
London.

173/10/1

93

1st March, 1960.

VISIT BY IRAQI HEALTH MINISTER AND OTHERS.

Please refer to your memorandum No. 214 of 15th February, 1960, concerning the possibility of visits by Iraqis to Australia. Copies of records of conversation between Mr. Rowland and Mr. Molyneux of the United Kingdom High Commission on 26th January and 26th February, are attached and will bring you up to date on the latest position regarding the visits. We presume that Mr. Molyneux has kept U.K. authorities informed.

Sec.

(B. G. Dexter)
for the Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

C
O
P
Y

CONFIDENTIAL → G.T. File

173/10/1
File No. _____

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Mr. J. A. Molynaux, First Secretary, U.K. High Commission

on 26th February, 1960

Officers Present: Mr. J. R. Rowland

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File

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M.T. Br.

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Melbourne Office

Antarctic Division

ER (You might like to send a copy to Trade)

FOLLOWING POSTS:

London (E.A. Officer) Cairo Tel Aviv

ACTION:

3825/58.

Report prepared by _____

(J. R. Rowland)

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C
O
P
Y

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. 173/10/1

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Mr. J. A. Molyneux, First Secretary, U.K. High Commission

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Melbourne Office

Antarctic Division

ER (You might like to send a copy to Trade)

FOLLOWING POSTS:

London (P.A. Officer) Cairo Tel Aviv

ACTION:

3825/58.

Report prepared by Mr. J. R. Rowland

(J. R. Rowland)

CONFIDENTIAL



3/12/38

Memo No. 214/60

DEPARTMENT
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
173/10/1
22 FEB 1960

AUSTRALIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

15th February, 1960

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Australian Assistance for Iraq

We refer to London memorandum No. 1119 of 6th November, 1959, concerning:

- (a) the possibility of a visit to Australia by the Iraqi Minister for Health;
- (b) the possibility of visits to Australia by Iraqi agriculture and irrigation experts.

2. We should be grateful for your advice on the reply you propose to make to the United Kingdom authorities on these matters.

Michael Thompson
(M. McPherson)

for Senior External Affairs Representative

Registy
Incorrect filing. Should be 173/10/1. Pls re file + R/S.
ALD:yl

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

AH:BMV

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

0.2000

Sent: 15th February, 1960.
1751

TO:

(via leased channel)

Australian Delegation to I.C.A.O.,
MONTREAL

4. UNCLASSIFIED. PRIORITY.

Your M2 re vacancy Chief of Mission, Iraq, although anxious assist regret unable make nomination as no suitably qualified officer available. Inform I.C.A.O. accordingly.

CIVIL AVIATION (CA80)
(Q37/2/3)
P.M.'s

17th February, 1960.

ER

[Signature]

*This was the final
instruction: position was
discussed.*

[Signature]

F 173/10/1

*180
- 1/2*



FOLIO REMOVAL ADVICE

SERIES NUMBER A1838/2

ITEM NUMBER 173/10/1 Pt 1

4 FOLIOS HAVE BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS PLACE IN THIS ITEM

(see Form "Document Removal Advice" at
front of file for the reason these folios were
removed)

Signature: [Handwritten Signature]
Date: 30 JUL 04

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Mr. J. A. Molyneux, First Secretary, U.K. High Commissionon 26th January, 1960Officers Present: Mr. J. P. RowlandMAIN SUBJECT(S): PROPOSED VISIT OF IRAQI AGRICULTURAL EXPERTS.

Mr. Molyneux (U.K. High Commissioner's Office) called on 26th January, and asked about the present position with respect to the proposal for a visit by Iraqi agriculturists.

I told Mr. Molyneux that we had been deferring a definite decision about this until the position about the invitation to the Iraqi Health Minister to visit Australia was clearer; but it now looked as if this invitation was going ahead, and we would be looking again at the agriculturists.

I added that the proposal had certain complications for us. There was no convenient fund from which we could pay for it; a special approach to Treasury would probably be the only way of getting the money, and we were not altogether confident of the strength of the case. Moreover, we had not so far engaged in direct assistance of this kind in the Middle East (though we had contributed to international aid programmes), so the proposal would mean breaking new ground for us. Finally we had not been sure about the strength of the political case for the invitation, in the light of recent developments in Iraq.

On this last point, Mr. Molyneux said that he had seen a recent report indicating that the U.K. still thought it most important to seek to encourage the moderate elements in Iraq.

He added that the Canadians, to whom the U.K. had put a similar suggestion for a visit by agriculturists, had apparently not been able to get the necessary money from their Treasury.

See my correspondence with ER below, which partly answers your queries. You may wish to tell Molyneux (H.A. 29).

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A/S Div. 7

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D.L. Br.

S. & S.E.A. Br.
E.R. Br.
Finance Br.
C. & P. Br.
E. & T.A. Br.

M.T. Br.
Com. Rel.
Sydney Office
Inf. Br.

Ex. Comms. Br.
Melbourne Office
Antarctic Division

FOLLOWING POSTS:

Senior External Affairs Representative, London

Report prepared by (J. P. Rowland)

ACTION: Cairo

3825/58.

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No. 173/10/1

Date 28.1.60

4063/59.

SUBJECT

Visit to Australia by Iraqi Health Minister & Agriculturists

FOR *ME & 11 Sections*

7

Sen

28/1

Reference your note of 25.1.60.

1. Trade accept our view that the invitation to the Health Minister will be sent through this Dept. They have also accepted the view that the invitation be issued through the Aust. H.C. at Karachi. As soon as the itinerary they have drawn up has been cleared by Health and PM's, Trade will call on us about the issue of the invitation.

2. Trade have been exploring the possibility of having the fares paid from Iraq. They have been negotiating with the British India Company to provide passages but if this falls through, the Prime Minister has suggested the passenger be put on boats to provide transport. If neither avenue is successful the Minister of Trade has said they will need to have another look at the matter. They would not want the visit to fall through over payment of fares between Iraq and Australia.

3. Trade are still examining the question of inviting the agriculturists to Australia.

Unfortunately, staff problems have prevented

them making greater progress in their examination

but they would hope that if they are able to

find qualifications for the next they would be

able to secure an invitation about the same time

as the one to the large small business.

4. Trade promotion of the matter is aimed

at finding sufficient material to enable them

to sell the next, and in the regard they have

ought information from their trade promoters

in Kotaki, Washington & London. ~~One of the~~

~~problem~~ by they are to sell "the personal, that

will have to show that the next may have

a favorable effect on trade, particularly in

agricultural products or machinery, with long, the

problem in the regard is the size of the factory

being built by the business in long for the manufacturing

of new equipment. It was suggested the expansion

(trade) might contact the dealer with some of the

background information. Trade was nothing.

5. The foregoing information was given by Mr. H. H. H. H.

to the committee, 29/

Mitlbauer

(I'm not sure
what EAME's
worry is on
this one.)

① I understand invitation will be
issued through us. Only question
is Karachi or another port. Our
Minister shld approve at
~~appropriate~~ appropriate stage.

Bitt India

② I thought visiting Ministers paid
their fares to + from Australia
(or other countries). If this is
not the case + any difficulties
arise over paying fares to
Australia, one possibility is that
Gantas might like to do the honors.

③ Res confirm with Le Rossignol
that Trade are still not interested
in visits by agriculturists.

25/1

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No. 173/10/1

Date. 25/1/60

SUBJECT Visit of Iraqi Health Minister and Agriculturalist.

FOR E.R.

Dr. Curran
shows I spoke with
L. Hospital last. all agreed
agreed that invitation go
through our office Karachi.
He faces. I understood
this is the normal
basis for such visits
but agree that it
may affect decision on
acceptance of invitation.

Please see copy of Trade's memo
of 20th January to PH's.

2. EAME consider that invitation must
be issued through E.A. In his memo
to Trade of 9th October, 1959, (filed)
Dr. Curran said that the invitation might
be issued through Aust. H.C. Karachi.
This is still our view. Can you
take this up with Trade?

3. We are not entirely happy about a
Minister being invited to Aust. by a
Dept, but since PH wishes him to be treated
as guest of Commonwealth, we would not press
our objection.

4. As regards tour, I am personally doubtful
that Minister of Health will accept if he has
to pay his own fare (see "Basis" (a)). Few
other inviting countries would ask him
to do so. Can't Trade offer to pay his
fare?

5. What is status of Trade's consideration
of allied proposal for group of agriculturalists
to be invited? ~~They~~ After having
initially rejected this idea, Trade were
having second thoughts about it
in December.

Al. Brecken
H.E. & Af. Sections

59/986

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

22 JAN 1960

173/10/1

CANBERRA

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

20th January, 1960.

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

PROPOSED VISIT TO AUSTRALIA OF THE IRAQI
MINISTER FOR HEALTH

In October last, the Minister for Trade discussed with the Prime Minister, a proposal that an invitation be extended to the Iraqi Minister for Health, to visit Australia for the purpose of inspecting hospital design, equipment and administration. The Prime Minister indicated his agreement. In this connection it is appropriate to mention that in this proposal the Iraqi Government has undertaken a \$10 million hospital building programme in respect of which an Australian firm has been engaged as consulting architects. Tenders have been called for large quantities of fixed hospital equipment for this project and Australian firms have submitted quotations.

The Department of External Affairs has advised that the United Kingdom Ambassador in Baghdad suggests that great value would derive from any action which the Australian Government might be willing to take to encourage the Iraqis to look to Australia for guidance and advice in fields in which Australia has particular experience to offer. The Department of External Affairs agrees that such a visit would be opportune and beneficial.

The Department is anxious to have this invitation issued through appropriate channels in keeping with recommended timing, i.e. in January and February, for a visit probably in April.

A draft itinerary has been drawn up covering a period of three to four weeks. This is based on purely practical considerations designed to suit the basic purpose of the exercise. The itinerary (copy attached) has been discussed with the Department of Health who consider it to be suitable.

This Department will be prepared to make an amount of up to \$12,500 available from the Trade Publicity Funds to meet expenses incurred in Australia arising from this visit. While in Australia the Prime Minister would wish the visitors to be treated as guests of the Commonwealth.

It would be appreciated if this Department could have your views on the arrangements which should be made to ensure the success of this proposed visit.

(E. F. McClintock)
First Assistant Secretary.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs.

For your information.

R. H. Rosemary
(E. F. McClintock)
First Assistant Secretary.

MINUTE PAPER

59/986
M5/22/1 & M3/1/578Invitation by Australia to Iraq for a visit to
Australia early in 1960 by the Minister for Health
and his senior officialsBasis

- a) The Iraqi guests pay their transport costs
- b) Australia pays for their accommodation and arranges their tour in Australia, on a VIP basis.
- We should plan their programme on the basis of -
- a) An uncrowded itinerary, with no rush, hurry, close timed appointments. Give the guests hours not minutes for visits.
- b) Include as well as visits to cities, tours and rests in interesting country centres to enable them to see Australian countryside. Personal contacts and less official contacts should be the aim in this context.
- c) Enlist the help of the State Governments of Victoria & N.S.W., Ministers of Health, with Premiers' VIP treatment.

Timing

- a) The invitation should be for a month, at a time of the year to fit in with the Iraqi Governments and the Minister's wishes against Ramadan (Feb 28-Mar. 21) and preferably in our Autumn.
- b) The visit should include
- | | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| Melbourne | 1 week | |
| Sydney | 1 week | |
| Canberra | 2 days | S.M.H.E.A. tour 2 day |
| Adelaide | 2 days | |
| Tour of South Coast of N.S.W. | Illawarra | |
| area from Sydney | 2 days | |
| 2 day tour of a) | Gippsland or | |
| | b) Western District. | |
- To (i) Visit some country towns and farms
(ii) Tour Healesville - Warburton district weekend
- c) A typical week in Melbourne or Sydney would be on a minimum basis as follows -
- 1 day - Hospital administration
 - 1 day - Training for doctors and nurses
 - 1 day - City hospital structure and construction (including dental clinic)
 - 1 day - Country hospital and clinic services e.g. Bacchus Marsh
 - 1 day - Equipment, and research facilities.

d) In sending the invitation we should give the Iraqi Government the choice of -

1. Leisurely visit - 3 States
2. Leisurely visit - 2 States
3. 3 States in a hurry
4. 2 States in a hurry

The following programme is based on No.1 in 3 weeks, allowing about a week for travel to and from Iraqi.

Melbourne: 1 week, including weekend
 Victorian Minister for Health, Mr. Cameron.
 295 Queen St. ? Public Health Com^d Medical Bd.
 ? Industrial Hygiene Plumbers &
 Cinema Bds.
 Medical & Dental Services
 Maternal & Child Hygiene
 Polio & T.B. Branches

Hospitals & Charities Commission
 61 Spring St., Dr. Lindell?

Hospitals - a general picture of
 city, town and small country
 hospitalisation, bush nursing
 service
 a private hospital e.g. St. Andrews
 Masonic or Francis Xavier
 a private clinic

Walter & Eliza Hall Institute & Royal Melbourne Hospital
 Repatriation & Commonwealth Serum Laboratories
 Hospital Benefits - a large friendly Society M.U.I.O.O.F.
 Stephenson & Turner
 Australian Medical Export Co. & members

Receptions by

2 Orgs - B.M.A. Dr. Dixon, 426 Albert St.
 R.C. Surgeons, Gynaecologists
 R.A.C. Physicians
 Federation of Civil Eng. & Contractors
 Mr. Casey, Berwick
 Chamber of Manufactures
 Warburton Chalet
 M.N.B.W. Marondah Chalet
 Meet D.G.M.S., C.M.O. etc.

Sydney

1 week, including weekend.

State Minister for Health, 52 Bridge St.,

Physically handicapped Council, Nutrition &
 Dietetics, Child Clinics & Baby Health
 Centre
 Hospital Commission, 86 George St.,
 Water Sewerage Drainage Board
 Concord Repat, a community hospital, a large
 private hospital & clinic.
 C.S.I.R.O. Animal Health McMaster Laboratory

Commonwealth Dept. of Health School of B.P. & Tropical
Medicine. Institute of Child Health

*Receptions

- * R.A.C.S., R.C.O.G., R.A.C.P.
- * Aust. Medical Export. Co. P/L members in Sydney e.g.
Both & Tallents
- * Chamber of Manufactures. Exporters Group
- Meet D.D.M.S., C.M.O. etc.

Weekend Tour - Port Kembla, Illawarra, Blue Mountains.

Adelaide -

2 days including weekend.
Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Woodville
Central Purchasing Office (Hospitals & institutions)
Weekend Tour-Barossa Valley.

Canberra -

Formal call on G.G
Meet Prime Minister and Ministers.
Brief Visits to the following Departments -

Trade
Health
Army
Social Services
External Affairs.

Inspection visits.

Nat'l University
War Memorial
Mt. Stromlo
Parliament House.

Your Snowy Mts. H.E. Scheme



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

IRS

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. DexterRec'd bank
25/1/4825/1/48
Do you want to tell Holman?
p.p.p.

Seay: "I agree" seems to refer
as to the Asian Visits
Fund, not to our proposed
to leave over the invitation
till the Health Minister
business was clearer.

How does it stand
now I wonder? Is it
* going to be moved
now? If not, we
may have to reconsider
the Agriculturalists
separately.

H. Rowland

Trade are not putting paper up to
their Minister till mid-January - they
have learnt (presumably through Sir
A. Stephenson?) that Health Minister could not
come till about April. Trade will go ahead under
the hospital project collapse (which is probable). Trade are
having second thoughts about agriculturalists, & might take it up.
15/12

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE No 574/4

DATE 4th December, 1959.


SUBJECT VISIT BY IRAQI AGRICULTURAL AND IRRIGATION EXPERTS

MR. QUINN

On 1st December, 1959, you transmitted to the Secretary with a favourable recommendation a submission from Mr. Rowland that a proposal for a visit by Iraqi agricultural and irrigation experts should be deferred for the moment and reconsidered when we know the Iraqi response to a contemplated invitation to the Health Minister. The Secretary asked for the views of the Information Branch and enquired whether it might not be possible to use the Asian Visits Fund to bring out the suggested experts.

2. This raises a matter of policy governing the use of the Asian Visits Fund. As originally conceived, the Fund was to be used for Cold War activities in South-East Asia. By the time the scheme was submitted to the Prime Minister and the Treasurer by our Minister, it had been broadened in scope to take in South Asia. Later, our own Minister approved individual proposals to use the Fund for visits to and from East Asia and the Prime Minister's Department and the Treasury concurred in this use of the Fund. To extend the area of application westward to include Iraq, even if to serve the same cold war purposes, is to make a fundamental change in the character of the Fund. I believe that there would be merit in such a change, that it would be better to be sure of obtaining agreement in principle from the other two Departments before putting up this particular case which I do not regard as strong.

A.M. Morris.



(J.M. McMillan)
Head, Information Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

Secretary
I agree with Mr McMillan's comments. We may need to review our system for promoting overseas visits next year (Africa is priority to UAR in particular will need to be considered) but I believe we should be advised to try to stretch our present terms of reference to Iraq at this stage. *9/12*

*Disagree
12/12*

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

IRS

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE No. _____

DATE _____

SUBJECT

Mr Macmillan

= Wd you like to
consider this please?
Apologies for
previous omission.

LA²/₁₂

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. 173/10/1

Date 30th November, 1959

SUBJECT

VISIT BY IRAQI AGRICULTURE AND IRRIGATION EXPERTS.

FOR THE SECRETARY.....

(through MR. WINN)

Recommended
by

When he called on you on 6th November, Mr. Pritchard, Acting High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, in discussing the proposal by the Department of Trade that the Iraqi Health Minister be invited to Australia, added that the United Kingdom Ambassador in Baghdad had suggested that Australia could, if it were interested, also make a useful impact in Iraq for itself and the West in general by inviting a group of agriculture and irrigation experts to visit Australia. The United Kingdom Ambassador in Baghdad had thought that an invitation by the United Kingdom might be suspect and, therefore, not as fruitful as an invitation by Australia; and that a visit here could show the Iraqis what can be done with a proper organisation of agriculture in a free economy as a means of dissuading them from the Communist type reforms which they are considering.

2. We understand that the Foreign Office has also mentioned this proposal to our London Office.

3. The Department of Trade have examined the possibility of bringing agriculturalists to Australia, but have concluded that there would be little immediate trade promotional value in such a visit. They, therefore, do not propose to interest themselves in the proposal.

4. It is now for consideration whether we regard our political interests in the Middle East as being of sufficient value to warrant the cost of arranging a visit by Iraqi agriculture and irrigation experts. There seems little doubt that a visit of the type suggested by the United Kingdom Ambassador could have useful results. On the other hand, we have so far avoided becoming involved in any direct aid programmes in the Middle East, so that the proposed visit would entail a new precedent for us. We should perhaps be cautious before deciding to enter the field of aid as distinct from trade. An invitation will probably go to the Iraqi Health Minister soon, and this would seem capable of producing useful political results as well as trade results.

5. It is therefore recommended that the proposal for a visit by Iraqi agriculture and irrigation experts should be deferred for the moment and reconsidered when we know the Iraqi response to the invitation to the Health Minister (if one is in fact issued).

6. Economic Relations and the Economic and Technical Assistance Branches have been consulted and agree with this submission.

Inf. Amman?
Why not Asian visit?
Fund?

Rowland
(J.R. Rowland)
Head: E.A. & M.E. Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

574/4

4th December, 1959.


VISIT BY IRAQI AGRICULTURAL AND IRRIGATION EXPERTS

MR. QUINN

On 1st December, 1959, you transmitted to the Secretary with a favourable recommendation a submission from Mr. Rowland that a proposal for a visit by Iraqi agricultural and irrigation experts should be deferred for the moment and reconsidered when we know the Iraqi response to a contemplated invitation to the Health Minister. The Secretary asked for the views of the Information Branch and enquired whether it might not be possible to use the Asian Visits Fund to bring out the suggested experts.

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A.M. Morris.


(J.M. McMillan)
Head, Information Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

*Copies passed to ER + ETA + Inf
plus 5/11.*

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

30th November, 1959

VISIT BY IRAQI AGRICULTURE AND IRRIGATION EXPERTS.

THE SECRETARY

(through MR. QUINN)

When he called on you on 6th November, Mr. Pritchard, Acting High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, in discussing the proposal by the Department of Trade that the Iraqi Health Minister be invited to Australia, added that the United Kingdom Ambassador in Baghdad had suggested that Australia could, if it were interested, also make a useful impact in Iraq for itself and the West in general by inviting a group of agriculture and irrigation experts to visit Australia. The United Kingdom Ambassador in Baghdad had thought that an invitation by the United Kingdom might be suspect and, therefore, not as fruitful as an invitation by Australia; and that a visit here could show the Iraqis what can be done with a proper organisation of agriculture in a free economy as a means of dissuading them from the Communist type reforms which they are considering.

2. We understand that the Foreign Office has also mentioned this proposal to our London Office.

3. The Department of Trade have examined the possibility of bringing agriculturalists to Australia, but have concluded that there would be little immediate trade promotional value in such a visit. They, therefore, do not propose to interest themselves in the proposal.

4. It is now for consideration whether we regard our political interests in the Middle East as being of sufficient value to warrant the cost of arranging a visit by Iraqi agriculture and irrigation experts. There seems little doubt that a visit of the type suggested by the United Kingdom Ambassador could have useful results. On the other hand, we have so far avoided becoming involved in any direct aid programmes in the Middle East, so that the proposed visit would entail a new precedent for us. We should perhaps be cautious before deciding to enter the field of aid as distinct from trade. An invitation will probably go to the Iraqi Health Minister soon, and this would seem capable of producing useful political results as well as trade results.

5. It is therefore recommended that the proposal for a visit by Iraqi agriculture and irrigation experts should be deferred for the moment and reconsidered when we know the Iraqi response to the invitation to the Health Minister (if one is in fact issued).

6. Economic Relations and the Economic and Technical Assistance Branches have been consulted and agree with this submission.

(J.R. Rowland)

Head: E.A. & M.E. Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

30th November, 1959

VISIT BY IRAQI AGRICULTURE AND IRRIGATION EXPERTS.

THE SECRETARY

(through MR. QUINN)

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4. It is now for consideration whether we regard our political interests in the Middle East as being of sufficient value to warrant the cost of arranging a visit by Iraqi agriculture and irrigation experts. There seems little doubt that a visit of the type suggested by the United Kingdom Ambassador could have useful results. On the other hand, we have so far avoided becoming involved in any direct aid programmes in the Middle East, so that the proposed visit would entail a new precedent for us. We should perhaps be cautious before deciding to enter the field of aid as distinct from trade. An invitation will probably go to the Iraqi Health Minister soon, and this would seem capable of producing useful political results as well as trade results.

5. It is therefore recommended that the proposal for a visit by Iraqi agriculture and irrigation experts should be deferred for the moment and reconsidered when we know the Iraqi response to the invitation to the Health Minister (if one is in fact issued).

6. Economic Relations and the Economic and Technical Assistance Branches have been consulted and agree with this submission.

(J.S. Rowland)

Head, E.A. & M.E. Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No.

Date.....

SUBJECT

FOR

hr Games (ER)

Mr. Nelson bridge (Columbo Plan)

Iraqi Agriculturalists

I would also think it
best to see what the
of health says first - if
C/Plen air is reported that
would only be another of
several countries (Africa etc) for
where some suggestions -
such such suggestions -
countries which are not in
the C/Plen region of S
9 S.E. Asia.

This is rather an indecisive sort of memorandum, which comes down on neither side - I gotten from Indignex that the UK High Commission is keen on the proposal (which they were asked to take up with us by the Foreign Office).

I wrote if you have any news,
please, before I get information to
Mr Quinn?

Jan 25/11

2nd 1 year off
 He Revised that without head of
 these remarks, our submission
 should stand as it is up to
 end of second sentence in
 para 4, and then continue
 with Dr Currier' points
 (iv) to (viii). Feb. 2. 1890

(viii) Therefore recommended spirit -
agree visit at
this stage but suggest
it be brought up after
after health visit is
concluded.

128 26/11

NAME : I would rather like to see
it this way:

- (i) Idea of agric. visit is a good one
- (ii) However it has little value to Trade
- (iii) But really it would be useful to encourage visits of this kind.
- (iv) However we should not too precipitately get into the aid as distinct from trade fields.
- (v) An invitation will probably go to Health Minister soon
- (vi) This would seem to satisfy idea in (iii) for the moment & would have trade advantages
- (vii) We might therefore defer consideration of agric visit until we see how Health visit turns out

For the Secretary.

Visit by Iraqi Agriculture and Irrigation Experts.

When he called on you on 6th November, Mr. Pritchard, Acting High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, in discussing the proposal by the Department of Trade that the Iraqi Health Minister be invited to Australia, added that the United Kingdom Ambassador in Baghdad had suggested that Australia could, if it were interested, also make a useful impact in Iraq for itself and the West in general by inviting a group of agriculture and irrigation experts to visit Australia. The United Kingdom Ambassador in Baghdad had offered the opinion that an invitation by the United Kingdom might be suspect and, therefore, not as fruitful as an invitation by Australia, and that a visit could show the Iraqis what can be done with a proper organisation of agriculture in a free economy as a means of dissuading them from the Communist type reforms which they were considering.

2. The Department of Trade have examined the possibility of bringing agriculturalists to Australia, but have concluded that there would be little immediate trade promotional value in such a visit. They therefore do not propose to interest themselves in the proposal.

3. It is now for consideration whether we regard our political interests in the Middle East as being of sufficient value to warrant the cost of arranging a visit by Iraqi agriculture and irrigation experts. There seems little doubt that a visit of the type suggested by the United Kingdom Ambassador could have useful results. On the other hand we have so far avoided becoming involved in any direct programmes of aid to or exchanges of visits with Middle Eastern countries. The projected visit by the Iraqi Minister for Health was originally proposed purely for its trade promotional possibilities. If we now issue an invitation to a group of Iraqi agriculturalists to visit Australia, we will be breaking new ground in our Middle Eastern policy. We shall have initiated a direct relationship with Iraq, which the Iraqis may seek to develop, and it may be that we will receive some further requests for aid in the area - for example, from the Government of Jordan.

4. Our resources are limited, and it is doubtful how far we can afford to extend them beyond Asia (and, on a very limited scale, Africa) to the Middle East. At most, we might be able to undertake one or two specific projects such as the visit of the Iraqi agriculturalists, if this is considered worth while.

5. I should appreciate your direction on this proposal.

CONFIDENTIAL

JRR/BCD

(J.P. Quinn),
Asst. Secretary, Division IV.

173/10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

For the Secretary.Visit by Iraqi Agriculture and Irrigation Experts.

When he called on you on 6th November, Mr. Pritchard, Acting High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, in discussing the proposal by the Department of Trade that the Iraqi Health Minister be invited to Australia, added that the United Kingdom Ambassador in Baghdad had suggested that if it were interested, Australia could also make a useful impact in Iraq by inviting a group of agriculture and irrigation experts to visit Australia. *probably the best in general* The United Kingdom Ambassador in Baghdad had given the opinion that an invitation to the United Kingdom might be suspect and, therefore, not as fruitful as a visit to Australia, and that the visit could show the Iraqis a successful system of land tenure alternative to the Communist ~~reforming~~ *an invitation* which they were considering.

2. The Department of Trade have examined the possibility of bringing ~~in~~ agriculturalists to Australia, but have concluded that there would be little immediate trade promotional value in such a visit. They therefore do not propose to ~~visit~~ *visit* a party.

3. It is now for consideration whether we regard our political interests in the Middle East as being of sufficient value to warrant the expenditure that would be incurred in arranging a visit by ~~agriculture~~ *agriculture* and irrigation experts. There seems little doubt that a visit of the type suggested by the United Kingdom Ambassador could have useful results. On the other hand we have so far avoided becoming involved in any programmes of aid or exchanges of visits with Middle Eastern countries. The projected visit by the Iraqi Minister for Health was originally proposed purely for its trade promotional possibilities. If we now issue an invitation to a group of Iraqis *agriculturalists* to visit Australia, we will be undertaking entirely new responsibilities in the Middle East, and it may be that we will receive a further stream of requests for intervention in the area. It is doubtful whether our resources can be extended to cover the Middle East in addition to Asia and, on a very limited scale, Africa.

4. I would appreciate your direction on this proposal.

(J.P. Quinn),

Asst. Secretary, Division IV.

B.G. Dexter,

Middle East and Africa Sections.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

TEMPLE BAR 2435.

AUSTRALIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
LONDON, W.C.2

In reply quote No. 3/13/38

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

6th November, 1959.

No. 1119/59

MEMORANDUM for -

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

12 NOV 1959

175/10/1
CANBERRA

AUSTRALIAN ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQ

In the course of a conversation on 5th November with the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, which we have reported separately, they mentioned that they had recently arranged for the United Kingdom High Commission in Canberra to take up with you (or, perhaps, with the Prime Minister's Department) a suggestion for Australian assistance to Iraq. There were apparently two separate ideas : one arising from Sir Arthur Stephenson's visit to Baghdad (to which our memorandum No. 1112 of 15th October, 1958, referred) concerned the possibility of a visit to Australia by the Iraqi Minister for Health; and the other, a more general one, for visits to Australia by Iraqi agriculture and irrigation experts.

2. We should be grateful for advice in due course of the response you make to the United Kingdom authorities on these matters.

Copy passed to the Home, ER.

ALB 13/11

G.B. Feakes
(G. B. Feakes)

For Senior External Affairs Representative

Registry - re-file on 173/10/1 and R/S

ALB.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with.....

on Mr. H. Pritchard, Acting High Commissioner for the
 Officers Present 6th November, 1959 United Kingdom
The Secretary

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

- (1) IRAQ
- (2) VOTE ON APARTHEID IN THE UNITED NATIONS
- (3) LAOS
- (4) ANZUS

Iraq

The Acting High Commissioner brought me a note expressing the United Kingdom view that it would be advantageous if Australia were to follow up opportunities of inviting the Iraqi Minister of Health, and also visits of Iraqi agriculturalists, to Australia - for political reasons. He said, incidentally, that an invitation might best be conveyed to the Minister of Health without specification of name since the United Kingdom Ambassador had reported that there might be a change in the occupancy of the portfolio. I said I would have the United Kingdom suggestions examined.

Apartheid

2. Pritchard said that he had received a telegram advising that Mr. Casey had confirmed the decision of the Australian Government to abstain on the Indian resolution. He was instructed to urge that Australia reconsider its decision. The United Kingdom very much hoped that Australia would continue to vote against the resolution for the following reasons:

- (1) an abstention would leave only the United Kingdom, France and Portugal in opposition;
- (2) this would weaken further the argument, to which the United Kingdom was strongly attached, that this resolution infringed Article 2 (7) of the Charter; the United Kingdom was particularly anxious to sustain this point since it had heard some suggestion that United Kingdom policy in Nyasaland might be brought to the United Nations;
- (3) there were some signs of South African efforts to create some autonomy in the Bantu community and it would be unwise to respond to this gesture by turning away from South Africa.

/3.

DISTRIBUTION:

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Secretary

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Legal Adviser

A/S Div. 7

Pac. & Am. Br.

U.N. Br.

Admin. Br.

E.A.M.E. Br.

D.L. Br.

S. & S.E.A. Br.

E.R. Br.

Finance Br.

C. & P. Br.

E. & T.A. Br.

M.T. Br.

Com. Rel.

Sydney Office

Inf. Br.

Ex. Comms. Br.

Melbourne Office

Antarctic Division

FOLLOWING POSTS:

ACTION:

9962/59

x External Affairs Officer, London.

x Please concert with H.A.M. on the attachments.

The British Embassy despatch of October 1st should be returned to Mr. Pritchard.

CONFIDENTIAL

N. Dexter.

This requires a paper from Div. IV.

R 9/10

Mr. Dexter

Mr. Casey did

know of this

Mr. Quinn says Ed. holds

hand until he returns, then

tells him - as this is

the first arab Minister.

But Ed. can go on hardly, if

they keep us fully informed.

Actg.

Legal Adviser

A/S Div. 7

M.A.

Report prepared by.....

Registry

(A. H. Pearce)

Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

3. I told Pritchard that we would certainly bring this question before the Acting Minister and Mr. Casey again. My preliminary reactions were :

- (1) our analysis of the position (which I explained to him) satisfied us that an abstention accompanied by an explanation that we regarded the resolution as outside the competence of the United Nations adequately protected us on Article 2 (7). I said that all we could hope to achieve was consistency. At an earlier time when the United Kingdom, against our judgment, had refrained from invoking Article 2 (7) on the Cyprus issue, we had felt it desirable to stand firm on the principle wherever we saw it arising. But the fact is, we believe, that all that is involved is consistency : what we say and the way we vote will not lead more than a handful of the 82 members of the United Nations to accept that apartheid Nyasaland or other potential subjects, are in fact covered by Article 2 (7);
- (2) I explained that we had satisfied ourselves that a switch by Australia could have only marginal effect on South Africa's attitude to the Commonwealth;
- (3) Australia had to have regard to the disadvantages to us of misunderstanding of our motives (support for South Africa) in Asia and elsewhere. I thought that if the United Kingdom voted against such a resolution they would automatically be given credit for voting out of consideration for another member of the Commonwealth rather than out of sympathy ~~for~~ the policies of racial discrimination. Australia would not receive this tolerance.

Laos

4. We discussed various aspects of the Laotian situation and I told him of our belief that a number of countries ought to be concentrating on ways and means of building up the long-term stability of Laos.

ANGUS

5. He asked whether he might be briefed as he had been on previous occasions. I said that London would have had a report of Mr. Casey's briefing on Cascia but that I would ask Mr. Heydon to give Pritchard some information for his own use.


(A.M. Tange)
Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

EA + ME

For inf.

128

F 173/10/1

Mr Dexter

Also a bit late in

ER discussing again
with Track by following activity -
Secretary is with the
Howland group

Any later developments
I under - grant from
VK's expense of funds
OK

Log 9/11
10/11

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY FOR E.A.M.E. BRANCH

9th October, 1959

The Secretary,
Department of Trade,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

(Attention: Mr. Le Rossignol)

Visit of Iraqi Health Minister to Australia

I refer to your enquiries by telephone concerning the possible visit by the Iraqi Minister for Health in connection with prospective sales of Australian medical equipment to Iraq.

2. This Department would have no objection to the issue of an invitation to the Iraqi Minister for Health to visit Australia. If you decide to go ahead with the proposal, we suggest:

- (i) That the invitation might be issued through the Australian High Commission in Karachi;
- (ii) That the Prime Minister's Department should be informed of the proposed Ministerial visit;
- (iii) That other interested Departments (for example, External Affairs and Health) be consulted as appropriate on detailed arrangements for the visit;
- (iv) That your Department, in consultation with the Prime Minister's Department, approach Treasury for the necessary funds for the visit; and
- (v) That any publicity should present the visit primarily as a technical (health) and trade operation.

3. We should be glad to give you any assistance you may require, for example, in passing the invitation through our High Commission in Karachi and in other ways.

CONFIDENTIAL

(J.W.C. Cumes)
for the Secretary

1. Iraq is A.
Sykes
was to send
him out first
during his visit.

2. Sound him
out only, though

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Mr. R. Pritchard, Acting High Commissioner for the
 on 6th November, 1959 United Kingdom

Officers Present: The Secretary

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

- (1) IRAQ
- (2) VOTE ON APARTHEID IN THE UNITED NATIONS
- (3) LAOS
- (4) ANGUS

Iraq

The Acting High Commissioner brought me a note expressing the United Kingdom view that it would be advantageous if Australia were to follow up opportunities of inviting the Iraqi Minister of Health, and also visits of Iraqi agriculturalists, to Australia - for political reasons. He said, incidentally, that an invitation might best be conveyed to the Minister of Health without specification of name since the United Kingdom Ambassador had reported that there might be a change in the occupancy of the portfolio. I said I would have the United Kingdom suggestions examined.

*high health
minutes*

*Ep. has
later
pages
apparently*

Apartheid

2. Pritchard said that he had received a telegram advising that Mr. Casey had confirmed the decision of the Australian Government to abstain on the Indian resolution. He was instructed to urge that Australia reconsider its decision. The United Kingdom very much hoped that Australia would continue to vote against the resolution for the following reasons:

- (1) on abstention would leave only the United Kingdom, France and Portugal in opposition;
- (2) this would weaken further the argument, to which the United Kingdom was strongly attached, that this resolution infringed Article 2 (7) of the Charter; The United Kingdom was particularly anxious to sustain this point since it had heard some suggestion that United Kingdom policy in Nyasaland might be brought to the United Nations;
- (3) there were some signs of South African efforts to create some autonomy in the Bantu community and it would be unwise to respond to this gesture by turning away from South Africa.

/3.

DISTRIBUTION:

Actg. Secy.	Pac. & Am. Br.	S. & S.E.A. Br.	M.T. Br.	Ex. Comms. Br.
Minister	U.N. Br.	E.R. Br.	Com. Rel.	Melbourne Office
Secretary	Admin. Br.	Finance Br.	Sydney Office	Antarctic Division
A/S Div. 1	E.A.M.E. Br.	C. & P. Br.	Inf. Br.	
A/S Div. 2				
A/S Div. 3				
A/S Div. 4				
Legal Adviser				
A/S Div. 7				
	D.L. Br.	E. & T.A. Br.		

FOLLOWING POSTS:Registry

Report prepared by.....

ACTION

5962/58.

External Affairs Officer, London.
Liberal concert with U.A.N.A. on the attachments.
 The British Embassy despatch of October 1st should be
 returned to Mr. Pritchard.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

3. I told Pritchard that we would certainly bring this question before the Acting Minister and Mr. Casey again. My preliminary reactions were :


- (1) our analysis of the position (which I explained to him) satisfied us that an abstention accompanied by an explanation that we regarded the resolution as outside the competence of the United Nations adequately protected us on Article 2 (7). I said that all we could hope to achieve was consistency. At an earlier time when the United Kingdom, against our judgment, had refrained from invoking Article 2 (7) on the Cyprus issue, we had felt it desirable to stand firm on the principle wherever we saw it arising. But the fact is, we believe, that all that is involved is consistency : what we say and the way we vote will not lead more than a handful of the 82 members of the United Nations to accept that apartheid Nyasaland or other potential subjects, are in fact covered by Article 2 (7);
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(A.H. Tange)
Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

(F 173/10/1)
CONFIDENTIAL

*Left with Secretary of Mr. Pritchard, Ag. UKHC,
on 6/11/59. Correspondence with ER.*

POSSIBLE VISITS OF IRAQI DELEGATIONS TO AUSTRALIA.

Her Majesty's Ambassador in Baghdad was recently told by Sir Arthur Stephenson, the Australian architect, that the Australian authorities have it in mind to invite the Iraqi Minister of Health, together with some of his senior officials, to visit Australia shortly. Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, who was asked for his views by Sir Arthur Stephenson, has reported that the proposal has his very warm support.

2. The United Kingdom authorities would regard such an Australian initiative as most opportune. They have been independently considering how to counteract, by keeping alive in Iraqi minds the achievements of Western-type democracies, the belief in Iraq that development is only possible through a "directed" economy. This belief has, of course, been fostered by the considerable number of technical delegations which the Iraqi Government has recently been sending to Iron Curtain countries. The United Kingdom is handicapped by past history in what it can do to counteract these developments. However, similar considerations do not apply, or apply less forcibly, to other countries in the Commonwealth; and the United Kingdom authorities therefore venture to suggest that great value would derive from any action which the Australian authorities might be willing to take to encourage the Iraqis to look to Australia for guidance and advice in fields in which Australia has particular expertise and experience to offer.

3. The Australian authorities might perhaps wish to consider the possibility of arranging visits for Iraqi agriculturalists, with the primary object of opening the visitors' eyes to what can be done with proper organisation of agriculture in a free economy. This might help to give the Iraqis fresh ideas for the use of the considerable agricultural potential of their own country and at the same time prompt

CONFIDENTIAL / them

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

them to turn to Commonwealth countries such as Australia for advice on particular problems. Sir Humphrey Trevelyan has mentioned that he believes that the Iraqi Minister of Agriculture would be receptive to an invitation to himself and possibly other top officials concerned with agriculture in Iraq. The Minister has only recently returned from a visit to the Soviet Union where, according to reports received by the British Embassy in Baghdad, he and his party were greatly disillusioned.

4. It would seem that contacts between Iraqi agriculturalists and Australia would be particularly valued by the former in view of the similarities between the climatic conditions of the two countries. There is the further point that Iraq is buying considerable quantities of Australian wheat this year and is likely to go on importing cereals for the next few seasons.

CONFIDENTIAL

↓
to
~~Mr. Melchior~~
~~Mr. M.~~

Our file is not
up to date =
the ^{later} papers are on
E.R.'s file, it seems
we shd have copies, please.

~~Mr. M.~~ is from the Secretary.

E.R. will send us the file
later
JRM 6/1
/x1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS **RESTRICTED**
INWARD CABLEGRAM

:FPG

I.18018

Dated: 7th October, 1959
1910

Rec'd: 8th October, 1959
0830

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

5792 RESTRICTED.

From External.

Iraqi Air Transport Agreement.

Our memorandum No.883.

Iraqi Embassy here has advised that:

- (a) Extension of Qantas Air Transport permit is still under consideration.
- (b) Iraqi authorities "regret that at present time company cannot undertake the conclusion of " an Air Transport agreement with Australia.

MIN. & DEPT. CIVIL AVIATION (T.T.)
A / MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S.

8th-October, 1959.

SEC A/Ss EEO E.A.F&ME E ME INF

173/10/1

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD CABLEGRAM

I. 17271.

:MP

Dated: 28th September, 1959.
1715.
Rec'd: 29th September, 1959.
0830.

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

3650. CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Austnat New York 114.

From External.

IRAQI EXECUTIONS.

Our 3633.

You may be considering whether Australia should participate in representations which are proposed to the Iraqis about further executions. It would seem prudent to make no representations either to Hammarskjöld or the Iraqis without first consulting the United Kingdom authorities whose present efforts are devoted to organizing representations to Iraqis by Hammarskjöld and Middle East countries (primarily non-cento powers) only. In my own view it would be best if we made no move to Hammarskjöld or the Iraqis.. The only representations likely to do good are those from other Arab countries and Trevelyan has reported for instance his fear that representations from him to Kaseen would do more harm than good since the latter is likely to react sharply to British or American pressure.

Shann.

A/MIN.&DEPT. E.A.
MIN.&DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M's

29th September, 1959.

SEC	A/Ss	LA	MR EASTMAN	UN	COMREL	PAC&AM
EA	AM&SP	S&SEA	SA	E.AF&ME	E AF	ME INF
DL	INTELL					

TOKYO WASHINGTON WELLINGTON

173/10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No. 173/10/1

Date 15th September, 1959.

SUBJECT

VISIT BY IRAQI MINISTER

FOR MR. CUMES

Copy for Dr. Cumes
C. and P.

Dr. Cumes agrees with my approach & is proceeding accordingly. 16.9.

Iraq is conducting an extensive programme of hospital building, involving the expenditure of some £4 million immediately and a further £10 millions in the near future. Since pre-revolutionary days the Australian architectural firm of Stephenson and Turner has been undertaking work connected with this programme. Sir Arthur Stephenson has several times consulted the Minister regarding political conditions in Iraq and the consular protection of his employees there. Sir Arthur is leaving for Iraq tomorrow to supervise the various phases of hospital contracts which his firm is letting.

2. The Department of Trade consider that considerable scope exists for Australian suppliers of medical equipment. They believe that if the Iraqi Minister for Health could be invited to Australia, this would probably boost Australian sales. They are confident that they can obtain funds to cover such a visit. They have consulted Dr. Cumes about the political aspects and the method of issuing an invitation.

3. Quite apart from the trade aspects, I believe that a visit by an Iraqi Minister would be useful politically. The balance between the communists and nationalists in Iraq is very delicate. At the moment only one or two of the Ministers are communists or fellow travellers, but the continuation of this situation seems to depend almost entirely on Kassem. He is capable of being influenced for good or evil - for instance, United Kingdom agreement earlier this year to supply arms had a marked effect for the good on his policies. It may be that, by inviting a responsible Iraqi Minister, we will not only help to build that Minister up in the eyes of his people, but also influence Kassem himself. In any case, the visit would do something to help the development of our relations with Iraq.

Selection of Minister

4. Dr. Cumes has queried whether the Minister of Health would be the best choice, or whether a more senior Minister should be considered. On the basis of portfolios, it is difficult to select a more suitable Minister from the more senior Ministries - Interior, Finance, Economics, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Education, Social Affairs, Guidance. The Ministry of Development is junior to Health. On the basis of personalities, we do not have sufficient detail to know who exercises most influence with Kassem. If it is thought that we should enquire further, a telegram to London would seem the best method.

5. Unless he has resigned within the last month Major-General Dr. Mohammed al-Shawwaf is Minister of Health, to which position he was appointed on 7th February, 1959. He is a brother of the ill-fated leader of the abortive Mosul revolt of March, 1959. This connection, however, does not seem to have compromised his position: in fact, another brother, Abdul Latif al-Shawwaf (perhaps a "fellow-traveller"), was taken into the Cabinet on 13th July, 1959.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Method of Invitation


6. Trade had thought of asking Sir Arthur Stephenson to issue an invitation during his visit. This seems entirely inappropriate to me, and Dr. Cumes is telling Trade that at first sight we do not like the idea. I feel that a foreign Minister should be invited by the Government, which will inevitably, for considerations of courtesy alone, have to provide some facilities and entertainment. This seems to me particularly valid if a government Department (Trade) is to be responsible for him during his visit.

7. I would think that if a Government invitation were to be issued, it should be extended by our High Commissioner in Karachi to the Iraqi Ambassador there. This, it seems to me, is the most direct route. It would avoid the possibility of the Iraqis thinking that we were acting at the behest of the United Kingdom or United States if the invitation were issued through London or Washington.

Recommendations

8. I recommend that:-

- (a) We support the idea of a visit by the Iraqi Minister of Health;
- (b) We tell Trade that in our view the invitation should be on a governmental basis, through the Australian to the Iraqi heads of mission in Karachi;
- (c) We advise Trade that in our view they should arrange some state hospitality in Australia, presumably through the Prime Minister's Department.


(B.G. Dexter)

MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA SECTIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

OF LETTER FROM
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

File No. 157/30

14th August, 1959.

Memorandum No. 739/59

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A.C.T.

Interview with the Acting Permanent
Representative of Iraq

... Attached for your information is a record of
conversation on 12th August between the Permanent Representative
of Australia and the Acting Permanent Representative of Iraq.

J. Blinell
Permanent Representative

JP:emk.

MR. ~~DEVER~~ for your file

del 24/8
27/8

F 173/10/1

Record of Conversation with the Acting Permanent
Representative of Iraq

I called today on the Acting Permanent Representative of Iraq (Dr. Adnan M. Pachachi). He began by saying that he assumed it was useless to ask Australia to change its vote this year on the Algerian question. I replied that the Algerian question was a very difficult one for all of us, and it was difficult to say how we would vote until we knew what sort of resolutions would be put before us and what attitude France was going to take on both substance and method of handling the question. Pachachi said that the basic point to keep in mind was that the French would sooner or later have to give Algeria its independence. Until they gained independence, the Algerians would keep fighting, if necessary by guerrilla warfare. It would be impossible for the French to subdue Algeria militarily. Therefore sooner or later the French would have to have talks with the Algerians, and the countries (including Iraq) which had put the Algerian item on the agenda of the Assembly would be content with the resolution calling on the French to have talks with representatives of the Algerians. I said that the French would not recognize the F.L.N. government, and Pachachi replied that he did not care whether the Algerian representatives were described as F.L.N. or not, so long as the French talked to them. He said however that the French would have to talk with the leaders of the F.L.N. government and not with some other Algerians.

2. Other points of interest Mr. Pachachi made during our conversation were:-

- (a) He thought the report of the Secretary-General on UNRWA could be accepted by the Arab States without much difficulty. He did not think that there was much prospect of a settlement of the refugee question in the early future and believed that the best thing was to let the situation go on from year to year. He seemed to have some hopes (without explicitly saying so) that, if left to time, the refugee situation would solve itself, possibly through the refugees becoming absorbed into the countries where they were now living. He said that in Iraq, where there were only about 6,000 refugees, the refugees were now fairly completely assimilated. Iraq of course differed from some other Arab countries in not being over-populated.
- (b) He thought that the Suez Canal disputes now were legal rather than political, and perhaps we ought to try and handle them in a legal forum. He was under the impression that the U.A.R. was willing to have taken to the International Court of Justice the question of its rights under the convention to hold up shipping on defence, etc. grounds. It was true that the U.A.R. was not observing a decision of the Security Council, but that decision was of course a political one and not a legal one.
- (c) Present indications were that Iraq would again abstain this year on the question of deferring consideration of the admission of Communist China. If however the substance of the matter came to a vote (which was not likely) and there was a motion to admit Communist China, Iraq would vote for it, because it recognized Peking.
- (d) Pachachi believed that the seat in the Security Council, now occupied by Japan, should be filled this year by a nominee of the Eastern European Communist states. This would give effect to the gentlemen's agreement in 1946 between the great powers.
- (e) Pachachi was very critical of the agreement at Geneva among the great powers to have a ten-power disarmament body outside the United Nations with parity for East and West. He said some neutral states ought to be added. There was more likely

to be progress in discussions if there were some independent members there to keep discussion going and help avoid deadlocks between two major blocs.

- (f) The Foreign Minister of Iraq would probably be coming for the first stages of the General Assembly.

12th August, 1959.

J. Plimsoll
J. Plimsoll

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED

AH:

O.10239

Sent: 6th August, 1959.
1830

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

2240. RESTRICTED. PRIORITY.

For External.

Your memorandum 17 of 7th January, 1959.

Please present Note along following lines to Iraqi Embassy,
London:

Begins:

The Office of the High Commissioner for Australia presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq and has the honour to refer to the Embassy's Note 3/6/7 of 1st January, 1959 granting an extension of the Qantas Air Transport permit until 31st August, 1959.

2. The Australian authorities now wish to apply for a further extension of this permit and they would be pleased if an early and favourable decision could be reached.

3. With regard to the possibility of an Air Transport Agreement between Australia and Iraq, the Australian authorities would also appreciate advice whether the Iraqi authorities are now in a position to proceed towards the formal completion of an Air Transport Agreement.

Ends.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (716/50/5/4)
MIN. & DEPT. CIVIL AVIATION
P.M.'S

(Cost £8.16.0)

7th August, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA ERQ S&SEA SA EAF&ME AF C&P

173/10/1

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. RESTRICTED
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

:HC

0.3823

Sent: 6th July, 1959.
1400

TO:

* (via leased channel)

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON. 8463

REPEAT:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON. (For External) 1835

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI. SAV.30.

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI. SAV.51

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA. SAV.94 *

RESTRICTED.

Your 1440 - Iraq Anniversary Celebration.

Please inform Iraqis as in London's 99 to you.

MIN. DEPT. E.A. (173/10/1)
P.M.'s.

(Cost £1.7.0)
6th July, 1959.

SEC L/Ss MR. EASTMAN UN COMREL PACNAM AM&SP S&SWA
SA E. AF&ME AF ME INF DL C&F INTELL

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

FFG:BMW

I.11830

Sent: 3rd July, 1959.
1750
Rec'd: 4th July, 1959.
0830

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

2458.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington 99 repeated Savingsgrams Karachi 5,
Delhi 15, Ottawa 57.

For External.

Your 1808.

Anniversary of Iraqi Republic.

United Kingdom have agreed that their Ambassador
should also represent us. Presume our Embassy in Washington
will advise Iraqi's that Trevelyan will act for us. The
Foreign Office is telegraphing their Embassy Baghdad.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s

4th July, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR.EASTMAN UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA
EAF&ME E AF ME INF DL INTELL C&P

173/10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM FOR DESPATCH.

CODED BY
TIME SENT
GROUPS
COST
TYPED BY
DISTRIBUTION

ADDRESSES

Ausamba Washington
Repeated Ausamba London (for External)
Ausamba Karachi Samungam
Ausamba New Delhi
Ausamba Ottawa

7281/56.

Serial No. Classification Restricted

Your 1440 - Iraq Anniversary Celebrations
Please inform Iraqis as in
London's 99 to you.

COPIES

SECRETARY

A.S. (DIV. 1)
A.S. (DIV. 2)
A.S. (DIV. 3)
A.S. (DIV. 4)
L. & T. (DIV. 5)
U.N. TA ER CR
PAC & AM EA AM & SP
S & SEA SA SEA
E. AF & ME E AF & ME
INF DL MT
C & P
ANT
ADMIN PERS PROP
FIN TRAV
EX. COMMS

M. Dwyer

State:-
London line replied (repeated
Wash.) saying they will represent
us. UK Amb. Baghdad informed.
I sent above after informing

M. Dwyer

AUTHORIZED BY

E.A. FILE NO.

173/10/1

DATE

F

SECRET

173/10/1.

3rd July, 1959.

The Secretary,
Department of Defence,
CANBERRA.

*Copied & passed to IC
& DL
HLS.*

Defence Significance of Iraq.

The Department of External Affairs is considering the political implications for Australia of a communist regime establishing itself in Iraq. The immediate danger of such a development has receded in recent weeks, but it is considered that such a study is still worth undertaking in view of the uncertainty of Iraq's future.

2. It would be of considerable value to the Department if you could provide a brief estimate of the significance, from the point of view of Australian defence, of such a development. In particular, your comments would be appreciated on the following aspects:

- (a) The danger to Australia resulting from the establishment of a Soviet naval base at Basra;
- (b) The danger resulting from the establishment in Iraq of Soviet air or military bases; and
- (c) The effect of a denial of overflying rights over Iraq.

B. G. -
(B. C. Hill)
for the Secretary.

*This memo approved in
Draft by IC. (H. Woodard)
and DL. (H. Anderson)
with 155/7/1 + Add 3/1.*

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

14.4.1959.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR AUSTRALIA OF SITUATION IN IRAQ.

MR. HEYDON.

I suggest that we ask the Intelligence Co-ordination Branch to recommend to J.I.C. that they prepare an estimate of the defence significance for Australia of a communist regime establishing itself in Iraq.

2. The following are some of the aspects that immediately occur to me:

- (a) Iraq would probably be reduced to the status of a Russian satellite;
- (b) The U.S.S.R. would obtain for the first time a firm foothold in the Middle East. The Russians would thus have penetrated the thin Northern Tier formed by the Baghdad Pact. Their presence in Iraq would menace the established order in Iran particularly, in Turkey, and in the Middle East countries generally. It would have implications for the Western position in Europe, for Africa, and for Asia;
- (c) By overflying the thin intervening strip of Turkey and Iran; the U.S.S.R. would obtain a route across the Middle East to a warm water port, Basra. At the very least, Basra could become an important Russian port for the peacetime operations of its submarine fleets, for communications with Antarctica, and for trade and political penetration in the Middle East, Asia and Africa;
- (d) The U.S.S.R. seems at present to aim at stirring up the Kurds in Northern Iraq and neighbouring areas in Iran and Turkey with a view to the creation of a separate Kurdish state. If such a state could be created, Russia would obtain a land route to Basra. Basra could then develop into the most important Russian port for the peacetime operations mentioned in (b) above. At the worst, it could become a major Russian military base, threatening the entire Western position as well as Australia's communications with Europe;
- (e) If the flow of oil from Iraq to the West were interrupted, the quantity thus lost to the West could relatively quickly be replaced by an increase in production (for which productive capacity exists) in Kuwait, Bahrain and perhaps Saudi Arabia. These alternative supplies would, however, be physically much more at the mercy of Russia. Further, in the long run it seems unlikely that Kuwait, which is territorially contiguous with Iraq and to which Iraq has on occasions laid claim, could escape communist subversion and eventual satellite status. Even if the flow of oil from Iraq and elsewhere to the West were not interrupted, Russia's presence in Iraq would enable it to turn the flow off at will. Interruption in its Middle Eastern oil supplies would oblige the West to seek oil elsewhere, thus possibly reducing the quantity available to Australia;

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

- (f) Establishment of a communist regime in Iraq would represent the first occasion on which a Moslem country had become communist. Other Islamic states, e.g. Indonesia, might be less constrained to resist the encroachments of communism on the (false) grounds that Islam and communism are incompatible.

3. There are no doubt numerous other aspects, some of them perhaps of more direct significance to Australia, which could be considered.

(B. G. Dexter)
Middle East Section.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

:FPG

I.11684

Dated: 2nd July, 1959
1905

Rec'd: 3rd July, 1959
0945
(Via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

1440 UNCLASSIFIED

IRAQ ANNIVERSARY.

We have today received further note from Iraq Embassy asking if the names of our Delegation could be forwarded as soon as possible and suggesting that the Delegation should arrive in Iraq on July 12th.

2. Grateful for advice.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (173/10/1)
P.M.'S.

3rd July, 1959.

SEC A/Ss MR.EASTMAN S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF INF DL MT
INTELL C&P

G

KARACHI LONDON NEW DELHI

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM **RESTRICTED**

.../LO

0.8743

Dated: 2nd Ju , 1959
1805

TO:

(*Transmitted via leased channel)

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.....1808

REPEATED (for information)

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....SAV. 248 *

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.....SAV.28

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.....SAV.49

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.....SAV.93 *

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 2234 and C.R.O. telegram W.No.421 of 26th June.

Anniversary of Iraqi Republic.

We shall not be sending delegation to Baghdad for 14th July. Please ask United Kingdom authorities whether their Ambassador would also represent Australia.

For Washington.

Above is for your information. Please await further advice before replying to Iraqi Note in your 1321.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s

Cost £8.15.0
3rd July, 1959

SEC 1/SS LA MR EASTMAN UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA
SA E.A.F&ME E AF ME INF DL C&P INTELL

RESTRICTED

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

~~Secretary~~

Inagi Anniversary Celebration

You would probably wish
to see attached draft
cable before despatch.

Solution therein is Minister's

J.F.B. $\frac{2}{7}$

Cable despatched unchanged. JB 2/7

→ ~~to~~
in there
JB $\frac{2}{7}$

LONDON (FOR EXTERNAL)

APW

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION WASHINGTON SAVINGRAM
KARACHI "
NEW DELHI "
OTTAWA "

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 2234 and C.R.O. telegram W.No. 421 of 26th June.
Anniversary of Iraqi Republic.

We will not be sending delegation to Baghdad for
14th July. Please ask United Kingdom authorities whether their
Ambassador could also represent Australia.

*For Wash. Please await further
advise etc. — your 132,*

173/10/1.

2/7/59

→ *M. B. C. Hill*
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Confidential

PLEASE SEE PAPER
FOR SIGNATURE OR
APPROVAL
BELOW

RECEIVED

30 JUN 1959

MINISTER'S

File No. 173/10/1

Date 26th June, 1959.

SUBJECT

ATTENDANCE AT IRAQI ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS

FOR THE SECRETARY

*Through
Mr. J. L. Heydon*

*Secretary
On balance,
I disagree with
the recommendation.
I appreciate his
arguments in
para 3 (a) & (b)
— but I think
"a show of support
to have any
effect, would need
more effort than
a delegation for a
celebration. In
my view para 4
overstates his
arguments for
attendance."*

PHH

29/6/59

Further minutes

*I think all the
facts and conclusions
are stated.*

*Submitted for
your decision pls.*

PHH

29/6/59

While the United Kingdom and United States (and Pakistan) have not taken final decisions whether to participate in the celebrations of the Anniversary of the Iraqi revolution on 14th July, and if so at what level, it seems most probable that they will be represented by their Ambassadors in Baghdad supported by other officials. We can therefore consider further the question of Australian attendance.

2. Arguments against attendance are as follows :

- (a) would attendance tend to condone the brutal massacres of the revolution?
- (b) would attendance persuade revolutionary elements that revolutions pay dividends inasmuch as they cause other nations to woo revolutionary régimes?
- (c) would we set a precedent, making refusal of similar invitations, particularly from more friendly countries, difficult in the future?
- (d) would our delegates be safe from physical violence if the mob gets worked up during the celebrations? (So far there has been almost no anti-Western violence).
- (e) Would our failure to attend be noticed at all?

3. There are the following arguments for attendance:

- (a) One or two officers would be able to look at Iraq at first hand, and this would be valuable to the Department in terms of
 - (i) their report, and
 - (ii) having available officers who had actually been to Iraq.
- (b) Our show of support might assist in the task of giving Kassem heart to move further away from the Communists towards a position of genuine neutrality.

4. As regards the latter point (3(b)), Australian attendance could be significant, for the following reasons :

- (a) Kassem has only felt strong enough to tackle the Communists after a show of support by the West (i.e. the U.K. agreement to supply arms). Hence he relies to a great extent on the moral support of the West in general.

Confidential

Confidential

- 2 -

- (b) Among the Western nations not all are able to exercise influence on Kassem. For instance the United States exercises no influence at present, but is on the contrary treated with suspicion. Therefore those nations capable of exercising influence must do so if they are to prevent Kassem slipping back.
- (c) Australia is potentially among the latter nations, since
- (i) it is free of the taint of "imperialism" in the area;
 - (ii) its name in the Middle East stands surprisingly high.
- (d) Australia's potential influence is increased by the fact that it does not normally take part in Middle Eastern Affairs: consequently its attendance would inevitably be noticed and commented upon by Middle Easterners.
- (e) Similarly, its attendance would be more obvious than that of the United Kingdom, United States, Pakistan or India, since they would be represented by their already-known representatives, whereas the Australian delegate would arrive from abroad and be fresh material for the press and local officials and people.

The compelling factor in making this recommendation is that Australia might, by attendance, contribute something to counter the spread of Communist influence in a key country of the Middle East.

Recommendation:-

5. The arguments for attendance seem to outweigh those against. It is therefore recommended that we decide to participate in the celebrations, provided the United Kingdom and United States also do so.

6. On your copy of Washington's telegram 1321/59 conveying the invitation (attached) you noted as possible delegates Mr. Cutler and the M.P.'s going to Warsaw. An alternative possibility for leader would be Mr. Kevin, who has a wide knowledge of Middle Eastern affairs and of the events of the Iraqi revolution. As regards the other member of the delegation, alternatives to the M.P.'s might be Messrs. Furlonger or D. Dexter. Perhaps one of them would be more suitable than the M.P.'s not only because the Iraqis have asked for "officials", but also because they could produce reports for the use of the Department.

NOTE:- Mr. May has no objection to either the Kevin/Furlonger or Cutler/D. Dexter teams. But he ^{considers} whether we would get M.P.'s to go. B.G.

M. Hill. As I said on telephone, we shall ask FO of UK Ambassador to represent us.

W.H.
20
259

B.G. Dexter
Middle East and Africa Sections.

B.G. Hill
HEAD E & M.E. BRANCH

Confidential

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

:HC

I.10578

Dated: 16th June, 1959.

1840

Rec'd: 17th June, 1959.

1317

FROM:

(via leased channel)

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

1321. RESTRICTED.

Relations with Iraq.

Following is text of note received today from
the Iraqi Embassy.

Begins:

The Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Australia and has the honour to state that the Government of the Republic of Iraq is extending an invitation to all friendly nations to send delegations to Iraq on the occasion of the celebration of the first anniversary of the Republic of Iraq on 14th July, 1959. Hence, a delegation from Australia is cordially invited to attend the celebrations.

It is suggested that the Australian delegation consist of two officials of the Australian Government. They will be the guests of the Iraqi Government during the period of the celebrations.

The Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq would appreciate it if His Excellency would transmit this invitation to the Government of Australia. It would also be appreciated if the Embassy of Australia would forward to this Embassy the names of the delegation members as soon as possible. Further information about the celebrations will be sent to the Embassy of Australia at a later date.

The Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq avails himself of this opportunity to renew to his Excellency the Ambassador of Australia the assurances of his highest consideration.

Ends.

Formal acknowledgment has been sent. Please advise regarding further reply.

MIN. DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

17th June, 1959.

SEC A/SS LA MR. EASTMAN UN COMREL P.C&M IN&SP S&SEA
SA SEA E.A.F&ME
INTELL C&P

RESTRICTED

G

COLOMBO KARACHI LONDON NEW DELHI TEL AVIV WELLINGTON.

→ *in connection with your com. - on which per. spk. this am.*
18/6

Mr. Blahney has been this looked at & advises me - suggest names of gen. recommended acceptance. better + m.p.'s for Warsaw.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

LO:OW

I.11233

Dated: 25th June, 1959.

1150

Rec'd: 26th June, 1959.

0945

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

324. CONFIDENTIAL.

Anniversary of Iraqi Republic.

I have asked in turn the Deputy Minister Pilai and Sen about this, but they all professed to be unaware of any invitation or of the anniversary ceremony. A probable explanation is that the invitation to India was given to the Indian Ambassador and had not yet reached New Delhi. No reactions were forthcoming other than a general pessimism about the stability of Iraq.

Crocker.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.(173/10/1)
P.M'S

26th June, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR. EASTMAN UN COMREL PAC&AM AM&SF
S:SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF ME INF INT'L C&P

COLOMBO LONDON NEW DELHI

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

ABJ:ABJ.

Dated: 22nd June, 1959.
1735.
Rec'd: 23rd June, 1959.
0830.

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI.

215 CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram 131.

Iraqi Anniversary Celebrations.

Pakistan Government is consulting Baghdad Pact allies before making final decision. Thinking at official level in Ministry, is inclined towards acceptance, in which case, Pakistan Delegation would probably be led by Ambassador in Baghdad. Pakistan soundings of other Baghdad Pact members, suggest their thinking is along similar lines.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (173/10/1)
P.M.

23rd June, 1959.

SEC. A/SS. LA. MR. EASTMAN. UN. CR. PAC&AM. AM&SP.
E. AF&ME. E. AF. ME. C&P. INF. INTELL.

G.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD CABLEGRAM

SHA:JT

I.11029

Dated: 22nd June, 1959.

1845

Rec'd: 23rd June, 1959.

1126

(via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

1374. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated London 60.

Delegation to Iraq.

Your telegram 795.

The State Department (Lakeland) confirmed today the the United States had received an invitation from the Government of Iraq to send a five man Delegation. Final decision had not been made as to composition but present thinking was along the lines that it would be headed by the United States Ambassador to Iraq. A couple of other officials will be sent from outside (including, for example, the senior American economic aid Representative in the area). Lakeland said that in any case it was unlikely that a delegation at a higher level than Assistant Secretary of State would be sent.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.(173/10/1)
P.M'S.

23rd June, 1959.

SEC A/Ss MR.EASTMAN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA UN
D.A.F&ME AF ME INF DL INTELL C&P COMREL

G

COLOMBO KARACHI NEW DELHI TEL AVIV WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS **CONFIDENTIAL**
INWARD CABLEGRAM

ABJ.MMc

I.10957

Dated: 21st June 1959
1300
Rec'd: 22nd June 1959
0830

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

312. CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 290.

India has an Embassy in Iraq. I will however see what I can find out discreetly about the invitation and Indian reaction.

Crocker.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (173/10/1)
P.M.'s.

22nd June, 1959.

SEC A/Ss MR. EASTMAN COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA
SA E.AF&ME AF INF DL INTELL C&P

G

COLOMBO KARACHI LONDON TEL AVIV WASHINGTON

Room 7

*Pls. file in 173/10/1 and R/S home.
ASB 22/6*

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD CABLEGRAM

I.10854.

..LS.

Sent: 19th June, 1959.
1915.
Rec'd: 20th June, 1959.
0830.

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

2234 CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated - Washington 90.

From External.

Your 1628

Anniversary of Iraqi Republic.

While no final decision has been made, and the matter is still for discussion with other members of the Baghdad Pact and possibly N.A.T.O., it is probable that the United Kingdom will be represented.

2. They are likely to ask the Ambassador in Baghdad to be the representative assisted by the Head of the Middle East Development Division from Beirut. United Kingdom Representatives would be warned to keep away from celebrations which harped too much on last years' events. Most countries will be represented by Ambassadors on the spot or nearby, but there is a chance that Germany, Canada and the United States will send special representatives.

3. Foreign Office will let us have definite advice next week.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S.

20th June, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR. EASTMAN UN PAC&AM AM&SP
S&SEA SA E. AF&ME E AF ME INF DL INTELL
C&P

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD TELETYPE MESSAGE

MESSAGE NO MIN 744 1.7.59 4.20

FOR MR. B. DEXTER, E A, CANBERRA

FROM HUTTON, MINS, MELBOURNE

URGENT CONFIDENTIAL

..... MINUTE (173/10/1) OF 26TH JUNE MINISTER'S COMMENT
IS ---"AS I SAID ON TELEPHONE (TO MR. HILL) WE SHOULD
ASK FOREIGN OFFICE IF U.K. AMBASSADOR COULD REPRESENT
US".

MESSAGE ENDS PM

Confidential

harkice

Mag - 14 July

Pls. have prepared:

- a. Draft reply
- b. Draft request to London
to take neces. action vis à vis
PO & Amb. in Bangladesh.

$\frac{1}{2}$

will have to wait
London - reply 4 Feb. 92 p.
re UK. representing Aust.
R.B.
1/2.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Confidential

Mr Blakeney

Iraq - 14th July.

Minister telephoned re attendance
at above.

We favour our asking U.K.
Ambassador to represent us +
is returning papers thus annotated.

BB

30.6.59

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MMC:BMW

INWARD CABLEGRAM

Sent: 29th June, 1959.
1300
Rec'd: 30th June, 1959.
0830

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

335. CONFIDENTIAL.

Iraq Invitation.

Malcolm Macdonald tells me that the United Kingdom High Commission here received directives from London on Friday night about the above. He thought that the United Kingdom High Commission in Canberra would be telling you. The position briefly is that the United Kingdom will accept the Iraq invitation as a matter of expediency but the United Kingdom Representative will abstain from any ceremony glorifying the method by which the revolution was brought about or vilifying the previous rulers. Macdonald has been instructed not to mention the invitation to the Indians unless the Indians first raise the question.

2. Macdonald says that Canada and Australia have been invited as well as the United Kingdom but he did not know what other countries.

Crocker.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (173/10/1)
P.M.'s

30th June, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR. EASTMAN UN COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA
SA E.F&ME E AF ME INF INTELL C&P
G
COLOMBO LONDON NEW DELHI.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

M. B. C. Hill DE A

TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched: 1605 Hours 26th June, 1959.

Received: 0830 Hours 27th June, 1959.

PRIORITY.

TELEGRAM CIRCULAR NO. 421. CONFIDENTIAL.

JULY 14TH CELEBRATIONS IN BAGHDAD.

Invitation has been received from Iraq Government to attend July 14th anniversary celebrations. In view of importance of showing goodwill towards Iraq Government despite circumstances attending its creation and of fact that refusal of invitation would hardly be consistent with our recognition of new Government very shortly after it came to power it is proposed to accept. United Kingdom Ambassador at Baghdad will represent United Kingdom. He has been instructed to avoid attending at functions which glorify the methods used on 14th July or at which inflammatory speeches are made condemning the old Iraq regime which would be almost as embarrassing to us as anti Western manifestations.

2. Similar invitations are known to have been received by Canadians, Australians and Pakistanis in Commonwealth. Others may have been invited e.g. Indians.
3. (To Ottawa, Canberra) Canada/Australia House have sought our advice and been informed of the record of our decision to accept invitation and reasons for it. Please inform Canadian/Australian authorities as in paragraph 1 above.
4. (To Wellington, Pretoria, Salisbury) You may inform Commonwealth authorities of paragraph 1 above. You should ask them to treat matter as confidential since we wish it to receive as little publicity as possible.
5. (To Delhi, Colombo, Accra, Kuala Lumpur) If Commonwealth authorities who may have received similar invitation should approach you you should speak on lines of paragraph 1 above.

CONFIDENTIAL

/6

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received:

2.

6. (To Karachi) Separate message is being sent to you.

SECRETARY OF STATE.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INWARD CABLEGRAM

LO: CW

I.11233

Dated: 25th June, 1959.

1150
Rec'd: 26th June, 1959.
0915

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

324. CONFIDENTIAL.

Anniversary of Iraqi Republic.

I have asked in turn the Deputy Minister Filai and Sen about this, but they all professed to be unaware of any invitation or of the anniversary ceremony. A probable explanation is that the invitation to India was given to the Indian Ambassador and had not yet reached New Delhi. No reactions were forthcoming other than a general pessimism about the stability of Iraq.

Crocker.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (173/10/1)
P.M.'S

26th June, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR. EASTMAN UN COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP
S:SEA SA E.A.F&ME E AF ME INF INTEL C&P

~~COLOMBO LONDON NEW DELHI~~

F 173/10/1

~~Mr Blakeney.~~

Mr, I sent
submission to
Secretary through
P.R.H. (who thumbed
it down) - it
would be with
Secretary now.

I think attached
just received giving
UK position should
go today to Secretary.

~~Mr Hill~~

Will you say
draft had
already gone to
P.R.H. ? Back yet?

Mr Gutter
→ Mr Hill

Some block.

29/6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

R.C.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

LO: CW

I.11233

Dated: 25th June, 1959.

1150

Rec'd: 26th June, 1959.

0945

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

324. CONFIDENTIAL.

Anniversary of Iraqi Republic.

I have asked in turn the Deputy Minister Pilai and Sen about this, but they all professed to be unaware of any invitation or of the anniversary ceremony. A probable explanation is that the invitation to India was given to the Indian Ambassador and had not yet reached New Delhi. No reactions were forthcoming other than a general pessimism about the stability of Iraq.

Crocker.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.(173/10/1)
P.M'S

26th June, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR. EASTMAN UN COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP
S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF ME INF INT'L C&P

COLOMBO LONDON NEW DELHI

F

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

173/10/1

26th June, 1959.

ATTENDANCE AT IRAQI ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS

THE SECRETARY

While the United Kingdom and United States (and Pakistan) have not taken final decisions whether to participate in the celebrations of the Anniversary of the Iraqi revolution on 14th July, and if so at what level, it seems most probable that they will be represented by their Ambassadors in Baghdad supported by other officials. We can therefore consider further the question of Australian attendance.

*Yels. attached
to original submission.*

Wash's 1321

N. Delhi 324

Karachi 215

Wash. 1374

N. Delhi 312

London 2234

*One to } 1628
London
(Kas., H.O.)*

*One to } 795
Wash.*

2. Arguments against attendance are as follows :

- (a) would attendance tend to condone the brutal massacres of the revolution?
- (b) would attendance persuade revolutionary elements that revolutions pay dividends inasmuch as they cause other nations to woo revolutionary regimes?
- (c) would we set a precedent, making refusal of similar invitations, particularly from more friendly countries, difficult in the future?
- (d) would our delegates be safe from physical violence if the mob gets worked up during the celebrations? (So far there has been almost no anti-Western violence).
- (e) would our failure to attend be noticed at all?

3. There are the following arguments for attendance:

- (a) One or two officers would be able to look at Iraq at first hand, and this would be valuable to the Department in terms of
 - (i) their report, and
 - (ii) having available officers who had actually been to Iraq.
- (b) Our show of support might assist in the task of giving Kassem heart to move further away from the Communists towards a position of genuine neutrality.

4. As regards the latter point (3(b)), Australian attendance could be significant, for the following reasons :

- (a) Kassem has only felt strong enough to tackle the Communists after a show of support by the West (i.e. the U.K. agreement to supply arms). Hence he relies to a great extent on the moral support of the West in general.

Confidential

- 2 -

- (b) Among the Western nations not all are able to exercise influence on Kassem. For instance the United States exercises no influence at present, but is on the contrary treated with suspicion. Therefore those nations capable of exercising influence must do so if they are to prevent Kassem slipping back.
- (c) Australia is potentially among the latter nations, since
 - (i) it is free of the taint of "imperialism" in the area;
 - (ii) its name in the Middle East stands surprisingly high.
- (d) Australia's potential influence is increased by the fact that it does not normally take part in Middle Eastern Affairs: consequently its attendance would inevitably be noticed and commented upon by Middle Easterners.
- (e) Similarly, its attendance would be more obvious than that of the United Kingdom, United States, Pakistan or India, since they would be represented by their already-known representatives, whereas the Australian delegate would arrive from abroad and be fresh material for the press and local officials and people.

Recommendation:

5. The arguments for attendance seem to outweigh those against. It is therefore recommended that we decide to participate in the celebrations, provided the United Kingdom and United States also do so.

6. On your copy of Washington's telegram 1321/59 conveying the invitation (attached) you noted as possible delegates Mr. Cutler and the M.P.'s going to Warsaw. An alternative possibility for leader would be Mr. Kevin, who has a wide knowledge of Middle Eastern affairs and of the events of the Iraqi revolution. As regards the other member of the delegation, alternatives to the M.P.'s might be Messrs. Furlonger or D. Dexter. Perhaps one of them would be more suitable than the M.P.'s not only because the Iraqis have asked for "officials", but also because they could produce reports for the use of the Department.

(B.C. Hill)

HEAD E & M.E. BRANCH

B.C. Dexter
Middle East and Africa Sections.

Confidential

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Confidential

File No. 173/10/1

Date 25/6/59

SUBJECT

Iraqi Anniversary CelebrationsFOR Mr Blakeney
Through the Hill

H/25/6

I agree with your ^{additional} argument against attendance — viz, that our failure to attend might not be noticed at all.

On the other hand, if we consider the question from a positive rather than a negative aspect, our attendance would, I believe, be really significant, for the following reasons:

- (a) Kassem has only felt strong enough to tackle the communists after a show of support by the West (i.e. the U.K. agreement to supply arms). Hence he relies to a great extent on the moral support of the West in general.
- (b) Among the Western nations not all are able to exercise influence on Kassem. For instance the United States exercises no influence at present, but is on the contrary treated with suspicion. Therefore those nations capable of exercising influence must do so if they are to prevent Kassem slipping back.
- (c) Australia is potentially among the latter nations, since
 - (i) it is free of the taint of "imperialism" in the area,
 - (ii) its name in the Middle East stands surprisingly high
- (d) ~~Australia~~ Australia's potential influence is increased by the fact that it does not normally take part in Middle Eastern affairs: consequently its attendance

would inevitably be noticed and commented upon by Middle Easterners.

- (c) Similarly, its attendance would be more obvious than that of the UK, US, Pakistan or India, since they would be represented by their ^{already-known} local representatives, whereas the Australian delegate would arrive from abroad and be fresh material for the press and local officials and people.

3. These points lead me to believe that we should not underestimate Australia's potential influence in Iraq and in the Middle East in general.

R. L. Dexter

HE & AF Sections

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. *Confidential*

File No. *173/10/1*

Date. *22/6/59*

SUBJECT

Large Anniversary Celebrations

FOR *Mr. Hill*

Mr. Blekeney

Mr. Hill is not available at the moment. You may care to see this evening.

2. Karachi reply now received. It is similar to UK+US.

ALLS 22/6.

Why should Australian participate. Is Karachi significant?

Point is that their main rep. will be a woman (Arab) already on spot.

Understand

Do see my notes hereon & on your earlier minute, discuss with Mr. Hill, & then let me know the arrangements for (3) above.

We have received replies from London and Washington, interim reply from New Delhi, and nothing yet from Karachi.

2. While final decisions have not yet been taken, United Kingdom and United States will probably be represented participants, being represented by their Ambassadors in Baghdad and other officials.

3. I think that we can now consider our attitude further. My original thoughts are given in my memo of 17 June (p. 1) & I think they are still valid. I think point 3(a) is the most important point - viz. that ~~we~~ ^{our} show of support by attending might give Kassar heart to move ^{further} away from the communists towards a position of genuine neutrality. I don't think we should underestimate our possible influence in this respect.

4. Since the U.K. and U.S. apparently don't see objections to their attendance, I think that we should attend.

5. As to the question who might represent us, the Secretary initially suggested "Cutler + M.P.'s for Warsaw?" Alternatives might be

Leader Mr. Kevin (with his knowledge of the background, he would probably be the best).

Accompanying Officer Mr. Durlinger Mr. D. Durlinger

ALLS 22/6.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD CABLEGRAM

SHA:JT

I.11029

Dated: 22nd June, 1959.

1845

Rec'd: 23rd June, 1959.

1126

(via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

1374. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated London 60.

Delegation to Iraq.

Your telegram 795.

The State Department (Lakeland) confirmed today the the United States had received an invitation from the Government of Iraq to send a five man Delegation. Final decision had not been made as to composition but present thinking was along the lines that it would be headed by the United States Ambassador to Iraq. A couple of other officials will be sent from outside (including, for example, the senior American economic aid Representative in the area). Lakeland said that in any case it was unlikely that a delegation at a higher level than Assistant Secretary of State would be sent.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (173/10/1)
P.M'S.

23rd June, 1959.

SEC A/Ss MR. EASTMAN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA UN
E.A.F&E AF ME INF DL INTELL C&P COMRL

G

COLOMBO KARACHI NEW DELHI TEL AVIV WELLINGTON

*Intell How going 23/6
b 13/6
→ Mr. Deuter
Karachi not to
hand yet - ok
Delhi interim
only. ?*

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

I.10854.

..IS.

Sent: 19th June, 1959.
1915.
Rec'd: 20th June, 1959.
0830.

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

2234

CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated - Washington 90.

From External.

Your 1628

Anniversary of Iraqi Republic.

While no final decision has been made, and the matter is still for discussion with other members of the Baghdad Pact and possibly N.A.T.O., it is probable that the United Kingdom will be represented.

2. They are likely to ask the Ambassador in Baghdad to be the representative assisted by the Head of the Middle East Development Division from Beirut. United Kingdom Representatives would be warned to keep away from celebrations which harped too much on last years' events. Most countries will be represented by Ambassadors on the spot or nearby, but there is a chance that Germany, Canada and the United States will send special representatives.

3. Foreign Office will let us have definite advice next week.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S.

20th June, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR. EASTMAN UN PAC&AM AM&SP
S&SEA SA E.A.F&ME E AF ME INF DL INTELL
C&P

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM. **CONFIDENTIAL**

FPG:ABJ.

0.8148.

Sent: 19th June, 1959.
1900.

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON...1628.

REPEATED:

Australian High Commission,
KARACHI...172.

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI...290.

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

ANNIVERSARY OF IRAQI REPUBLIC

Through Iraqi Embassy, Washington, Iraq has invited delegation of two Australian officials to attend celebration of first anniversary of Republic on 14th July, 1959. Delegation would be guests of Iraqi Government during period of celebrations. Embassy note states invitations being extended to "all friendly nations".

2. Assume United Kingdom will have received invitation. Please ascertain whether they will send delegation and at what level, repeating your reply to Washington.

3. For Karachi and New Delhi.

Please enquire whether Pakistan and India have also received invitations and if so their likely responses?

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.(173/10/1)
P.M.'S.

22nd June, 1959.

SEC A/Ss MR. EASTMAN UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME
AF ME INF DL INTELL

G.

COLOMBO.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HP: CW

0.8149

Sent: 20th June, 1959.
0916

(Transmitted via leased channel)

TO:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

795. CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 1321. Delegation to Iraq.

Please ascertain whether United States have received invitation, and if so, whether they will send delegation and at what level. Please repeat your reply to External, London, to whom we are addressing similar enquiry.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.(173/10/1)
P.M'S

22nd June, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR. EASTMAN UN CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA
SA E.A.F&ME E AF ME INF DL C&P INTELL

COLOMBO KARACHI LONDON NEW DELHI TEL AVIV WELLINGTON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. REIVED

CONFIDENTIAL

19 JUN 1959

MINISTER'S OFFICE

File No. 173/10/1.

Date. 16th June, 1959.

SUBJECT

REQUEST FOR ADVICE ON IRAQ FROM
SIR ARTHUR STEPHENSON

FOR THE MINISTER:

(Through
MR. BLAKENEY):*H. Blakeney 17/6*PLEASE SET PAPER
FOR SIGNATURE OR
APPROVAL
BELOW*Minister - you
were asking
about this
earlier today**G.A.
19/6.**File
under 24/6*

You will recall that Sir Arthur Stephenson wrote to you on 2nd June, 1959, saying that his firm anticipated that they would be sending a number of senior personnel to Iraq to supervise the various phases of the hospital contracts which they expect to be let shortly in Kadhemain (Baghdad), Amara and Basra. He asked for advice on what protection would be available for their personnel and their goods in Iraq in case of further trouble.

2. On 4th June, you sent an interim reply to Sir Arthur Stephenson, informing him that you had asked our people in London to consult the Foreign Office.

3. The views of the Foreign Office (telegram 2020, a copy of which was forwarded to you) have been embodied in the attached draft letter to Sir Arthur. These views were given to us on a confidential basis and that is why we have marked the letter "confidential" and "personal".

W.G.A. Landale
(W.G.A. Landale)
Consular and Protocol.

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL
CONFIDENTIAL

19 JUN 1959

I refer to my letter of 4th June, 1959.

The United Kingdom authorities have expressed the view that while there has been in recent weeks a considerable improvement in the treatment of Foreign nationals in Iraq, difficulties might arise in outlying areas, where in a crisis, individuals might have to fend for themselves. This applies in particular to Basra, where conditions have not been favourable. They recommend that any of your personnel, who do go to Iraq, should register with the United Kingdom Embassy in Baghdad, which would do everything possible to protect them in accordance with plans which have already been worked out. The United Kingdom authorities also expressed the hope that Australian experts would go to Iraq to give advice on such matters as construction work.

I have nothing to add, but I would like to stress that if you do decide to send personnel to Iraq, they should make a point of calling at the United Kingdom Embassy in Baghdad immediately on arrival.

I know that you will appreciate that the United Kingdom expressed these views on a confidential basis and I should therefore be grateful if you would safeguard the source.

R.G. CASEY

(R.G. Casey).

Sir Arthur Stephenson, C.M.G., M.C.,
Messrs. Stephenson and Turner,
Architects,
37th Little Collins Street,
MELBOURNE. C.I. VIC.

PERSONAL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No. 173/10/1.

Date 18th June, 1959.

SUBJECT AUSTRALIAN REPRESENTATION AT IRAQI ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS.

FOR ~~THE SECRETARY~~

We are weighing the considerations for and against acceptance of the Iraqi invitation that we send two officials to the celebration of the anniversary of the Iraqi Republic on 14th July, 1959.

2. A preliminary factor of overriding importance is the attitudes of the United Kingdom and United States. Draft telegrams to London and Washington seeking an indication of these attitudes are attached. Mr Heydon feels that we might at the same time seek comments from Karachi and New Delhi.

→ Mr Denton

J. J. Reading 18/6 ✓

BGD/APW

1. we can't pretend that Arab acceptance with alarm will affect Korean march (see original draft)
2. Minister is reluctant to see any advantages (but will leave open for discussion) - hence elimination of para 6.

19/6/59

→ Mr Hill
Mr Denton
19/6

CONFIDENTIAL

APW

AUSTEMBA,
WASHINGTON.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 1321 Delegation to Iraq.

We can see arguments against and for acceptance of Iraqi invitation. For instance, would acceptance create unfortunate precedent? On other hand would it, as seems to have been case with United Kingdom agreement to supply arms, give Kassem heart to move further away from Communists towards genuine neutrality?

2. Please ascertain whether United States have received invitation, and if so, whether they will send delegation and at what level. Please repeat your reply to External, London, to whom we are addressing similar enquiry.

173/10/1.

18/6/59

EXTERNAL, LONDON.

APW

CONFIDENTIAL.

ANNIVERSARY OF IRAQI REPUBLIC.

Through Iraqi Embassy, Washington, Iraq has invited delegation of two Australian officials to attend celebration of first anniversary of Republic on 14th July, 1959. Delegation would be guests of Iraqi Government during period of celebrations. Embassy note states invitations being extended to "all friendly nations".

2. We can see arguments against and for acceptance of Iraqi invitation. For instance, would acceptance create unfortunate precedent? On other hand would it, as seems to have been case with United Kingdom agreement to supply arms, give Kassem heart to move further away from Communists towards genuine neutrality?

3. Assume United Kingdom will have received invitation. Please ascertain whether they will send delegation and at what level, repeating your reply to Washington.

173/10/1.

18/6/59

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No. 173/10/1

Date 17/6/59

SUBJECT

Rushdram Representation at Iraqi Anniversary Celebration

FOR H. Hill

Mr Denton

OKs do
separate
tels. of enquiring
to Wash.
& London.
Also brief
note from
FEB saying
we are
weighing pros
& cons, but
a prelim.
factor of
overriding
imp. is
attitudes of
UK & US.

ABH

The probability that funds would not make attendance at the Iraqi anniversary celebrations on 14th July possible may render political consideration of the question superfluous. However, for what they are worth, my immediate preliminary reactions to the Iraqi invitation (Washington telegram 1321 attached) are as follows.

2. Against ~~the~~ attendance, there are the following considerations:

- (a) Would attendance tend to condone the brutal massacre of the royal family last year?
- (b) Would attendance persuade leftist elements that they were being courted, and therefore reinforce them in their policy of anti-Western "neutrality"?
- (c) Would we set a precedent making refusal of similar invitations in the future ^{particular} from more friendly countries, difficult?
- (d) Would our delegates be safe from physical violence if the crowd gets worked up during the celebrations? (I think they would - there has been almost no anti-Western violence so far)

X // (e) Would our ^{possibility} to attend or our attendance be asked at all?

3. On the other hand, there are some factors in favour of our

→

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

:HC

1.10578

Dated: 16th June, 1959.

1840

Rec'd: 17th June, 1959.

1317

FROM:

(via leased channel)

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

1321. RESTRICTED.

Relations with Iraq.

Following is text of note received today from
the Iraqi Embassy.

Begins:

The Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq
presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of
Australia and has the honour to state the the Government of the
Republic of Iraq is extending an invitation to all friendly
nations to send delegations to Iraq on the occasion of the
celebration of the first anniversary of the Republic of Iraq
on 14th July, 1959. Hence, a delegation from Australia
is cordially invited to attend the celebrations.

It is suggested that the Australian delegation
consist of two officials of the Australian Government. They
will be the guests of the Iraqi Government during the period
of the celebrations.

The Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq would
appreciate it if His Excellency would transmit this invitation
to the Government of Australia. It would also be appreciated
if the Embassy of Australia would forward to this Embassy
the names of the delegation members as soon as possible.
Further information about the celebrations will be sent to
the Embassy of Australia at a later date.

The Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq avails
himself of this opportunity to renew to his Excellency
the Ambassador of Australia the assurances of his highest
consideration.

Ends.

Formal acknowledgment has been sent. Please
advise regarding further reply.

MIN. DEPT. E.A.
P.M's.

17th June, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR. EASTMAN UN COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA
SA SEA E.A.F&ME
INTELL C&P

RESTRICTED

E AF ME INF DL MT

G

COLOMBO KARACHI LONDON NEW DELHI TEL AVIV WELLINGTON.

attendance:

I am inclined to be convinced but cannot accept the view that a priori our attendance would be really significant.

(a) Our show of support might, in the same way as the UK arms deal, give Kasseem heart to move away from the communists towards a position of genuine neutrality.

(b) We would demonstrate our interest in the Middle East.

This is, I think, the really valid argument for attendance.

(c) One or two officers would be able to look at Iraq at first hand, and this would be valuable for the Department in terms

of (i) their report, and

(ii) having available officers who had actually been to Iraq (so far as I am aware, Parkinson is the only officer to have visited Iraq - at least for any length of time).

I hardly think so.

(d) We would be in a better position to advise Australians with interests in Iraq - eg. Stephenson and Turner.

At this stage I do not feel competent to make a recommendation one way or the other. We must, however, give Washington a reply.

Bob Deakin

ME & Af. Archives.

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

:HC

I.10578

Dated: 16th June, 1959.

1840

Rec'd: 17th June, 1959.

1317

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(via leased channel)

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WASHINGTON.

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if the Embassy of Australia would forward to this Embassy
the names of the delegation members as soon as possible.
Further information about the celebrations will be sent to
the Embassy of Australia at a later date.

The Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq avails
himself of this opportunity to renew to his Excellency
the Ambassador of Australia the assurances of his highest
consideration.

Ends.

Formal acknowledgment has been sent. Please
advise regarding further reply.

MIN. DEPT. E.A.
P.M's.

17th June, 1959.

SEC 4/Ss LA MR. EASTMAN UN COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA
SA SEA L.F&ME
INTELL C&P

RESTRICTED

G

COLOMBO KARACHI LONDON NEW DELHI TEL AVIV WELLINGTON.

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

:HC

I.10578

Dated: 16th June, 1959.

1840

Rec'd: 17th June, 1959.

1317.

FROM:

(via leased channel)

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

1321. RESTRICTED.

Relations with Iraq.

Following is text of note received today from
the Iraqi Embassy.

Begins:

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presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of
Australia and has the honour to state that the Government of the
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nations to send delegations to Iraq on the occasion of the
celebration of the first anniversary of the Republic of Iraq
on 14th July, 1959. Hence, a delegation from Australia
is cordially invited to attend the celebrations.

It is suggested that the Australian delegation
consist of two officials of the Australian Government. They
will be the guests of the Iraqi Government during the period
of the celebrations.

The Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq would
appreciate it if His Excellency would transmit this invitation
to the Government of Australia. It would also be appreciated
if the Embassy of Australia would forward to this Embassy
the names of the delegation members as soon as possible.
Further information about the celebrations will be sent to
the Embassy of Australia at a later date.

The Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq avails
himself of this opportunity to renew to his Excellency
the Ambassador of Australia the assurances of his highest
consideration.

Ends.

Formal acknowledgment has been sent. Please
advise regarding further reply.

MIN. DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

17th June, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR. EASTMAN UN COMREL PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA
SA SEA E.A.F&ME
INTELL C&P
RESTRICTED
E AF ME INF DL MT

G

COLOMBO KARACHI LONDON NEW DELHI TEL AVIV WELLINGTON.

F 173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM. **CONFIDENTIAL**

BMW

I.10600

Sent: 10th June, 1959.

Rec'd: 17th June, 1959.

FROM:

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

S.A.V.E.X. 274.

CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Washington EX.380, Tel Aviv EX.3.

Iraq.

Following report on the internal situation from
United Kingdom Ambassador, Baghdad is dated 6th June:

"There are signs of some improvement in the internal situation including security, at least in large towns. We know of cases where the output of the workers has improved both at contractors' sites and in factories. Labour Unions, although heavily penetrated by Communists, are beginning to be useful in encouraging harder work; for example a recent strike in Basra port was defeated by white collar workers turning out to do the work. Although Communist demonstrations under peace partisan auspices continue spasmodically in smaller towns, they have virtually ceased in Baghdad since May Day. We have not heard of any new arrests for some time and a number of those arrested after the Mosul revolt have been released after interrogation. We hear of some resignations forced by Leftist elements in departments but Communist demands for a new large scale purge have not been met. It is reported from Basra that death sentences have been passed on four of the soldiers who shot their colonel, though this has not been officially announced. The Army are in better control of P.R.F. in most places and P.R.F.'s powers have been curtailed. Although the situation in Mosul oilfield and with the geophysical party has improved, P.R.F. have still got too much power there. We and the Company are continuing to press the Military Governor to remove trouble-makers. He appears to be increasingly asserting his authority. There are signs that some Iraqis are beginning to consider again investing in Iraq.

"It is of course impossible to say whether this trend will be continued. The Communists may well be lying back for a time to gather strength for the next round. Meanwhile, there is still no news when Kassem proposes to appoint his new Ministers."

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.

17th June, 1959.

MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME

E AF ME INF DL MT

G

COLOMBO K.R.CHI NEW DELHI OTTAWA WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

*a draft letter for
Thompson has
already gone to
the Ministers. I
think perhaps that this is
with less detailed for Thompson*

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

16th June, 1959.

REQUEST FOR ADVICE ON IRAQ FROM
SIR ARTHUR STEPHENSON

THE MINISTER:
(Through
MR. BLAKENEY):

You will recall that Sir Arthur Stephenson wrote to you on 2nd June, 1959, saying that his firm anticipated that they would be sending a number of senior personnel to Iraq to supervise the various phases of the hospital contracts which they expect to be let shortly in Kadhemain (Baghdad), Amara and Basra. He asked for advice on what protection would be available for their personnel and their goods in Iraq in case of further trouble.

2. On 4th June, you sent an interim reply to Sir Arthur Stephenson, informing him that you had asked our people in London to consult the Foreign Office.

3. The views of the Foreign Office (telegram 2020, a copy of which was forwarded to you) have been embodied in the attached draft letter to Sir Arthur. These views were given to us on a confidential basis and that is why we have marked the letter "confidential" and "personal".

(W.G.A. Landale)
Consular and Protocol.

CONFIDENTIAL

URGENT

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Confidential

F 173/10/1

File No.

Date 12/6/59

SUBJECT

Protection of Australians in Iraq

FOR Mr. Laidlaw

Mr. D. Laidlaw

12/6/59

I think that
we should
handle this
and we will
draft a reply
for the Minister

was 13/6

Mr. Blakeney has raised the question whether E.A.H.E. should continue to handle the ~~question~~ protection of Australians in Iraq, or whether this should be done by C.P.

Initially Mr. Kevin decided enquiries on this subject to E.A.H.E. when it was a highly political matter. Now the ^{political} urgency has gone out of it, and it seems to E.A.H.E. that the subject could better be dealt with by C.P.

3. Stephenson & Turner, Melbourne architects with contracts in Iraq, have several times asked our advice regarding the safety of and protection for their Australian employees in Iraq. They recently asked the Minister again, as they expect to send several senior personnel to Iraq this year (see Melbourne's teletype message of 4th June, flepped). On 4th June Minister gave interim reply (flepped) and E.A.H.E., after consultation with you, asked London for advice in telegram 1394 (flepped).

4. London has now replied in telegram 2020 of 8th June (flepped, on hot paper). Will C.P. do reply from Minister to Stephenson & Turner, and take over arrange of this and future enquiries?

S.L. Decker
H.E. & H.J. Seckman

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

AH:

I.10002

Sent: 8th June, 1959.

1754

Received: 9th June, 1959. ✓

0830

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

2020. CONFIDENTIAL.

From External.

Iraq.

Wiffie
Es spk re
handling 19/6

While there has been, in recent weeks, considerable improvement in the treatment of Foreign personnel in Iraq, the Foreign Office still counsels some caution in outlying areas where people in crisis might have to fend for themselves and in particular in Basra, where conditions have not been favourable.

2. The I.P.C. is encouraged by recent directions given by the Government relating to their operations.

3. Personnel should certainly register with the United Kingdom authorities who would do everything possible in accordance with plans already worked out.

4. The Foreign Office expressed anxiety, that every encouragement should be given to expert advice given in matters of this kind by nationals of countries like Australia and Canada. The Iraqis have been looking towards India particularly and it is hoped that Western countries such as ourselves will show interest in development there.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'S

I have attended to this

was 17/6
9th June, 1959.

SEC A/Ss MR.EASTMAN UN CR PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA
SA EAF&ME E INF DL INTELL

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

F.J. Blakeney, Esq.

With

Mr. R. G. Casey's

Compliments

Reference my teletype
message No. 571 of 4th June, 1959.

W.C.

COMMONWEALTH OFFICES
TREASURY GARDENS
MELBOURNE, C.2

4.6.59

Commonwealth Offices,
Treasury Place,
MELBOURNE, C.2.

4th June, 1959.

our letter of 2nd June. I will
at once to our External Affairs
ing them to speak to the Foreign
o let us know as soon as possible.

R. G. CASEY

Sir Arthur Stephenson, C.M.G., M.C.,
Stephenson & Turner,
Architects,
374 Little Collins Street,
MELBOURNE. VIC.

1169/6
→ Mr. Linter
→ Mr. Linter 118/6
Or is Linterdale
handling?
No, EAME did 118/6
this enquiry.

F 173/10/1

AGS, IT.

Commonwealth Offices,
Treasury Place,
MELBOURNE. C.2.

4th June, 1959.

Thank you for your letter of 2nd June. I will have a telegram sent at once to our External Affairs Office in London, asking them to speak to the Foreign Office about it and to let us know as soon as possible.

R. G. CASEY

Sir Arthur Stephenson, C.M.G., M.C.,
Stephenson & Turner,
Architects,
374 Little Collins Street,
MELBOURNE. VIC.

1159/6
→ Mr. Lunter
→ Unice 118/6
Grat. Unice/ale
handling?
No, EAME did 118/6
this evening.

F 173/10/1

AGS, JT.

SIR ARTHUR STEPHENSON
A. R. STEPHENSON
D. J. MOORE
C. FISHER
J. H. H. H.
R. J. HANCOCK
A. H. HEDDERLEY
A. H. WISE
A. H. WILKINSON

STEPHENSON & TURNER

ARCHITECTS

HEAD OFFICE
374 LITTLE COLLINS STREET MELBOURNE

ARCHITECTS & ENGINEERS
STANBURY

211 L. ST.
MELB. ADE. 4-11
NEWCASTLE 4-11
WARRINGTON 4-11
TELEPHONE 411

2nd June, 1959.

The Rt. Hon. R. G. Casey, D.S.O., M.C., M.A.,
Minister for External Affairs,
Commonwealth Offices,
Treasury Gardens,
MELBOURNE, C.2.

Dear Mr. Casey,

Before the end of the year, in accordance with our agreement with the Development Board and Ministry of Development of Iraq, we anticipate that we will be sending a number of senior personnel to Iraq to supervise the various phases of the hospital contracts which we expect to be let shortly in Kadhemain (Baghdad), Amara, and Baerah.

This letter is to respectfully request that we may be advised of what protection is available for our personnel and their goods in Iraq in case of further trouble. We hesitate to commit ourselves farther until we have some understanding in this important aspect of the problem.

Your advice in this connection would be greatly appreciated.

Yours faithfully,

STEPHENSON & TURNER

Per: (SGD) A.G. Stephenson

ACS, JT.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL

MMC:HMS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

Sent: 4th June, 1959
1813.

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

1394. CONFIDENTIAL

For External.

AUSTRALIANS IN IRAQ

You have previously (paragraph 3 of your Savingsgram Ex 963 of 23rd December, 1958), enquired regarding prospects and protection of Stephenson and Turner in Iraq.

2. Firm has asked Minister what protection is now available for its personnel and their goods in case of further trouble.

3. Firm anticipates that in accordance with its agreement with Iraq Development Board and Ministry of Development, it will be sending several senior personnel to Iraq before end of year to supervise various phases of hospitals contracts which are expected to be let shortly in Kadhemain (Baghdad), Amara and Basra. However, firm reluctant to commit itself until it has information requested in paragraph 2 above.

4. Presume personnel should register with United Kingdom missions in Baghdad and Basra, which would provide warnings where appropriate and such protection as feasible. We are aware of terms of C.R.O. Saving Z. No. 12 of 14th April.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (173/10/1)

MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE

TRADE (C. S. M.)

P.M.'s.

(Cost: £9.4.-.)

5th June, 1959

SEC A/SS LA UN TA ER CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA
SA E.A.F&ME E ME INF DL C&P ADMIN

WASHINGTON KARACHI

F

CONFIDENTIAL

THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
LONDON (FOR EXTERNAL).

APW

CONFIDENTIAL.

AUSTRALIANS IN IRAQ.

You have previously (paragraph 3 of your Savingram Ex 963 of 23rd December, 1958), enquired regarding prospects and protection of Stephenson and Turner in Iraq.

2. Firm has asked Minister what protection is now available for its personnel and their goods in case of further trouble.
3. Firm anticipates that in accordance with its agreement with Iraq Development Board and Ministry of Development it will be sending several senior personnel to Iraq before end of year to supervise various phases of hospitals contracts which are expected to be let shortly in Kadhemain (Baghdad), Amara and Basra. However, firm reluctant to commit itself until it has information requested in paragraph 2 above.
4. Presume personnel should register with United Kingdom missions in Baghdad and Basra, which would provide warnings where appropriate and such protection as feasible. We are aware of terms of C.R.O. Saving Z. No. 12 of 14th April

R/s 16/6.

173/10/1.

4/6/59

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT Telegram

CONFIDENTIAL.

173/10/1.

LONDON (FOR EXTERNAL)

AUSTRALIANS IN IRAQ.

You have previously (paragraph 3 of your Savingram Ex 963 of 23rd December, 1958), enquired regarding prospects and protection of Stephenson and Turner in Iraq.

2. Firm has asked Minister what protection is now available for its personnel and their goods in case of further trouble.

3. Firm anticipates that in accordance with its agreement with ~~the~~ Iraq Development Board and Ministry of Development it will be sending several senior personnel to Iraq before end of year to supervise various phases of hospitals contracts which are expected to be let shortly in Kadhmain (Baghdad), Amara and Basra. However, ~~Firm~~ reluctant to commit itself until it has information requested in paragraph 2 above.

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ED/APW

4/6/59

*Mr. Laidlaw OK was 4/6
Do you consent? Any changes?
Could I have back today.
BLS 4/6.*

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD TELETYPE MESSAGE.

COMMUNIS BRANCH

MESSAGE NO MIN 571 40.6.59

FOR BLAKENEY, E A, CANBERRA

FROM MINISTER, MELBOURNE

RESTRICTED

59 JUN 4 AM 9:44

URGENT

I HAVE HAD FOLLOWING LETTER FROM SIR ARTHUR STEPHENSON
(SENIOR PARTNER IN STEPHENSON AND TURNER, LEADING FIRM
OF ARCHITECTS IN MELBOURNE.)

BEGINS

BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR, IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR AGREEMENT
WITH THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND MINISTRY OF DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQ,
WE ANTICIPATE THAT WE WILL BE SENDING A NUMBER OF SENIOR
PERSONNEL TO IRAQ TO SUPERVISE THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE
HOSPITAL CONTRACTS WHICH WE EXPECT TO BE LET SHORTLY IN
KADHEMAIN (BAGHDAD), AMARA, AND BASRAH.

THIS LETTER IS TO RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT WE MAY BE
ADVISED OF WHAT PROTECTION IS AVAILABLE FOR OUR PERSONNEL AND THEIR
GOOD IN IRAQ IN CASE OF FURTHER TROUBLE. WE HESITATE TO
COMMIT OURSELVES FURTHER UNTIL WE HAVE SOME UNDERSTANDING IN THIS
IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM.

YOUR ADVICE IN THIS CONNECTION WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED.
ENDS

PLEASE TELEGRAPH THE GIST OF THIS ENQUIRY TO SHANN IN
LONDON AND ASK HIM TO ASK FOREIGN OFFICE WHAT WE SHOULD TELL
STEPHENSON. I PRESUME ANY SUCH AUSTRALIAN PERSONNEL SHOULD
REGISTER AT BRITISH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD AS BRITISH SUBJECTS AND THAT
THEY WOULD BE GIVEN SAME DEGREE OF "PROTECTION" AS ANY OTHER
BRITISH SUBJECTS.

HOWEVER FOREIGN OFFICE MAY HAVE SOMETHING MORE TO SUGGEST.

MESSAGE ENDS

PM

CONFIDENTIAL

POL. 127/2. *PM*

CONFIDENTIAL



W. H. H. /
22/4
P. R. Heydon, Esq.,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

K. Denton
→
With the Compliments

of the *Copy passed to C.P.*

Official Secretary *As 20/4*

Encl: 1 copy Z No.12 Saving.

Ref: Iraq.

F 173/10/1

Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom,

Canberra, A.C.T.

24th April, 1959.

CONFIDENTIAL

14th April, 1959

CONFIDENTIAL
ve provided the information
to the numbers of
ens in Iraq. They emphasise
represent only those who have
the case Baghdad itself,
olution) or whose names
employers.

ts at Kirkuk and Mosul
bjects in those areas,
th citizens for whom we are
after by our Embassy in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Z. No. 12 SAVING CONFIDENTIAL

14th April, 1959

I R A Q

/ The Foreign Office have provided the information enclosed herewith relating to the numbers of certain Commonwealth citizens in Iraq. They emphasise however that the figures represent only those who have actually registered (or in the case Baghdad itself, re-registered since the Revolution) or whose names have been supplied by their employers.

2. Since our Consular posts at Kirkuk and Mosul have been closed British subjects in those areas, including those Commonwealth citizens for whom we are responsible, are now looked after by our Embassy in Baghdad.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD TELETYPE MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NO795 17/3/59

TO EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MELBOURNE

FROM DEXTER EA CANBERRA

YOUR TELEPRINTER 742 OF 10TH MARCH.

EX COMMS BRANCH

1959 MAR 17

PM 2:46

YOU COULD INFORM STEPHENSON AND TURNER THAT THE SITUATION IN IRAQ NOW SEEMS TO BE SETTLING DOWN. SO FAR THERE HAVE, AS FAR AS WE KNOW, BEEN NO ANTI-EUROPEAN DEMONSTRATIONS AND THE PRESENT DISTURBANCES HAVE NOT BEEN ANTI-WESTERN IN CHARACTER. DEMONSTRATIONS IN BAGHDAD AND ELSEWHERE HAVE BEEN ANTI-NASSER RATHER THAN ANTI-WEST. TROUBLE SO FAR HAS BEEN, AND DEVELOPMENTS OF IT ARE LIKELY TO BE, IN THE NORTH-WEST NEAR THE SYRIAN FRONTIER. SOME PRESS ACCOUNTS WHICH HAVE PREDICTED CIVIL WAR OR WAR WITH U A R SEEM TO US TO BE UNDULY PESSIMISTIC IN LIGHT OF PRESENT KNOWLEDGE.

~~WILKIE~~

WILKIE AND WITTE SHOULD BE ADVISED TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH UNITED KINGDOM EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD OR CONSULATES IN PROVISIONAL CITIES WITH A NEW VIEW TO-

- (A) PROTECTION IN CASE THIS SHOULD AT ANY TIME BE DESIRABLE, AND
- ~~(B)~~ (B) WARNING OF POSSIBLE DANGER AT ANY TIME.

MESSAGE ENDS FILE NOF.173/10/1

← F

External Affairs, Melbourne

B. Dexter, E.A. Canberra

F.173/10/1

Your teleprinter 742 of 10th March.

You could inform Stephenson & Turner that the situation in Iraq now seems to be settling down. So far there have, as far as we know, been no anti-European demonstrations and the present disturbances have not been anti-Western in character. ~~So far~~ demonstrations in Baghdad and elsewhere have been anti-Masser rather than anti-West. Trouble so far has been, and developments of it are likely to be, in the north-west near the Syrian frontier. Some press accounts which have predicted civil war or war with U.A.R. seem to us to be unduly pessimistic in light of present knowledge.

Wilkie and Witte should be advised to maintain contact with United Kingdom Embassy in Baghdad or Consulates in provincial cities with a view to -

- (a) protection in case this should at any time be desirable, and
- (b) warning of possible danger at any time.

*Signed by W. H. Deane
despatched 17/3.
RD*

17.3.1959.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD TELETYPE MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NUMBER 742

10 3 59

1959 MAR 10 PM 3:24

TO EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANBERRA

FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MELBOURNE

COMMS BRANCH

IRAQ FLARE UP.

STEPHENSON AND TURNER (ARCHITECTS) HAVE TWO OF THEIR STAFF

WORKING IN AND OUT OF BAGDAD ON HOSPITAL IMPROVEMENTS -

ALEX. WILKIE (AGED ABOUT 45) MARRIED WITH TWO YOUNG CHILDREN

AND HERMAN WITTE (NATURALISED WHITE RUSSIAN) SINGLE.

FAMILY OF EACH MAN IS WORRIED AT PRESS COVERAGE AND STEPHENSON
AND TURNER HAVE ASKED IF WE HAVE ANY NEWS. BOTH HAVE BRITISH
PASSPORTS AND ENTERED IRAQ SIX WEEKS' AGO AND ARE DUE TO BE
THERE ANOTHER TWO TO THREE WEEKS. GLAD OF ANY ADVICE WHEN TO
HAND.

MESSAGE ENDS

1515 MMS

↓
~~M.E.~~

can you advise on present condition
in Iraq for advice to the families pls.

B L&P.
13.11.59

~~RB?~~
Rep'drafted 17/3

Mr Smith,

M.E. understanding
carnage

see thank

17/3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

SDP

I:1516

Dated: 23rd January, 1959.

Rec'd: 24th January, 1959.
0930

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

320. UNCLASSIFIED.

From External.

Commonwealth Relations Office has passed to us this evening copy telegram of 15th January from United Kingdom Ambassador, Baghdad, advising that Iraqi Government is considering purchase of 15,000 tons or more of hard wheat for baking. Red wheat preferred and not hardest grade. Delivery might be required in March, 1959. They have asked United Kingdom to make approaches to Australian and Canadian Governments with urgent request for samples if possible and the following information:-

- (a) Price quotations.
- (b) Conditions of payment.
- (c) Total quantity available.
- (d) Earliest date of delivery.

2. Replies and samples should be addressed to Director-General of Supply, Ministry of Finance, Baghdad.

3. Australian Wheat Marketing Board may be aware of this.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. TRADE (C-S-M)
MIN. & DEPT. PRIMARY INDUSTRY (C-M)
TREASURY
P.M.'s. DEPT.
P.M.'s.

24th January, 1959.

SEC
INF

A/Ss

ER@

AM&SP

PAC&AM

E. AF&ME

E

AF&ME

F 173/10/1
173/10/1

374 LITTLE COLLINS STREET,
MELBOURNE

173/10/1
23 JAN 1959
173/10/1
CANNISTON

This is rather late, but your kind letter of the 17th has remained unanswered.

It was very thoughtful of you to forward the information from our Internal Affairs office in London about Iraq. Their advice is noted that we should proceed with caution.

We were advised that a further cheque would be sent last week, which keeps the payments fairly well up to date. In accordance with our agreement we sent the rep with the contract documents to Iraq yesterday. We still fulfil our commitment completely by the end of January for the preparation of documents to call tenders internationally. The tenders will be open probably for three months and, according to the present programme, they will require us to visit Iraq in June or July when the tenders are to be examined.

Thank you again very much indeed for your kind thought and interest.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd) Arthur S. (Stephenson)

The Rt. Hon. J.G. Casey, M.P.,
Minister of External Affairs,
Commonwealth Offices,
Treasury Place,
Melbourne, C.2.

Is this in wrong file?
Yes. Previous correspondence on 173/10/1. RD 2/1
Please refile on 173/10/1 (no need to R/S)

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs.
....

(Mr. B.C. Hill)

For information. The Minister would be grateful if Sir Arthur Stephenson was informed of any significant developments relating to his enterprise in Iraq the Department may hear of.

G.J. Price
(G.J. Price)
Private Secretary
21.1.59

PERSONALCommonwealth Offices,
Treasury Place,
MELBOURNE. C-2.

9th January, 1959.

I think you may care to see, in further reference to what I understand Mr. Kevin of my Department has already told your firm, the following extract from a communication from our External Affairs Office in London, quoting a conversation (on 23rd December) with a responsible individual in the Foreign Office in London -

"I asked what the British Government's attitude was towards business activity in Iraq, particularly having in mind the interest of an Australian architectural firm (Stephenson and Turner) and possibly some constructional firms in the erection of some large hospitals in Iraq. I was told that Sir Michael Wright had taken the view that British business firms already established and operating in Iraq should hang on and although they may go through difficult times for a period it might well pay them in the long run to hang on. He had advised against panic but equally advised against embarking on any ideas of expansion of business for the present. It was thought that Australian firms would be wise not to outlay too much or to become heavily committed financially. In short, they would be wise to proceed with caution."

I'd be glad if you did not quote the above as having come from the Foreign Office - but I thought you would wish to know what was said.

(Sgd) R. G. Casey

Sir Arthur Stephenson,
Stephenson and Turner,
374 Little Collins Street,
MELBOURNE. C-1.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No. 173/10/1

Date 5th Jan. 1959.

SUBJECT: Business Conditions in Iraq - Enquiry by Stephenson & Turner.

FOR Mr Kevin

On 13th October 1958 Mr Fisher of Stephenson & Turner asked you about business conditions in Iraq.

You rang him the next day and advised him as indicated on the attached paper.

Paragraph 3 of the attached Savingsom (EX 963) from London might be of interest ~~useful~~ to Stephenson & Turner in supplementing our earlier advice, if you should think it worthwhile passing on to them.

F. R. Dalrymple.

M.C. Section

→ Mr Dalrymple 11/1

Mr Dalrymple
11/1

to action
11/1

Price thanked me today & told me Minister was sending paraphrase of para. 3 to S. & T. - we'll get a copy in due course. 11/1

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD SAVINGRAM.

:JAS

Dated: 23rd December, 1958

Rec'd: 2nd January, 1959

FROM:

Australian External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

SAV.EX.963 SECRET

Repeated Washington Ex.101.

Middle East.

On 23rd December I discussed with Sir Roger Stevens, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, the general situation in the Middle East.

Iraq

2. Stevens said that he considered the picture of the situation in Iraq as painted by the press as inclining to undue pessimism, particularly on the score of increased Communist influence. Sir Michael Wright thought, and he did also, that neither the U.A.R. nor the Communists could come out on top without a civil war. It was true, however, that Colonel Aref's action had forced Kassem to turn for help to the Communists. The recent attempted coup, in which Rashid Ali had been involved and which was U.A.R. inspired, had pushed him further into dependence on assistance from the Communists. It was true that the Communists were the most highly organized section of the community, and in addition they had gained substantial measure of control of the radio and press, had infiltrated the Government and to a very limited extent the Army. Nevertheless, Kassem still appeared to be in control supported by the Army.

3. I asked Stevens what the British Government's attitude was towards business activity in Iraq, particularly having in mind the interest of an Australian architectural firm (Stephenson and Turner) and possibly some constructional firms in the erection of some large hospitals in Iraq. Stevens said that Sir Michael Wright had taken the view that British business firms already established and operating in Iraq should hang on and although they may go through difficult times for a period it might well pay them in the long run to hang on. He had advised against panic but equally advised against embarking on any ideas of expansion of business for the present. Stevens thought that Australian firms would be wise not to outlay too much or to become heavily committed financially. In short, they would be wise to proceed with caution.

Egypt

4. Stevens said that the agreement reached between the Shell Company and Egypt was subject to the final settlement of the outstanding United Kingdom/Egypt financial negotiations. The question had been what were Egypt's intentions in relation

SECRET

SECRET

INWARD SAVINGRAM.10

to the Shell establishments in Egypt. It had not been possible to settle the other issues involved in the financial negotiations until it was known what was to be done by Egypt with regard to this major item. Egypt had now agreed to de-sequestration of the Shell properties and to permit the establishment of operations by Shell and B.P. in Egypt on good terms. Black, of the International Bank, would be arriving in London on 27th December on his way to Egypt, when he would have talks with the Bank of England. After further talks with the Egyptians he would presumably put up proposals to both sides. Stevens thought that prospects for reaching agreement now seemed reasonably good. He thought that Egypt would be anxious to get its hands on sterling balances for the procurement of wheat, payment of Suez Canal Company compensation, etc. If the financial negotiations were concluded the United Kingdom would want to establish a Mission under a Charge with appropriate technical experts and perhaps three or four months later send an Ambassador.

5. United Kingdom was anxious to re-establish its Mission, not only in order to have experts in Cairo in order to follow through the Anglo-Egyptian financial agreement, but also for reasons of trade. He said that there had been worthwhile trade over the last year. The figure for the last ten months of trade with the U.A.R. had been £16 million sterling, as compared with about \$5 million stg. for the year before that. The bulk of this trade was with Egypt. To a certain extent it had consisted of the completion of old contracts, but it still represented a substantial figure. There had not, however, been large Egyptian exports to the United Kingdom. It was desirable to re-establish diplomatic relations in order to assist the restoration of normal trade.

Israel

6. Stevens said that the relations between Israel and the United Kingdom had undoubtedly been much improved in recent times, partly arising out of United Kingdom agreement to supply Israel with certain military equipment. One difficulty with this situation was that Israel, given an inch, was inclined to assume a much greater willingness on the part of the United Kingdom than was the case and was constantly putting forward proposals of an economic nature which the United Kingdom was unable to accept. So far as the United Kingdom was concerned the chief significance of the improved relations was that the United Kingdom felt itself able to exercise a greater influence towards moderation than hitherto. Israel had been extremely touchy and there was a serious danger of major retaliation by Israel against Syria for border raids. United Kingdom policy, although misunderstood by Egypt, was to take some of the heat out of the Middle East situation and this it could best do by counselling moderation on Israel.

Baghdad Pact

7. The Baghdad Pact Council would be meeting in Karachi on 26th January. The meeting would be important in the sense that many major events had taken place in the Middle East since the last meeting. Some Indian hostility to the meeting being held in Karachi was expected (this might be added to by the fact that its opening on India's National Day).

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
INWARD SAVINGRAM.

SECRET

- 3 -

I.110

He said that there was no thought of expanding the Baghdad Pact to include other countries with the idea of surrounding the U.A.R. as suggested in an article by Randolph Churchill. This would be a mistake and only drive the Arabs into Soviet hands.

Jordan

8. The internal security situation was better than might have been expected, although it was still far from stable. He mentioned that Hammarskjöld had recently given it as his opinion that Jordan now seemed one of the more stable countries of the Middle East. The Secretary-General had been informed by Spinelli that there was no longer any immediate danger of internal trouble. Spinelli thought that Jordan's preoccupations were more with the situation in Syria and Iraq and with the dangers of aggressive Israeli policy on the Syrian or even the Jordanian frontier.

Syria

9. The situation in Syria was confused and United Kingdom had little reliable information at present. It appeared that the Communists and the Ba'athists were both in conflict with each other and with Nasser.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE

2nd January, 1959

SEC A/Ss. IA UN ER CR PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL C&P

TEL AVIV WELLINGTON

G.

SECRET

F. 173/10/1

A.B.C. NEWS SUMMARY - MONDAY, 22ND DECEMBER,
1958, AT 12.30 P.M.

GENERAL DE GAULLE ELECTED PRESIDENT OF FRANCE.

General de Gaulle will become President of France on the 8th of next month with greater powers than any French Head of State has had for 88 years. The General, who is now France's Premier, was chosen as President yesterday by the voting of an Electoral College of Grand Electors made up of Parliamentarians and representatives of Municipal Councils and overseas territories. As well as being President of the fifth French Republic, General de Gaulle will be head of State of the new French Community of Nations which he created. The Community includes 12 big African States with a total population of 25 million. The new President gained an absolute majority in the first ballot yesterday over two opponents, Monsieur Georges Marrane, a Communist, and a left-wing University Professor, Monsieur Chatelet.

General de Gaulle received 77 per cent of the votes in metropolitan France, 81 per cent in overseas departments, and 97 per cent in the Community of Nations. One of General de Gaulle's first tasks when he begins his seven-year term next month will be to select a new Premier. Under the new Constitution he will not have to consult Parliament about the appointment.

TENDERS FOR THREE HOSPITALS IN IRAQ.

Australian firms are being invited to compete for a multi-million pound contract for the construction of three new hospitals in the Middle East Republic of Iraq. The project is expected to attract tenders from countries behind the Iron Curtain and the West. The hospitals have been designed by an Australian firm of Architects. The head of the firm, Sir Arthur Stephenson, a world authority on hospital design has just returned from Iraq. Sir Arthur said today Australia's leading building firms would have a good chance of winning the £10 million contract. He said his firm had designed and planned two 500-bed hospitals and one 250-bed hospital. These would be built at Baghdad, Basra and Ammele. Tenders would be called in February and it was expected that building would be started by August. Sir Arthur Stephenson said Iraq Government officials had asked the Australian firm for guidance on setting up hospital administration and control on Australian lines. He expected a party of Iraq experts would inspect Australian hospitals and would ask for a group of Australians to be sent to Iraq to give practical guidance.

RESTRICTED

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM.

173/10/1

CM

O.14182

Sent: 12th November, 1958.

TO:

ALL POSTS.

SAV.AP61. RESTRICTED.Australian Recognition of Iraq.

In course of his statement to the House of Representatives on 6th August, 1958, the Minister for External Affairs announced that the Australian Government had decided to extend diplomatic recognition to the new Government of Iraq.

2. In pursuance of this decision the following Note dated 20th August, 1958 was passed to the Iraqi Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs by the United Kingdom Ambassador in Baghdad:

"I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia have asked that I should inform you that they have noted the assurances of the Government of Iraq of existing international obligations and that they recognise that the Republic of Iraq is an independent sovereign state and that the Government established by Brigadier Abdal Karin Kassen as Prime Minister is the Government of the Republic of Iraq."

3. We have now received the text of the reply signed by the Iraqi Acting Foreign Minister dated 16th September and addressed to the United Kingdom Charge d' Affaires in Baghdad in the following terms:

"I have the honour to refer to the Ambassador's letter of 20th August, 1958 by which I was informed of the recognition by Her Majesty's Government in the Australian Commonwealth of the Republic of Iraq, and I have pleasure to inform you that my Government have received the recognition by Her Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia of the Iraqi Republic with great appreciation and thanks."

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.(173/10/1)
P.M'S

12th November, 1958.

SEC A/Es LA UN CR PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA
E.AF&ME E AF&ME INT DL C&P MR.EASTMAN

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

SAVINGRAM TO ALL POSTS

173/10/1

RESTRICTED

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2. In pursuance of this decision the following Note dated 20th August, 1958 was passed to the Iraqi Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs by the United Kingdom Ambassador in Baghdad

"I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia have asked that I should inform you that they have noted the assurances of the Government of Iraq of existing international obligations and that they recognise that the Republic of Iraq is an independent sovereign state and that the Government established by Brigadier Abdul Karim Kassem as Prime Minister is the Government of the Republic of Iraq."

3. We have now received the text of the reply signed by the Iraqi Acting Foreign Minister dated 16th September and addressed to the United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires in Baghdad in the following terms:

"I have the honour to refer to the Ambassador's Letter of 20/8/1958 by which I was informed of the recognition by Her Majesty's Government in the Australian Commonwealth of the Republic of Iraq, and I have pleasure to inform you that my Government have received the recognition by Her Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia of the Iraqi Republic with great appreciation and thanks."

→ 173/10/1

RESTRICTED

12/11/58

DRAFT SAVINGRAM TO ALL POSTS.

Australian Recognition of Iraq.

In course of his statement to the House on 6th August the Minister announced that the Government had decided to extend formal recognition to the Republic of Iraq and the Kassem Government.

2. In pursuance of this decision the following note was passed to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs by the United Kingdom Ambassador in Baghdad:

"I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia have asked that I should inform you that they have noted the assurances of the Government of Iraq of existing international obligations and that they recognise that the Republic of Iraq is an independent sovereign state and that the Government established by Brigadier Abdul Karim Kassem as Prime Minister is the Government of the Republic of Iraq."

We have now received the text of the reply signed by the Iraqi ^{Acting} Foreign Minister dated 6th September and addressed to the United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires in Baghdad in the following terms;

"I have the honour to refer to the Ambassador's letter of 20/8/1958 by which I was informed of the recognition by Her Majesty's Government in the Australian Commonwealth of the Republic of Iraq, and I have pleasure to inform you that my Government have received the recognition by Her Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia of the Iraqi Republic with great appreciation and thanks".

Fik *RD* 10/11

10/11/58

TEMPLE BAR 2435.

In reply quote No. 3/12 /38



29 OCT 1958
173/10/1
CANBERRA

AUSTRALIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
LONDON, W.C.2

21st October, 1958

Memo No....1136

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Iraq: Australian Recognition

I refer to your telegram No. 1728 and my memorandum No. 916 of 19th August in relation to Australian recognition of Iraq.

2. I have now received from the Commonwealth Relations Office copy of Sir Michael Wright's note of 20th August to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of Iraq conveying formal Australian recognition. Also enclosed is a copy of the Acting Foreign Minister's reply of 16th September.

[Signature]
(O.L. Davis)

Senior External Affairs Representative

Copy passed to C & P. 110

Mr. Kevin to see files.
Mr. Hill to see.
Mr. Kevin might be interested

180.10/11

*Hand to home & Circulate find down barrow
on this ps. 100/11 1/2 1/2 1/2*

COPY

IRAQI REPUBLIC
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BRITISH EMBASSY,
BAGHDAD
6/9/58

August 20, 1958

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia have asked that I should inform you that they have noted the assurances of the Government of the Republic of Iraq regarding the maintenance by Iraq of existing international obligations and that they recognise that the Republic of Iraq is an independent sovereign state and that the Government established by Brigadier Abdul Karim Qasim as Prime Minister is the Government of the Republic of Iraq.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
With the highest consideration,
Your Excellency's obedient Servant,

(Signed) MICHAEL WRIGHT

His Excellency,
Sayid Siddiq Shanshal,
The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Republic of Iraq,
Baghdad.

C O P Y

IRAQI REPUBLIC
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CEREMONIES

6/9/58

No. 3374/3374/200/9/1958

Mr. Chargé d'Affaires,

I have the honour to refer to the Ambassador's letter of 20/8/1958 by which I was informed of the recognition by Her Majesty's Government in the Australian Commonwealth of the Republic of Iraq, and I have pleasure to inform you that my Government have received the recognition by Her Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia of the Iraqi Republic with great appreciation and thanks.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to you my deep appreciation and respect.

(Signed) S. SHANSHAL

Mr. R.S. Crawford, C.M.G., C.V.O.,
Ministry Plenipotentiary and Chargé d'Affaires of
Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy,
Baghdad.

TEMPLE BAR 2435.

In reply quote No. 3/12/38



DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

LONDON, W.C.2

22 OCT 1958

173/10/1

CANBERRA

15th October, 1958

CONFIDENTIAL

Memo No.....

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

British Subjects wishing to go to Iraq

I refer to your memorandum No. 606 of 8th October, 1958, file 173/10/1, in which you enquired why the Foreign Office is withholding a general directive and issuing only private discouragement to British subjects wishing to proceed to Iraq.

2. On 14th October I discussed this matter with Mr. Combs, Acting Head, Eastern Department, Foreign Office (this department is a new sub-division of the Foreign Office dealing with Iraq, Iran, Baghdad Pact and Economic and Social developments in the Middle East). Mr. Combs said that the reason for not issuing a general directive was simply the practical difficulty of drafting an appropriate directive which would cover all cases and also cater for the changing situation. They felt it better to treat each case on its merits and preferred to discuss the projected visit with the individual concerned. He said there had been over 400 United Kingdom citizens employed in Iraq and a number of these had been home on leave at the time of the 14th July revolution. The general practice had been to advise such persons to take steps before returning to Iraq to confirm that their contracts were still valid. If they found their contract was still valid Foreign Office left to individual decision, but generally did not discourage them from returning. They did, however, discourage the return of wives and children. Others who did not have a specific job to go to were generally advised to delay their departure as long as possible owing to the unsettled situation in Iraq, both politically and administratively.

644 m 173/10/1

→ H. Keen
H. Hill 23/10
H. Dalrymple 23/10

ALB 23/10.

O. L. Davis
(O. L. Davis)

Senior External Affairs Representative

GR

CONFIDENTIAL

3/12/38

CONFIDENTIAL



173/10/1

15th October, 1958

CONFIDENTIAL

Memo No.....

1112

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Visit to Iraq: Sir Arthur Stephenson

Sir Arthur Stephenson, senior partner of the architectural firm of Stephenson and Turner, called on me on 13th October in relation to the design work of three large hospitals in Iraq which his firm was carrying out for the Iraqi Government. Sir Arthur explained that a great deal of the design work had already been carried out before the new regime in Baghdad came into power and his firm was employing a large number of persons for this particular task. Since the revolution his firm had received no payments and a very considerable sum was outstanding. He had cabled the Iraqi Government and had received a reply requesting his firm to continue with the work and advising that payment would be forthcoming. However, no payment had yet been received. Sir Arthur said that he was thinking of paying a visit to Iraq in order to try to contact a responsible Minister and get a clear statement regarding Iraqi Government's intentions, both with regard to the continuance of the work and the payment.

2. Sir Arthur sought my advice regarding conditions in Iraq and the advisability of proceeding to Iraq and possibly making contact with the Iraqi Embassy in London, before doing so.

3. With Sir Arthur's approval I discussed the matter with Foreign Office. Foreign Office advised that the political and administrative situation in Iraq was still very unsettled. It was difficult to get decisions from the Government in view of the confusion. In addition there were frequently substantial delays in payments, even though authority might have been given for the payments to be made. There were, however, several recent cases in which, after considerable delay, payments had been made to British firms of consultants. Foreign Office thought it well worth while Sir Arthur visiting Iraq, particularly if it was on his way home to Australia and whether or not he had previously been able to obtain an appointment with the appropriate Minister. They thought it might be of some value to contact the Iraqi Mission in London, but the present Chargé d'Affaires was a very junior officer.

(O. L. Davis)

Senior External Affairs Representative

173/10/1

(orig on 173/10/1)

CONFIDENTIAL

In reply quote No. 3/12/38



DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

22 OCT 1958
173/10/1
CANBERRA
AUSTRALIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

15th October, 1958

CONFIDENTIAL

Memo No...../112.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Visit to Iraq: Sir Arthur Stephenson

Sir Arthur Stephenson, senior partner of the architectural firm of Stephenson and Turner, called on me on 14th October in relation to the design work of three large hospitals in Iraq which his firm was carrying out for the Iraqi Government. Sir Arthur explained that a great deal of the design work had already been carried out before the new regime in Baghdad came into power and his firm was employing a large number of persons for this particular task. Since the revolution his firm had received no payments and a very considerable sum was outstanding. He had cabled the Iraqi Government and had received a reply requesting his firm to continue with the work and advising that payment would be forthcoming. However, no payment had yet been received. Sir Arthur said that he was thinking of paying a visit to Iraq in order to try to contact a responsible Minister and get a clear statement regarding Iraqi Government's intentions, both with regard to the continuance of the work and the payment.

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Copy on 12/11/58

Mr Kevin - As see also letter on this file re
Mr Fisher's enquiry re this committee (O. L. Davis)
immediately below.
Senior External Affairs Representative

Mr Hill

At Mr Denton has seen Rd. 23/10.
24/10

CONFIDENTIAL *CR*

173/10/1

14th October, 1958.

ENQUIRIES ON CONDITIONS IN IRAQ BY STEPHENSON AND TURNER

MR. B. C. HILL:

With reference to Mr. Fisher's enquiries of Mr. Kevin, the following is a brief estimate of -

1. The stability of the present regime;
2. Conditions of business with the regime.

1. Stability of Present Iraqi Regime

For.

The position of the Prime Minister, Brigadier Kassem has been strengthened by the removal from the Government of Colonel Aref and several other Ministers who were violently anti-Western and pro-Nasser.

Against.

It appears that there is still a strong body of opinion, e.g. in the Army, favouring the extremist line which Aref followed.

There is a possibility that the Kassem regime may sooner or later be swept away by a coup by these extremist elements.

The machinery of government is functioning either inefficiently or not at all. The country is being run mainly by army officers who have little notion of administration. This running down of the administrative machine could itself lead to conditions of anarchy and upset the regime.

2. Prospects for Business Dealings with Present Regime

Favourable.

Prime Minister Kassem and other members of the Government have given assurances that the Government will honour Iraq's contracts with Western firms.

United Kingdom and United States officials in Baghdad have regarded these assurances as sincerely given.

As far as we know, Western firms with business in Iraq are carrying on normally.

Unfavourable.

The Minister of Development cancelled a contract for a sulphur recovery plant which had been awarded to an American firm.

The contracts of some British technical experts have been terminated. This was done to reduce the preponderance of British experts and to secure a more equal representation from Foreign countries.

*Original
& action on 173/2/1
RD.*

With the change of government and the reconstitution of the Iraq Development Board, there will certainly be some redistribution of funds. In the short run this is likely to hold up payment of instalments (e.g. the money which should have gone to Stephenson and Turner may be going for guns or aircraft).

The inefficiency of the administration is likely to delay the paying of instalments.

3. Conclusions

(1) There does not seem much likelihood of the Kassem Government being overthrown in the short run (say six months), but its long-term stability is open to some doubt.

(2) It will be surprising if Stephenson and Turner do not get their payments. But it is not surprising that these are late.

(3) The indications are that business can safely be conducted with the present regime but that they cannot yet be expected to be prompt or efficient.

20

F. R. DALRYMPLE
Africa and Middle East Section

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No. 173/10/1

Date 13th October, 1958.

SUBJECT

FOR MR. B. C. HILL: ...

FILE

Please consider the attached. I have said to Mr. Fisher that I would ring him back to-morrow morning. He tells me that there are no Australian employees in Iraq so that aspect need not worry us. I imagine that what in effect he is asking is our estimate of the stability of the Iraqi regime and secondly whether we would regard it as a regime with which Stephenson and Turner can, from the financial point of view, safely do business.

Mr

(J.C.G. KEVIN)
Assistant Secretary

*Submission done 14/10 and passed to
Mr Kevin through Mr Hill. R.H. 14/10
Forwarded to Mr Munro too
by Mr Kevin.*

File No. 173/10/1

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Mr. Fisher (Stephenson & Turner, Architects, Melbourne) MY11

on 13th October, 1958.

Officers Present J.C.G. Kevin

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

Iraq.

Mr. Fisher telephoned me this afternoon about a large contract in Iraq. He said that the Iraqis have defaulted in two instalment payments amounting together to £20,000. The Iraqis had, however, said that payment was under way. Mr. Fisher said that his firm was worried about the contract and would like our advice. He said that they had already committed themselves to £100,000 expenditure in Iraq.

DISTRIBUTION:

Minister
Secretary

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Com. Rel.
Sydney Office
Inf. Br.

Ex. Comms. Br.
Melbourne Office
Antarctic Division

FOLLOWING POSTS: Mr. B. C. Hill

Report prepared by J.C.G. Kevin

ACTION:

5962/58.

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

606

FRD:BT

8th October, 1958.

Senior External Affairs Representative,
Australian High Commissioner's Office,
LONDON.

BRITISH SUBJECTS WISHING TO GO TO IRAQ

We have seen a copy of C.R.O. telegram W.No.801 concerning United Kingdom policy towards British subjects wishing to proceed to Iraq. This telegram sets out United Kingdom policy in the following terms:

"Foreign Office have given no general directive to British subjects wishing to proceed to Iraq. Policy is to discourage from returning those whose presence not essential. While individuals are told decision must rest with them, it is suggested they might consider postponing departure until situation in Iraq is clearer."

2. For our own guidance we would appreciate any information as to why the Foreign Office is withholding a general directive and issuing only private discouragement.

(J.C.C. KEVIN)
Assistant Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No. 173/10/1

Date 1/10/58

SUBJECT

Australian Citizens wishing to go to Iraq

FOR Mr. Hill

Mr. Hill

Do you think we should also advise Immigration as the passport issuing authority?

Rfb
1/x

yes

yes

Mr. Hill
Mr. Hill

Wk 1/10

I showed the attached to C.O.P. They say that Immigration have no Immigration section capable of advising Australians proceeding abroad, and that there would therefore be no point in sending copies to Immigration.

C.O.P. ~~suggest~~ say that when persons apply for a passport, there is a section in the application in which they are asked to list the countries they propose to visit; but they are not obliged to fill this section in, and Immigration have no machinery for issuing warnings in respect of certain countries.

C.O.P. suggest that the most we can usefully do would be to inform our Sydney and Melbourne Offices.

I would suggest that in addition we advise overseas posts by telegram.

ALD 1/10.

1/ seems need to inform posts. If we inform Immigration we must be prepared to say plainly that we want them to do the Foreign Office has not given any formal direction about travel to Iraq. If they do not see the necessity to do so, I doubt our posts in countries can take action - the direction. You need not send to Sydney & Melbourne Office. I suggest for each Office has the I.D. ~~Magazine~~ the wish - no formal direction but private discussions. He doubts the reason is political.

COPY

RESTRICTED

OUTWARD TELEGRAM FROM COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

TO: OTTAWA

RPTD: CANBERRA (ACTING H.C.)

WELLINGTON

CAPE TOWN

DELHI

KARACHI

COLOMBO

ACCRA (ACTING H.C.)

KUALA LUMPUR (ACTING H.C.)

SALISBURY

} BY AIR MAIL

(Sent: 11.40 hours 16th September, 1958)

CYPHER

PRIORITY

W.NO. 801 RESTRICTED

Repeated Air Mail to Canberra, Wellington,
Cape Town, Delhi, Karachi, Colombo, Accra, Kuala, Salisbury.

Repeated Trade Commissioner Halifax (Ottawa please
pass).

Your No. 1025.

MRS. COOK

Foreign Office have given no general directive to
British subjects wishing to proceed to Iraq. Policy is to discourage
from returning those whose presence not essential. While individuals
are told decision must rest with them it is suggested they might
consider postponing departure until situation in Iraq is clearer.

2. Foreign Office therefore think it would be better
for Mrs. Cook and children to remain in Canada for present.

173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

REW:ABK

I.14671

Dated: 25th August, 1958.

1700

Rec'd: 26th August, 1958.

0830.

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

2443 UNCLASSIFIED.

From External.

Terrys and Miss Vickery.

Our 2358.

Foreign Office have received report dated 18th August from United Kingdom Embassy, Baghdad, that Terrys safe and well. No information yet about Miss Vickery.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.(1600/37)
P.M.'S

26th August, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF C&P@.

173/10/1

RESTRICTED.

TEMPLE BAR 2435.

In reply quote No.

3/12/38

Memo No. 916.



DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

25 AUG 1958

173/10/1

CANBERRA

RESTRICTED

AUSTRALIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

LONDON, W.C.2

19th August, 1958.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra.

Iraq: Australian Recognition.

The Commonwealth Relations Office have confirmed that a message, along the lines of the one which you requested in your telegram No. 1728 should be given to the Iraqis, was conveyed to them orally in Baghdad on 8 August. We will advise you when we have confirmation from the C.R.O. of the date on which the formal written message of recognition (referred to in my telegram No. 2241) was given to the Iraqis in Baghdad.

(O.L. Davis)

Senior External Affairs Representative.

(Copy given C.R.P.)

Mr Hill to me. ✓ H 1/9
HLS 29/8.

RESTRICTED

C.R.

173/10/1

AUSTINAT
NEW YORK

Your NY.626.

Note should be acknowledged.

6/8/58

173/10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

0.9973

Sent: 8th August, 1958
1855

BD

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

1753.

CONFIDENTIAL.

For external.

Your 2241. Iraq.

Please use similar form to United Kingdom communication as in your 2260, omitting reference to assurances regarding Anglo-Iraqi relations but retaining reference to Iraqi assurances (which we understand they made public) regarding maintenance of existing international obligations.

(Cost £5.18.4)

M.N. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

11th August, 1958

SEC A/Ss Lr UN PaC&A AM&SP S&S&A SA E&P&M A&M&M
INF DL C&P&C

File 173/10/1 please.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SDP:CM

0.9867

Sent: 6th August, 1958.
2215

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

1728. CONFIDENTIAL.

Please ask Foreign Office to arrange for United Kingdom Ambassador at Baghdad to notify new Iraqi Government formally that Her Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia extends recognition to it. The Minister for External Affairs will be announcing this in the House of Representatives during his Foreign Affairs statement today.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S

Cost £5/-/-

7th August, 1958.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

MBF:ABK.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I 13308.

Dated: 4th August, 1958.
2200.

Rec'd: 5th August, 1958.
1919.

(Transmitted via leased channel)

FROM:
Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK.

NY626 CONFIDENTIAL.

The Iraqi Mission has notified us that Dr. Abbass (the Permanent Representative appointed by the Feisal Regime last month) has been dismissed from the Government Service and that Kittani (a junior officer of the Mission) has been named Acting Permanent Representative.

2. Kittani told us that Jawad came here only for the Security Council Meetings and not as Permanent Representative.

3. We should be glad of your advice on question of acknowledgment of the note.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'S.

6th August, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA E.AF&ME E AF&ME
INF DL C&P.

LONDON OTTAWA TEL AVIV WASHINGTON WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/11

SECRET

M.1Mc

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

I.12931/40

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

Dated: 11th September 1957
2245
Rec'd: 12th September 1957
1100

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
L O N D O N.

2115. SECRET. PRIORITY.

The Prime Minister from Casey.

M.11.

Following are the main points of interest in a 1½ hour discussion with Selwyn Lloyd this morning.

1. Syria.

Lloyd sees the arming of Syria's neighbours as a policy of containment but there is as yet no clear course of action for retrieving the situation inside Syria. Having in mind the report of Pakistan origin (which I did not feel free to describe to Lloyd in view of the terms upon which it was given to Cawthorn) I asked whether the United Kingdom had any evidence of Iraqi or Turkish intentions of intervention in Syria. Lloyd said that there was a good deal of talk about courses of action but he personally did not believe that they would come to anything. He was more afraid that nothing would be done. He also said that there was a very intimate exchange of views and information between the United States and the United Kingdom on the Syrian question but he said that the Americans had insisted that the fact of this consultation be kept completely secret (even withholding customary circulation of information within the Old Commonwealth) because of American desire to be able to keep the French out. Lloyd said the Turks had moved their forces inside Turkey.

2. Egypt.

Lloyd said the Americans were keeping their economic pressure on Nasser and wanted the United Kingdom to continue to do so. The United Kingdom position was that they could not contemplate a resumption of Legations until Nasser had freed British assets. There would then be some advantages to the United Kingdom in a restoration of their Embassy in Cairo.

As to the Canal, Lloyd thought that there was still a possibility that some of the sensible people in Egypt would come round to accepting a better regime but that this would not come about if the United Kingdom debated the question publicly with Egypt.

3. Hungary's Credentials.

Lloyd said the United Kingdom had not decided whether to support the rejection of credentials of the Kadar

SECRET

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS I.12931/40

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

regime in the United Nations. They were not much concerned at the risk of the United Kingdom Mission being ejected from Budapest. They thought the precedent in the United Nations more important. The present instructions to the United Kingdom delegation in New York required them to report back development of thinking on the credentials matter with a view to a decision being made later. I told him that we saw rejection of credentials as being the most that the United Nations could do by way of expressing disapproval of the Kadar regime and circumstances by which it came into office. Lloyd asked me to explain our doubts about parts of the Hungary resolution. I said that we would give it our full support now that it had been presented.

4. S.E.A.T.O.

I told Lloyd that the impression had got about that the United Kingdom was hanging back in its support of S.E.A.T.O. and gave him one or two illustrations. He denied that this was so although he said Treasury policy prevented the United Kingdom spending more money on it. He said they regarded S.E.A.T.O. as ranking in importance with the Baghdad Pact and N.A.T.O. United Kingdom opposition on such matters as dissemination of propaganda in non-S.E.A.T.O. countries was based on an informed opinion that this would do more harm than good.

5. Malaya.

We discussed the prospects of Rahman coming into S.E.A.T.O. We agreed that there was a good chance that he was unlikely to be able to join S.E.A.T.O. before the Malayan elections but that we must make it a firm objective to try to get him in. We mentioned the desirability of continuous efforts to explain to him problems of Malayan defence so that he would better understand the need for Malaya to associate herself in planning the defence of Malaya outside that country. We were told that C.R.O. have sent today a paper listing the advantages of S.E.A.T.O. to be used at his discretion in discussion with Rahman. Lloyd at one point suggested that it could be that we will have to reconcile ourselves to unwillingness of countries like Malaya to enter as full members of military organisations and try to associate them in some more limited way on the lines of United States association with the Baghdad Pact. Tomlinson said he thought that if there was local objection to full membership it would apply equally to partial association. I said that we should continue to aim at full membership and with this Lloyd concurred.

6. Antarctic.

Lloyd raised this subject and asked my views. I said that our problem arose from the presence of the Russians. Internationalisation seemed only worthwhile if it achieved demilitarisation. It could be that status quo was the best thing. We felt that it was important not to make early decisions since the problem would not arise until early 1959, which was the earliest date upon which it would be clear whether the Russians were leaving or not. We would want to be able to say to Parliament that no decisions had been reached and

SECRET

SECRET

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I.12931/40

preferably to deny that discussions had taken place since we do not want to prompt the Russians into believing that we are concerned. Lloyd asked me whether I agreed that demilitarisation required that the Russians participate, I agreed that Soviet participation would be necessary but said we had yet to hear Americans argue their case for an international solution excluding the Russians.

7. Australian Representation in the Middle East.

Lloyd said he greatly hoped that Australia would either open a diplomatic mission in Baghdad or find other ways of expressing support for the Iraqi Government. I told him that we would have to think twice about extending our representation commitments but I would see if there was anything which we could do in other ways.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s.

12th September, 1957.

SECRET

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No. 173/10/1

Date 16th July, 1957.

SUBJECT

Students from Iraq.

FOR MR. WHITE:

Our records show that we have only had 3 Iraqis training here (under the United Nations and Specialised Agencies programmes). We have had no private students.

2. The Australian wartime and post-war birth rate is now making itself felt in the Universities and Technical Colleges and, as you know, the Universities Commission is sitting to make recommendations about coping with the future. In order to avoid competing with our own people for University and Technical College places, we are stabilising our Colombo Plan figure at between 800 and 850 here at any one time (it could easily soar to over 1000 now if we released control). We have also indicated to Immigration and C.O.E. that we think the present figure of about 4,000 private Non-European students is a fair thing. By far the largest number of those comprising this latter figure come from Asia and the Pacific but there are a few from Africa and the Middle East.

3. Following the Ghana Independence Celebrations Mr. Fred Osborne (Air) suggested to the Minister that we should help to find training places for Ghana (who would pay for them herself). After careful investigation with C.O.E. (for University places) and Labour and National Service (for Technical College places), we advised the Minister that, under present circumstances, it would be possible to find 10 places for Ghana at Universities and 10 at Technical Colleges. The Minister advised Lord Home accordingly.

4. There is no reason to think that similar places would not be available for Iraq.

Economic & Technical Assistance Branch.

DD:FD

→ Mr. White

McAlister

I understand that the Minister is now not going to Iraq.

In this case, we cannot do the matter now.

173/10

16th July, 1957.

Students from Iraq.

MR. WHITE:

Our records show that we have only had 3 Iraqis training here (under the United Nations and Specialised Agencies programmes). We have had no private students.

2. The Australian wartime and post-war birth rate is now making itself felt in the Universities and Technical Colleges and, as you know, the Universities Commission is sitting to make recommendations about coping with the future. In order to avoid competing with our own people for University and Technical College places, we are stabilising our Colombo Plan figure at between 800 and 850 here at any one time (it could easily soar to over 1000 now if we released control). We have also indicated to Immigration and C.O.E. that we think the present figure of about 4,000 private Non-European students is a fair thing. By far the largest number of those comprising this latter figure come from Asia and the Pacific but there are a few from Africa and the Middle East.

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4. There is no reason to think that similar places would not be available for Iraq.

Economic & Technical Assistance Branch.
DD:FJ

DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

175/10

10 JUL 1957

CANBERRA

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BAGDAD

June 12, 1957.

I was very glad to get your letter of May 24, and to hear that Sir Arthur Stephenson is undertaking architectural work in Iraq. I have written to him to say how much I look forward to seeing him when he comes.

I wish that there could be more contacts between Australia and Iraq. Dr. Tritton, of whom you may know, has done a first class job here in helping to draft the new Social Security Law. While he was here I talked over with him the possibility of finding openings in Australian Technical Schools or Universities for Iraqi students, but of course there are many complications including the relatively high cost of air passages. There is a basis of goodwill here towards Australians and Australia. It would be a valuable counterpart to other influences if it were possible to take some practical advantage of it. I will talk all this over with Sir Arthur Stephenson and perhaps we can hammer out some ideas.

Heather joins in most affectionate messages to you both.

The Secretary,
DEPT. OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

(Mr. Kevin) (Sir MICHAEL WRIGHT)

For information,

R.H. Gardner

(R.H. Gardner)

Private Secretary.

The Right Hon. Richard G. Casey, P.C., C.H., D.S.O., M.C.,
Minister for External Affairs,
Commonwealth Offices,
Treasury Place,
Melbourne, C.2.

M. Dexter

For comment pls.

15/7

173/10/1.
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

HD:ABK.

0.16806.

Sent: 6th December, 1956.
1750.

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

2896. UNCLASSIFIED.

For External.

Please ask Foreign Office for report on crash
(or shooting down) of Proctor aircraft EAIHF in Iraq on 9th
November.

Occupants said to be Englishman Royce and Australian
Colin Walter Carleton.

Member of Parliament and mother enquiring.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (716/58/5)
MIN. & DEPT. CIVIL AVIATION.
P.M.'S.

(Cost £3/5/-)

7th December, 1956.

SEC A/Ss ERC E.A.F&ME E AF&ME INF C&P.

Mr Buckingham

*Have we heard
anything about
this*

Thanks

wrong

*File
wrong*

*Mr. Buckle: No - I had not heard
of this previously. London's reply
attached 14/1/56*

Pd

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
UNCLASSIFIED.
INWARD CABLEGRAM.

I.17253

BH

Sent: 8th December, 1956.
1450
Rec'd: 9th December, 1956.
0900

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

3348. UNCLASSIFIED.

From External.

Your 2896 proctor aircraft crash.

Preliminary report received by the foreign office states that proctor aircraft, G-IAHF, crashed near Kirkuk about 9th November and that both occupants were killed. One was Colin Walter Carleton tank-sinked and student pilot, Australian passport C40449, dated Brisbane 26/2/52, whose English wife lives in this country. Burials took place 12th November at I.P.C. cemetery Kirkuk, Church of England chaplain officiating.

2. Aircraft was proceeding South East from Diyarbekr (last stop) and appears to have lost way in North Iraq owing to bad weather. All papers in order but at present held by Iraqi military intelligence.

3. Australia house notified Mrs. Carleton who said she would inform Carleton's relatives in Australia.

4. Full report still awaited from Baghdad and Foreign office yesterday telegraphed reminder.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (716/58/5)
MIN. & DEPT. CIVIL AVIATION
P.M'S.

9th December, 1956.

SEC A/Ss ER@ EAF&ME E AF&ME INF C&P

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

173/10/1

MP:MB

O. 3889.

Sent: 15th March, 1956.
1000

TO:

Australian Legation,
CAIRO.

40. UNCLASSIFIED.

Understand Iraq authorities calling tenders
for 300 Maintainers i.e. Light Graders Australian manufacturers
most interested. Please arrange airmail documents
Director Trade Promotion, Melbourne.

MIN. & DEPT. TRADE (C. S. M.)(552/67/16)
P.M'S.

Cost £1/18/4.

15th March, 1956.

SEC A/Ss ER AF&ME

FILE COPY
FHS.AG

173/10/1

Memo No.

289

2nd December, 1955.

The Australian Legation,
CAIRO.

.... With reference to your memorandum 670 of
27th October I forward copy of a letter send to Mr.
McClure-Smith regarding the parrots for the Crown Prince
of Iraq.

^{FS}
(F.H. Stuart)
for the Secretary.

file

COPY

173/10/1

Council of Ministers' Office,
BAGHDAD.

13th November 1955

Dear Mr. Casey,

Many thanks for your letter dated 17th
October 1955.

His Royal Highness the Crown Prince has
asked me to request you to be good enough to convey to
the Australian Government on his behalf his warmest thanks
for the nice gift of fifty parrots they have been so kind
to present and which His Royal Highness has accepted same
with the greatest appreciation.

I assume that an acknowledgment will also be
sent direct from His Royal Highness.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Yours sincerely,
(sgd.)
Noury Elsaid.

Right Honourable
Mr. R.G. Casey, C.H., D.S.O., M.C.,
Minister for External Affairs,
Parliament House,
Canberra, A.C.T.,
Australia.

→ Mr. Stuart

Secretary	
Department of External Affairs	
Forwarded for:	
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply.	<i>N. H. Gardner</i> (R. H. Gardner) Private Secretary 23 / 11 / 1955
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply direct.	
<input type="checkbox"/> Attention.	
<input type="checkbox"/> Information.	

See
3/11

RS

fu

Mr. Stuart

AMPOL PETROLEUM LIMITED

Head Office : Buchanan Street, Balmain, N.S.W.

CABLES & TELEGRAMS: "AMPOLCO" AND TELEPHONE: WB0233 . BOX 5342 G.P.O. SYDNEY

BPC:IS

16th November, 1955.



Mr. R. R. Quarmby,
Department of the Exterior,
119 Phillip Street,
SYDNEY. N.S.W.

Dear Mr. Quarmby,

mt. "Andwi" - Voyage No. 8.

We have pleasure in confirming our recent telephone conversation when we advised you that arrangements have been made by our Agents at Bahrain for the consignment of birds to be on-carried to Basrah.

The birds are to be transferred to the "Dumra" and we understand that this vessel is due at Basrah on the 20th November, 1955.

Yours faithfully,
AMPOL PETROLEUM LIMITED,

B. P. Coates
SHIPPING DEPARTMENT

G.R.
File
TS



173/10/1

CABLE ADDRESS
AUSTUNAT. NEW YORK

TELEPHONE
LONGACRE 5-5050

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
4510 EMPIRE STATE BUILDING,
NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

14th November, 1955.

Mr. Francis Stuart,
C/o Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A.C.T.

Dear Sir:

Many thanks for your letter telling me that fifty Australian parrots are at present on the water enroute to the Crown Prince of Iraq. I am much obliged to you for getting this somewhat unusual transaction carried to a successful conclusion and I know that the Crown Prince will be highly gratified. Having initiated the project, and having promised the Crown Prince that we would do what we could, I also am gratified and I will be interested to hear how the birds fare when they get to Baghdad.

Unless they are put in an air-conditioned aviary I should imagine that their span of life will not be as long as it should be, since the summer temperature is around 120° most of the time!

*Yours sincerely
Louis Mountbatten*

*Sen. FF.
21/11*

for file

m 6.

173/10/1

~~Page~~ 1. Show to see ^{9/11/12} ~~Shaw~~
then **Out Kuni**

✓ ~~Am Kan~~
✓ ~~Am Kan~~ ^{In/kan}

San

FS

9/12

RECEIVED

DEC 1955

MINISTER'S OFFICE



MSL

Baghdad, November 12, 1955.

Dear Mr Casey

The Prime Minister Nouri al Said has brought to my notice your letter of 17th October, and I would like you to accept my appreciation and thanks for the exquisite gift of fifty Australian parrots. It was extremely thoughtful of you to have sent them to me. They will be a welcome and a delightful addition to the various species of birds which I already have.

Will you kindly convey my thanks to the Australian Government for their much appreciated gift.

With my sincere kind regards.

Yours Sincerely
Abdullah

Rt. Hon. R.G. Casey,
P.C., C.H., D.S.O., M.C.
Minister for External Affairs,
Australia

*Copy sent to Mr. McClure Smith
from Minister 3/9/56.*

AUSTLEG, CAIRO.

UNCLASSIFIED

Your memo 670.

Birds for Iraq transhipped to Dumra. Estimated time
of arrival Basra 20th November.

PFP/AG

173/10/1

14/11/55

E.A.

File

FILE COPY
FFP.AC

173/10/1

Memo No.

263

11th November, 1955.

The Australian Legation,
CAIRO.

Gift of Birds for Iraq.

Please refer to your memorandum No. 670
(81/3/2), of the 27th October, 1955.

2. The birds for the Crown Prince of Iraq are
to be transhipped at Bahrein to the "Dumra" and their
estimated time of arrival at Basra is Sunday 20th
November.

(F.H. Stuart)
for the Secretary.

173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD PRINTERGRAM MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NUMBER 4457 3 25 PM 10 11 55

TO MR STUART E A CANBERRA

FROM QUARMBY E A SYDNEY

=====

AMPOL ADVISE BIRDS FOR CROWN PRINCE OF IRAQ ARE TO BE TRANSHIPPED
AT BAHREIN TO THE "DUMRA" AND THEIR E T A BASRA IS SUNDAY

W+ 20TH NOVEMBER.

MESSAGE ENDS

Please R/S with file.

FILE COPY
FHS.AG

1st November, 1955.

PERSONAL

My dear Ambassador,

Last year following your visit to Baghdad correspondence took place between us on the presentation of some Australian parrots to the Crown Prince of Iraq. Progress in this for a while was slow owing to the difficulty of making suitable transport arrangements. However everything has now been concluded and on October 15th a consignment of fifty parrots, kindly presented by Sir Edward Hallstrom, was placed aboard the Ampol tanker "Andwi" for shipment to Basra.

Mr. Casey wrote a letter to the Prime Minister of Iraq once the shipment was under way informing him that it was coming and asking for delivery of it to be taken at Basra.

I feel sure that you would like to know this arrangement, which was initiated in your time at Cairo, has been successfully concluded.

Yours sincerely,

(F.H. Stuart)

His Excellency Mr. H.A. McClure-Smith,
Australian Ambassador to the Netherlands,
C/o Australian Delegation to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

Ref:- 81/3/2.

Memo No. 670.

27th October 1955.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.


Gift of Birds for Iraq.

I refer to Press Release No.84 of the 13th October 1955, concerning the gift of fifty Australian parrots to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Iraq.

2. It would be appreciated if definite advice could be given to this post of the date of expected arrival in Basrah of these birds, as it was through us that this gift was first arranged and we would like to inform the Iraqi Ambassador here who has raised the matter on a number of occasions.

(Sgd) H. D. WHITE

(H.D. WHITE)
Charge d'Affaires a.i.



173/10/1

Ref:- 81/3/2.

Memo No. 670.

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
CAIRO.

27th October 1955.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

Gift of Birds for Iraq.

I refer to Press Release No.84 of the 13th October 1955, concerning the gift of fifty Australian parrots to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Iraq.

2. It would be appreciated if definite advice could be given to this post of the date of expected arrival in Basrah of these birds, as it was through us that this gift was first arranged and we would like to inform the Iraqi Ambassador here who has raised the matter on a number of occasions.

H.D. White

(H.D. WHITE)

Charge d'Affaires a.i.

Mr Steward (C.P.)

GR

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No. 173/10/1.....

Date.....19th October, 1955.

1302/55.

SUBJECT Gift of Parrots for the Crown Prince of Iraq.

FOR THE ACTING.....
MINISTER

This gift, which was arranged by McClure-Smith while in Cairo and by Mr. Casey, has in fact been made possible by the generosity of Sir Edward Hallstrom who provided the birds, and the Ampol Petroleum Company which is carrying them free. It would be appropriate to express thanks to both of them and I attach draft letters for your signature if you approve.

Francis Stuart

(F.H. Stuart)
Consular & Protocol Branch.

F.H. Stuart/AG

file

FILE COPY
FHS.AC

173/10/1

Parliament House,
CANBERRA...A.C.T.

20th October, 1955

Dear Sir Edward,

May I ask you to accept the Government's sincere thanks for your generosity and trouble in making possible the gift of fifty parrots for the Crown Prince of Iraq? This is only one of many instances for which we owe you our gratitude in providing Australian fauna to overseas countries. The present instance will, I know, give great pleasure to the Crown Prince and should not be without importance in our public relations.

Yours sincerely,



(P.M. McBride)

Sir Edward Hallstrom,
President,
Taronga Zoological Park Trust,
MOSMAN. N.S.W.

FILE COPY
FHS,AG

173/10/1

Parliament House,
CANBERRA...A.C.T.
20th October, 1955

Dear Mr. Lennard,

I write to convey my sincere thanks to you for your Company's generous undertaking to carry to Basra the consignment of parrots recently made available to the Crown Prince of Iraq. We experienced considerable difficulty in arranging transport for these birds and your carrying them for us was a most welcome solution. Your doing so gratis in addition has been most generous.

Yours sincerely,

✓
(P.M. McBride)

Mr. M. Lennard,
General Manager,
Ampol Petroleum Company Ltd.,
Buchanan Street,
BALMAIN. N.S.W.



COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

Singapore

17-X-57

With the Compliments

of the

*Private Secretary to the Minister for
External Affairs.*

NO.

COMMONWEALTH OFFICES,
TREASURY GARDENS,
MELBOURNE, C.2.

for file

173/10/1
Minister for External Affairs,

Written from Australian Commission
Singapore.

17th October, 1955.

When the then Australian Minister at Cairo visited Baghdad in December last year His Royal Highness the Crown Prince asked his help in obtaining some Australian parrots. Mr. McClure-Smith said he would gladly pass this request on to me and I was of course delighted to be of what assistance I could.

I am now writing to tell you that the Australian Government would be grateful if His Royal Highness will accept a gift of fifty parrots which have been specially chosen as most likely to withstand the journey from Australia to Iraq and which are really representative of the Australian parrot family. A list of the actual types is attached.

The birds are being carried to Bahrein by the Ampol Petroleum Company's tanker "Andwi" and arrangements have been made for them to be carried on from Bahrein to Basra by one of the vessels of the B.I. They are addressed to the Supervisor of the Royal Treasury, Royal Court, Baghdad.

Would you be kind enough to inform His Royal Highness of this gift and to ensure that arrangements can be made for the reception of the birds in Basra and their onward carriage to Baghdad?

With my warm personal regards,

I am,

Yours sincerely,

R.G. Casey
(R.G. CASEY)

His Excellency General Nouri el Said,
Prime Minister of Iraq,
BAGHDAD. Iraq.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
CANBERRA.

In reply quote No.

12th October, 1955.

My dear Minister,

The parrots for the Crown Prince of Iraq, about which I spoke before you left Australia, will leave Sydney by the Ampol tanker "Andwi" on Friday 14th October. I enclose a letter which, if you approve of it, you might send to Nouri telling him that this is being done.

With kind regards,

I am,

Yours sincerely,

F.H. Stuart

(F.H. Stuart).

The Rt. Hon. R.G. Casey, C.H., D.S.O., M.C.,
Australian Commission,
SINGAPORE.

Eight Cockatiels
Six White Cockatoos (sulphur crested)
Four Corellas,
Twelve Galahs
Four Eastern Rosellas
Four Crimson Rosellas
Four Major Mitchell Cockatoos
Four Many-coloured Parrakeets
Four Rainbow Lorikeets.

Daily Telegraph 15/10/55



FROM TARONGA PARK ZOO Sydney, Australia	
LIVE ANIMAL WITH CARE	
Please give Water and Deliver Immediately	
TO	FEEDING INSTRUCTIONS
THE SUPERVISOR OF THE ROYAL NAVY ROYAL FORCES ADVISORY VIA AIRMAIL	KEEP IN A DRY, AND COOL PLACE GIVE FRESH CLEAN WATER DAILY DO NOT FEED WITH HANDS KEEP IN A DRY PLACE

50 AUSTRALIAN BIRDS, a gift to the Crown Prince of Iraq from the Department of External Affairs, through the Minister, Mr. R. G. Casey, were loaded aboard the tanker Andwi at Balmain wharf yesterday. In the top picture the birds are being taken aboard in their cages, each of which bears the label in the lower picture giving directions for feeding on their 80-day journey.

fee

Sydney Sun - 14/10/55

**CASEY'S
GIFT
Galahs
for a
prince**

External Affairs Department is shipping 50 Australian birds to the Crown Prince of Irak as a gift.

The birds are lorikeets, Major Michel cockatoos, white cockatoos, eastern rosellas, many-colored parakeets, cockatiels, corellas, galahs and crimson rosellas.

Sir Edward Hallstrom will supervise their loading in crates on to the tanker Andwui at Balmain wharf today.

Sir Edward has provided the birds from the Zoo and arranged for food for them on the eight-day journey to Bahrain, in the Persian Gulf.

Another ship will take them from Bahrain to Basra.

The Crown Prince will arrange for an attendant to take the birds overland from Basra to Baghdad, the capital of Irak.

for
+ P/S

173/10/11

S. M. Herald
14/1/51

50 Australian Parrots To Go To Iraq

CANBERRA, Thursday.
—Fifty Australian parrots
will soon be sent as a gift to
the Crown Prince of Iraq,
the Emir Faisal.

The Acting Minister for Ex-
ternal Affairs, Sir Philip Mc-
Bride, announcing this to-day,
said the birds included cocka-
tiels, galahs, eastern rosellas,
Major Mitchell cockatoos,
parrakeets, and rainbow lori-
keets.

The birds had been
assembled at Taronga Park
Zoo.

The Ampol Company would
carry the birds to the Persian
Gulf in its tanker Andwi,
which was expected to sail
from Sydney during the week-
end.

Sir Philip said the Crown
Prince, who had a notable col-
lection of birds and animals in
Baghdad, had recently "ex-
pressed interest" in obtaining a
representative selection of
Australian parrots to add to it.

file



the Ingram

F 173/10/1 755.

FOR THE PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CANBERRA

PR 84.

13th October, 1955.

GIFT OF BIRDS FOR IRAQ

The Acting Minister for External Affairs, Sir Philip McBride, said today that arrangements had been made to send a gift of 50 Australian parrots to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Iraq.

The gift has been assembled through the kind offices of Sir Edward Hallstrom at Teronga Park, and comprises, among other birds, cockatiels, galahs, eastern rosellas, Major Mitchell cockatoos, parrakeets and rainbow lorikeets.

The Ampol Company is generously carrying the consignment of birds free of charge to the Persia Gulf in one of its tankers, the "Andwi", which is expected to sail from Sydney at the week-end.

Sir Philip McBride said that the Crown Prince, who has a notable collection of birds and animals in Baghdad, had recently expressed interest in obtaining a representative selection of Australian parrots to add to it.



Mr. Stuart

755.

FOR THE PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CANBERRA

PR 84.

13th October, 1955.

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73/10/1
FILE COPY
FHS.AG

When the then Australian Minister at Cairo visited Baghdad in December last year His Royal Highness the Crown Prince asked his help in obtaining some Australian parrots. Mr. McClure-Smith said he would gladly pass this request on to me and I was of course delighted to be of what assistance I could.

I am now writing to tell you that the Australian Government would be grateful if His Royal Highness will accept a gift of fifty parrots which have been specially chosen as most likely to withstand the journey from Australia to Iraq and which are really representative of the Australian parrot family. A list of the actual types is attached.

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Would you be kind enough to inform His Royal Highness of this gift and to ensure that arrangements can be made for the reception of the birds in Basra and their onward carriage to Baghdad.

With my warm personal regards,

I am,

Yours sincerely,

(R.G. CASEY)

His Excellency General Nouri el Said,
Prime Minister of Iraq,
BAGHDAD. Iraq.

12th October, 1955.

My dear Minister,

The parrots for the Crown Prince of Iraq, about which I spoke before you left Australia, will leave Sydney by the Ampol tanker "Andwi" on Friday 14th October. I enclose a letter which, if you approve of it, you might send to Nouri telling him that this is being done.

With kind regards,

I am,

Yours sincerely,

(F.H. Stuart).

The Rt. Hon. R.G. Casey, C.H., D.S.O., M.C.,
Australian Commission,
SINGAPORE.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD PRINTERGRAM MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NO 5785 28 9 55

TO QUARMBY, EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, SYDNEY.

FROM STUART, EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

=====

PARROTS FOR THE CROWN PRINCE OF IRAQ.

BIRDS SHOULD BE CONSIGNED TO "THE SUPERVISOR OF THE ROYAL
TREASURY, ROYAL COURT, BAGHDAD".

File

MESSAGE ENDS FILE N O 173 /10/1 ABK

RRQ/MGC

DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

29 SEP 1955

175/10/1
CANBERRA

27th September, 1955.

Dear Mr. Stead,

Gift Birds for the Crown Prince of Iraq

I wish to confirm my telephone conversation of the 26th in which I advised that Taronga Park Zoo will be pleased to provide sufficient feed for the birds for a carry-over of 50 days.

With reference to the instructions for feeding, one copy of the instructions will be given to the Officer-in-Charge of the birds and one copy will be tacked to each crate. An officer from the Zoo will accompany the birds on board the "Andwi", and advise the Officer-in-Charge Birds how the birds are to be fed.

I also wish to advise some slight variations in the size of the boxes. There will now be -

8 boxes measuring 24" x 18" x 19" - each box weighs 17 lbs.
plus 3 lbs. of birds - total of 20 lbs. per box.

5 boxes measuring 24" x 18" x 19" - each box weighs 32 lbs.
plus 3 lbs of birds - total of 35 lbs. per box.

2 boxes measuring 30" x 23" x 22" - each box weighs 26 lbs.
plus 6 lbs. of birds - total of 32 lbs. per box.

It is suggested that the birds should be consigned to the Crown Prince of Iraq, Baghdad via Basrah. The Crown Prince is being advised of the shipment and requested to arrange the carriage of the birds from Basrah to Baghdad.

All arrangements regarding customs and health formalities will be attended to by this Department.

I should like once more to express the appreciation of this Department for the splendid co-operation of your Company in making possible the transport of these birds to Basrah.

Yours faithfully,

*Superintendent of the Royal
Army*

RRQ

(R.R. Quarmby)
External Affairs Officer

V.C. Stead, Esquire,
Ampol Petroleum Limited,
Box 5342, G.P.O.
SYDNEY. NEW SOUTH WALES.

F.H. Stuart - Consular and Protocol Officer.

RRQ

GR.
TC

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No.....

Date

SUBJECT:

Parrots.

FOR Mr. Walter:

These are going forward by
Ansell's "Andree" to Balvau, March 15/10.
to Bona, free of charge.
Mr. Quarmby tells me that the "Andree" is
expected to sail on 15/10.


The question arises of an allowance
for these men who look after the
birds on the voyage to ~~Bona~~ ^{Bahia}. Can we
have £10 in cash available for
landing on 15/10?

FS.
28/9

Mr. Waipat:

Mr. Walter spoke to ^{you} ~~me~~ on this. What we
would like is to have the money in
cash to hand to the Master of the vessel.
Could you get this from Mr. Quarmby?

FS.
29/9



Quarmby, External Affairs, Sydney.

C & P

Stuart, External Affairs, Canberra.

173/10/1

Parrots for the Crown Prince of Iraq.

Birds should be consigned to "The Supervisor
of the Royal Treasury, Royal Court, Baghdad".

FHS /AG

28/9/1955

173/10/1

2nd September, 1955.

THE MINISTER

On 7th December last, when he was Minister at Cairo, McClure-Smith gave you an account of a visit he had just made to Iraq. In this he mentioned that the Crown Prince had asked him if he could get some Australian parrots for the royal collection. You minuted, "This we had better do".

2. Sir Edward Hallstrom, with his usual kindness and enthusiasm, agreed to assemble a collection free of charge of those birds the Crown Prince particularly wanted. The problem of transporting them took rather longer to overcome, but Ampol Petroleum has now agreed to carry a consignment of fifty birds by one of its tankers to Bahrein, and arrange for its onward shipment by B.I. to Basra - where it should arrive about the end of November. Once we know the birds are on their way I think it would be a good idea for you to write a personal letter to the Prime Minister of Iraq, informing him of this gift. Nuri could then tell the Crown Prince. If you agree, I could have a letter drafted and typed here and sent over to you at wherever you happen to be at the time, for signature and onward transmission to Baghdad.

3. There might be a suitable press announcement here too, which gives due credit to Sir Edward. Ampol would also like it to be publicised that they carried the consignment gratis.

4. I will tell McClure-Smith that the arrangement he initiated has been successfully carried out.

(F.H. Stuart)
Consular & Protocol Branch.

F.H. Stuart/AG.

173/10/1

[Handwritten signature]
10/9

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No. 173/10/1.....

Date 2nd September, 1955.

1202/55.

SUBJECT

FOR THE MINISTER

On 7th December last, when he was Minister at Cairo, McClure-Smith gave you an account of a visit he had just made to Iraq. In this he mentioned that the Crown Prince had asked him if he could get some Australian parrots for the royal collection. You minuted, "This we had better do".

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4. I will tell McClure-Smith that the arrangement he initiated has been successfully carried out.

M. STUART.

Good. Glad
you have followed
this up. You M.
draft letter to
Nuri etc etc
have.

No doubt you will
have Sir Philip
McClure-Smith - re
press statements

2/9/55

Thiel

^{FS}
(F.H. Stuart)
Consular & Protocol Branch.

F.H. Stuart/AG.

21/5 ✓ FS
21/9
20/9

INWARD PRINTERGRAM MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NUMBER 3823 5 10 PM 19 55

TO MR STUART E A CANBERRA

FROM QUARMBY E A SYDNEY

=====

BIRDS FOR CROWN PRINCE OF IRAQ.

SIR EDWARD HALLSTROM HAS ADVISED THAT HE PROPOSES TO PRESENT ~~XXX~~ THE FOLLOWING BIRDS TO THE CROWN PRINCE:

EIGHT COCKATIELS, SIX WHITE COCKATOOS (SULPHUR CRESTED), FOUR CORELLAS, TWELVE GALAHS, FOUR EASTERN ROSELLAS, FOUR CRIMSON ROSELLAS, FOUR MAJOR MITCHELL COCKTA++ COCKATOOS, FOUR MANY-COLOURED PARRAKEETS, FOUR RAINBOW LORIKEETS: TOTAL FIFTY BIRDS.

THEY WILL BE SHIPPED IN THIRTEEN BOXES 24 X 18 X 18 AND TWO BOXES 24 X 24 X 24.

I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MR STEAD OF AMPOL REFERENCE THE ABOVE AND THEY ARE QUITE HAPPY TO TAKE THE FIFTEEN CASES FROO++ FREE OF CHARGE FOR US. THEY ARE ARRANGING TO SHIP THEM ON THE "ANDWI" WHICH WILL NOW BE DEPARTING FROM SYDNEY ON WEDNESDAY 19TH OCTOBER AND IS DUE IN BAHREIN ON 17TH NOVEMBER. THEY ARE ARRANGING FOR THE BIRDS TO BE TRANS-SHIPED TO B I S N VESSEL AT BAHREIN FOR DISCHARGE AT BASRA AND I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULD CONTACT THECR++ THE CROWN PRINCE AND SEE THAT ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE FOR HIM TO TAKE DELIVERY IN BASRA AND ARRANGE FOR THEIR ONWARD TRANSMISSION TO BAGHDAD. THE AGENTS OF ~~AMPOKXN~~ AMPOL WILL TAKE CARE OF THE BIRDS DURING ANY PERIOD THEY HAVE TO STAY IN BAHREIN TO CONNECT WITH THE B I S N VESSEL. B I S N ARE ALSO CARRYING THE BIRDS FREIGHT FREE. I MENTIONED TO AMPOL THAT WE WERE ANXIOUS TO GET SOME PUBLICITY ON THIS ^{GIFT} ~~OCCASION~~ AND THEY WOULD BE VERY GLAD IF IT WERE POSSIBLE IN SUCH PUBLICITY TO MENTION THAT THE BIRDS WERE CARRIED ON THE "ANDWI" GRATIS.

MESSAGE ENDS

CORRECTION - PLS CROSS OUT 'OCCZ++' 'OCCASION' IN THIRD LAST LINE AND PUT 'GIFT' - THE LINE READ 'ON THIS GIFT AND THEY WOULD ETC ETC

PLS ACK

VCROWN PRINCE OF IRAQ OR IRAN?

IRAQ

TA RCD TKS

COPY

Parliament House,
CANBERRA...A.C.T.

27th July, 1955

Just a note to say that I just happened to have seen (in the London Times of June 9th) the reference to your having received the insignia of the G.C.M.G. from the Queen.

I venture to send you my warm congratulations on this high order - and to hope that all goes well with you.

I remember very well our many meetings in Baghdad and elsewhere in 1942 and 1943 - and have followed your distinguished career since with the greatest interest.

R.G. CASEY

His Excellency General Nouri Al-Said,
Prime Minister of Iraq.

====

(Sent L.R. McIntyre, London under cover of C/Slip
"Would you be good enough to have this sent
through the Foreign Office bag to Baghdad.
Copy attached."

F 173/10/1

MR. PLIMSOLL

====

Ray Plimsoll
27/7/55

For information.

173/10/1

29th June, 1955.

Dear Sir Edward,

Thank you for your kind letter of 25th June regarding the parrots for the Crown Prince of Iraq.

It appears likely that Ampol Petroleum will be prepared to carry these birds to Bahrein and arrange their onward shipment by air from there to Baghdad if indeed they cannot take them direct to Basra. Mr. Quarmby is at present finalising these arrangements and he will get in touch with you as soon as a firm arrangement for shipment can be made.

We will of course arrange for an honorarium to the person who actually looks after them on board.

I have noted that you would like a week's notice when these arrangements have been completed.

With kind regards,

I am,

Yours sincerely,

(F.H. Stuart)

Sir Edward Hallstrom,
President,
Taronga Zoological Park Trust,
MOSMAN. N.S.W.

CABLE ADDRESS
ZOOLOGY
SYDNEY

TELEPHONE: XM 3006
(3 LINES)

173/10/1
28 JUN 1955

TARONGA ZOOLOGICAL PARK TRUST

ADDRESS ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE SECRETARY

ZOOLOGICAL GARDENS AND AQUARIUM, MOSMAN
SYDNEY, N.S.W., AUSTRALIA.

Your Ref: 173/10/1

25th June 1955.

F. H. Stuart, Esq.
Dept. of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.


Dear Mr. Stuart,

I am in receipt of your letter of 14th inst.
in regard to the shipment of birds for the Crown
Prince of Iraq.

I am very happy to co-operate in this matter,
and it would appear that there is no alternative
but to ship the birds by sea. It will be necessary
therefore to contact one of the Shipping Companies
and arrange with them to care for the birds on the
trip, one member of the crew being allotted to care
for them on the journey. It is usual under these
circumstances to pay an honorarium to the person
recommended by the Captain or Chief Officer of the
vessel.

If you could make such arrangements, and give
us about a week's notice, we will have the birds
packed and ready for shipment.

Yours sincerely,



(Sir Edward Hallstrom)
P R E S I D E N T.

ppm

GR

173/10/1

14th June, 1955.

Dear Sir Edward,

Mr. Quarmby has been in touch with you recently regarding a gift of parrots for the Crown Prince of Iraq. He has also been making enquiries as to the possibility of our despatching these by air. It appears that the air companies will not accept Australian parrots for health reasons and that in the circumstances the only means of getting them there will be by sea.

We had always assumed, I think on your advice, that if the birds could not travel by air it would be difficult to despatch them for a variety of reasons. I should be grateful for your advice whether, in the circumstances, there is any objection from the point of view of the birds welfare to us making arrangements for their transport by sea.

Yours sincerely,

FS.
(F.H. Stuart)

Sir Edward Hallstrom,
President,
Taronga Zoological Park Trust,
MOSMAN. N.S.W.

R/c

30/6 ✓

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD TELEPRINTER MESSAGE

MESSAGE NUMBER 2669 4 15 PM 10 6 55

173/10/1

TO MR STUART E A CANBERRA

FROM QUARMBY E A SYDNEY

=====

file
FURTHER TO OUR DISCUSSION RE PARROTS WHEN I ADVISED YOU THAT QANTAS WERE CABLING BOAC IN LONDON ADVISING THAT APPROXIMATELY TWELVE BIRDS AS GIFT OF AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WERE TO BE SENT TO THE CROWN PRINCE OF IRAQ AND ASKING COULD DISPENSATION BE OBTAINED TO CARRY THE PARROTS ON THE ~~XXXXXXX~~ FREIGHTER AIRCRAFT WHICH DEPARTS WEEKLY FROM SINGAPORE. QANTAS HAVE NOW RECEIVED A REPLY FROM BOAC TO THE EFFECT THAT REGULATIONS DO NOT PERMIT THE CARRIAGE OF PARROTS OR BIRDS OF THE PARROT FAMILY. (IT SEEMS THAT THERE IS A FEAR OF PSITTACOSIS.)

I DO NOT PROPOSE CONTACTING SIR EDWARD HALLSTROM ON THIS MATTER AGAIN UNTIL I HAVE HEARD FROM YOU FURTHER.

MESSAGE ENDS

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD PRINTERGRAM MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NUMBER 3622 8 6 55

TO MR QUARMBY E A SYDNEY

FROM STUART E A CANBERRA

PARROTS FOR IRAQ.

I TALKED TO WALLER THIS MORNING ABOUT THIS POINTING OUT THAT I WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO PUT UP A FORMAL SUBMISSION TO THE TREASURY. HE TOLD ME I CAN'T DO THIS UNTIL WE HAVE A FIRM ESTIMATE OF THE COSTS INVOLVED.

/MYTE/

I WONDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR YOU BY ARRANGEMENT WITH HALLSTROM'S PEOPLE AT THE ZOO IT TO GET AN ESTMATE NOW OF THE WEIGHT AND SIZE OF THE CAGES IN WHICH THE BIRDS WOULD TRAVEL. UNLESS WE COULD DO THIS IN ADVANCE IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO APPROACH TREASURY FOR THE MONEY AND THEREFORE NO SHIPMENT CAN PROCEED. I SHOULD HVE THOUGHT MYSELF THAT IF TWELVE BIRDS WERE GOING THEY WOULD REQUIRE SUCH AND SUCH AN AMOUNT OF SPARE AND THERE MUST BE CRATES AVAILABLE AT THE ZOO FROM WHICH AN IDEA OF THE DIMENSIONS AND WEIGHT COULD BE OBTAINED.

MESSAGE ENDS

File

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Mr. Stuart

Parrots to Basra.

BA 705 departs Sydney 2130 hrs on
Sunday nights, arrives Singapore
1540 hrs. on Monday afternoons.

BA 963 departs Singapore 0830 hrs on
Tuesdays, arrives Basra 2045 hrs
on Wednesday days (overnight in
Colombo.)

or

K.L.M. 846 departs Sydney 2000 hrs Thursday
arrives Bangkok 1610 " Friday
K.L.M. 842 departs " 0850 " Sunday
arrives Basra 2125. "

Mr. Stuart

FILE COPY
FHS.AC

173/10/1

¹⁸
15th April, 1955.

My dear Minister,

Thank you for your 81/3/2 of 29th March forwarding copy of your letter of 26th February. In fact the first letter reached me on 10th March and I passed on its contents to Sir Edward Hallstrom. I saw Sir Edward yesterday and he tells me that he can arrange an immediate shipment of about twenty birds once a suitable method can be found for conveying them.

He is anxious to avoid periods of off-loading at intermediate points and as there is unfortunately no direct air service from Sydney to Baghdad or even Basra we have not been able to decide on anything really suitable. It may however be possible to make adequate arrangements for trans-shipment at Singapore and we are looking into this. I shall let you know as soon as possible what is decided.

Yours sincerely,

(F.H. Stuart)

His Excellency Mr. H.A. McClure-Smith,
Australian Minister,
CAIRO.

¹⁷
[Signature]
Mr. McMillin

J. v. 1/2



DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

18 APR 1955

CANBERRA

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
CAIRO.

29th March, 1955.

In reply quote No. 81/3/2

Dear Stuart,

I have just discovered that, through an inexplicable lapse in the Chancery, my letter to you of the 26th February was sent by ordinary air mail instead of having been put in the Bag. To make matters worse, the girl who attends to the stamping and postage of letters, who should have known that all communications to the Department go by Bag, did not even take the trouble to observe that the letter was only addressed to Canberra without any country indicated. It therefore seems to me unlikely that the letter ever reached you, and I am enclosing a copy of it herewith. The lapse is the more unfortunate, since I feel that the diplomatic value to us of the gift of birds to the Crown Prince of Iraq is to some extent bound up with the expedition of delivery. I am therefore hoping against hope that the original letter reached you, but if it did not, I should be greatly obliged if you could push the matter ahead as quickly as is convenient.

With kind regards,

(H.A. McClure-Smith)
MINISTER.

F.H. Stuart, Esq.,
Chief of Protocol,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

TH S

CS

COPY OF LETTER SENT 26TH FEBRUARY, 1955.

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,

CAIRO.

File 81/3/2

26th February, 1955.

Dear Stuart,

Many thanks for your letter of the 11th February. I am glad that the Government has agreed to my suggestion that it should make a gift of a number of birds to the Crown Prince of Iraq. I am sure that these gestures pay good dividends in this part of the world.

Since I wrote the Minister and the Secretary, I have been waiting for the Crown Prince to furnish me with a list of the birds in which he is interested. Such things are slow in coming in the Middle East and I only received the list a couple of days ago. Not being a bird fancier, I do not know how many of the birds he has listed are procurable or transportable. Sir Edward Hallstrom will have to be the final judge on these points, but I hope that the Government will include as many of the birds in its gift as is practicable.

The birds should be consigned to :-

The Supervisor of the Royal Treasury,
The Royal Court,
Baghdad.


I understand that this functionary will attend to all the import formalities and I should assume that you will notify him in advance that the birds are coming. I would suggest that, at the same time, the Minister sends a personal letter to the Crown Prince, telling him that the gift is on its way and saying what is usual on such an occasion.

I have told the Iraqi Ambassador here (who brought me the Crown Prince's list from Baghdad) that the Government will be pleased to send the Crown Prince, by way of a gift, such birds as can be made available from his list. At the same time, I asked him to explain to His Royal Highness that preliminary enquiries in Australia had established that only the hardiest birds would survive shipment, and that therefore it would in all probability not be possible to send more than a selection of the birds listed.

If/ ...

If I am still in Cairo, will you please let me know when the choice has been made and the date of shipment decided upon, so that I can inform the Ambassador.

Yours sincerely,



(Signed) H.A. McClure-Smith.
MINISTER.

F.H. Stuart, Esq.,
Chief of Protocol,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

LIST OF BIRDS.

Lyre Bird
Red sided or Eclectus Parrot
King Parrot
Major Mitchell Pink Cockatoo
Lesser Lemon Crested Cockatoo
Banksian Cockatoo
Galah or Rose Breasted Cockatoo
Many-coloured Parrot
Rainbow Lorikeet
Crimson Rosella
Golden-shouldered Parrot.

173/10/1

16th March, 1955

Dear Sir Edward,

I am writing in connection with your kind offer to prepare a shipment of Australian birds for the Crown Prince of Iraq.

Mr. McClure-Smith, the Australian Minister in Cairo, has been in touch with the Crown Prince, who has forwarded a list of birds in which he has expressed particular interest. The Minister has explained to the Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo that it would in all probability not be possible to send more than a selection of these birds as only the hardiest would survive shipment. The list is as follows -

Lyre Bird
Red Sided or Eclectus Parrot
King Parrot
Major Mitchell Pink Cockatoo
Lesser Lemon Crested Cockatoo
Banksian Cockatoo
Galah or Rose Breasted Cockatoo
Many coloured Parrot
Rainbow Lorikeet
Crimson Rosella
Golden-shouldered Parrot

Could you please let me know which birds it would be most practicable to send and let me have an estimate of the likely cost? I shall then seek approval from the Treasury to meet this expense. I shall let you know when we can go ahead.

Yours sincerely,

(F.H. Stuart)
for the Acting Secretary.

Sir Edward Hallstrom,
c/- Taronga Park Zoo,
SYDNEY. New South Wales.



In Reply quote No. 81/3/2.

- 2 -

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
CAIRO.

26th February, 1955.

Dear Stuart,

Many thanks for your letter of the 11th February. I am glad that the Government has agreed to my suggestion that it should make a gift of a number of birds to the Crown Prince of Iraq. I am sure that these gestures pay good dividends in this part of the world.

Since I wrote the Minister and the Secretary, I have been waiting for the Crown Prince to furnish me with a list of the birds in which he is interested. Such things are slow in coming in the Middle East and I only received the list a couple of days ago. Not being a bird fancier, I do not know how many of the birds he has listed are procurable or transportable. Sir Edward Hallstrom will have to be the final judge on these points, but I hope that the Government will include as many of the birds in its gift as is practicable.

P.H. Stuart,
Chief of Protocol,
Department of
CANNIBERIA

The birds should be consigned to :-

The Supervisor of the Royal Treasury,
The Royal Court,
Baghdad.

I understand that this functionary will attend to all the import formalities and I should assume that you will notify him in advance that the birds are coming. I would suggest that, at the same time, the Minister sends a personal letter to the Crown Prince, telling him that the gift is on its way and saying what is usual on such an occasion.

I have told the Iraqi Ambassador here (who brought me the Crown Prince's list from Baghdad) that the Government will be pleased to send the Crown Prince, by way of a gift, such birds as can be made available from his list. At the same time, I asked him to explain to His Royal Highness that preliminary enquiries in Australia had established that only the hardiest birds would survive shipment, and that therefore it would in all probability not be possible to send more than a selection of the birds listed.

If/ ...



In reply quote No.

- 2 -

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION
CAIRO.

If I am still in Cairo, will you please let me know when the choice has been made and the date of shipment decided upon, so that I can inform the Ambassador.

Yours sincerely,

(H.A. McClure-Smith)
Minister.

F.H. Stuart, Esq.,
Chief of Protocol,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.



Lyre Bird.

Red Sided or Eclectus Parrot.

King Parrot.

Major Mitchell Pink Cockatoo.

Lesser Horn Crested Cockatoo.

Banksian Cockatoo.

Galah or Rose Breasted Cockatoo.

Many-colored Parrot.

Painted Quail.

Crimson Rosella.

Golden-shouldered Parrot.

— //

FILE COPY
FHS.AC

173/10/1

11th February, 1955.

Dear Sir Edward,

The Minister for External Affairs much appreciates your kind offer to assist us in providing a shipment of suitable birds for the Crown Prince of Iraq. I am informing the Australian Minister at Cairo that arrangements can be made to meet the Crown Prince's request and asking his advice as to the number of birds that might be sent and of the method by which they should be got to Baghdad. I shall not fail to communicate with you again as soon as I have his reply.

Yours sincerely,

FS
(F.H. Stuart)
Chief of Protocol.

Sir Edward Hallstrom,
President,
Taronga Zoological Park Trust,
MOSMAN. N.S.W.

173/10/1

TARONGA ZOOLOGICAL PARK TRUST

ADDRESS ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE SECRETARY

ZOOLOGICAL GARDENS AND AQUARIUM, MOSMAN
SYDNEY, N.S.W., AUSTRALIA.

7th February 1955.

Your Ref: 173/10/1A.

F. H. Stuart, Esq.
Chief of Protocol,
Dept. of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Dear Mr. Stuart,


I am in receipt of your letter of the 21st January, and I will be very happy to co-operate.

From past experience, it would be unwise to ship to inexperienced persons anything but our hardiest birds, such as cockatoos, galahs and corellas. The smaller birds need more expert handling.

I would be very glad to prepare a shipment of suitable birds and make all the arrangements for permits, health certificates, etc.

If there is anything further that you wish to suggest or ask me, kindly drop me a note as quickly as possible.

Yours sincerely,



(Sir Edward Hallstrom)
P R E S I D E N T.

(1) Records

(2) R/s to C2P
with file

CS

FILE COPY
PFP.AC

173/10/1

21st January, 1955.

Dear Sir Edward,

I am taking the liberty of writing to you on a matter which arose during the recent visit of the Australian Minister in Cairo to Iraq. During Mr. McClure Smith's visit, the Crown Prince of Iraq expressed interest in Australian parrots and enlisted the assistance of the Minister to obtain some varieties of these birds.

Apparently the Crown Prince is building up something of a private zoo, with special emphasis on birds, and with the ultimate intention of presenting it to the State.

As I feel it would be a gracious gesture for the Commonwealth Government to send the Crown Prince some of the birds he wants by way of a present, I should be grateful for any suggestions you may be able to offer, for example, what varieties are most likely to interest the Crown Prince, how these may be obtained, and so forth. I hope that in so doing I am not presuming too much on your time and co-operation.

Yours very truly,

(F.H. Stuart)
Chief of Protocol.

Sir Edward Hallstrom,
C/- Taronga Park Zoo,
SYDNEY. N.S.W.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

St. Stuart

File No. ¹⁵ 173/10/1

Date

SUBJECT

Parrots for the Crown Prince of Iraq.

FOR Mr. Shaw

You are our parrot expert. How would you suggest we proceed?

Had I not better write to the Sydney Zoo & ask them for some suggestions?

Rev.

Parrots and cockatoos I suggest

Sir E. Hallstrom of the Zohanga Park Zoo might be asked to advise. He helped recently with a request for a bird for Lady Lamb. If it comes to a private dealer Schultze of Kogarah is recommended by the Canberra Bird Society as a reliable purveyor. They — parrots and cockatoos — are not expensive and for £20-30 one could buy at least 6-12 good ones.

Could letter to Hallstrom be prepared also

Rev 20
XII
54

done 2/11

Rev

R/S 17/2
to Peters C&P.

Mr. Stuart



In reply quote No.

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION.
CAIRO.

PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL

8th December, 1954

Dear Tange.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have written to the Minister reporting certain matters which arose in my talks with the King and the Crown Prince of Iraq during my recent visit to Baghdad. I thought that this was a simpler course to follow, rather than to write you separately regarding the Crown Prince's references to representation, particularly since you may be amused by some of the less important things he had to say.

With kindest regards,

Yours, Owen

High Commissioner

A.H. Tange, O.B.E., Esq.,
Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

*Should Admin handle
this or should we?
lib 16/12*

and 14/12/54
1 Mr Kingall
2 Central
3 Mr Waller
lib 15/12

CONFIDENTIAL
EX-100-174

Box 273

7th December, 1954

PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL

My visit to Iraq, from which I returned a few days ago, was very rewarding, though Baghdad itself is a most disappointing town - shabby and squalid for the most part with nothing of archaeological or artistic interest. As usual when I move about the Middle East, I met several old friends and colleagues of yours, who asked after you and asked me to send you their greetings. Among them were the Ambassador, Sir John Troutbeck, with whom I stayed, Nuri Pasha and the Crown Prince. I have set down in my despatch, which will reach you with this letter, the results of my talks on politics and defence. In the despatch I have given you my impressions of Nuri and the young King, but there were one or two matters which came up in our talks about which I thought you would like to hear.

I discovered that the King was extremely interested in the Olympic Games. He told me that he was hoping it would be possible to send an Iraqi team out to Melbourne. None went to Helsinki, but I gather Iraq was represented at the London Games in 1948. I told the King that we should be extremely happy to welcome an Iraqi team if it was decided to send one, and he then said, rather surprisingly, that he would very much like to go out to Melbourne for the Games himself. I do not think this would really be feasible, but I thought you would like to know that such ideas are passing through his head.

After leaving the King, with whom I spent about half an hour, and who is one of the most charming young men I have met for a long time, I was told by the Chamberlain that I would be received by the Crown Prince. This is apparently the normal procedure. Though he is no longer Regent, he still controls the Palace policy and apparently likes to see anyone with whom the King has been talking.

He began our conversation by asking me whether it would not be possible for Australia and Iraq to exchange diplomatic representatives. I replied that, while we were well disposed to any move that would make our mutual relations closer and more cordial, the question of reciprocal representation was not one on which I could talk officially. I explained, however, that it involved many problems from the Australian point of view owing to the fact that our Diplomatic Service was still young and we had not yet the trained personnel available to cover anything like the number of countries in which we would like to be represented. The Crown Prince then said that many countries were represented in Iraq by Ambassadors or Ministers who were resident in other Arab countries and that Iraq had no objection to this. I replied that I understood this form of representation had been considered by my Government, but that it had felt it unwise, on the one hand, to overburden one man by accrediting him to all the Arab countries while on the other, it might be misunderstood if the Australian Minister to Egypt were accredited in this manner to some Arab countries and not to others. I said, however, that I would report to you what he had said to me, and it was at this point that he told me that he remembered you well from the war years.

/ The Crown ..

The Crown Prince talked very freely and frankly on Arab affairs generally, and particularly on the question of a link up with the West. He himself is strongly in favour of this, and expressed quite vehemently the view that, even were the Arab States united among themselves (which he admitted that they were not), and even were they armed and trained to the hilt, they would still be incapable of defending the Middle East against a Russian assault. He complained that in the other Arab countries there was no real leadership on this important question. He expressed the opinion that throughout the Arab world there was a deplorable tendency for those in the political driving seat to follow tamely in the wake of what they believe to be public opinion instead of setting out to formulate a public opinion in accordance with the realities of the international situation as they knew them.

Like the King, Nuri and the other Cabinet Ministers whom I met, the Crown Prince showed a keen interest in what was happening in Egypt, and asked me many questions about the situation here. In all my talks I had not a little difficulty in steering the conversation on to Iraq and away from Egypt's internal problems. I think there is a general feeling in Iraq that Nasser's Government is the best available to Egypt at the present time and is at least prepared to pursue a strong anti-Communist policy internally if not externally. But I had a feeling that the Crown Prince's strictures on the lack of Arab leadership in foreign affairs were directed as much against Nasser as against the deplorable performance which is at present being put up by the Syrian Cabinet.

When I was leaving the Crown Prince after a forty-minute talk, two very surprising things happened. The first was that he said that before I left he wanted to ask me what I thought of the King! To this rather astounding question I replied that I had found him utterly charming, but the Crown Prince went on to ask me if I had talked politics with him and whether I felt he had a good grip on them. By way of explanation he added that he had had the responsibility of bringing up the King, and now that Feisal had ascended the Throne, he was particularly anxious to know what kind of impression he made upon visitors such as myself. I side-stepped his questions as gracefully as I could by remarking that I thought the King was a great credit to him, and that he struck me as being a very intelligent young man.

The second surprise was that he then asked if I could help him get some Australian parrots. The Crown Prince is apparently keenly interested in birds, and when I offered to send him some books on Australian birds, he replied that he had the books but now wanted the birds. He asked me what types of birds, particularly of the parrot variety, were available for purchase in Australia. I said I did not know, but that if he would send me a list of the birds in which he was interested, I would do my best to find out whether any of the species were available. Apparently he is building up something of a private zoo, with special emphasis on birds, and with the intention of eventually presenting it to the State. The British Ambassador told me that he had recently made the Crown Prince the present of a lion which had been very warmly received. It occurs to me that it might be a gracious and perhaps politically advantageous, gesture were the Commonwealth Government to send the Crown Prince some of the birds he wants by way of a present. As you know this sort of thing is done a good deal in the East and earns more goodwill than many political gestures. I have not yet heard from the Crown Prince as to the birds he wants, but when I do I shall write you again. In the meantime I thought you might like to think the matter over.

/ Our

*This one
had better
do.*

- 3 -

Our Christmas greetings have already gone forth to you and Maie in the customary form, but since this letter will be arriving so soon before Christmas I must repeat them again.

The Rt. Hon. R.G. Casey, C.H., D.S.O., M.C., M.P.,
Minister of State for External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

TEMPLE BAR 604

2435

4/4/1



DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

14 JUL 1954
173/10/1
CANBERRA

AUSTRALIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE,

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
LONDON, W.C.2.

7th July, 1954.

Memo, No. 733/54

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A. C. T.

We refer to your memorandum No. 311 of 8th June (your file 173/10/1) enquiring why the Foreign Office uses the term "Persia" for "Iran" and which is the correct title.

2. The Foreign Office has now replied that they use "Persia" following a direction from the Prime Minister, who, we understand, considers that confusion with Iraq is thereby avoided. The Foreign Office therefore uses the term "Persia" in all its internal correspondence and documents, but when addressing communications to the Iranian Government it uses the term "Iran" as a matter of courtesy. Likewise, any official publication e.g. a Treaty List, should refer to the country as "Iran".

3. The Treaty of Friendship signed on 4th March, 1857, is still in force.

N. Gleeson-White

(N. Gleeson-White) (Miss)
for EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER

Mr. Plimsoll
We had a hunch that
this was the case.
18/6/7

Leopold
16/7/54

F

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref: 1/118



DEPARTMENT OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

7 DEC 1952

ONER

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs.

Mr Vert *Mr re. ngala*

With the compliments

173/10/1

of the

8/18/12

Official Secretary

Two copies of letter to the
Secretary, Prime Minister's Department,
dated 16th December, on the subject of
the recent Note Verbale from the Iraqi
Government.

Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom,
Canberra, A.C.T.

16th December 1952

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,
CANBERRA.

16th December, 1952.

Ref: 1/118
CSP:GW

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

I am directed by the High Commissioner to refer to his letter of the 13th November, 1952, which enclosed a copy of a Note Verbale which had been received by the British Embassy in Baghdad from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2. The High Commissioner would be grateful if you would enable him to inform the United Kingdom authorities as soon as possible what reply should be sent to the Iraqi Government's Note.

3. I am sending two copies of this letter to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd.) C. S. RICKARD

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

No. *173/10/1* Paper *The Sydney Morning Herald*

File No. *173/10/1*

Published at *Sydney*

Date *28/11/52*

**Canberra Man
For U.N.
Job In Iraq**

CANBERRA, Thursday.
—Mr. L. D. Pryor, superintendent of parks and gardens in Canberra, is to supervise the growing of eucalyptus in Iraq.

Mr. Pryor's services have been given on loan by the Commonwealth Government to the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations.

His duties will be to investigate the possibilities of growing eucalypts in Iraq and to draw up a plan for their propagation.

He will leave Australia early in January and will spend several months in Iraq.

Ref:

1/118

CONFIDENTIAL



173/10/1
17 Nov 52
new file

The Official Secretary to the High Commissioner in Australia for His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom presents his compliments to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned document.

Two copies of a letter with enclosure to the Secretary, Prime Minister's Department with reference to a Note Verbale from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

CANBERRA, 13th November, 19 52.

Reference to previous correspondence:

CS
Mr. Pritchett
for action
I see no objection

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
CANBERRA

13th November, 1952.

Commissioner to
Verbale which
may in Baghdad
Affairs.

be glad to be
ed to the Iraqi

his letter to
Affairs.

fully,

C. S. RICKARD

Official Secretary.

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Ref: 1/118
CSP/BB

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
CANBERRA

13th November, 1958.

Dear Sir,

... I am directed by the High Commissioner to forward the enclosed copy of a Note Verbale which has been received by the British Embassy in Baghdad from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2. The High Commissioner would be glad to be informed what reply should be returned to the Iraqi request.

3. I am sending two copies of this letter to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs.

Yours faithfully,

(Sgd.) C. S. PICKARD

Official Secretary.

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

COPY

TRANSLATION

NO. 960/960/100/22168

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
CANBERRA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ceremonies Dept.
Bagdad, 4th October, 1952.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy Bagdad, and has the honour to state that in view of the existence of extensive commercial and economic relations between Iraq and Australia, and since no Iraqi mission exists in Australia to protect Iraq's interests there, the Iraqi Government has decided to establish an Honorary Consulate in Sydney and to appoint Mr. Anthony Alexander Alam as an Honorary Consul for Iraq there.

The Ministry would be very grateful if the esteemed Embassy would be so good as to intervene with the competent authorities to obtain their approval to this.

In awaiting the result of the efforts to be exerted by the esteemed Embassy in this connection, the Ministry avails itself of the opportunity to express its highest consideration and esteem.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy,
BAGDAD.

173/10/2

CABLEGRAM.

I.1059

DB:HP

Dated: 18th January, 1952.
1725

FROM:

Rec'd: 19th January, 1952.
10.30 a.m.High Commissioner's Office,
L O N D O N.264. UNCLASSIFIED.

Commerce.

Your telegram 114. Copper joint sleeves, your telegram 6277, are for Iraq Petroleum. On the contrary my telegram 98 referred to sleeves for Iraq Posts and Telegraphs. Originally transmitted my despatch 24th September. Please telegraph reply.

C. & A. (Canb. Syd. & Melb.)
P.M.'s.

21st January, 1952.

DISTRIBUTION	
SECRETARY	
AS (U.N.)	
AS (G.R.)	
AS (Admin.)	
AS (L. & T.)	
U.N.	
Sec. Gen.	
Sec. R.	
Sec. A.	
Sec. B.	
Sec. C.	
Sec. D.	
Sec. E.	
Sec. F.	
Sec. G.	
Sec. H.	
Sec. I.	
Sec. J.	
Sec. K.	
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Sec. O.	
Sec. P.	
Sec. Q.	
Sec. R.	
Sec. S.	
Sec. T.	
Sec. U.	
Sec. V.	
Sec. W.	
Sec. X.	
Sec. Y.	
Sec. Z.	

ac 7
in



COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' OFFICE

Baghdad

23.5.1951

Personal,

Dear Excellency,

Many thanks for your letter dated 7th May 1951. I highly appreciate your good wishes and which I strongly reciprocate same.

I do hope to have the pleasure of meeting you once again whenever circumstances permit.

With kind regards

Yours Sincerely

Nasir Sa'id

His Excellency the Hon. Richard G. Casey
Minister of External Affairs
&
Minister for National Development
37 Queen Street
MELBOURNE .C.I.

Handwritten notes:
Mr. A. S. ...
Mr. ...
file

(i) Minister

(ii) *then Mr. Webb.*

File

W

Said-Nuri el

RGC.JL

Minister for External Affairs
and

37 Queen Street,
MELBOURNE. C.I.
7th May, 1951

PERSONAL

Your Excellency,

I believe I am right in thinking that you are Prime Minister of Iraq again - and this is just a note to wish you well. It seems a long time since we used to meet in Bagdad in the early years of the war. Maybe we will meet again before long, although I have no present plans. I am temporarily Minister for External Affairs, as well as holding other portfolios in the Australian Government - pending the creation of a new Government, following on our recent General Election.

With all good wishes to you in these difficult times -

I am,

Yours sincerely,

His Excellency the Hon. Nuri el Said,
Prime Minister of Iraq,
BAGDAD. IRAQ.

CABLEGRAM.

173/10/2

:::FN

I.4906

DECODED FROM :

Dated: 13th March, 1951
1315
Recvd: 14th March, 1951
1540 hours

High Commissioner's Office,
LONDON.

1437. UNCLASSIFIED.

For Commerce from Sullivan.

Letter in following terms received from Iraqi
Ambassador, London, begins:-

"My Government are desirous of entering into
a trade agreement with the Government of Australia, which
will serve to regulate exchange of commodities and products
between the two countries..

I should be grateful if you would ascertain the
views of your Government with regard to this proposal and
advise me accordingly."

I should be grateful for your advice.

Recently we have received representations from the
Iraqi Authorities, concerning delivery of Jarrah sleepers for
Iraqi railway and possibly the desire to obtain regular supplies
of these goods is the reason for the present approach, as it
is stated that Jarrah wood sleepers are the only types that
will stand up to the climatic and local conditions in Iraq.

Min. & Dept. C. & A. (Canberra)
Min. & Dept. T. & C. (Canberra)
Min. & Dept. E.A.
Min. & Dept. N.D.
Min. & Dept. Supply
Treasurer & Treasury
E.P.D.
N.S.R.B.
P.M.'s. Dept.

15th March, 1951

Handwritten: RUH, ME, 7, 28/3, ER. in leading line

DISTRIBUTION	
Secretary	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Deputy Sec.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
E.A.M.E.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
P.N.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
P.A.O.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
S.R.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
P.I.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
C.C.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
EXP.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
COM.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
...	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

RR:EGM:

Q. 01204

Sent: 24 JAN 1951 1400

ENCODED TO:

High Commissioner's Office,
LONDON.

483. UNCLASSIFIED.

Your 373. Sleepers for Iraq.

Recent request by Ceylon revealed that Jarrah sleepers are produced only in Western Australia where output has been reduced by the demands for building timber. Present production of sleepers in Australia is insufficient to meet the needs of the Commonwealth and State Railways and South Australia has, in fact, placed orders for substantial quantities overseas.

Export permit to Ceylon was refused. We presume that same position holds for Iraq. However, confirmation has been sought and we will advise further.

E.A. (794/1)
C. & A. (Canberra)
P.M.'s DEPT:

173/1012

25th January 1951

Secretary	
Deputy Sec.	
Asst. Sec.	
U.N.	
P.A.C.	
E.R.	20
P.L.	
L.O.	
ANT.	
A.M.	
C.	
EX-100	

JPQ.EW
L50/3/1/7

LONDON

No.1148

20th December 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR : The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

The Office of the Senior Government Trade Commissioner has referred to us an informal request from the Foreign Office that we should look into the question of supplying Western Australian jarrah sleepers to the Iraq State Railways. The Foreign Office has stated that the United Kingdom has a direct interest in the maintenance of the Iraq State Railways and would be glad if the Australian Government could help in the matter of an export license. Apparently tenders have already been called for sleepers and a Western Australian firm has put in an acceptable tender but stressed that no contract could be carried out without an export license.

The Senior Government Trade Commissioner's Office has explained the difficulties which have arisen in the case of jarrah and karri which was on order for the National Coal Board and British Railways. We, for our part, have pointed out that the Australian authorities would probably not be willing to divert supplies from traditional customers, e.g. those in South Africa, but that if they would put their sponsorship of the Iraqi request in writing we would ensure that it would receive consideration. We were then told that a written communication would be forthcoming but were asked if we would explain the position to the Department of External Affairs on the basis of our telephone conversations. This we agreed to do and the foregoing is accordingly transmitted.

*Original with
E.R. for action*

Acting External Affairs Officer.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

O. 6408.

GG.MAW.

Sent • 11th May, 1950.
1730.

DECODE TO:

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
LONDON.

2080. UNCLASSIFIED.

Qantas Traffic Rights Basra. Advise any further developments. Present indications are that unless confirmation of Iraqi Government's authorisation of a renewal of Qantas rights is obtained soon, the period of authorisation will have expired before the Company has an opportunity of exercising Rights at all.

Civil Aviation.
E.A.
P.M's

11th May, 1950.

173/10/✓

Sec	✓
AS	✓
E	✓
MA	✓
A	✓
IO	✓
PI	✓
Proc	✓
ANT	✓
UN	✓
ER	✓
Adm	✓
L, C	✓
Exec	✓

173/10/3

11th March, 1948.

MEMORANDUM for :-

The Secretary,
Department of Commerce and
Agriculture,
CANBERRA.

.....

I enclose herewith, in the original, a letter dated 28th February, from Messrs. Ohanes Ohanah Agopian, of Baghdad, regarding the supply of margarine and other cooking oil products.

2. It would be appreciated if you would kindly arrange ~~arrange~~ to reply to the enquirer direct.

JHE
Secretary.

PA



NAA: A1838, 173/10/1 PART 2

Series number: A1838

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Barcode: 589288

Number of pages: 300

Title: Iraq - Relations with Australia - General

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SUBJECT:

IRAQ - RELATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA -
GENERAL.

RECORDED

SECRET

RELATED PAPERS

FORMER PAPERS

Pt. 1.

LATER PAPERS

3.

ARCHIVAL ACTION

FILE No.

SUBJECT

Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Clearing Officer's Initial	Date Cleared	Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Clearing Officer's Initial	Date Cleared	Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Clearing Officer's Initial	Date Cleared
P/A		8/6												
P/A		22/9												
BASEMENT		8/4/80												

BASEMENT

8/4/80

173 / 10 / 1

PT. NO. 2

FILE CLOSED

THIS PART OPENED ON

THIS PART CLOSED ON 23/10/70

SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE ON FILE 173/10/1 Pt 3.

29974/68-1

Confidential

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No.

173/10/1

DATE

SUBJECT

Stephenson & Turner

Mr. Moogie
FOR

Mr. Treflow
2/10

no 5/10/1

Good
CM

10 2/10.

Trade have re-drafted the telegram to hand down in the light of further discussions with S & T. They read it over to me and I agreed to it. As re-drafted it recognizes that they would not wish to protect their own position at the expense of Wade or Mahmood.

Privately, S & T now accept that if the worst comes to the worst, they may have ~~to prepare~~ to pay whatever is necessary to ensure the safety and exit of both Wade and their own employees.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No _____

DATE 1 October, 1970.

SUBJECT STEPHENSON AND TURNER'S AFFAIRS IN IRAQ

⁴⁶
FOR Mr Cooper

Copy to: Mr Homer

Mr Moodie

I think it likely that the Iraqis will give such an assurance, but in that event they will see to it that Wade is not allowed to leave. In other words they will probably insist on retaining either one of our people on the Brit as a hostage. If the Brit wants to leave I don't think he should be forced to stay on S&T's account. Either him or another S&T man should return & let Wade off the hook even if it costs S&T a lot of money as it probably will!


Mr Angus Paltridge, F.A.S. Department of Trade and Industry telephoned me on 30 October arising out of the cable recently in from London.

2. Mr Paltridge said that the substance of this cable had been conveyed to some of the partners of Stephenson and Turner, although at the moment they were all scattered and it was difficult for them to get together and discuss what they should do. Their preliminary reaction was that it would be better not to send back their man who had already been in Iraq, but to send two other senior people who had not been in difficulties with the Iraq authorities. However before deciding on this they suggested that the British Embassy might be asked to get a guarantee from the Iraq authorities that these two men would be allowed to leave Iraq on completion of their visit.

3. I said that I believed the best course would be for us to ask the British Embassy to advise on the prospects of getting such a guarantee and, if possible, sounding out the Iraq authorities about this. I would be disposed to leave it to the British Embassy to judge how far they could go since their judgement might be that a direct request might add to the complications and affect the prospects of their man already held in Iraq. It was difficult for us here to make a judgement on this.

4. Mr Paltridge said that he would discuss matters further with the Stephenson and Turner people and, if they liked the idea send over to me a draft cable.

5. If you have comments or ideas, I should be grateful for them.


(C. T. Moodie)
Acting First Assistant Secretary
Division IV

46 1/10

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

LDS6

I. 103961

FROM

TOD 29.9.70..1335 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

TOR 29.9.70..2311 LT

16448 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

IRAQ - STEPHENSON AND TURNER.

OUR 16360.

FCO HAS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT
"THE SOMEWHAT PARALLEL CASE OF ROGERS", REFERRED TO IN
PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE TELEGRAM FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD.
ROGERS IS AN ENGLISHMAN WHO WAS WORKING FOR A LARGE UNITED
KINGDOM COMPANY ENGAGED BY CONTRACT TO CONSTRUCT ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT
FOR AN AIRPORT PROJECT IN IRAQ.

A FOREIGN COMPANY OF CONSULTANTS AND ENGINEERS HELD A
CONTIGUOUS CONTRACT FOR A PROJECT ON A MUCH GREATER SCALE
AT THE AIRPORT.

2 WHEN THE FOREIGN COMPANY ABRIDGED ITS CONTRACT IN THE
EYES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ, ROGERS AND HIS
COMPANY WERE HELD PARTLY RESPONSIBLE AND ROGERS WAS NOT ISSUED
WITH AN EXIT VISA.

THE MOTIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ APPEARS TO HAVE
BEEN TO FORCE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO EXERT PRESSURE UPON THE
FOREIGN COMPANY'S GOVERNMENT TO ENSURE THAT THE
CONTRACT WAS HONoured BY THE LATTER COMPANY. "ROGER'S DETENTION
WAS STRONGLY RESISTED BY HIS PARENT COMPANY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
WHICH ENLISTED THE HELP OF THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO
MAKE REPRESENTATIONS ON ROGERS' BEHALF TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ.

3 THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ THEN TRIED A NEW APPROACH.

A LEGAL ACTION WAS BROUGHT AGAINST THE FOREIGN COMPANY AND ROGERS
WAS NAMED AS A WITNESS.

IN SUCH A POSITION, ROGERS WAS LEGALLY BOUND
TO REMAIN IN IRAQ AND HE IS STILL EFFECTIVELY DETAINED THERE.

THE WHOLE MATTER HAS DRAGGED ON OVER THREE MONTHS BUT THE
NAMING OF ROGERS AS A WITNESS ONLY OCCURRED ABOUT
THREE WEEKS AGO.

EA
T AND I (C-M)
DCO
PMS

ACTION AFME

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) FAS(3) ER FAS(4) EAMEC E C AND P
LA ICR PIO

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

173/110/1
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

KAG4

I.103526

FROM

TOD 28.9.1970...1540 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

TOR 29.9.1970...0302 LT

16360 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

IRAQ - STEPHENSON AND TURNER (UNDERLINED)

YOUR 11308 AND 11845 AND OUR 15715 AND 15963.

3. FOLLOWING PASSED BY FCO FROM BRITISH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD:

" WE HAVE NOW SPOKEN TO WADE WHO CONFIRMS THAT THE
MINISTRY OF WORKS AND HOUSING ARE NOT PREPARED TO ISSUE HIM
WITH A LETTER WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITE TO HIS GETTING
AN EXIT VISA.

THE OFFICIAL CONCERNED IN THE MINISTRY, SABRI WAHID, TOLD
WADE THAT IF LUMSDEN WERE TO RETURN THEN THERE 'SHOULD BE NO
DIFFICULTY ABOUT WADE OBTAINING THE VISA'.

"2 THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION IN YOUR TEL. 676 PARAGRAPH
2 ARE:

(A) MADLOOM WOULD OF COURSE FORFEIT THE ID.1,000.

HE PERSONALLY DOES NOT THINK THAT HE WOULD BE IMPRISONED
BUT HE ANTICIPATES 'VERY UNPLEASANT' QUESTIONING AND TREATMENT.
WE OURSELVES ARE NOT SO SANGINE ABOUT HIS CHANCES OF
ESCAPING IMPRISONMENT.

(B) WADE'S POSITION HAS ALREADY BEEN COMPROMISED BY
LUMSDEN'S ABSENCE DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE IS FROM A DIFFERENT
FIRM.

WAHID HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WISH TO PUT PRESSURE
ON STEPHENSON AND TURNER AND IN THE ABSENCE OF LUMSDEN WADE
IS THE ONLY AVAILABLE HOSTAGE.

(C) IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS LUMSDEN'S CHANCES IF
HE WERE TO RETURN.

THE MINISTRY ARE VERY ANXIOUS TO COMPLETE THE CONTRACT AND
WAHID SAID THAT HE DEFINITELY NEEDED A REPRESENTATIVE OF
STEPHENSON AND TURNER IN THE COUNTRY EITHER TO NEGOTIATE THE
END OF THE CONTRACT OR CONTINUANCE OF IT.

HE HAS SENT A TELEGRAM TO THIS AFFECT DIRECT TO
STEPHENSON AND TURNER.

"3. "THE DEPARTMENT WILL BE ABLE TO BRIEF THE HIGH
COMMISSION ON THE SOMEWHAT PARALLEL CASE OF ROGERS.
WE OBVIOUSLY WANT IF POSSIBLE TO AVOID A SIMILAR SITUATION
OVER WADE OR LUMSDEN.

000/2

Mr. Tringlove 20/9
Thanks

Mr. Tringlove 24/9
I assume Trade will pass
to S & T.

Mr. PACTIDGE
(UNDERSTANDS FROM

24/9

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2.

I.103526

LUMSDEN'S UNHERALDED DEPARTURE HAS UNDOUBTEDLY UPSET THE IRAQIS AND I FEAR THAT UNLESS STEPHENSON AND TURNER TAKE URGENT STEPS TO SETTLE THEIR PROBLEMS WITH THE MINISTRY OF WORKS WADE WILL FIND HIMSELF IN AN UNPLEASANT POSITION.

HE HAS RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS OWN FIRM TO CEASE ALL WORK FOR STEPHENSON AND TURNER AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER AND HE PROPOSES ON THAT DATE SUBMITTING A FORMAL APPLICATION FOR AN EXIT VISA.

ON PRESENT FORM HE WILL NOT GET IT UNLESS LUMSDEN HAS RETURNED OR STEPHENSON AND TURNER HAVE TAKEN SUFFICIENT STEPS TO PLACATE THE IRAQIS.

ONE POSSIBLE STEP WOULD BE FOR STEPHENSON AND TURNER TO SEND SOMEONE OTHER THAN LUMSDEN TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION WITH THE MINISTRY.

MR. HAWLEY.^^

3. WE WILL FOLLOW UP WITH THE FCO THE PARALLEL CASE REFERED TO IN PARAGRAPH 3 AND LET YOU KNOW.

EA
T AND I (C-M)
DCO
PMS

ACTION: AFME

SEC DEPSEC FAS(1) FAS(3) ER FAS(4) EAMEC CANDP LA ICR PIO

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No.

DATE

SUBJECT

4. Moofie
FOR

C + P are already on
the distribution.

The substance has
been passed by
Trade to S + T.

J. Lantgen

(M)

30/9

26

29/9.

1. M. Truglowe 20/9

2. File

→ NEW STUART

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

KAG4

I.103526

FROM

TOD 28.9.1970...1540 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

TOR 29.9.1970...0302 LT

16360 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

IRAQ - STEPHENSON AND TURNER (UNDERLINED)

YOUR 11308 AND 11845 AND OUR 15715 AND 15963.

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WE OBVIOUSLY WANT IF POSSIBLE TO AVOID A SIMILAR SITUATION OVER WADE OR LUMSDEN.

°°°/2

Mr. Leaper
21/9 80 speak. Better see
that C. P. get copies from now on.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2.

1.103526

LUMSDEN'S UNHERALDED DEPARTURE HAS UNDOUBTEDLY UPSET THE IRAQIS AND I FEAR THAT UNLESS STEPHENSON AND TURNER TAKE URGENT STEPS TO SETTLE THEIR PROBLEMS WITH THE MINISTRY OF WORKS WADE WILL FIND HIMSELF IN AN UNPLEASANT POSITION.

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MR. HAWLEY."

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EA
T AND I (C-M)
DCO
PMS

ACTION: AFME

SEC DEPSEC FAS(1) FAS(3) ER FAS(4) EAMEC CANDP LA ICR PIO

CONFIDENTIAL

STEPHENSON & TURNER
ARCHITECTS
400 ST. KILDA ROAD MELBOURNE 3004
CABLES & TELEGRAMS - STEMEL
TELEPHONE 266611

DVD:CJP

25th September, 1970.

Ma
Mr. F. B. Cooper,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, 2600.


Dear Mr. Cooper,

Thank you very much indeed for your letter of the 18th
of September advising that you have forwarded my earlier
letter to our Embassy in Rome.

I shall get in touch with Mr. P. B. Clare either on
arrival in Rome or perhaps by letter before I get there.

Thank you once again.

Yours sincerely,



D. V. Dunn

1 *Mr. Hill*
2 *File*

HEAD OFFICE MELBOURNE ALSO AT CANBERRA SYDNEY NEWCASTLE ADELAIDE WELLINGTON AUCKLAND & DUNEDIN
SIR ARTHUR STEPHENSON 1921-1967 A. P. STEPHENSON J. D. FISHER R. G. FREEMAN D. V. DUNN C. A. D. WILLIAMS K. K. SEDGFIELD
R. R. TRENGOVE J. H. WILCOX F. E. L. ALLCHIN L. J. BISHOP A. N. GODFREY M. DEGENHARDT L. A. C. HARRIS PRINCIPAL ENGINEER

Mrs Thwaites

116 file

Inter relations with Iraq

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

File No.

173/10/1

INWARD CABLEGRAM

LDS6

I. 103961

FROM

TOD 29.9.70..1335 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

TOR 29.9.70..2311 LT

16448 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

IRAQ - STEPHENSON AND TURNER.

OUR 16360.

FCO HAS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT
"THE SOMEWHAT PARALLEL CASE OF ROGERS", REFERRED TO IN
PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE TELEGRAM FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD.

ROGERS IS AN ENGLISHMAN WHO WAS WORKING FOR A LARGE UNITED
KINGDOM COMPANY ENGAGED BY CONTRACT TO CONSTRUCT ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT
FOR AN AIRPORT PROJECT IN IRAQ.

A FOREIGN COMPANY OF CONSULTANTS AND ENGINEERS HELD A
CONTIGUOUS CONTRACT FOR A PROJECT ON A MUCH GREATER SCALE
AT THE AIRPORT.

2 WHEN THE FOREIGN COMPANY ABRIDGED ITS CONTRACT IN THE
EYES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ, ROGERS AND HIS
COMPANY WERE HELD PARTLY RESPONSIBLE AND ROGERS WAS NOT ISSUED
WITH AN EXIT VISA.

THE MOTIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ APPEARS TO HAVE
BEEN TO FORCE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO EXERT PRESSURE UPON THE
FOREIGN COMPANY'S GOVERNMENT TO ENSURE THAT THE
CONTRACT WAS HONoured BY THE LATTER COMPANY. "ROGER'S DETENTION
WAS STRONGLY RESISTED BY HIS PARENT COMPANY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
WHICH ENLISTED THE HELP OF THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO
MAKE REPRESENTATIONS ON ROGERS' BEHALF TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ.

3 THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ THEN TRIED A NEW APPROACH.

A LEGAL ACTION WAS BROUGHT AGAINST THE FOREIGN COMPANY AND ROGERS
WAS NAMED AS A WITNESS.

IN SUCH A POSITION, ROGERS WAS LEGALLY BOUND
TO REMAIN IN IRAQ AND HE IS STILL EFFECTIVELY DETAINED THERE.

THE WHOLE MATTER HAS DRAGGED ON OVER THREE MONTHS BUT THE
NAMING OF ROGERS AS A WITNESS ONLY OCCURRED ABOUT
THREE WEEKS AGO.

EA
I AND I (C-M) ✓
DCO
PMS

ACTION AFME

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) FAS(3) ER FAS(4) EAMEC E C AND P
LA ICR PIO

NOT S. F. H. R. I

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

LRW 6

I.63862

FROM

TOB 10.6.70...1810LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

TOR 11.6.70...0402LT

9911 CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DGCA, FADG (P), ADG(IR).

THE FOLLOWING NOTE FROM THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ DATED 2ND JUNE WAS RECEIVED BY CALO ON THE 5TH JUNE, 1970:-

" THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION AND HAS THE HONOUR TO BRING TO ITS NOTICE THE FOLLOWING MATTER.

A PRIVATE AUSTRALIAN AIRCRAFT, CALL (VHKCA), MAKE (BIN 20), VIOLATED IRAQI AIRSPACE ON THE 4TH JANUARY, 1970, BY FLYING FROM DAMASCUS TO KUWAITE WITHOUT EITHER INFORMING THE BASRAH CONTROL TOWER OR OBTAINING PRIOR PERMISSION FROM THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES TO OVERFLY IRAQI TERRITORY.

THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ KINDLY REQUESTS THAT THIS INCIDENT BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE APPROPRIATE AUSTRALIAN AUTHORITIES, AND AT THE SAME TIME WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT AUSTRALIAN AIRCRAFT IN GENERAL ARE NOT ALLOWED TO OVERFLY IRAQI TERRITORY OR USE IRAQI AIRSPACE.

THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ AVAILS ITSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION THE ASSURANCE OF ITS HIGHEST CONSIDERATION. "

THE PILOT CONCERNED WAS MISS JANET FERGUSON, HOLDER OF UNITED KINGDOM CPL 34639, WHO WAS DELIVERING THE AIRCRAFT - A BEAGLE 206S REGISTERED VH-KCA.

I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MISS FERGUSON, WHO STATES THAT SHE CANNOT DEFINITELY REMEMBER, AND DOES NOT HAVE ANY READY RECORDS AVAILABLE TO HER, WHETHER SHE DIVERTED FROM RED 19 AIRWAY AT QAISUMAH DIRECT TO KUWAITE OR ATTEMPTED TO CUT THE CORNER BY LEAVING AIRWAY RED 19 AT POSITION REPORTING POINT "VICTOR", WHICH IS 41 NAUTICAL MILES EAST OF RAFHA, WHICH IS WITHIN 5 MILES OF THE IRAQ/SAUDI ARABIAN BORDER.

.../2.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

-2-

I.63862

IT HAS BEEN IMPRESSED ON HER THAT SHE SHOULD ENDEAVOUR TO OBTAIN AS MUCH POSITIVE INFORMATION AS CAN BE SUPPLIED TO THIS OFFICE REGARDING HER ROUTE OTHERWISE WE MAY BE FORCED TO REQUEST DETAILS OF THE FLIGHT PLAN SUBMITTED TO DAMASCUS ATC ON THE 4TH JANUARY, 1970.

HER RECOLLECTION OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS IS ALSO SOMEWHAT HAZY AND SHE AT FIRST STATED SHE COULD NOT RECALL MAKING CONTACT WITH BASRAH OR BAGHDAD COMMUNICATION CENTRES, BUT WHEN IT WAS POINTED OUT TO HER THAT AT LEAST THREE POSITION REPORTS WOULD HAVE TO HAVE BEEN MADE AS SHE WAS FLYING THROUGH THE BAGHDAD FIR TO THE CONTROL CENTRE RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT FIR, SHE FELT THAT SHE PROBABLY DID COMMUNICATE WITH BASRAH CONTROL.

MISS FERGUSON KNEW THAT HER CLEARANCES DID NOT INCLUDE ONE TO OVERFLY ANY PORTION OF IRAQI TERRITORY AND THE FERRY ORGANISATION BY WHOM SHE IS EMPLOYED WERE BRIEFED BY THIS OFFICE THAT NO INFRINGEMENT OF IRAQI TERRITORY MUST OCCUR DURING THE FERRY FLIGHT TO AUSTRALIA ON BEHALF OF BEAGLE AIRCRAFT SALES OF SYDNEY.

YOU WILL OBSERVE FROM THE CONTENT OF THE NOTE, 3RD PARAGRAPH THAT THE IRAQI EMBASSY HAS USED THE WORDS "IRAQI TERRITORY OR USE IRAQI AIRSPACE".

WHEN WE DO FORMALLY REPLY TO THE IRAQI NOTE, I FEEL WE SHOULD ONCE AGAIN INFER THAT INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION LAW DOES NOT CONFER ON ANY STATE THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AIRCRAFT FROM AN FIR UNDER THE CONTROL OF ANOTHER STATE WHEN PERMISSION HAS BEEN GRANTED BY THE STATE OVER WHOSE TERRITORY THE AIRCRAFT WILL BE FLYING.

I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF ANY FURTHER INFORMATION WHICH BECOMES AVAILABLE FROM MISS FERGUSON, BUT WOULD SEEK YOUR ADVICE AS TO WHETHER I SHOULD COMMUNICATE WITH THE SYRIAN AUTHORITIES AT THIS EARLY STAGE FOR A POSSIBLE COPY OF THE FLIGHT PLAN SUBMITTED BY MISS FERGUSON ON THE 4TH JANUARY.

.../3.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

-3-

1.63862

CIVIL AVIATION
D.C.O.
P.M'S

SEC DEP SEC FAS(3) ER FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME

INWARD CABLEGRAM

KAG4

I.103526

FROM

TOD 28.9.1970...1540 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

TOR 29.9.1970...0302 LT

16360 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

IRAQ - STEPHENSON AND TURNER (UNDERLINED)

YOUR 11308 AND 11845 AND OUR 15715 AND 15963.

3. FOLLOWING PASSED BY FCO FROM BRITISH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD:

“ WE HAVE NOW SPOKEN TO WADE WHO CONFIRMS THAT THE
MINISTRY OF WORKS AND HOUSING ARE NOT PREPARED TO ISSUE HIM
WITH A LETTER WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITE TO HIS GETTING
AN EXIT VISA.

THE OFFICIAL CONCERNED IN THE MINISTRY, SABRI WAHID, TOLD
WADE THAT IF LUMSDEN WERE TO RETURN THEN THERE 'SHOULD BE NO
DIFFICULTY ABOUT WADE OBTAINING THE VISA'.

“2 THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION IN YOUR TEL. 676 PARAGRAPH
2 ARE:

(A) MADLOOM WOULD OF COURSE FORFEIT THE ID.1,000.
HE PERSONALLY DOES NOT THINK THAT HE WOULD BE IMPRISONED
BUT HE ANTICIPATES 'VERY UNPLEASANT' QUESTIONING AND TREATMENT.
WE OURSELVES ARE NOT SO SANGINE ABOUT HIS CHANCES OF
ESCAPING IMPRISONMENT.

(B) WADE'S POSITION HAS ALREADY BEEN COMPROMISED BY
LUMSDEN'S ABSENCE DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE IS FROM A DIFFERENT
FIRM.

WAHID HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WISH TO PUT PRESSURE
ON STEPHENSON AND TURNER AND IN THE ABSENCE OF LUMSDEN WADE
IS THE ONLY AVAILABLE HOSTAGE.

(C) IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS LUMSDEN'S CHANCES IF
HE WERE TO RETURN.

THE MINISTRY ARE VERY ANXIOUS TO COMPLETE THE CONTRACT AND
WAHID SAID THAT HE DEFINITELY NEEDED A REPRESENTATIVE OF
STEPHENSON AND TURNER IN THE COUNTRY EITHER TO NEGOTIATE THE
END OF THE CONTRACT OR CONTINUANCE OF IT.

HE HAS SENT A TELEGRAM TO THIS AFFECT DIRECT TO
STEPHENSON AND TURNER.

“3. “THE DEPARTMENT WILL BE ABLE TO BRIEF THE HIGH
COMMISSION ON THE SOMEWHAT PARALLEL CASE OF ROGERS.

WE OBVIOUSLY WANT IF POSSIBLE TO AVOID A SIMILAR SITUATION
OVER WADE OR LUMSDEN.

.../2

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

2.

I.103526

LUMSDEN'S UNHERALDED DEPARTURE HAS UNDOUBTEDLY UPSET THE IRAQIS AND I FEAR THAT UNLESS STEPHENSON AND TURNER TAKE URGENT STEPS TO SETTLE THEIR PROBLEMS WITH THE MINISTRY OF WORKS WADE WILL FIND HIMSELF IN AN UNPLEASANT POSITION.

HE HAS RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS OWN FIRM TO CEASE ALL WORK FOR STEPHENSON AND TURNER AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER AND HE PROPOSES ON THAT DATE SUBMITTING A FORMAL APPLICATION FOR AN EXIT VISA.

ON PRESENT FORM HE WILL NOT GET IT UNLESS LUMSDEN HAS RETURNED OR STEPHENSON AND TURNER HAVE TAKEN SUFFICIENT STEPS TO PLACATE THE IRAQIS.

ONE POSSIBLE STEP WOULD BE FOR STEPHENSON AND TURNER TO SEND SOMEONE OTHER THAN LUMSDEN TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION WITH THE MINISTRY.

MR. HAWLEY.**

3. WE WILL FOLLOW UP WITH THE FCO THE PARALLEL CASE REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 3 AND LET YOU KNOW.

EA
T AND I (C-M)
DCO
PMS

ACTION: AFME

SEC DEPSEC FAS(1) FAS(3) ER FAS(4) EAMEC CANDP LA ICR PIO

CONFIDENTIAL

173 / 10/1
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

GHD3

I.103046

FROM

TOD 25.9.70...1450 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT

TOR 26.9.70...0619 LT

750 PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL

FOR IMMIGRATION
YOUR 69/70626
OF 16 SEPT 1970-PROPOSED VISIT BY WHITE TO BAGHDAD.

SEE EXCHANGE OF CABLES BETWEEN CANBERRA, CMO LONDON AND
THIS OFFICE OUT 365 OF 15 APRIL, 1969, 9354 TO YOU FROM
LONDON 31 MAY, 1969 REPLY YOUR 5246 AND YOUR 244 OF
21 APRIL, 1969 AND 348 OF 9 JUNE, 1969 RE EARLIER
VISITS OF OWEN TO BAGHDAD. CHARGE D AFFAIRES KINGSMILL
(NOW IN CANBERRA), BRITISH AMBASSADOR BAGHDAD AND FOREIGN
OFFICE INDICATED OWEN SHOULD GO TO BAGHDAD AS DIPLOMATIC
SECRETARY ON DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT SPECIALLY ENDORSED.
AMBASSADOR CONSIDERS SAME CONDITIONS SHOULD APPLY.
GRATEFUL YOU CONSULT FURTHER WITH EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND ADVISE
URGENTLY AS ESSENTIAL TO MAKE FINAL PROGRAMME ARRANGEMENTS.

KUWAIT NO PROBLEM.

IMMIGRATION (C) ✓

EA
DCO
PM'S

ACTION : C AND P ✓

SEC DEP SC FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME ICR PIO
DEPT DUTY OFFICER

→ Mr STUART

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/11
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

DB6

FROM

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

I.101180

TOD 22.9.70... 1218 LT

TOR 22.9.70... 2205 LT

15963 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

FROM EXTERNAL

IRAQ - STEPHENSON AND TURNER

YOUR 11308 AND 11845 AND OUR 15715.

2 FOLLOWING CABLE PASSED BY FCO FROM BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD:

"WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO GET IN TOUCH WITH WADE AND HAVE
JUST HEARD FROM BASRA THAT HE WILL BE GETTING IN CONTACT WITH US
SHORTLY. AS SOON AS WE HAVE SEEN HIM WE WILL LET YOU KNOW HOW
THE MATTER STANDS."

EA
T AND I (C+M)
DCO
PMS

ACTION: ~~EA~~ AFME

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) FAS(3) ER FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME
C AND P LA ICR PIO

BEIRUT

SWART
I HAVE DRAWN
THIS TO GIBBONS
(TROTTER) ATTENTION
4/12/70

173/10/1
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

JDF5

I.99746

FROM

TOD 17.9.70..1950 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

TOR 18.9.70..0355 LT

15715

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM EXTERNAL

IRAQ: STEPHENSON AND TURNER

YOUR 11845

FCO HAVE PASSED ENQUIRY ON TO BRITISH EMBASSY BAGHDAD
AND HOPE TO HAVE A REPLY EARLY NEXT WEEK.

EA
I AND INDUSTRY
DCO
PMS

ACTION: ICR

SEC DEPSEC FAS(1) FAS(3) ER FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME C AND P LA PIO
BEIRUT

M. [unclear]

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

STEPHENSON & TURNER

ARCHITECTS

400 ST KILDA ROAD, MELBOURNE 3004

TELEPHONE 482001

173/10/1

18th September, 1970.

Dear Mr Dunn,

With reference to your letter of 15th September, I am forwarding a copy to our Embassy in Rome for the attention of the Embassy's Commercial Counsellor, Mr P.B. Clare.

As it may not be possible for Mr Clare to reply to your letter before you leave Melbourne on 27th September, I suggest that you contact him upon your arrival in Rome. The Embassy's address is :-

Via Sallustiana 26,
ROME 00187

Telephone - 482001.

Yours sincerely,

(F.B. Cooper)

Mr D.V. Dunn,
Stephenson and Turner,
Architects,
400 St Kilda Road,
MELBOURNE, 3004, Vic.

The Australian Embassy,
ROME

ATTENTION: Mr P.B. Clare

Referred for your attention please.

(F.B. Cooper)
Acting Assistant Secretary

STEPHENSON & TURNER
ARCHITECTS
400 ST. KILDA ROAD MELBOURNE 3004
CABLES & TELEGRAMS - STEMEL
TELEPHONE 266811

DVD:CJP

15th September, 1970.

*Mr P.B. Glare
Can't communicate*

Mr. F. Cooper,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, 2600.

Dear Mr. Cooper,

I am writing to you as you have recently had some brief contact with this office in connection with our problems in Iraq.

My own problem is however of a much more benign nature. I am most anxious to meet Professor Pier Luigi Nervi who is an engineer of world renown living in Rome where I expect to be somewhere around the 13th to 15th of October.

I have been advised that through our diplomatic representation in Rome it might be possible for an appointment or some arrangement made for me to meet Professor Nervi, such appointment being subject to confirmation on my actual date of arrival in Rome.

We are particularly interested in concrete construction and in concrete finishes in which field Professor Nervi is highly regarded. I believe that such a visit could assist us considerably with our developmental work in this field.

Do you think that you could in some way assist me to make contact with Professor Nervi; I would be most grateful if this is possible.

.../2

HEAD OFFICE MELBOURNE ALSO AT CANBERRA SYDNEY NEWCASTLE ADELAIDE WELLINGTON AUCKLAND & DUNEDIN
SIR ARTHUR STEPHENSON 1921-1967 A.P. STEPHENSON J.D. FISHER R.G. FREEMAN D.V. DUNN C.A.D. WILLIAMS K.K. SEDGFIELD
R.R. TRENGOVE J.H. WILCOX F.E.L. ALLCHIN L.J. BISHOP A.N. GODFREY M. DEGENHARDT L.A.C. HARRIS PRINCIPAL ENGINEER


Department of External Affairs

15th September, 1970.

I will be leaving Melbourne on the 27th September, but information is not available by that date then anything sent to this office would be forwarded to me before I reach Rome.

This may be a somewhat unusual request and I hope that you will not regard it as being too far outside the sort of help that your Department could give!

Yours faithfully,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'D. V. Dunn', with a stylized flourish at the end.

D. V. Dunn

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

173/10/11

JDF5

I.99746

FROM

TOD 17.9.70..1950 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

TOR 18.9.70..0355 LT

15715

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM EXTERNAL

IRAQ: STEPHENSON AND TURNER

YOUR 11845

FCO HAVE PASSED ENQUIRY ON TO BRITISH EMBASSY BAGHDAD
AND HOPE TO HAVE A REPLY EARLY NEXT WEEK.

EA
T AND INDUSTRY
DCO
PMS

21/9
Mr. Tryglove
Trade may have
already done so.
No.

No
Mr. Cooper

*Better have someone
tell S & T from*

ACTION: ICR

C/M 15/9

SEC DEPSEC FAS(1) FAS(3) ER FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME C AND P LA PIO

BEIRUT

Mr. 5/1/71

No.
Mr. COOPER

*As soon as I saw this cable
I telephoned it to Trade (Gibbons)
Latter was to inform S & T.*

21/9

Mr. COOPER

File

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/11
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

JDF5

I.99746

FROM

TOD 17.9.70..1950 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

TOR 18.9.70..0355 LT

15715

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM EXTERNAL

IRAQ: STEPHENSON AND TURNER

YOUR 11845

FCO HAVE PASSED ENQUIRY ON TO BRITISH EMBASSY BAGHDAD
AND HOPE TO HAVE A REPLY EARLY NEXT WEEK.

EA
I AND INDUSTRY
DCO
PMS

ACTION: ICR

SEC DEPSEC FAS(1) FAS(3) ER FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME C AND P LA BIO
BEIRUT

CIBBONS (TRADE) INFORMED

MR COCKER

NO. I HAVE
ASKED EX. COMS
TO CORRECT.

Mr. Truelove

In ICR handling?

6

Mr. Spencer

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

CROTONATE

LONDON. (For External)

PRIORITY

Confidential

Iraq: Stephenson and Turner.

Our 11308.

Grateful your advice.

CONFIDENTIAL



F.B. Cooper

17/9/70

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Record of telephone conversation with ^{JOHN} MR F. FISHER (Melbourne Architect)

on 31st August, 1970.

Officers Present Mr F.B. Cooper

RESTRICTED**MAIN SUBJECT(S):**

Mr Fisher, a member of the Melbourne firm of Stevenson and Turner (Architects) telephoned me this morning to say that his firm had been engaged for some years past in construction of a hospital in Iraq. Mr Fisher went on to say that many problems had arisen in connection with the project and in an endeavour to clear up some of these, they were proposing to ask their representative, Mr Lumsden, to proceed from Basra (where he is presently located) to Bahrain so that they can communicate with him freely by telephone. Their intention apparently is to use the good offices of the Australian Trade Commissioner in Bahrain for this purpose.

2. Mr Fisher said that the purpose of his call to me was to alert us to the possibility that Mr Lumsden may not be given an exit visa to leave Iraq, in which event Mr Fisher hoped that we would be prepared to make the necessary representations to the Iraqi Government to secure his release.

3. It emerged in the course of our discussion that Lumsden is in fact a New Zealand citizen and travels on a New Zealand passport. I explained that in these circumstances any representations would have to be made by the New Zealand Government rather than our own. In any event, since neither country was directly represented in Iraq, it would be necessary to ask the British Embassy in Bagdad to act on Lumsden's behalf.

4. I concluded by saying that if Lumsden were refused an exit visa, and if Mr Fisher would provide us with full details of the case, we would be glad to pass these to the New Zealand High Commission in Canberra for further action. Mr Fisher said that he was grateful for our offer to assist if this proved to be necessary.

DISTRIBUTION:

Minister
Secretary
Deputy Secretary
F.A.S. Div. 1
F.A.S. Div. 2
F.A.S. Div. 3
F.A.S. Div. 4
Tele. Adviser
S.A.S.M.S.

S.E.A.
D.L.
S.A.M.T.

U.N.
Pac. Am.

I.C.
E. Aid
C. & P.
I. & C.R.
Public Inf.
L. & T.

E.A.M.E.C.
E.R.
ANNE Section

Antarctic Div.
Finance
Property
Staffing
Comms.
Sydney
Melbourne
Perth
Adelaide
Brisbane

Posts: Beirut
Teheran

FOLLOWING POSTS:**ACTION:**

Report prepared by ^{HB}

(F.B. Cooper)

RESTRICTED

[Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

CROTONATE

LONDON (For External)

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Grateful if F.C.O. would pass following to

British Embassy BAGHDAD:

Begins: Stephenson & Turner, a firm of Australian architects, who have been engaged on building projects in Iraq for a number of years have contacted us regarding income tax the Iraqi Government is now demanding be paid in respect of their operations over the last ten years. The tax involved is of the order of \$A250,000 and is alleged to be contrary to the contract between the Iraqi Government and the firm which provided that payments would be tax free.

2. Lumsden (firm's local agent and an Australian national) has been withdrawn from Iraq and is currently in Bahrain. He was allowed to leave Iraq against the establishment of a substantial bond by local businessman Said Ali Madloom. Wade (British national) who has also been working in association with Stephenson & Turner is still in Iraq.

3. Stephenson & Turner are seeking answers to following questions:

.../2.

CONFIDENTIAL

146.

8/9/70 (F)

CONFIDENTIAL

- (a) What happens to Madloom if Lumsden does not return to Iraq in accordance with the bond? Would his life be in danger?
- (b) Would Wade's position be compromised if Lumsden did not return?
- (c) If Lumsden returns to Iraq to argue the case for Stephenson & Turner, what are the chances that the Iraqis will hold him hostage until the \$250,000 is paid?

4. Stephenson & Turner make the point that \$250,000 would cause them some difficulty in payment and one approach would be to cut their losses in Iraq and refuse to pay the income tax. They would not wish however to put safety of any of above named at risk.

5. Since circumstances of case and persons involved are, we understand, known to Ambassador personally, Stephenson and Turner would be grateful for Ambassador's comments to assist them in reaching decision. *Ends.*

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

VR1

0.79201

TO

TOD 8-9-70...1030 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON11308 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY
FOR EXTERNALGRATEFUL IF F.C.O. WOULD PASS FOLLOWING TO BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD.
BEGINS:-

STEPHENSON AND TURNER, A FIRM OF AUSTRALIAN ARCHITECTS, WHO HAVE BEEN ENGAGED ON BUILDING PROJECTS IN IRAQ FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, HAVE CONTACTED US REGARDING INCOME TAX THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IS NOW DEMANDING BE PAID IN RESPECT OF THEIR OPERATIONS OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS.

THE TAX INVOLVED IS OF THE ORDER OF DOLLARS AUST. 250,000 AND IS ALLEGED TO BE CONTRARY TO THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND THE FIRM WHICH PROVIDED THAT PAYMENTS WOULD BE TAX FREE.

2. LUMSDEN (FIRM'S LOCAL AGENT) HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM IRAQ AND IS CURRENTLY IN BAHRAIN.

HE WAS ALLOWED TO LEAVE IRAQ AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUBSTANTIAL BOND BY LOCAL BUSINESSMAN, SAID ALI MADLOOM.

WADE (U. K. CITIZEN) WHO HAS ALSO BEEN WORKING IN ASSOCIATION WITH STEPHENSON AND TURNER IS STILL IN IRAQ.

3. STEPHENSON AND TURNER ARE SEEKING ANSWERS TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS

(A) WHAT HAPPENS TO MADLOOM IF LUMSDEN DOES NOT RETURN TO IRAQ IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BOND? WOULD HIS LIFE BE IN DANGER?

(B) WOULD WADE'S POSITION BE COMPROMISED IF LUMSDEN DID NOT RETURN?

(C) IF LUMSDEN RETURNS TO IRAQ TO ARGUE THE CASE FOR STEPHENSON AND TURNER, WHAT ARE THE CHANCES THAT THE IRAQIS WILL HOLD HIM HOSTAGE UNTIL THE DOLLARS 250,000 IS PAID?

4. STEPHENSON AND TURNER MAKE THE POINT THAT DOLLARS 250,000 WOULD CAUSE THEM SOME DIFFICULTY IN PAYMENT AND ONE APPROACH WOULD BE TO CUT THEIR LOSSES IN IRAQ AND REFUSE TO PAY THE INCOME TAX.
THEY WOULD NOT WISH HOWEVER TO PUT SAFETY OF ANY OF ABOVE NAMED

.../2

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

- 2 -

0.79201

AT RISK.

5. SINCE CIRCUMSTANCES OF CASE AND PERSONS INVOLVED ARE, WE UNDERSTAND, KNOWN TO AMBASSADOR PERSONALLY, STEPHENSON AND TURNER WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AMBASSADOR'S COMMENTS TO ASSIST THEM IN REACHING DECISION.

ENDS.

EA (173/10/1)
T AND I
DCO
PMS

ACTION: AFME

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) FAS(3) ER FAS(4) EAMEC C AND P LA
ICR PIO

BEIRUT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Record of telephone conversation with

56
MR F. FISHER (Melbourne Architect)

on 31st August, 1970.

Officers Present Mr F.B. Cooper

173/10/1
RESTRICTEDMAIN SUBJECT(S):

Mr Fisher, a member of the Melbourne firm of Stevenson and Turner (Architects) telephoned me this morning to say that his firm had been engaged for some years past in construction of a hospital in Iraq. Mr Fisher went on to say that many problems had arisen in connection with the project and in an endeavour to clear up some of these, they were proposing to ask their representative, Mr Lumsden, to proceed from Basra (where he is presently located) to Bahrain so that they can communicate with him freely by telephone. Their intention apparently is to use the good offices of the Australian Trade Commissioner in Bahrain for this purpose.

2. Mr Fisher said that the purpose of his call to me was to alert us to the possibility that Mr Lumsden may not be given an exit visa to leave Iraq, in which event Mr Fisher hoped that we would be prepared to make the necessary representations to the Iraqi Government to secure his release.

3. It emerged in the course of our discussion that Lumsden is in fact a New Zealand citizen and travels on a New Zealand passport. I explained that in these circumstances any representations would have to be made by the New Zealand Government rather than our own. In any event, since neither country was directly represented in Iraq, it would be necessary to ask the British Embassy in Bagdad to act on Lumsden's behalf.

4. I concluded by saying that if Lumsden were refused an exit visa, and if Mr Fisher would provide us with full details of the case, we would be glad to pass these to the New Zealand High Commission in Canberra for further action. Mr Fisher said that he was grateful for our offer to assist if this proved to be necessary.

DISTRIBUTION:

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S.A.S.M.S.

S.E.A.
D.L.
S.A.M.T.

U.N.
Pac. Am.

→ I.C.
E. Af.
C. & S.
Public Inf.
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E.A.M.E.C.
E.R.

APPS Section

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Perth
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Posts: Beirut
Teheran

FOLLOWING POSTS:Report prepared by *26*ACTION:

(F.B. Cooper)

RESTRICTED
→ *Mr Homeyden*
Mr. G. G. G. G.

173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

CT2

FROM

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT

I. 95000

TOD 4.9.70...1500 LT

TOR 5.9.70...0547 LT

672

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR METCALFE ASISTANT SECRETARY DEPT OF IMMIGRATION FROM
BARTLEY.

F.M.C.70 OF 16TH JANUARY 1970. USE OF AFFIDAVIT PROCEDURE
AND MY CABLE 623 OF 20 AUGUST 1970.

BRITISH EMBASSY KUWAIT BECOMING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED WITH
NUMBER OF IRAQIS WHO HAVE MET MIGRANT ENTRY REQUIREMENTS
IN BAGHDAD BUT CANNOT GET PROPER GEOGRAPHIC VALIDITY AUSTRALIA.
MANY ARE SEEKING MIGRANT VISAS IN KUWAIT IN PASSPORTS WITH OBVIOUS
FALSE ENDORSEMENT +AUSTRALIA+. BRITISH EMBASSY KUWAIT REQUESTS YOUR
URGENT CONSIDERATION FOR USE OF FORM OF AFFIDAVIT IN TERMS
F.M.C.70 FOR FOLLOWING IRAQIS WHO HAVE MET ENTRY
REQUIREMENTS: (1) LAZAR OSHANA LAZAR BORN 1892
WIDOWER AND HIS SON OSHANA LAZER LAZER WIFE AND THREE
CHILDREN FORMS M40 N15981, N157906, N69/34941 AND
N69/47433 RESPECTIVELY. ANOTHER DAUGHTER OF SON OSHANA
ALREADY IN AUSTRALIA. KUWAIT ADVISES IMPOSSIBLE
FOR FAMILY TO GET OFFICIAL ENDORSEMENT AND COMPASSIONATE CON-
SIDERATION REQUESTED. (2) EDISON BABA KHAMO BORN
1949 SINGLE MAN SPONSORED BY UNCLE FORM M40 161331
N69/35735. DESTITUTE IN KUWAIT. HAS MADE FALSE ENTRY
IN PASSPORT AND AFRAID TO RETURN IRAQ FOR FEAR OF CONSEQUENCES.
NOT PARTICULARLY SYMPATHETIC BUT IF YOU AGREE WILL HELP BRITISH EMBASSY
(3) YOUSIF BAIJO SLAIMAN BORN 1946 SINGLE COUSIN NOMINATION N161783
N69/65424. HOLDS PASSPORT DUE FOR RENEWAL 18TH SEPTEMBER 1970
WHICH IRAQ EMBASSY REFUSES TO DO AS HE MUST RETURN IRAQ. BRITISH
EMBASSY ADVISES NOMINEE'S FATHER SERVED 23 YEARS IN BRITISH ARMED FORCE
IN IRAQ AND CAUSES EMBARRASSMENT FOR EMBASSY.

PLEASE CABLE DECISIONS.

MIN AND DEPT IMMIG
MIN AND DEPT EA
PMS DEPT
DCO
PMS

SEC DEPSEC FAS(4) EAMEC AFME C AND P ICR PIO

N. SPART

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No 173/10/1

DATE 7/9/70

SUBJECT

Iraq - Stevenson & Turner Operations.

FOR File

Mr Fisher of Stevenson & Turner (Melbourne 266611) rang to discuss problems facing the firm of partners.

He explained that the firm had been working in Iraq for 12 years designing hospitals etc. Two years ago it started building ~~the~~ a hospital there. It had two of its men in Iraq, one of whom Turneson, the New Zealander, had been able to get out to Bahrain so that he could telephone freely to the firm. To do so, however, he had had to get an Iraqi to stand guarantee for \$2,500 dollars for him.

The firm had had a letter from the British Accountant firm in Iraq which looked after the firms accounts saying it had been informed by the Iraqi taxation authorities that the firm was subject to tax & had to submit accounts for assessment. The tax involved amounted to over \$250,000.

Twelve years ago & again six years ago the firm had concluded agreements under which the firm was not taxed in Iraq on condition it obtained a specified amount in Iraq.

Mr Fisher was concerned whether the Iraqi guarantee might lose much more than \$2,500 if Turneson did not return & the other representative of the firm might be prevented from leaving. On the other hand if Turneson did return, he might be held hostage, too, for the tax demanded.

I reminded Mr Fisher that there was a new regime in Iraq since the agreements on tax were concluded & this regime may not regard itself bound in any way by the old

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No

DATE

SUBJECT

FOR

I declined Mr Fisher's suggestion that I might visit Melbourne to discuss the matter with the several partners involved, mentioning amongst other things that the Economics Relations Branch & Department of Trade & Industry might need to be consulted. I also said that before we could take any helpful action we should need a well documented case in writing. In this connection I suggested that he consult the Regional Office of Trade & Industry in Melbourne in the first instance. I thought Trade Melbourne would need to consult Trade Canberra & the latter ~~indeed~~ would no doubt seek our assistance as needed.

Fisher said that the firm was ^{considered} ~~from Melbourne~~ bringing Trunsden back to Melbourne to report. I said that it would appear normal enough for Trunsden to return to Melbourne for consultations but that probably Trunsden was in the best position to advise how the Iraqi's would react & specifically whether the Iraqi quaranteller or the other representative of the firm would suffer if they did.

I replied I could not see any immediately any way to help & repeated my suggestion that he consult Trade Melbourne & meanwhile I should think about the matter & consult again.

Subsequently I rang Gibbans, Trade, who knew something of the case & readily agreed that Fisher should deal with Trade Melbourne.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No

DATE

SUBJECT

FOR

In the latter afternoon, before I had a chance to discuss the matter with him, Mr Cooper was informed by Mr Tallbridge of Trade that Trade had had discussions with the firm I would be drafting a cable to pass to us with a recommendation it be sent to London to ask the British Embassy in Baghdad to take certain action

J. F. Lane

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Record of ^{Telephone} Conversation With ^{John} MR F. FISHER (Melbourne Architect)

on 31st August, 1970.

Officers Present: Mr F.B. Cooper

RESTRICTED

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

Mr Fisher, a member of the Melbourne firm of Stevenson and Turner (Architects) telephoned me this morning to say that his firm had been engaged for some years past in construction of a hospital in Iraq. Mr Fisher went on to say that many problems had arisen in connection with the project and in an endeavour to clear up some of these, they were proposing to ask their representative, Mr Lumsden, to proceed from Basra (where he is presently located) to Bahrain so that they can communicate with him freely by telephone. Their intention apparently is to use the good offices of the Australian Trade Commissioner in Bahrain for this purpose.

2. Mr Fisher said that the purpose of his call to me was to alert us to the possibility that Mr Lumsden may not be given an exit visa to leave Iraq, in which event Mr Fisher hoped that we would be prepared to make the necessary representations to the Iraqi Government to secure his release.

3. It emerged in the course of our discussion that Lumsden is in fact a New Zealand citizen and travels on a New Zealand passport. I explained that in these circumstances any representations would have to be made by the New Zealand Government rather than our own. In any event, since neither country was directly represented in Iraq, it would be necessary to ask the British Embassy in Baghdad to act on Lumsden's behalf.

4. I concluded by saying that if Lumsden were refused an exit visa, and if Mr Fisher would provide us with full details of the case, we would be glad to pass these to the New Zealand High Commission in Canberra for further action. Mr Fisher said that he was grateful for our offer to assist if this proved to be necessary.

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S.E.A.
D.L.
S.A.M.T.

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Pac. Am.

I.C.
E. Aid
C. & P.
I. & C.R.
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L. & T.

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Melbourne
Perth
Adelaide
Brisbane

APPE Section

Posts: Beirut
Tehran

FOLLOWING POSTS:

ACTION:

Report prepared by

(P.B. Cooper)

1. 7. Toulon 3/6
2. M. H. H. - PL send copies to Posts

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

173/10/1

GMW 7

0.61203

TO

TOD 09.07.70...1404 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
ROME

1904 UNCLASSIFIED

YOUR 2142.

FOLLOWING SHIPMENTS WILL TAKE PLACE:-

PROJECT	QTY AND COMMODITY	SHIP
-----	-----	-----
IRAQ345 (S I NO.339)	31MTN CANNED MEAT	"BARPETA"
IRAQ451 (S I NO.340)	46.5MTN CANNED MEAT	"BARPETA" ETD MELBOURNE 15.7.70 ETA BASRA 16.8.70
S.YEMEN497 (S I NO.390 S I NO.391)	7.5MTN DRIED FRUIT 7MTN DRIED FRUIT	"UJAMAA"
SOMALIA387 (S I NO.3413)	5MTN CANNED FRUIT	"UJAMAA" ETD MELBOURNE 20.7.70 ETA ADEN 18.8.70

SOMALIA PROJECT 387 IS BEING SHIPPED TO BERBERA WITH TRANS-
SHIPMENT AT ADEN ON THROUGH BILL OF LADING.

E.A. (715/13/9/3)
P.I.
T AND I
TREASURY
P.M.'S DEPT.
P.M.'S
D.C.O.

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) FAS(2) UN PACAM AM SP FAS(3)
ER AID* EAPD FAS(4) EAMEC E ICR PIO

173 / 10 / 11

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

LRW 6

I.63862

FROM

TOB 10.6.70...1810LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

TOR 11.6.70...0402LT

9911 CONFIDENTIAL

→ M. Stuppi

FOR DGCA, FADG (P), ADG(IR).

THE FOLLOWING NOTE FROM THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
DATED 2ND JUNE WAS RECEIVED BY CALO ON THE 5TH JUNE, 1970:-

" THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ PRESENTS ITS
COMPLIMENTS TO THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION AND HAS THE
HONOUR TO BRING TO ITS NOTICE THE FOLLOWING MATTER.

A PRIVATE AUSTRALIAN AIRCRAFT, CALL (VHKCA), MAKE (BTN 20),
VIOLATED IRAQI AIRSPACE ON THE 4TH JANUARY, 1970, BY FLYING FROM
DAMASCUS TO KUWAITE WITHOUT EITHER INFORMING THE BASRAH CONTROL
TOWER OR OBTAINING PRIOR PERMISSION FROM THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES
TO OVERFLY IRAQI TERRITORY.

THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ KINDLY REQUESTS THAT
THIS INCIDENT BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE APPROPRIATE
AUSTRALIAN AUTHORITIES, AND AT THE SAME TIME WOULD LIKE TO
POINT OUT THAT AUSTRALIAN AIRCRAFT IN GENERAL ARE NOT ALLOWED TO
OVERFLY IRAQI TERRITORY OR USE IRAQI AIRSPACE.

THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ AVAILS ITSELF OF THIS
OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION THE
ASSURANCE OF ITS HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

THE PILOT CONCERNED WAS MISS JANET FERGUSON, HOLDER OF UNITED
KINGDOM CPL 34639, WHO WAS DELIVERING THE AIRCRAFT - A BEAGLE
206S REGISTERED VH-KCA.

I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MISS FERGUSON, WHO STATES THAT
SHE CANNOT DEFINITELY REMEMBER, AND DOES NOT HAVE ANY READY
RECORDS AVAILABLE TO HER, WHETHER SHE DIVERTED FROM RED 19 AIRWAY
AT QAISUMAH DIRECT TO KUWAITE OR ATTEMPTED TO CUT THE CORNER BY
LEAVING AIRWAY RED 19 AT POSITION REPORTING POINT "VICTOR",
WHICH IS 41 NAUTICAL MILES EAST OF RAFHA, WHICH IS WITHIN 5
MILES OF THE IRAQ/SAUDI ARABIAN BORDER.

.../2.

M. Cooper

2.10.1968 → M. Cooper

Thanks → M. Stuppi
see penultimate
para.

DCA seem to be behaving very
properly but you'd better keep
your eye on this. 11/12/6

INWARD CABLEGRAM

-2-

I.63862

IT HAS BEEN IMPRESSED ON HER THAT SHE SHOULD ENDEAVOUR TO OBTAIN AS MUCH POSITIVE INFORMATION AS CAN BE SUPPLIED TO THIS OFFICE REGARDING HER ROUTE OTHERWISE WE MAY BE FORCED TO REQUEST DETAILS OF THE FLIGHT PLAN SUBMITTED TO DAMASCUS ATC ON THE 4TH JANUARY, 1970.

HER RECOLLECTION OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS IS ALSO SOMEWHAT HAZY AND SHE AT FIRST STATED SHE COULD NOT RECALL MAKING CONTACT WITH BASRAH OR BAGHDAD COMMUNICATION CENTRES, BUT WHEN IT WAS POINTED OUT TO HER THAT AT LEAST THREE POSITION REPORTS WOULD HAVE TO HAVE BEEN MADE AS SHE WAS FLYING THROUGH THE BAGHDAD FIR TO THE CONTROL CENTRE RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT FIR, SHE FELT THAT SHE PROBABLY DID COMMUNICATE WITH BASRAH CONTROL.

MISS FERGUSON KNEW THAT HER CLEARANCES DID NOT INCLUDE ONE TO OVERFLY ANY PORTION OF IRAQI TERRITORY AND THE FERRY ORGANISATION BY WHOM SHE IS EMPLOYED WERE BRIEFED BY THIS OFFICE THAT NO INFRINGEMENT OF IRAQI TERRITORY MUST OCCUR DURING THE FERRY FLIGHT TO AUSTRALIA ON BEHALF OF BEAGLE AIRCRAFT SALES OF SYDNEY.

YOU WILL OBSERVE FROM THE CONTENT OF THE NOTE, 3RD PARAGRAPH THAT THE IRAQI EMBASSY HAS USED THE WORDS "IRAQI TERRITORY OR USE IRAQI AIRSPACE".

WHEN WE DO FORMALLY REPLY TO THE IRAQI NOTE, I FEEL WE SHOULD ONCE AGAIN INFER THAT INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION LAW DOES NOT CONFER ON ANY STATE THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AIRCRAFT FROM AN FIR UNDER THE CONTROL OF ANOTHER STATE WHEN PERMISSION HAS BEEN GRANTED BY THE STATE OVER WHOSE TERRITORY THE AIRCRAFT WILL BE FLYING.

I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF ANY FURTHER INFORMATION WHICH BECOMES AVAILABLE FROM MISS FERGUSON, BUT WOULD SEEK YOUR ADVICE AS TO WHETHER I SHOULD COMMUNICATE WITH THE SYRIAN AUTHORITIES AT THIS EARLY STAGE FOR A POSSIBLE COPY OF THE FLIGHT PLAN SUBMITTED BY MISS FERGUSON ON THE 4TH JANUARY.

2 .../3.

*F. I. R.**is a flight information
region.*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

-3-

I.63862

CIVIL AVIATION
D.C.O.
P.M'S

SEC DEP SEC FAS(3) ER FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

RR 1

0.29098

TO

TOD 3/4/70...0143 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

3976.

CONFIDENTIAL.

QANTAS OVERFLIGHT OF IRAQ.

YOUR 19214.

WE REFER TO THE IRAQI'S NOTE OF THE 14TH OCTOBER, 1969 WHICH ADVISED THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO RECONSIDER THE DECISION REGARDING QANTAS OVER-FLIGHTS ARGUING THAT ARTICLE 1 OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSIT AGREEMENT WAS NOT BINDING OF IRAQ BECAUSE OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 6 ON THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION.

WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THE IRAQI CLAIM HAS NO FOUNDATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.

CONSEQUENTLY, WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO PRESENT TO THE IRAQI EMBASSY THE FOLLOWING NOTE.

"THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ AND HAS THE HONOUR TO REFER TO ITS NOTE OF 14TH OCTOBER 1969 ADVISING THAT THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO RECONSIDER THE DECISION CONCERNING FLIGHTS BY QANTAS OVER IRAQI TERRITORY ON ITS REGULAR SCHEDULED SERVICE BETWEEN ISTANBUL AND BAHRAIN.

IN THAT NOTE IT IS CONTENDED THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1 OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES TRANSIT AGREEMENT ARE NOT BINDING ON IRAQ BECAUSE OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION.

THE AUSTRALIAN AUTHORITIES WISH TO RECALL THE FACT THAT THE VIEW THAT ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION OVERRIDES ARTICLE 1 OF THE AIR SERVICES TRANSIT AGREEMENT WAS REJECTED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION ON 22 MARCH, 1951, IN AN ADVISORY OPINION GIVEN AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN.

THE AUSTRALIAN AUTHORITIES SUPPORT THIS OPINION.

QANTAS AIRWAYS WILL AGAIN BE CONSIDERING RE-ROUTING SOME OF THEIR SERVICES OVER IRAQI TERRITORY WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF ITS NORTHERN WINTER SCHEDULES IN OCTOBER NEXT.

...2/.

W. Stewart.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

RR 1

- 2 -

0.29098

AS SOON AS PLANNING OF SCHEDULES AND ROUTES FOR THE SERVICES CONCERNED HAS BEEN COMPLETED QANTAS WILL SUBMIT SUCH DETAILS TO THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION AVAILS ITSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ THE ASSURANCES OF ITS HIGHEST CONSIDERATION."

E.A. (716/55/5/2)
D.C.A. (M)
D.C.O.
P.M. 'S

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SEC DEP SEC FAS(3) ER* FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME

173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

~~W. J. G.~~
13/11

MH 6

I.126080

FROM

TOD 10.12.69...1900 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

TOR 10.12.69...0536 LT

21025 UNCLASSIFIED

FOR DEPT OF CIVIL AVIATION MELBOURNE
FROM CALO

CA2967

FOR AOTC

CONFIRMING MY TELEPHONE COVERSATION MRS LEONARD EARLIER
TODAY 10 DECEMBER.

1 CIVILAIR BAGHDAD HAS NOTIFIED BOARD OF TRADE THAT U.S.
AND AUSTRALIAN REGISTERED AIRCRAFT WILL BE REFUSED OVERFLIGHT
AND TECHNICAL LANDING CLEARANCES.

2 BLAKE'S REPORT ON HIS VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES
HAS NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE BEEN PREPARED AND I HAVE ASKED FOR A
FULL REPORT FROM UK RACE COMMITTEE ON WHEY WE WERE LED TO
BELIEVE THAT IRAQ WOULD FAVOURABLY CONSIDER BLOCK AIR RACE
CLEARANCES.

3 CALO HAS BEEN INVITED TO ATTEND FINAL BRIEFING AT BIGGIN
HILL ON SUNDAY 14 DECEMBER

4 DJAKARTA AND RANGOON HAVE BEEN FURNISHED ALL AIR
RACE DETAILS AND FEEL THIS COVERS QUERY RAISED IN YOUR CA1421
OF 28 NOVEMBER

5 BURMESE EMBASSY IN LONDON IS REFUSING TO GRANT VISAS TO
INDIVIDUAL COMPETITORS UNLESS THEY CAN QUOTE CLEARANCE DETAILS.
UNDERSTOOD THAT BLOCK CLEARANCES OVERCAME THE NECESSITY FOR
NORMAL VISA APPLICATIONS BUT IF THIS NOT SO WOULD YOU PLEASE
ADVISE URGENTLY CLEARANCE DETAILS FOR AIR RACE AIRCRAFT SO THAT
WE MAY ADVISE EMBASSY OR ALTERNATIVELY HAVE THE BURMESE
EMBASSY IN CANBERRA CABLE TO LONDON THAT VISAS OR NO VISAS
ARE NECESSARY AS THE CASE MAY BE.

.../2.

*Ugla. I can you submit evidence on this content.
Ray has is of interest to you*

RB

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

2.

1.126080

CIVIL AVIATION (M) (T/T)
IMMIGRATION
E.A.
D.C.O.
P.M.'S

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) SEA FAS(2) SA FAS(3) ER FAS(4)
EAMEC E C AND P ICR

1 73/10 61

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

NMCK 6

I.126998

FROM

TOD 12.12.69...1499 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT

TOR 13.12.69...0231 LT

1253 UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED LONDON (FOR CALO AND EXTERNAL)
139 REPEATED INFORMATION CANBERRA 1253 (OUR 1239 REFERS LM
AIR RACE M THANKS YOUR 106 (CA2868). BRITISH CIVIL
AIR ATTACHE HERE TOLD US TODAY 2 DECEMBER HE HAS LEARNED FROM
LONDON THAT SYRIA HAS GIVEN WHAT APPEARS TO BE APPROVAL TO
OVERFLY WITHOUT LANDING AT DAMASCUS (ALSO THAT IRAQ IS STILL
CONSIDERING WHETHER OR NOT TO ALLOW AUSTRALIAN AIRCRAFT AND
PILOTS TO OVERFLY AND THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAS NOT YET GIVEN OVER
FLIGHT CLEARANCES).

2. YOU WILL HAVE READ OF INCURSION
INTO SYRIAN AIR SPACE YESTERDAY BY ISRAELI AIR FORCE PLANES
AND OF CONSEQUENT DOGFIGHT OVER DAMASCUS. ASSUME DATES WHEN
RACE AIRCRAFT WILL BE IN SYRIAN AND JORDANIAN AIR SPACE ARE
BEING CONVEYED TO ISRAELI AUTHORITIES. CEM.

E.A.
D.C.A. (M - I/T)
D.C.O.
P.M.'S

SEC DEP SEC FAS(3) ER@ FAS(4) EAMEC AFME

173/10/1
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

JMS 7

I.127312

FROM

TOD 13.12.69...

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT

TOR 13.12.69...2104 LT

1259 RESTRICTED

ADDRESSED LONDON 140 REPEATED INFORMATION CANBERRA 1259 AIR
RACE OUR 139 (1253 TO CANBERRA) FOLLOWING FROM LEBANESE CIVIL
AVIATION AUTHORITIES THIS MORNING 13 DECEMBER:

IN TELEGRAM DATED 9 DECEMBER IRAQI CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES
ADVISE THAT AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN PILOTS AND AIRCRAFT IN THE
AIR RACE ARE NOT RPT NOT PERMITTED TO OVERFLY IRAQ OR TO LAND
AT BAGDAD OR BASRA.

D.C.A. (M) I/T
(D) I/T

E.A.
D.C.O.
P.M'S

SEC DEP SEC FAS(3) ER FAS(4) EAMEC AFME ICR PIO

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

AMT

1.115797

FROM

TOD 13.11.69...1815 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

TOR 14.11.69...0626 LT

19467

UNCLASSIFIED

FOR: DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION MELBOURNE.

C.A. 2850.
FROM C.A.L.O.

YOUR 13138 BP ENGLAND TO AUSTRALIA AIR RACE POSITIONING
FLIGHTS.

FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

QUOTE:

CA/79/8661.

PERMISSION GRANTED FOR PA 24/400 COMANCHE AIRCRAFT
REGISTRATION VH-BSH TO OVERFLY IRAQ 9TH DECEMBER ON POSITIONING
FLIGHT TO COMPETE IN ENGLAND/AUSTRALIA AIR RACE EN ROUTE
ABADAN/DAMASCUS PROVIDED THAT THE PILOTS SHOULD NOT BE OF JEWISH-
NATIONALITY OR HAVING ANY RELATION WITH ISRAEL.

THANKS.
UNQUOTE.

D.C.A. (M) (I/T)
E.A.
D.C.O.
P.MS

SEC DEP SEC FAS(0) ER FAS(4) EAMEC AFME ICR P10

173/10/1 193/10/1
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

MDH 5

I. 108545

FROM

TOD 24.10.69...1530 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT.

TOR 25.10.69...0351 LT

1054

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR TRADE YOUR 697.

HAVING BEEN INSTRUCTED NOT TO VISIT IRAQ FOR TIME BEING CAN
ONLY EXTEND INVITATION THROUGH BRITISH EMBASSY IF BRITISH
AGREEABLE.

TO SEND SUCH AN INVITATION THROUGH MAIL AT THE MOMENT
WOULD INVITE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR TOMA WHO HAS ALREADY INDICATED
DISPLEASURE AT RECEIVING AN INVESTMENT ENQUIRY FROM ELDER G.M.
WILL CABLE AS SOON AS ABLE OBTAIN REACTION AND INFORMATION
YOU SEEK.

T. AND I.
D.C.O.
P.M'S.

CONFIDENTIAL

FAS(3) ER FAS(4) EAMEC AFME C AND P

173 / 10 / 1
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

VR
TO

0.72627
TOD 12-9-69...2348 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
ROME

2108 UNCLASSIFIED PRIORITY
FAO - KHALIL IBRAHIM LATIF - IRAQ

ELEVEN MONTHS' TRAINING (WHICH INCLUDES ONE MONTHS' ENGLISH TUITION) ARRANGED WITH C.S.I.R.O. AND N.S.W. AGRICULTURE DEPT.'S LABORATORIES.

PROGRAMME COMPRISES PRACTICAL WORK ON LABORATORY AND FIELD TECHNIQUES FOR DIAGNOSIS AND CONTROL OF PARASITIC DISEASES INCLUDING LIVER FLUKES.

FELLOW SHOULD BE ALERTED TO FOR TRAVEL TO SYDNEY BY 30TH SEPTEMBER
PLEASE ADVISE URGENTLY F.A.O. APPROVAL SO THAT BRITISH EMBASSY BHAGDAD CAN BE INSTRUCTED TO ISSUE VISA.

E.A. (2037/5/245)
U.N.D.P. (S) (T/T)
D.E.S. (S-C) (T/T)
D.C.S.
P.M.S

UN FAS(3) AID ITS(3) FAS(4) EAMEC AFME

CONFIDENTIAL 1.8.6

NOTE FOR FILE

MIGRATION FROM IRAK

I have spoken to Immigration and Prime Minister's Department and explained to them that I do not see that the risks, though small, to our interests in Irak would justify what seems to be a negligible gain either in terms of migration or in terms of humanitarian assistance to be derived from granting visas to Iraqis outside Irak when those Iraqis do not have travel documents valid for Australia. Immigration have said that they have no interest from their point of view in giving visas under these circumstances. I have also pointed out to both Departments and both Departments have accepted that any Irakis presenting themselves for migration in Arab countries outside Irak are almost certain to be Iraki Arabs and not Iraki jews. The possibility of our helping any Iraki jews outside Irak is extremely small. If Iraki jews are allowed outside Irak by the Iraki Government it is likely that they will be allowed outside on the basis that they can travel to Australia or elsewhere outside Arab countries.

After discussion with Hooten of Prime Minister's Department, I agreed to a very limited arrangement which would enable us to give the impression that we were assisting Iraki jews. This very limited arrangement would be that if any Iraki jews present themselves to the Embassy in Beirut seeking migration to Australia, the Embassy in Beirut would inform us of the circumstances including the travel documents of the particular Iraki jew concerned and this would then be considered by us in Canberra as an individual case on its merits and we would determine then whether to instruct the Embassy in Beirut to issue a migrant visa and, if so, in what form and on what document. Hooten agreed that this might be a solution and agreed to put it to his Secretary.

..2/

→ In Butler



CONFIDENTIAL

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It was also agreed that, if any advice of our intended policy were passed to the Jewish community, this should be done with discretion and full emphasis should be placed on the need for the Jewish community to preserve, in their own interests, the *confidential* nature of the advice which we gave them.

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No.

DATE

1978

SUBJECT

Migration from Iraq.

FOR

Dr. Clynes

I attach my revised
draft. The earlier
submission is also
attached.

Bullen

DRAFT
=====

CONFIDENTIAL

Migration from Iraq

THE MINISTER:

(attached),

In a recent submission^(attached) we mentioned that possible changes in arrangements for granting visas to migrants from Iraq were being considered by the Department of Immigration, the Prime Minister's Department, and ourselves. The following submission discusses this migration question and its possible consequences for our trade and civil aviation interests in Iraq.

The Migration Question

2. In May, 1969, the Iraqi Government made new and stringent rules in respect of passports for Iraqis. For virtually all Iraqis, passports valid only for travel to Arab countries are now the standard issue. Iraqi Jews are apparently denied any passport.

3. As you know, an Australian migration officer was sent recently on attachment to the British Embassy in Baghdad to process the backlog of applications by Iraqis for migration to Australia. This backlog had arisen ^{as a result of} ~~due to~~ the severance of diplomatic relations between the British (through whose mission we had worked) and the Iraqis. The attachment of the Australian officer was made possible following the re-opening of those relations and as a result of the Prime Minister's concern over reports of maltreatment of Jews in Iraq. As mentioned above, however, Iraqi Jews are not permitted to leave the country at present. There seems little prospect of this situation changing in the near future.

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4. The Department of Immigration now envisages two possible migration situations:

- a) a request for migration from an Iraqi in possession of a passport valid for Australia. Although it is extremely unlikely that this situation will arise, the procedure would be to inscribe a migrant visa in that passport if the application was approved. This could occur in Baghdad and/or at Beirut, depending on where the application was presented. This is a "normal" situation and would require no special authority or procedures;
- b) a request for migration from an Iraqi in possession of a valid passport but without validation for Australia. The specific and most likely case is a passport validly held but marked ~~is~~ for travel to Arab countries only. An application for migration under these circumstances could occur inside or outside Iraq. If the application were inside Iraq, we would not ^{approve} ~~agree~~ to it, ^{since} ~~as~~ we could not inscribe a visa in such a passport which would necessarily be presented at an Iraqi border and would thus demonstrate that we had failed to observe Iraqi regulations. Even if in respect of such an application we decided to inscribe the visa in a document of identity, separate from the passport (a fairly common practice in "refugee" situations), we would still run an almost identical ~~risk~~ because Iraqis are subject to search before leaving Iraq. The question under consideration by the Department of Immigration, however, is whether we should take the step of issuing visas on a separate document of identity outside Iraq for Iraqis with these restricted passports.

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4. The backlog of applications in Baghdad is relevant in this context. The Department of Immigration has advised us that there are at least 100 applications from Iraqis which have been approved for migration. Under the restrictive regulations since May, however, we are now not able to issue visas to these approved applicants in Baghdad.

5. Accordingly, the Department of Immigration has decided to issue visas on a separate document of identity at Beirut to any of these approved applicants who arrive at Beirut with a valid passport even though it may be restricted to travel to Arab countries. Specifically, the conditions under which this step is being taken are:

- a) the applicant has been cleared by us in Baghdad;
- b) the applicant has family sponsorship in Australia;
- c) the applicant's passport is valid but restricted.

6. To date, no such cases have been acted on and in any case this procedure applies to Iraqis with the qualifications listed above whether Jewish or not. In other words, it involves no particular arrangement for Iraqi Jews and indeed is unlikely to apply to them given their present inability to obtain even a restricted passport.

7. The Department of Immigration has now asked whether a further procedure in respect of Iraqis who manage to get out of Iraq and with whom we have had no previous contact may be employed. It is proposed that when Iraqis ~~we~~ apply for migration at Beirut, with restricted validity passports, we should take the following steps:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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- a) in cases where relatives are already in Australia and/or compassionate grounds exist a visa be issued on a separate document of identity provided of course the applicant passes the normal migration tests;
- b) in similar cases but where no relatives or compassionate grounds exist that each applicant be referred by cable to Canberra.

8. The chief motives behind this suggestion are the recognition of the difficulties presently experienced by Iraqis, especially Iraqi Jews, in respect of migration, and the Prime Minister's expressed interest in and sympathy for the plight of Iraqi Jews. This proposal has been approved by the Secretary, Prime Minister's Department.

9. Although we can see the humanitarian purpose of the proposal, we wonder about its efficacy in respect of Iraqi Jews given their inability to leave Iraq. We also wonder ~~about~~ how widely our arrangements could become known to prospective Iraqi immigrants. The migration officer presently attached to the British Embassy in Baghdad is free only to ^{give} ~~give~~ a general hint ~~about~~ ^{about} our arrangements and cannot openly describe them or publicise them. This difficulty, however, does not strike us as a determinant of whether or not we should at least make these arrangements against the time when Iraqis including Iraqi Jews may find a way of leaving Iraq.

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CONFIDENTIAL 5.

10. The practice of friendly governments offers some precedents for the contemplated procedure. The U.S. authorities are willing to inscribe visas in Iraqi passports even when these are not valid for travel to the U.S.A. - provided the passports are otherwise valid. The U.S. regards this policy as a humanitarian measure, in view of the fact that would-be migrants have already severed their connection with their homeland. The Canadians issue visas on separate but valid travel documents even if the applicants' passports are limited in validity, provided that they were unexpired as to time. The British authorities would, however, issue visas in this way only with Ministerial approval for specific cases. The New Zealanders follow the British lead.

Possible Consequences for our Trade & Civil Aviation Interests

11. The main risk in granting Australian visas on separate travel documents in the manner proposed would be in a possible adverse reaction from the Iraqi Government which, if it learned of the practice, might retaliate with measures affecting Australian interests in Iraq. Iraq has from political motives taken in the past, and is taking at present, action detrimental to Australian interests.

12. Australia's exports to Iraq amounted to about \$2 million in 1968/69, comprising mainly cheese and wool. Iraq is an extremely valuable market for a leading Australian cheese manufacturer. Wheat exports were also important in 1966/67 and 1967/68. Following the "June War" of 1967, Iraq placed an embargo on trade with countries which did not support the Arab cause in the United Nations and this, of course, included Australia. But as a result of representations made by the Australian Trade Commissioner Beirut, in November 1967, this embargo on trade with this country was lifted. However, should Iraq have further cause for criticism of Australia's policy, we could well expect a disruption of trade ~~involved~~ again.

13. ^{On} The position with civil aviation, is we ~~that~~ the Australian Government already have ~~our~~ problems with Iraq. Notwithstanding its signature of the International Air Transit Agreement, which gives other signatories overflight rights across its territory, Iraq continues to deny QANTAS permission to overfly its territory. This attitude appears to be based on political considerations and further strain on relations between Australia and Iraq could be expected to reduce further whatever prospect there may be of QANTAS obtaining permission to overfly. We have several civil aviation problems in the Middle East at present - particularly with Iran and Syria - and adding to difficulties with Iraq could weaken our bargaining position with these other countries.

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6.

Conclusions:

14. It is clear that we must observe strictly within Iraq the rules of the Iraqi Government in respect of passports and their validity. A deviation from this policy would in our view put our trade and civil aviation interests at definite risk. It may also have unfortunate repercussions for the prospective migrants themselves especially Jewish Iraqis.

15. The risk flowing from the procedures suggested for outside Iraq is less clear. The key question is how prospective immigrants could be informed of the arrangements as such and whether or not our so informing them would attract the attention of Iraqi authorities and lead them to take reprisal action. On this point the British Embassy in Baghdad has stated that it has ~~as~~ so far attracted no adverse attention from the authorities on account of its role in the processing of emigrants to Canada and Australia whose passports were validated outside Iraq for travel to either country. The Embassy has suggested that intending Iraqi emigrants to Australia, might be given advice on how to proceed in an indirect way, e.g. through correspondence from their sponsors in Australia. We are not sure whether or not such advice would be intercepted by Iraqi authorities and if it was what their reaction would be. We believe it should not be encouraged because it is outside our control.

15. Whereas we feel certain that direct activity on our part in Iraq would attract unacceptable retaliation we are not sure that this is true of indirect activity and we do not believe that the visa arrangement as such proposed for outside Iraq would attract adverse reaction.

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Accommodation

16. It is recommended that you approve our agreeing that the Department of Immigration authorise its representatives in Beirut to issue visas on a separate document of identity to successful Iraqi applicants with valid but restricted passports who have relations in Australia and/or compassionate reasons for wishing to migrate to Australia and that cases where relatives ~~or~~ for compassionate circumstances ~~do~~ do not exist be referred to Canberra for decision. We would also like your agreement that we state to the Department of Immigration that no steps be taken to make our arrangements known through direct or official channels in Iraq and that we should confine ourselves to making them known informally.

(J.W.C. Cumes)

Acting First Assistant Secretary.

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No.

DATE

11/8/69

SUBJECT

FOR

Dr. Curmes

Mr. Dunn had a hand in the preparation of this paper & supports it.

It is slightly at variance with the paper sent by PMs to Sec. PMs. This paper makes it clear we can do nothing at Baghdad but it asks for authority to issue visas to Iraqis outside Iraq, i.e. at Beirut, on a separate document.

a.) immediately, when the applicant has relatives in Australia &/or compassionate reasons for the application

b.) through cabled request, to Canberra in other cases.

Sec. PMs has approved this.

If our paper is to be more in line with PMs I think the last page would need to be re-written - mentioning the case where the applicant has relatives etc., & making clear the specific & limited nature of the authority we are seeking

MBulley

Dr. Cunnors

I think that Mrs. Cunnors
deserves the note you ~~to~~ P1/r

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE No 173/10/1

DATE

SUBJECT

Migration from Iraq

FOR The Minister:

In a recent submission, we mentioned that possible changes in the technicalities of granting visas to migrants from Iraq were being considered by the Department of Immigration, the Prime Minister's Department and ourselves, and that the possible consequences for our trade and civil aviation interests in Iraq were being weighed. The following submission spells out the problem.

2. There is no difficulty in issuing visas, whether through the British Embassies in Baghdad or Kuwait or through our own Embassy in Beirut, to approved migrants whose passports are valid for travel to Australia. (We suspect that some validations have been obtained by bribery of Iraqi officials in Kuwait or Beirut, or by forgery, but in view of the character of the Iraqi Government we would not propose to query validations inscribed in the passports of properly qualified migrants).

3. A more delicate situation would arise if a qualified migrant applied in Beirut or Kuwait but had a passport of limited validity not including Australia (e.g. one valid only for travel to some Arab countries). Consideration is therefore being given to the possibility of issuing visas to such persons on separate documents provided that their passports are current and are not specifically made invalid for travel to Australia or for emigration in general.

4. This could be done only for persons outside Iraq, as Iraqis are liable to search on leaving that country; if visaed documents were found the migrants would be punished and the British Embassy in Baghdad seriously embarrassed. Such visas would be issued only by our Embassy in Beirut, as it would also probably be unwise to seek to involve, for example, the British Embassy in Kuwait in a

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procedure which the Iraqi Government would certainly not favour.

5. The practice of friendly governments offers some precedents for the contemplated procedure. The U.S. authorities are willing to inscribe visas in Iraqi passports even when these are not valid for travel to the U.S.A. - provided the passports are otherwise valid. The U.S. regards this policy as a humanitarian measure, in view of the fact that would-be migrants have already severed their connection with their homeland. The Canadians issue visas on separate but valid travel documents even if the applicants' passports are limited in validity, provided that they were unexpired as to time. The British authorities would, however, issue visas in this way only with Ministerial approval for specific cases. The New Zealanders follow the British lead.

6. The procedure suggested in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, if followed, would apply to all migrants from Iraq, and thus to any Iraqi Jews who were able to leave. (As you know, an Australian migration officer has spent some time in Baghdad attached to the British Embassy to process the backlog of applications for migration to Australia. This attachment was made as a result of the Prime Minister's concern over reports of maltreatment of Jews in Iraq). According to the most recent reliable information we have received, Iraqi Jews are at present permitted to leave the country; there seems little prospect of this situation changing in the near future.

7. The main risk in granting Australian visas on separate travel documents in the manner proposed would be in a possible adverse reaction from the Iraqi Government which, if it learned of the practice, might retaliate with measures affecting Australian interests in Iraq. Iraq has from political motives taken in the past, and is taking at present, action detrimental to Australian interests.

8. Australia's exports to Iraq amounted to about \$2 million in 1966/69, comprising mainly cheese and wool. Iraq is an extremely valuable market for a leading Australian cheese manufacturer. Wheat exports were also important in 1966/67 and 1967/68. Following the "June War" of 1967, Iraq placed an embargo on trade with countries which did not support the Arab cause in the United Nations and this, of course, included Australia. But as a result of representations made by the Australian Trade Commissioner, Beirut, in November 1967, this embargo on trade with this country was lifted. However, should Iraq have further cause for criticism of Australia's policy, we could well expect a disruption of trade involved again.

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9. The position with civil aviation is that the Australian Government already has its problems with Iraq. Notwithstanding its signature of the International Air Transit Agreement, which gives other signatories overflight rights across its territory, Iraq continues to deny QANTAS permission to overfly its territory. This attitude appears to be based on political considerations and further strain on relations between Australia and Iraq could be expected to reduce further whatever prospect there may be of QANTAS obtaining permission to overfly. We have several civil aviation problems in the Middle East at present - particularly with Iran and Syria - and adding to difficulties with Iraq could weaken our bargaining position with these other countries.

10. The degree of further risk to Australian interests in Iraq arising from a variation in our existing immigration practices is difficult to gauge, but does not appear great. The immigrants concerned would be advised with the utmost discretion on the steps they should take to obtain an Australian visa, and it would be in the interests of the people themselves to avoid disclosure of the information. We have sought the advice of the British Embassy in Baghdad, which has stated that it has so far attracted no adverse attention from the authorities on account of its role in the processing of emigrants to Canada and Australia whose passports were validated outside Iraq for travel to either country. The Embassy has suggested that intending Iraqi emigrants to Australia, instead of receiving direct advice through the Embassy of the means to evade their government's travel restrictions, might be given indications in a less direct way, e.g. through correspondence from their sponsors in Australia, of facilities available at Beirut. We are not certain whether this course would be practicable, particularly if such correspondence were subject to interception by Iraqi censorship, and we intend to make further enquiries in Baghdad into the matter.

11. The information received from the British Embassy there encourages us to believe that the Iraqis would not find out that we were issuing visas in the way proposed, or that, if they did, they would not take such exception that our trade or civil aviation interests would be seriously or lastingly affected. However, there is an element of risk which cannot be completely excluded. The possibility of other Arab states reacting adversely in sympathy appears slight, although Iraq would presumably seek to maintain that our action was anti-Arab and pro-Israeli.

12. The basic question is whether action towards the desirable end of enabling some migrants from Iraq - including any Jews who managed to get from Iraq

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to Beirut on passports of limited validity - to reach Australia is worth the risk to our trade and civil aviation interests outlined above. If it were thought desirable to take the risk and if our other interests were thereby affected, it would not help very much even if we were able to say to the Iraqis that their nationals were not the only ones to whom we gave visas in this way. By then the harm might well have been done.

13. If you think that the risk should be taken we would suggest that relevant Departments should draw up strict guidelines for the Immigration Officer in Beirut; some cases might be referred to Canberra for decision but discretion might be given to Beirut to issue visas without reference particularly if there were very strong humanitarian reasons (for example if delay would cause great hardship). We would need to be notified of the number of visas issued by them as they were issued. This procedure would not eliminate the risk of adverse Iraqi reaction but it would keep the question under very close review.

14. If you agree with the above view, we should be glad of your authority to put it to other Departments concerned. You might wish to discuss the question with other Ministers.

(J.W.C. Gumes)
Acting First Assistant Secretary
Division IV.

AF/ME Branch
J.M.Kirtley:ga

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173/10/1

Migration from Iraq

The Minister:

In a recent submission, we mentioned that possible changes in the technicalities of granting visas to migrants from Iraq were being considered by the Department of Immigration, the Prime Minister's Department and ourselves, and that the possible consequences for our trade and civil aviation interests in Iraq were being weighed. The following submission spells out the problem.

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13. If you think that the risk should be taken we would suggest that relevant Departments should draw up strict guidelines for the Immigration Officer in Beirut; some cases might be referred to Canberra for decision but discretion might be given to Beirut to issue visas without reference particularly if there were very strong humanitarian reasons (for example if delay would cause great hardship). We would need to be notified of the number of visas issued by them as they were issued. This procedure would not eliminate the risk of adverse Iraqi reaction but it would keep the question under very close review.

14. If you agree with the above view, we should be glad of your authority to put it to other Departments concerned. You might wish to discuss the question with other Ministers.

(J.W.C. Gumes)
Acting First Assistant Secretary
Division IV.

AF/ME Branch
J.M.Kirtley:ga

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE No

DATE 1st August, 1969.

SUBJECT

IRAQ ISSUE

FOR Mr. ~~Donn~~

M. Kerley

As discussed.

Pls. incorporate these points in a redraft which should be cleared with Dr. Lyons before it reaching Houston. There will be a full read week.

The idea is to put on equal note of Ministers pointing out it risks and - subject to it making decisions - suggesting the in your view on request papers to people with family connections here and possibly the handshake means for approved migrants. B.S.T. would be for the meeting & lay down suggested grounds for the Minister.

With reference to your draft submission, we have had a close further check of both the trade and civil aviation references in conjunction with the Departments concerned.

2. We suggest para. 9, concerning trade, might be reproduced as follows:-

+ Australia's exports to Iraq amounted to about \$2 million in 1968/69, comprising mainly cheese and wool. Iraq is an extremely valuable market for a leading Australian cheese manufacturer. Wheat exports were also important in 1966/67 and 1967/68. Following the "June War" of 1967, Iraq placed an embargo on trade with countries which did not support the Arab cause in the United Nations and this, of course, included Australia. But as a result of representations made by the Australian Trade Commissioner, Beirut, in November 1967, this embargo on trade with this country was lifted. However, should Iraq have further cause for criticism of Australia's policy, we could well expect a disruption of trade involved again *PK*

3. Para. 10, concerning civil aviation, is redrafted as follows:-

Y "The position with civil aviation is that the Australian Government already has its problems with Iraq. Notwithstanding its signature of the International Air Transit Agreement, which gives other signatories overflight rights across its territory, Iraq continues to deny Qantas permission to overfly its territory. This attitude appears to be based on political considerations and further strain on relations between Australia and Iraq could be expected to reduce further whatever prospect there may be of Qantas obtaining permission to overfly. We have several civil aviation problems in the Middle East at present - particularly with Iran and Syria - and adding to difficulties with Iraq could weaken our bargaining position with these other countries."

H. Marshall
H. Marshall

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No.

DATE

SUBJECT

*Middle East.**Mr. Mansfield.*
FOR

Glad of your early views on this draft submission as it might affect trade and civil aviation. Your branch has been consulted at working level, but perhaps paras 9-10 would need further checking with Trade and D.C.A.

A main factor is of course the P.M.'s interest in helping Iraqi Jewish people.

I don't think Iraqis can estimate the number of Jews the right hand to be greater, but the point does affect the general problem.

OK
3/13

Mr. Hickey

It is a matter of letting T.I. & C.A. know what is now proposed, and seeing that the positions in their respective fields are adequately set out herein. Ed
you check please and preferably by 1/8.
Hm 3/17

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BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION
CANBERRA 2600

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT

69/7599.

CANBERRA, A.C.T.

4 August, 1969.

4 AUG 1969

Mr H. Dunn,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T. 2600.

With the Compliments

of the

Secretary

Prime Minister's Department

r, received on 24 July,
alia. We now have guidance
alth Office in London, who
British Ambassador in Baghdad.

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would impede the Embassy's processing of immigration in
some way. It would therefore be preferable that
information about facilities outside Iraq, e.g. in Beirut,
should reach prospective emigrants by less direct means.
Their sponsoring relatives in Australia could in correspondence
advise them, when their application to emigrate is approved,
to make their way to Beirut.

So much for non-Jewish Iraqi emigrants. As for
Iraqi Jews, however, the Embassy comments that the
proposal to issue travel documents to them outside Iraq
is unlikely to help. The Embassy states that they have

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

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*This would be
needed by the consuls,
and our post would
be obvious.*

CONFIDENTIAL



Telephone 7-2244
Telephone 70422

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION
CANBERRA 2600

18/101

4 August, 1969.

Dear Sir,

I refer to your letter, received on 24 July, about Iraqi migrants to Australia. We now have guidance from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, who obtained the comments of the British Ambassador in Baghdad.

We confirm that considerable numbers of non-Jewish Iraqis are able to travel abroad using passports whose validity is restricted to Arab countries. This is the standard validity given to Iraqi passports, though it may be extended in special cases. The possibility of leaving Iraq without too much trouble, ostensibly to visit an Arab country, has in the past been used by would-be emigrants to Canada and Australia whom the British Embassy has processed for immigration but to whom they were unable to issue visas because their passports were not valid for the country of immigration. Until recently they were able to arrange validation outside Iraq and could then be granted immigration visas. Although the British Embassy has not yet suffered any embarrassment from the part they have played, it is certainly possible that the Iraqis would object if they learned that we were advising people how to avoid their Government's travel restrictions, and would impede the Embassy's processing of immigration in some way. It would therefore be preferable that information about facilities outside Iraq, e.g. in Beirut, should reach prospective emigrants by less direct means. Their sponsoring relatives in Australia could in correspondence advise them, when their application to emigrate is approved, to make their way to Beirut.

*This would be
ready to consider,
and our part would
be obvious.*

So much for non-Jewish Iraqi emigrants. As for Iraqi Jews, however, the Embassy comments that the proposal to issue travel documents to them outside Iraq is unlikely to help. The Embassy states that they have

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

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had a report confirming that the Iraqi authorities will not allow Jews to emigrate. It seems virtually certain therefore that they will continue to be denied permission even for visits to neighbouring countries. The Embassy goes on to comment that the reports of Iraqi Jews applying for passports in considerable numbers seem well-founded, but that the Jews must have misinterpreted the relaxation of restrictions on Iraqi Jews internally as willingness to let them leave.

Yours faithfully,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'M. Reith'.

(M. REITH)

CONFIDENTIAL

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PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT

CANBERRA, A.C.T.

25 JUL 1969

Mr H. Dunn,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T. 2600.

With the Compliments

of the

Secretary

Prime Minister's Department

to you concerning a letter
er for External Affairs on 5
ppointment as Governor-General.
ich I attach, was written by
of the Executive Council of
pressed concern for people of the
untries. I should be grateful if
llowing reply from me to the Council
l remain confidential in view of the

The Australian Government shares the
that Jewish minorities should not be
subject to persecution wherever they may be and will lend its
support to any necessary efforts to relieve their difficulties.
It was in this spirit that I wrote to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations in February 1969 expressing the deep
concern of the Australian Government at the trials and mass
executions of those persons, including Jews accused of
espionage. The Council may be assured that the Government
will remain sensitive to any measures taken against Jewish
people which infringe human rights or offend human dignity.

The Australian Government is at present pursuing
efforts to assist the Jewish community in Iraq. In particular
its Australian representatives have been instructed to maintain
a close liaison with a number of international agencies on
this matter. A fundamental and immediate objective is to
make endeavours to secure a relaxation of the Iraqi Government's
policy of refusing exit visas to members of the Jewish
community. It is desirable to this end that we avoid highly
publicized efforts which might be counter-productive, as it
is important that efforts to alleviate the suffering of the
Jewish community do not have the opposite effect of complicating

.../2

(39)

Dear Mr. Aston,

I am writing to you concerning a letter addressed to the Minister for External Affairs on 5 February prior to his appointment as Governor-General. The letter, a copy of which I attach, was written by Mr. Goldstein on behalf of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry and expressed concern for people of the Jewish faith in Arab Countries. I should be grateful if you would pass on the following reply from me to the Council which I would ask should remain confidential in view of the delicacy of the matter.

As you know the Australian Government shares the concern of the Council that Jewish minorities should not be subject to persecution wherever they may be and will lend its support to any necessary efforts to relieve their difficulties. It was in this spirit that I wrote to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in February 1969 expressing the deep concern of the Australian Government at the trials and mass executions of those persons, including Jews accused of espionage. The Council may be assured that the Government will remain sensitive to any measures taken against Jewish people which infringe human rights or offend human dignity.

The Australian Government is at present pursuing efforts to assist the Jewish community in Iraq. In particular its Australian representatives have been instructed to maintain a close liaison with a number of international agencies on this matter. A fundamental and immediate objective is to make endeavours to secure a relaxation of the Iraqi Government's policy of refusing exit visas to members of the Jewish community. It is desirable to this end that we avoid highly publicized efforts which might be counter-productive, as it is important that efforts to alleviate the suffering of the Jewish community do not have the opposite effect of complicating

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their lives further. At the same time as efforts are being made internationally the Government has alerted its Immigration authorities so that preparations can be made to receive migrant members of the Jewish community in the event of a change of Iraqi Government policy on exit visas.

The Council may also be interested to know that the Australian Government has asked that the British Embassy facilitate the processing of migrant applications and to have, on an official visit, a migration officer to render assistance for this purpose.

Yours sincerely,

(J. G. GORTON)

The Honourable W.J. Aston, M.P.,
Speaker,
House of Representatives,
Parliament House,
CANBERRA. A.C.T. 2600.

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PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT

69/7599

CANBERRA. A.C.T.

115 AUG 1969

Mr H. Dunne,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T. 2600.

With the Compliments

of the

Secretary

Prime Minister's Department

by Prime Minister of Iraq
(the Minister most concerned
) , outlined Government policy
24 July, 1969 in a formal
for in Baghdad, at which the
stry of Foreign Affairs was

ned his Government's refusal
cause -
d induce them to move to

permitting Iraqi Jews to
Israel the pretext to
Arab Jews in addition to

head and Iraq would do
en Israel in the meantime.

Iraq's point of view is
tion Organisation and of
hat a multi-racial "Palestine"
of Israel. General Ammash
d recently been improving the
g. He claimed that there is

no discrimination in Iraq, indeed that Jews had no desire to
depart, and that they are opposed to Zionism.

General Ammash added that his Government also could
not permit the emigration of professional people and those
with technical knowledge needed for economic and social
development.

(On 13 May 1969 the Iraq Government cancelled
regulations of 1963 which had permitted Jews to go abroad
for limited periods for such purposes as education,
medical care, etc.)

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General Ammash, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and Minister of the Interior (the Minister most concerned with the emigration question), outlined Government policy on the emigration of Jews on 24 July, 1969 in a formal conversation with an Ambassador in Baghdad, at which the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was present.

General Ammash explained his Government's refusal to allow Jewish emigration because -

- (a) Zionists outside would induce them to move to Israel;
- (b) It is now felt that permitting Iraqi Jews to emigrate would give Israel the pretext to claim it represents Arab Jews in addition to European Jews;
- (c) A long struggle lay ahead and Iraq would do nothing to strengthen Israel in the meantime.

In this context he added that Iraq's point of view is "that of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and of all progressive forces" and that a multi-racial "Palestine" must be established in place of Israel. General Ammash stated that his Government had recently been improving the conditions of Jews within Iraq. He claimed that there is no discrimination in Iraq, indeed that Jews had no desire to depart, and that they are opposed to Zionism.

General Ammash added that his Government also could not permit the emigration of professional people and those with technical knowledge needed for economic and social development.

(On 13 May 1969 the Iraq Government cancelled regulations of 1963 which had permitted Jews to go abroad for limited periods for such purposes as education, medical care, etc.)

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

BML

27.7.69

FROM

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT

I.75298

TOD 26.1450 LT

TOR 27.0240 LT

734

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 734.

FOR IMMIGRATION FROM HAWTON.

MIGRATION FROM IRAQ.

YOUR 459 REFERS.

YOUR REFERENCE IN PARAGRAPH FOUR TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM BRITISH EMBASSY BAGHDAD TO VICE CONSUL, KUWAIT (OUR 687 GIVEN AS REFERENCE) IS NOT UNDERSTOOD. ANY COMMENT MADE IN MY 687 REFERS TO OPINIONS AND ACTION OF BRITISH EMBASSY KUWAIT ONLY. WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPH FIVE OF YOUR MESSAGE THE NECESSITY TO REFER DETAILS OF EACH CASE TO CANBERRA FOR DECISION ABOUT USE OF SEPARATE TRAVEL DOCUMENT MAY CAUSE HARDSHIP IN SOME CASES WHERE LIMITED FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE TO MEET LIVING COSTS IN BEIRUT PENDING A DECISION. IS IT POSSIBLE PERHAPS FOR A POST DECISION TO BE MADE WHERE COMPASSIONATE CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST TO ENABLE REJOINING IMMEDIATE FAMILY UNITS AND REFER OTHER CASES BUT USING CABLE FACILITIES WHERE ANY HARDSHIP IS INVOLVED.

IMMIGRATION
E.A.
DCO
P.M.'S

Note

*This is source of
idea - Charles
of Immigration
Unit's ref. 115.*

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

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MJP

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23/7/69

23.2245 LT

TO

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT

459 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

FROM IMMIGRATION

FURTHER MY NO 447 : MIGRATION FROM IRAQ

FROM YOUR RECENT TELEGRAMS AND REPORTS WE CANNOT NECESSARILY ASSUME THAT MIGRANTS APPROVED IN BAGHDAD ARE UNABLE TO OBTAIN AUSTRALIAN ENDORSEMENTS IN IRAQ OR THAT THOSE WHO TRAVEL TO ADJOINING COUNTRIES (IN PARTICULAR THE LEBANON AND KUWAIT) WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SECURE EXTENSION OF VALIDITY FROM LOCAL IRAQI REPRESENTATIVE.

2. SHOULD APPROVED IRAQI MIGRANT PRESENT VALID PASSPORT WITH AUSTRALIAN ENDORSEMENT EITHER AT BAGHDAD OR IN ADJOINING COUNTRIES (AT BEIRUT OR KUWAIT), VISA MAY BE ISSUED SUBJECT TO SATISFACTORY IDENTIFICATION.

3. IN THE EVENT THAT APPROVED MIGRANT APPLIES FOR VISA AT BEIRUT OR KUWAIT WITH PASSPORT NOT ENDORSED FOR TRAVEL TO AUSTRALIA WE WOULD, PROVIDED PASSPORT WAS VALID AND SPECIFICALLY DID NOT EXCLUDE AUSTRALIA FROM ITS VALIDITY (OR WAS NOT ENDORSED 'NOT VALID FOR EMIGRATION'), WISH TO CONSIDER ISSUING VISA ON A SEPARATE TRAVEL DOCUMENT (AFFIDAVIT OF IDENTITY).

4. IN VIEW OF BRITISH EMBASSY, BAGHDAD INSTRUCTIONS TO VICE CONSUL, KUWAIT (YOUR 687), IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO CONSIDER CONFINING SEPARATE TRAVEL DOCUMENT PROCEDURE TO APPLICATIONS MADE ONLY TO AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, BEIRUT OR TO OTHER AUSTRALIAN POSTS IN THE AREA.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTWARD₂CABLEGRAM

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5. THE PROPOSED USE OF THE SEPARATE TRAVEL DOCUMENT PROCEDURE IS STILL SUBJECT TO CONSIDERATION.
WOULD YOU SEE ANY PRACTICAL DIFFICULTY TO IT BEING SUBJECT FIRST TO REFERENCE OF DETAIL OF EACH CASE TO CANBERRA FOR PRIOR CONSIDERATION AND APPROVAL (I.E. IN TERMS OF COMPASSIONATE CIRCUMSTANCES BASED ON FAMILY RELATIONSHIP ETCETERA)?

6. VIEWS OF BRITISH EMBASSY, BAGHDAD ARE BEING SOUGHT SEPARATELY.

WE WOULD NOT IN ANY EVENT PROPOSE TO INTRODUCE SEPARATE TRAVEL DOCUMENT PROCEDURE FOR APPLICANTS AT BAGHDAD.

IMMIGRATION
D.C.O.
P.M.'S

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PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT

TELEPHONE 71411
IN REPLY QUOTE

CANBERRA, A.C.T.

The Counsellor (Head of Chancery),
British High Commission,
CANBERRA. A.C.T. 2600.

IRAQI MIGRANTS TO AUSTRALIA

I should be grateful if you could help to clarify the situation of persons in Iraq who wish to migrate to Australia. Since the Australian Migration Officer who visited your Embassy in Baghdad returned the situation concerning Iraqis wishing to migrate to Australia has become less clear. I should like therefore to set out the situation as we see it and seek any comment or additional information which you may be able to glean on recent developments.

The Israeli Ambassador in Australia recently mentioned privately that some 1500 Jews have registered under procedures laid down by the Iraqi Government for would-be emigrants. The Ambassador believes that they are now apprehensive that their registration may be used against them by the authorities as proof of their disloyalty to the Government. Our impression is that, though certain migrants obtain documents validated for Australia, they gain validation by irregular means and few, if any, are Jews.

Until recently, however, Iraqis including Jews, who obtained passports validated for Arab countries only were able, after leaving Iraq, to obtain extended validation for Australia through local Iraqi Missions. Iraqi Missions in Beirut and Kuwait were used in this way. We have now heard that this procedure has become difficult though validations are being obtained in some cases by bribery. We are unable to assess whether this situation arises from a consistent tightening of procedures at Iraqi Missions.

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As you know Australia is willing to receive migrants who have family sponsorship here. Our only problem is that of documentation. Though it is not possible for us to do more for persons in Iraq it is being considered here whether we could issue a visa as a separate document, provided that the migrant has in his possession a valid passport which does not specifically exclude Australia in its validity. Your assessment of any reaction by the Iraqi Government to this procedure - should it become known in Baghdad - would be useful.

Our consideration of this step has been hastened by information that the Government of Iraq has lifted all restrictions on travel to the Lebanon and other Arab countries and according to press reports up to 33,000 Iraqi tourists are expected to visit Beirut in the next few weeks. We understand that the United States and Canada are already issuing visas according to a procedure similar to that under consideration. They require only that the passport be valid.

(C. L. Hewitt)
Secretary

*Will read from Mr. Charles. (Immigration).
Mr. Kistler. His first opinion on relevant files.
4/25/71*

IRAQI MIGRANTS - VISA ISSUE IN THE LEBANON

United States of America:

The US Consul in Beirut will place an immigrant visa in an Iraqi travel document provided it is a valid passport, even though the USA was not specified in its geographical validity or if it specifically stated that it was not valid for emigration. The US authorities take the view that the immigrant is severing ties with his former homeland and, provided he had a valid travel document, the US Service was prepared to place an immigrant visa in it.

Canada:

The Canadian Immigration Office in Beirut accepts foreign passports provided they are unexpired as to date and validity. For example, if an Iraqi passport limited the holder to travel only in Arab countries, this would be acceptable from the Canadian point of view for travel to Canada provided it was unexpired as to time. The Canadians in any event place their visa on a separate document issued by their office and in practice may not sight the applicant's passport, as many of the visaed documents are sent by post.

United Kingdom:

The British authorities will only in special circumstances and on instructions from the Home authorities place a visa in a passport not having geographical validity of the United Kingdom. A separate form of affidavit normally is used only where a suitable travel document is not available.

New Zealand:


In line with the British practice.

Switzerland:

The Swiss authorities will not issue a visa in a passport not valid for travel to Switzerland, nor on a separate document.

..oOo..

Department of Immigration,
22nd July, 1969.



Mr. K. E. J. M. L.
Iraq.

Charles (Lombard) is sending a telegram saying that approved Iraqi migrants can have visas issued in passports valid for Australia (implicitly - we would not give valid visas on request than has obtained by bribery or forgery.) He is also saying that he is considering putting visas on separate paper when passports are not specifically made invalid for Australia. He shall, on the basis of the telegram, and Trade and D.C. A. for a formal statement of their interests in Iraq; it will remain for us to judge the ~~political~~ likelihood of these interests being affected if the Iraqi govt. were annoyed about our issuing visas in the way (assuming they read it.).

Hooton is making more inquiries though the UKHC about the present application of the laws against fraud. I had ~~some~~ relations with Iraq were directly our business, but agreed to ~~it~~ enquiring on the way as the question would affect our relations with the UK. and the UK. ~~fact it is.~~ No 24/5

Note passed to Iraqi Embassy London
on 10th June, asking them to reconsider
refusal to allow Qantas airport
To date no Reply

It is intended that if the
Situation does not improve that we
will send an C-4 aircraft to Iraq
to talk to them about civil
aviation problems.

IRAQI REFUSAL TO ALLOW QANTAS OVERFLIGHTS

MR. SHANN

c.c. Dr. Cumes
✓ Mr. Connolly

in Kelly

....

I am attaching a copy of a minute by Mr. Miles Connolly on the question of Iraq/Australia air services. The examination contained in the minute has been prompted by the refusal of the Iraqi authorities to grant Qantas overflights of that country.

2. I am suggesting to D.C.A. that the next step might be for a further note to be sent to the Iraqis through London, arguing our request on the basis of the provisions of the International Air Services Transit Agreement, to which both countries are parties. I am sanguine that this further approach will produce the desired result. However, it would put the ball back into the Iraqi court and could serve as a pretext for a visit by an External Affairs officer to Baghdad if this were later judged to be desirable.

D.C.A. are being requested to draft an appropriate note for clearance with us.

B

(L. Corkery)

cc Connolly.

CONFIDENTIAL

DMC/bz

6th May, 1969

IRAQI REFUSAL TO ALLOW QANTAS OVERFLIGHTS

MR. CORKERY

Background:

Qantas flights to Europe on the "Kangaroo Route" have always crossed the Middle East (except during times of serious conflict) using the airspace of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.

2. Until 31st August, 1967, Qantas understood that it had landing and transit rights through Iraqi territory by virtue of an annual licence which had been re-issued annually since 1949 by the Iraqi authorities. Qantas had used landing rights at Basra up to 1949, and agreed to the renewal of the licence believing landing rights in Iraq would be a long-term proposition. However, the licence was not renewed after August, 1967, and D.C.A. did not make representations.

3. The Iraqi authorities, although desiring a formal bilateral agreement, were evidently satisfied with the annual licence arrangement. They appear to have interpreted it to mean that a formal agreement would be signed if either party expressed the desire to establish an air link between the two countries. D.C.A. never expressed disagreement with this interpretation, although no attempt was ever made to discuss the matter with the Iraqis. As both countries were signatories to the International Air Services Transit Agreement, signed at Chicago between 1944 and 1946, D.C.A. always believed that we had the freedom to fly across Iraqi airspace and to make technical landings if necessary.

4. These varying interpretations were tested during 1968 when on two occasions Qantas planes crossed Iraqi territory. A protest note was subsequently lodged with the Australian High Commission, London.

5. Our reply Note to the Iranians informed them that Qantas wished to regularise the situation and route flights across Iraq between Istanbul and Bahrain regularly (to avoid using Syrian airspace). The Iraqis were informed that such

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flights were to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the International Air Services Transit Agreement, noted earlier.

6. After two reminder notes and protracted delays, the Iraqi authorities finally advised that our request for permission to overfly Iraqi airspace had not been obtained. This suggests that the Iraqis do not intend honouring the "Chicago Agreement".

7. Before acknowledging receipt of the Note, our High Commission, London, has asked us for comments and advice on whether we wish to lodge a formal protest with the Iraqi authorities.

General Considerations:

8. Australia's relations with the Arab countries in the field of aviation generally are not good. Consequently, any further deterioration must be viewed seriously. In addition to the Iraqi problem, we are faced with similar potential situations in both Syria and Iran.

- (a) Negotiations are currently being conducted with the Iranian authorities, at their request, for a revised Aviation Agreement. To date, the Iranian terms have been "completely unacceptable" to D.C.A. and Qantas, and it is quite possible that the final outcome will not be to our advantage.
- (b) Qantas overflights of Syria airspace have only been permitted on the understanding that the whole question of overflights would be reconsidered when the new Damascus airport was operational (scheduled to be opened in March, 1969). Qantas fears that the Syrians may renew an earlier demand that a certain proportion of airline flights using Syrian airspace must land at Damascus. (This was one reason why they wanted to use Iraqi airspace as an alternative, and it was this Syrian policy which caused Qantas to terminate flights via Beirut in 1955.)
- (c) We understand that other major airlines using Iraqi airspace have not been subjected to the same problem as Qantas, presumably because they already have air agreements with Iraq or are politically more acceptable.

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- (d) In the last two years, the Arab countries have made a determined effort to obtain revenue from foreign airlines in return for all concessions. Because of this, Qantas was forced to enter into a special financial arrangement with the U.A.R. or lose the use of Cairo airport.

Conclusion:

9. Although political questions do play a role in Arab attitudes to civil aviation matters, e.g. the threats made when Qantas was considering opening an office in Tel Aviv, there is insufficient evidence to link the current Iraqi problems with politics.

10. The Department of Civil Aviation suspect that the Iraqis are merely trying to obtain some financial advantage from Australia in return for the concession we have requested.

Recommendations:

11. We could arrange for a further note to be sent to the Iraqi authorities through our High Commission, London, in which we could ask them to reconsider their decision, in view of the fact that both countries are signatories to the International Air Services Transit Agreement.

12. On the presumption that this will fail to elicit the required response, D.C.A. have agreed that we consider sending a Diplomatic officer to Iraq to find out exactly what the Iraqis want. In 1967, Qantas tried to send its representative in Beirut but they refused to speak to anyone not representing the Australian Government. Mr. Peter Henderson, the Counsellor at the High Commission in London, might be visiting Beirut officially during June, 1969, and it may be possible for him and an officer from D.C.A. to visit Iraq. There is no possibility in the immediate future of sending an officer from either Beirut or Cairo for staffing reasons, and sending an officer from Iraq would probably not be wise due to the current poor relations between Iran and Iraq.

13. In 1965, the Iraqi authorities wanted to send a delegation to Australia, to discuss an Aviation Agreement. At that stage, neither Qantas nor D.C.A. were interested and the visit was post-


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poned indefinitely. If it is decided that an officer should visit Baghdad, his negotiating position would be circumscribed by the fact that D.C.A. does not want to negotiate with Iraq, but merely wants to have Qantas flights across Iraq approved while giving nothing in return. If it is agreed that an officer should be sent to Baghdad, an understanding will have to be reached with D.C.A. on exactly what can be fruitfully discussed.

14. If the problem is not satisfactorily settled after discussion with the Iraqi authorities, we could take it to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for consideration. D.C.A., however, are not in favour of this course of action.

15. In view of the growing possibility that the Qantas "Kangaroo Route" to Europe could be seriously interrupted in the Middle East area, the need for Australia to actively explore an alternative route via Russia is becoming essential.


(D. Miles Connolly)

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No. _____

DATE _____

SUBJECT

Mr Owen
FORSee record of
conversation Ames/
Hatt below.

If in fact Iraqi
Jews can now register
for emigration, the
picture is altered,
depending on whether
the main concern of
the Iraqis is to permit
them to depart or to
encourage them to
expose themselves to
hostile action from
the authorities.

I don't see anything
which we could effectively
do to test this, or to
influence the Iraq
Govt. We could observe,
however, whether or not
these new facilities for
emigration are genuine.
It is something which
Mr Owen should definitely
be able to advise on.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

NMS

I.70576

16/7/69

TOD 14.1400LT

FROM

TOR 15.0150LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT

687 CONFIDENTIAL

FOR IMMIGRATION FROM HAWTON

MIGRATION FROM IRAQ

A COMMUNICATION RECEIVED TODAY FROM THE BRITISH VICE CONSUL KUWAIT OUTLINES SIMILAR DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING AUSTRALIA ADDED TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL VALIDITY OF IRAQ PASSPORTS BY PROSPECTIVE MIGRANTS PRESENTING FOR VISA ISSUE THERE.

HE SAID STANDARD ENDORSEMENT IS FOR ARAB COUNTRIES AND KUWAIT ONLY.

HE IS INFORMING SUCH PEOPLE TO HAVE THEIR PASSPORTS MADE VALID FOR AUSTRALIA BUT IS CONVINCED IT IS OBTAINED IN MANY CASES BY BRIBERY AND IN OTHERS THAT PEOPLE WRITE IT IN THEMSELVES.

THE EMBASSY IS INSISTING ENDORSEMENT HAD TO BE MADE VALID BY IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

THE SUMS INVOLVED IN BRIBERY TRANSFORMATIONS ARE QUITE LARGE HE SAYS AND INVOLVES PROSPECTIVE MIGRANTS IN CONSIDERABLE HARDSHIP.

HE HAS ASKED WHETHER IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE NECESSITY TO HAVE AUSTRALIA ENDORSED IN THESE PASSPORTS COULD BE WAIVED WHILE THE SITUATION IS AS IT IS.

HE HAS FURTHER COMMENTED THAT FROM HIS EXPERIENCE IRAQI AUTHORITIES ARE VERY STRICT LIMITING GEOGRAPHICAL VALIDITY TO ARAB STATES ONLY AND THAT ESPECIALLY THIS APPLIES TO YOUNG MEN AND IRAQ IS NOT OF MOHAMMEDAN RELIGION OR ARAB STOCK WHICH COVERS MAJORITY OF OUR PROSPECTIVE MIGRANTS HE SAYS.

WOMEN DO NOT SEEM TO BE AFFECTED HE SAYS.

A REPORT APPEARING IN BEIRUT ENGLISH NEWSPAPER OF 12TH JULY SAID TO HAVE BEEN RECEIVED THROUGH LEBANESE EMBASSY IN BAGDAD STATES IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS LIFTED ALL RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL TO LEBANON AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AND RETAINED THE RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL TO EUROPE.

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

MB

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1.70576

REPORT GOES ON TO SAY THAT 33,000 IRAQI TOURISTS ARE EXPECTED TO INFRINGE INTO BEIRUT. MAYBE IN NEXT FEW WEEKS ESPECIALLY AS IRAQI AIRWAYS HAS OFFERED SPECIAL FACILITIES CUTTING BAGDAD TO BEIRUT FARES BY ONE THIRD FOR PASSENGERS STAYING IN LEBANON FOR ONE MONTH.

IT CAN BE ANTICIPATED THAT MORE INTENDING MIGRANTS WILL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS SITUATION TO TRAVEL TO BEIRUT AND PROBABLY KUWAIT ALSO FOR MIGRANT VISA ISSUE.

IMMIGRATION
D.C.O.
P.M.'S

FAS(4) EAMEC AFME C AND P

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No. _____
DATE _____

SUBJECT

Migration from Iraq.

Mr. H. H. H. H.

FOR

We have, I think, a political interest in not disturbing our relations with Iraq on this question until it is unavoidable (other Arabs would also react). And we don't want to involve the British more than we have to, for the sake of their relations with Iraq. So we have to concern ourselves with the problem of documents.

If migrants get any documents signed by Owen, they would be found at the airport. Immigration would have to devise some means of completing documentation in Iraq, sending it to Beirut, and identifying the person concerned there. Moreover once they are on their way, they would be hard to find and publicity and the Iraqis would presumably stop future arrivals. Therefore, if we want to get any migrants out, they should all be processed before any stand is made.

Please consider whether there are any more points for us to raise and speak. Let's discuss with Dr. Lewis.

H. H. H. H.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No. _____

DATE _____

SUBJECT

① MR ~~THOMAS~~
 ② MR BEATTIE
 Conf/Plas

This question is
 under study with
 Immigration

Limitations on validity of
 passports seem to me in
 this case to be a matter
 of primary concern to the
 issuing authorities in
 Iraq. We are under no
 obligation to be bound
 by these limitations as to
 regard an Iraqi passport
 as invalid for travel to
 Australia just because
 the issuing authorities
 say it is.

I see no objection to
 the issue of visas to Iraqi
 applicants in Iran; but
 I do not see how the
 technical problem can be
 overcome if satisfactorily
 identifying eligible Iraqis
 particularly when these
 are unable to have Iraq
 safely in possession of the
 necessary documentation
 to obtain an Australian
 visa. This is essentially ^{for immigration} ~~for immigration~~
 Iran/Iraq relations are
 having a difficult patch at
 present. Iraqis could have
 trouble entering Iran. It might
 would be better. Must,

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

CD

I. 54502

29/6/69

TOR 27.1515 LT

FROM

TOR 28.0544 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT

629 CONFIDENTIAL

FOR IMMIGRATION.

FROM HILTON.

MIGRATION FROM IRAQ.

OWEN REPORTS FROM BAGHDAD THAT IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR NATIONALS TO HAVE PASSPORTS VALIDATED FOR AUSTRALIA AND THAT EARLIER VALIDATIONS FOR OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES ARE REMOVED WHEN THE PASSPORT IS PRESENTED FOR PAYMENT OF THE TEN DINARS TAX MENTIONED IN MY 557.

OWEN STATES ALSO THAT WELL QUALIFIED PERSONS (NOT SPECIFIED) NEEDED FOR EMPLOYMENT IN IRAQ ARE REQUIRED TO POST A 5,000 DINAR BOND TO GUARANTEE RETURN FROM ABROAD.

BRITISH EMBASSY ADVISED OWEN THEY FEEL THAT TRAVELLERS COULD BE DETAINED AT PASSPORT CONTROL IF A MIGRANT VISA, IS INSCRIBED IN A PASSPORT AND THAT PERSONAL CENSORSHIP APPLIES TO PERSONS LEAVING IRAQ AND POSSESSION OF A SEPARATE LETTER OF AUTHORITY WOULD BE AN OFFENCE.

ALSO THE BRITISH FEEL THEY COULD BE EMBARRASSED IF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT THOUGHT THE EMBASSY WERE ACTING TO CIRCUMVENT ITS WISHES.

IT SEEMS THAT THE ONLY METHOD TO GIVE VISA FACILITIES TO THESE MIGRANTS IS TO ISSUE VISA IN BEIRUT ON PRODUCTION OF TRAVEL DOCUMENTS VALIDATED FOR TRAVEL TO AUSTRALIA OR ON SEPARATE DOCUMENT IF VALIDATION IS NOT ~~SEEN~~ POSSIBLE.

IMMIGRATION
A.S.I.O. (C-M)
D.C.O.
P.M.'S

FAS(4) | EAMEC SEC E AFME C AND P ICR PIO
LONDON

W. John Hurley
over
drag
drag

I spoke to Mr. Treckalfe (Immigration) who thought that in view of the Prime Minister's interest in this matter, they would probably be prepared to alter the regulations which are that passports must be valid for Australia before a visa is issued. He is thinking along the lines of having full documentation completed in Iran and providing passport does not specifically exclude Australia visa could be issued in a country outside Iran. One has been asked for their comment also - would we have any objection to this method.
L. Heath C+P.

CONFIDEN

16th July, 1969.

IMMIGRATION FROM IRAQ

MR KATLEY

*Dr. Arab.
for information
at this stage.
No 16/7*

Charles (Immigration) rang on 16th July about the question of inscribing Australian visas in Iraqi passports not valid for travel to Australia. The UK, New Zealand, and Switzerland will not do so, but Canada is more relaxed and the US takes the view that persons who have left their original homeland and seek to emigrate elsewhere have already severed the connection with their homeland and, if eligible, can get visas on any travel document. Hooton (P.M.'s) thinks this a rational approach. There is the added consideration that Iraqi Jews who have managed to leave Iraq have presumably completely cut themselves off from that country.

2. Charles asked for our view on the possibility of issuing Australian visas in Beirut to Iraqis whose passports were not valid for travel to Australia. How would such a decision affect our relations with Iraq (and possibly other Arab countries)?

3. Please discuss the possible trade and civil aviation repercussions with appropriate sections and other Departments. I doubt if the UAR, Lebanon or other Arab countries would make an issue of the matter unless stimulated by Iraq (and possibly not even then). The main problem might be overflights and landing rights in the UAR if Egypt thought it must make some show of sympathy with Iraq.

4. The main question therefore may be whether the Iraqis would in practice be so disturbed by our admitting people-whom it probably would know would not return if they were allowed to leave-that they would by deliberate act cut off our trade and overflights.

(H.A. Dunn)
Acting Assistant Secretary

EAM/EC
HAD/kf

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

9/173/10/1

MB

I.70930

17/7/69

TOD 15.1520 LT

FROM

TOR 16.0445 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT

698 SECRET

AUSTRALIAN RELATIONS WITH IRAQ.

YOU WILL HAVE SEEN SENIOR MIGRATION OFFICER'S TELEGRAM 687 OF 14TH JULY TO THIS DEPARTMENT IN WHICH HE IS SUGGESTING THAT VISAS BE GRANTED TO INTENDING MIGRANTS FROM IRAQ EVEN THOUGH IRAQI AUTHORITIES MAY HAVE REFUSED TO ENDORSE RELEVANT PASSPORTS AS VALID FOR TRAVEL TO AUSTRALIA. TO DO THIS WOULD, OF COURSE, BE TO ACT AGAINST THE IMPLIED WISHES OF IRAQI AUTHORITIES IN A MATTER AFFECTING IRAQI NATIONALS.

- (1) ASSUME THAT BEFORE ANY DECISION IS MADE ON SENIOR MIGRATION OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATION THE ADVANTAGES THAT WOULD ACCRUE TO MIGRATION PROGRAMME WILL HAVE BEEN BALANCED AGAINST THE POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES TO OUR POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL RELATION WITH IRAQ SHOULD IRAQIS OBJECT TO OUR TAKING SUCH ACTION.

2. THERE IS PERHAPS NOT A GREAT DEAL TO LOSE ON POLITICAL LEVEL. I TOLD YOU IN MY MEMORANDUM NUMBER 180 OF 22ND MAY 1969 OF UNFAVOURABLE POSITION WE EARNED IN IRAQI ESTIMATION BY OUR VOTING AT SPECIAL UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEETING IN JUNE AND JULY 1967.

3. IN TRADE THERE IS MORE TO BE LOST. THE TRADE COMMISSIONER HAS TOLD ME THAT ANNUAL VALUE OF AUSTRALIAN TRADE WITH IRAQ IS BETWEEN DOLLARS 6 MILLION AND DOLLARS 10 MILLION. BRITISH AND UNITED STATES GOODS HAVE BEEN BANNED FROM IRAQ SINCE 1967 AND THIS HAS PROVIDED AUSTRALIA WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPAND HER OWN TRADE THERE. IT ALSO SHOWS, HOWEVER, THAT IRAQIS ARE QUITE PREPARED, THOUGH IT MAY PROVIDE THEM WITH UNNECESSARY ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, TO RESTRICT TRADE FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

4. IN DRAWING UP A BALANCE SHEET IT MUST NOT BE OVERLOOKED THAT THERE IS A DEBIT COLUMN.

KINGSMILL.

.../2

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

- 2 -

1.70930

MIN. AND DEPT E.A.
MIN. AND DEPT DEFENCE
D.C.O.
P.M.'S

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) AS(JIC) SEA FAS(2) UN PPO FAS(3)
ER FAS(4) EAMEC AFME ICR PIO

173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

NMS

I.70576

16/7/69

TOD 14.1400LT

FROM

TOR 15.0150LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT

687 CONFIDENTIAL

FOR IMMIGRATION FROM HAWTON

MIGRATION FROM IRAQ

A COMMUNICATION RECEIVED TODAY FROM THE BRITISH VICE CONSUL KUWAIT OUTLINES SIMILAR DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING AUSTRALIA ADDED TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL VALIDITY OF IRAQ PASSPORTS BY PROSPECTIVE MIGRANTS PRESENTING FOR VISA ISSUE THERE.

HE SAID STANDARD ENDORSEMENT IS FOR ARAB COUNTRIES AND KUWAIT ONLY.

HE IS INFORMING SUCH PEOPLE TO HAVE THEIR PASSPORTS MADE VALID FOR AUSTRALIA BUT IS CONVINCED IT IS OBTAINED IN MANY CASES BY BRIBERY AND IN OTHERS THAT PEOPLE WRITE IT IN THEMSELVES.

THE EMBASSY IS INSISTING ENDORSEMENT HAD TO BE MADE VALID BY IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

THE SUMS INVOLVED IN BRIBERY TRANSFORMATIONS ARE QUITE LARGE HE SAYS AND INVOLVES PROSPECTIVE MIGRANTS IN CONSIDERABLE HARDSHIP.

HE HAS ASKED WHETHER IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE NECESSITY TO HAVE AUSTRALIA ENDORSED IN THESE PASSPORTS COULD BE WAIVED WHILE THE SITUATION IS AS IT IS.

HE HAS FURTHER COMMENTED THAT FROM HIS EXPERIENCE IRAQI AUTHORITIES ARE VERY STRICT LIMITING GEOGRAPHICAL VALIDITY TO ARAB STATES ONLY AND THAT ESPECIALLY THIS APPLIES TO YOUNG MEN AND IRAQ IS NOT OF MOHAMMEDAN RELIGION OR ARAB STOCK WHICH COVERS MAJORITY OF OUR PROSPECTIVE MIGRANTS HE SAYS.

WOMEN DO NOT SEEM TO BE AFFECTED HE SAYS.

A REPORT APPEARING IN BEIRUT ENGLISH NEWSPAPER OF 12TH JULY SAID TO HAVE BEEN RECEIVED THROUGH LEBANESE EMBASSY IN BAGDAD STATES IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS LIFTED ALL RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL TO LEBANON AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AND RETAINED THE RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL TO EUROPE.

../2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

MB

- 2 -

1.70576

REPORT GOES ONTO SAY THAT 33,000 IRAQI TOURISTS ARE EXPECTED TO INFRINGE INTO BEIRUT. MAYBE IN NEXT FEW WEEKS ESPECIALLY AS IRAQI AIRWAYS HAS OFFERED SPECIAL FACILITIES CUTTING BAGDAD TO BEIRUT FARES BY ONE THIRD FOR PASSENGERS STAYING IN LEBANON FOR ONE MONTH.

IT CAN BE ANTICIPATED THAT MORE INTENDING MIGRANTS WILL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS SITUATION TO TRAVEL TO BEIRUT AND PROBABLY KUWAIT ALSO FOR MIGRANT VISA ISSUE.

IMMIGRATION
D.C.O.
P.M.'S

FAS(4) EAMEC AFME C AND P

CONFIDENTIAL

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OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

$$\dots/2$$

Mr. Kintley. Were we connected?
It seems to me that an obvious point is that at Iraq's attention
would be drawn + suspicion of passing was done in Baghdad. 14/5

Mr. Spurr
No
Reply now in from Beirut
does something to indicate
likely difficulties involving
Iraqi authorities
Nur,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

-2-

0.54342

OF FORMS IS BEING SENT YOU BY AIR. MOVEMENT OF APPROVED
APPLICANTS WILL NOT NEED TO BE DEFERRED PENDING ASSESSMENT
OF INFORMATION ON FORMS.

MIN. & DEPT. IMMIG.
E.A.
D.C.O.
P.M'S

SEC FAS(1) FAS(2) FAS(3) FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME C & P

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

CD

I. 64502

29/6/69

TOD 27.1515 LT

FROM

TOR 28.0544 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT

629 CONFIDENTIAL

FOR IMMIGRATION.

FROM HILTON.

MIGRATION FROM IRAQ.

File 173/10/1

OWEN REPORTS FROM BAGHDAD THAT IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR NATIONALS TO HAVE PASSPORTS VALIDATED FOR AUSTRALIA AND THAT EARLIER VALIDATIONS FOR OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES ARE REMOVED WHEN THE PASSPORT IS PRESENTED FOR PAYMENT OF THE TEN DINARS TAX MENTIONED IN MY 557.

OWEN STATES ALSO THAT WELL QUALIFIED PERSONS (NOT SPECIFIED) NEEDED FOR EMPLOYMENT IN IRAQ ARE REQUIRED TO POST A 5,000 DINAR BOND TO GUARANTEE RETURN FROM ABROAD.

BRITISH EMBASSY ADVISED OWEN THEY FEEL THAT TRAVELLERS COULD BE DETAINED AT PASSPORT CONTROL IF A MIGRANT VISA, IS INSCRIBED IN A PASSPORT AND THAT PERSONAL CENSORSHIP APPLIES TO PERSONS LEAVING IRAQ AND POSSESSION OF A SEPARATED LETTER OF AUTHORITY WOULD BE AN OFFENCE.

ALSO THE BRITISH FEEL THEY COULD BE EMBARRASSED IF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT THOUGHT THE EMBASSY WERE ACTING TO CIRCUMVENT ITS WISHES.

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IMMIGRATION
A.S.I.O. (C-M)
D.C.O.
P.M.'S

FAS(4) | EAMEC SEC E AFME C AND P ICR PIO
LONDON

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
GARDEN CITY
CAIRO

In reply quote No. 262/1/3

Memorandum No. 172

27th May, 1969.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA .. A.C.T.

file 173/10/1
(original on 214/11/30)

CAIRO DIPLOMATIC CORPS: IRAQI AMBASSADOR

I am making my rounds of calls on my colleagues in Cairo and so far these have been normal and pleasant enough with one exception, Iraq.

2. The Iraqi Ambassador here is Mr. Dhiab Al Algawi who was a Major-General in the Iraq Army before taking up this appointment. Although he told me this unsolicited there was no need for him to do so since from his appearance and manner he could be nothing but a general officer.
3. He had told us in advance that he could speak nothing but Arabic (I doubt whether this is true) and insisted that we provide the interpreter. Through our interpreter he subjected me to a prolonged tirade which, by implication, was critical of Australia, laying down the standards by which the Iraqi Government would judge its relations with other governments. The main criteria were support for the Palestine refugees, support for Iraq in its struggle against Zionist imperialism, support for the Iraqi Government in its troubles with the Kurds which were solely due to incitement by the imperialist powers and support for Iraq in its just struggle against Iran over the use of the waterway at Shatt el Arab. He made it clear that Australia so far was not doing well when judged by these criteria.
4. When he turned to a discussion of the struggle with Israel his passion became quite unbridled and contrasted sharply with the rather passive self-righteousness of the UAR authorities and other Ambassadors from Arab countries whom I have called on here.
5. I am sure you are already aware of the fanaticism of the present Iraqi Government but it came as something of a surprise to me since in Geneva my Iraqi colleague was the eminent jurist Professor Yasseen with whom it was possible to discuss things in a reasonable way. My present feeling is however that the Major-General here in Cairo probably reflects much more accurately the views of the Iraqi authorities than does his colleague in Geneva.

B.C. Hill
(B. C. Hill)
Ambassador

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No.

DATE

SUBJECT

*Immigration Office for Baghdad.**Dr. Chapin*
FOR*Please see telegram below, and flagged
telegram on file.**Mr. Kirtley tells me that the member
of the Israeli Embassy said to him that
the P.M. agreed to an immigration
office in Baghdad at a recent Jewish
occasion.**Have you heard anything about it at your
level?**Given the limitation on Iraqi passports,
and the refusal of entry visas to Jews, I'm
not sure who he would do there.**MR. D. H. N.**I talked with ^{H-2}
Hooton on the phone 9/6.
this a.m. He says there is no
reference to this in latest
Jewish speech by P.M., copy of
which he is sending across.
Perhaps Mr. Subal was just
fishing. V 10/6*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

HRM

I.55847

09/6/69

TOD 05.1800 LT

FROM

TOR 06.0705 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT

557 CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 557 FOR IMMIGRATION FROM HAWTON REPEATED
CHIEF MIGRATION OFFICER, LONDON 51.

FURTHER TO MY CABLE NO 549 ABOUT ATTACHMENT OF OFFICER TO
THE BRITISH EMBASSY BAGHDAD, IT HAS BEEN ASCERTAINED FROM AN
IRAQI MIGRANT NOW IN BEIRUT, BUT UNCONFIRMED OTHERWISE, THAT THE
IRAQI GOVERNMENT ISSUED A DECREE ON 14TH MAY, 1969, CANCELLING
THE VALIDITY OF ALL IRAQI PASSPORTS IN TIME AND GEOGRAPHICAL
COVERAGE.

IT WAS SAID BY THIS SOURCE THAT PASSPORTS CAN ONLY BE
REVALIDATED AFTER APPROVAL BY THE SECURITY DEPARTMENT AND PAYMENT
OF A FEE OF 700 DINARS TO OBTAIN A STAMP APPROVING EXIT.

THIS SAME SOURCE SAID IT WAS NOW VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO
HAVE AUSTRALIA INCLUDED IN GEOGRAPHICAL VALIDITY PASSPORTS.

AMERICAN AUTHORITIES IN BEIRUT SAY THAT FOREIGN PASSPORTS
ARE ACCEPTED FOR IMMIGRANT VISAS EVEN IF A SPECIFIC EXCLUSION
IS MADE THAT THE DOCUMENT IS NOT VALID FOR EMIGRATION, AND A
RED CROSS TRAVEL DOCUMENT IS ALSO ACCEPTABLE TO THEM.

IMMIGRATION (C)
ASIO (C-M)
D.C.O.
P.M'S.

F

FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME SAS(MS) STAFF C AND P

LONDON



*Mr. Kerley: How far has the proposal been taken?
Would we accept people on Red Cross travel documents?*

8/6

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

HRM

I.55847

09/6/69

TOD 05.1800 LT

FROM

TOR 06.0705 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT

557 CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 557 FOR IMMIGRATION FROM HAWTON REPEATED
CHIEF MIGRATION OFFICER, LONDON 51.

FURTHER TO MY CABLE NO 549 ABOUT ATTACHMENT OF OFFICER TO
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IS MADE THAT THE DOCUMENT IS NOT VALID FOR EMIGRATION, AND A
RED CROSS TRAVEL DOCUMENT IS ALSO ACCEPTABLE TO THEM.

IMMIGRATION (C)
ASIO (C-M)
D.C.O.
P.M'S.

File 173/10/1

FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME SAS(MS) STAFF C AND P

LONDON

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. 173/10/1

Record of Conversation with Messrs Stephenson and Olgey of Stephenson & Turner, Architects, Melbourne (phone 266 611) on 4th June, 1969

Officers Present H.A. Dunn

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

Australians in Iraq

Mr Stephenson said that his Firm had five employees in Iraq, all located in Basra; however, the senior member of the group spent a lot of time in Bagdad. The people mainly concerned were: Mr Alex Wilkie, Mr Michael Lumsden, and Mr John Maddison, all of whom are Australians. In addition they employed a Mr Boyle, a British subject, one local Iraqi architect, drivers, etc.

2. Stephenson's firm had first started work in Iraq under the King and, in the employment of the Director of Works, had designed a series of hospitals of which one had been under construction with Stephenson and Turner as consultants. Work on this had now stopped however. The Revolutionary Committee at present appeared more interested in the defence budget than in hospitals.

3. The contractor for construction was an "official Egyptian firm". There had been suggestions that some Minister-to-Minister exchanges had taken place with the Egyptians as to whether the contracts should be terminated. Stephenson had the impression that the Egyptians might want to extract themselves from the contract.

4. Stephenson said that his employees in Iraq did not seem to be in "physical fear" but were concerned about the atmosphere in general and the pressure in regard to the work they were supposed to be doing. Conflicting instructions were given and the Iraqi Director-General of Works, whom Stephenson regarded as an "honourable man", appeared to be out of favour, possibly because he supported foreign consultants, whereas the Revolutionary Committee wanted Iraqis to do the work.

5. Under its contract with the Ministry of Works, the Australian architects received some payment in Iraq, but a proportion of their pay in Australia. They had not received any payments in Iraq since the Revolutionary Committee took over. However, they did not seem to be distressed; they

DISTRIBUTION:

Minister
Secretary
Deputy Secretary
F.A.S. Div. 1
F.A.S. Div. 2
F.A.S. Div. 3
F.A.S. Div. 4
Legal Adviser
S.A.S.M.S.

S.E.A.
D.L.
S.A.M.T.

U.N.
Pac. Am.

London
Beirut
Teheran

I.C.
E. Aid
C. & P.
I. & C.R.
Public Inf.
I. & T.

E.A.M.E.C.
E.R.

AFME

Antarctic Div.
Finance
Property
Staffing
Comms.
Sydney
Melbourne
Perth
Adelaide
Brisbane

....2.

FOLLOWING POSTS:

Report prepared by: *[Signature]*

(H.A. Dunn)

ACTION:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

were able to move to Kuwait reasonably frequently. Stephenson was reluctant to have funds transferred to them in Iraq, since this might play the Iraqi game; he preferred first to clarify what the Iraqis intended to do about the contract. If they had to transfer funds it might be time to take his employees out.

6. Stephenson said that the partners in his firm had decided that they should honour the Iraqi contract if at all possible. Their reputation in the Middle East was high, other business in Bahrain was in prospect, and they would prefer to be sacked, if necessary, rather than break the contract themselves. He had sought clarification of the present position from the Iraqi Ministry of Works and had asked that Maddison be repatriated on medical grounds (he had "cracked up" under the strain, had made a scene at a recent meeting with Iraqis, and Wilkie had recommended that he come out). Stephenson had also proposed that one of the others, who was due for furlough, should take a holiday soon. He had in mind that when this man's furlough was completed another Australian should take his furlough in turn. If the Iraqis agreed to the proposal that furlough be granted, this might be an encouraging sign. Stephenson had also written on 22nd May asking for a visa which would enable him to transit Iraq himself. If this was granted, it could also be an encouraging sign but no answer had yet been received. He said he would send me copies of some letters which gave some indications of the local conditions.

7. I outlined the position as we understood it (largely from London telegram 9639) and said that we would pass any further relevant information on when it was received. I advised Mr Stephenson to have his people keep in touch with the British Embassy in Bagdad. I said I appreciated what Mr Stephenson had said about the firm's desire to honour the contract so that its reputation (and that of Australia) did not suffer in the area. I assured Mr Stephenson that we would continue to take a close interest in the well-being of Australian nationals in Iraq.

-:-

CONFIDENTIAL

*John: This is of wider relevance than just
to line aviation. As you may not see it
otherwise, I am sending you this copy. Don.*



BEIRUT

22nd May 1969

With the Compliments

of

The Australian Embassy

*Mr J. M. Kintner
Department of
External Affairs
Canberra.*

CONFIDENTIAL

of an "enemy" country by
noticeable and immediate
commercial interests in Iraq.
of our telegram no. 51/2 of
of Australian 180
no. Indeed it has been
it would be
22nd May, 1969.

to Iraq in following
y. He therefore believes
agreement the Iraqi
two Qatari permission to

*file
173/10/11*

of Iraq.

1/1/1/7.

. 70 of 5th May 1969 you asked
the Iraqi authorities to allow
territory.

there are political motives
thorities. Australia's reaction
d is probably, however, no more
ur difficulties is to be found,
g at the end of the Special
of the United Nations in June/

3. In our memorandum no. 67 of 22nd June 1967, with
the forthcoming Special Meeting of the General Assembly in mind,
we warned -

"that positions and votes in the U.N. which
could be construed as anti-Arab will probably
adversely affect the attitude of the Arab
states to countries concerned for a considerable
time to come and affect the interests of those
countries in the Middle East including future
trade relations and opportunities".

In the event, once the votes were taken, our prediction was shown
to be correct. Although other Arab countries generally reacted
more moderately, Iraq made it known that her trading patterns
and her relations with other countries in general would be
rearranged as far as possible to give preference

- (i) to other Arab countries
- (ii) and then to countries which voted with the
Arabs at the Special Meeting of the General
Assembly
- (iii) ahead of countries which abstained from voting
- (iv) and lastly, and only where there was no
commercial alternative, to "enemy" countries - i.e.
those which voted against Arab interests at the
Special Meeting of the General Assembly.

CONFIDENTIAL/...

CONFIDENTIAL

51/2

180

22nd May, 1969.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

file 173/10/1
Qantas Overflights of Iraq.

Your ref : 716/51/1/1/7.

In your memorandum no. 70 of 5th May 1969 you asked for our views on the refusal by the Iraqi authorities to allow Qantas aircraft to overfly Iraqi territory.

2. We do not doubt that there are political motives for the attitude of the Iraqi authorities. Australia's reaction to the recent hangings in Baghdad is probably, however, no more than incidental. The basis of our difficulties is to be found, we believe, in Australia's voting at the end of the Special Meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations in June/July 1967.

3. In our memorandum no. 67 of 22nd June 1967, with the forthcoming Special Meeting of the General Assembly in mind, we warned -

"that positions and votes in the U.N. which could be construed as anti-Arab will probably adversely affect the attitude of the Arab states to countries concerned for a considerable time to come and affect the interests of those countries in the Middle East including future trade relations and opportunities".

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- (ii) and then to countries which voted with the Arabs at the Special Meeting of the General Assembly
- (iii) ahead of countries which abstained from voting
- (iv) and lastly, and only where there was no commercial alternative, to "enemy" countries - i.e. those which voted against Arab interests at the Special Meeting of the General Assembly.

CONFIDENTIAL/...

CONFIDENTIAL

Australia came into the category of an "enemy" country by that definition and there was a noticeable and immediate reaction against Australia's commercial interests in Iraq. (See, for example, paragraph 5 of our telegram no. 339 of 19th July 1967.) The Iraqi boycott of Australian commercial activities has never been complete. Indeed it has been modified in some ways - but only, it would seem, to meet Iraqi needs. There is no advantage to Iraq in allowing Qantas to overfly Iraqi territory. We therefore believe that, despite any international agreement, the Iraqi authorities will continue to refuse Qantas permission to use Iraqi air space.

4. We do not have any detailed knowledge of Iraqi civil aviation regulations but we understand that with the sole exception of Pan American (who cannot use that particular air route because they are not allowed to overfly Syria) all the airlines which fly between Beirut and Teheran (Air France, Lufthansa, PIA, Swissair and BOAC) overfly Iraqi territory. If Australia's airline seems to have been singled out for especially harsh treatment from Iraq, the reason - or at least part of the reason - is to be found, we suggest, in paragraph 3(H) of telegram no. 866 of 4th July 1967 from the Australian Mission to the United Nations and in the UN Mission's telegram no. UN921 of 14th July 1967.

(D.J. Kingmill)
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL REGISTRY
D.E.A.

CONFIDENTIAL

JUN 5 9 10 AM '69

173/10/1

DESPATCHED

140

4th June, 1969

The Senior External Affairs Representative,
LONDON.

IRAQ

.....
With reference to our telegram 6028 and your 9369 about Australians in Iraq, we attach a copy of a record of conversation on 4th June with one of the partners in the Melbourne firm of architects concerned.

2. We should be glad if you would keep us informed of any developments.

H.A.
(H.A. Dunn)

A/g Assistant Secretary.

ENCLOSURES ATTACHED

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

File No. 173/10/1

Record of Conversation with... **Messrs Stephenson and Olgay of Stephenson & Turner,**
Architects, Melbourne (phone 266 611)
on... **4th June, 1969**

Officers Present... **H.A. Dunn**

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Teheran

FOLLOWING POSTS:

ACTION:

Report prepared by

(H.A. Dunn)

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2.

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7. I outlined the position as we understood it (largely from London telegram 9639) and said that we would pass any further relevant information on when it was received. I advised Mr Stephenson to have his people keep in touch with the British Embassy in Bagdad. I said I appreciated what Mr Stephenson had said about the firm's desire to honour the contract so that its reputation (and that of Australia) did not suffer in the area. I assured Mr Stephenson that we would continue to take a close interest in the well-being of Australian nationals in Iraq.

-i-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. 173/10/1

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Record of Conversation with Messrs Stephenson and Olgay of Stephenson & Turner,
Architects, Melbourne (phone 266 611)
on 4th June, 1969

Officers Present H.A. Dunn

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

Australians in Iraq

Mr Stephenson said that his Firm had five employees in Iraq, all located in Basra; however, the senior member of the group spent a lot of time in Bagdad. The people mainly concerned were: Mr Alex Wilkie, Mr Michael Lumsden, and Mr John Maddison, all of whom are Australians. In addition they employed a Mr Boyle, a British subject, one local Iraqi architect, drivers, etc.

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C. Afr.
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L. & T.

FAIRFED
F.B.

ATTN: Mr. [unclear]

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Adelaide
Brisbane

.... / 2.

FOLLOWING POSTS:

Report prepared by H.A. Dunn

ACTION:

→ Mr Dunn:

(H.A. Dunn)
I don't think we can do any more. We can only pass on such reports as we have. It is for them then to decide whether to stay or not - unless of course conditions become so threatening that we must advise them to leave. That stage seems not to have been reached yet. D.H. 4/6

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

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AFME

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.... /2.

FOLLOWING POSTS:

Report prepared by 169

ACTION:

(H.A. Dunn)

-P.A.S.

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2.

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CONFIDENTIAL

File 173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

NMS

1.53683

1/6/69

TOD 30.1850 LT

FROM

TOR 31.1437 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

9369

IRAQ

YOUR 6028

*Passes 8 Stevenson J. Stephenson and Turner.
266611 on 3/6. He will in any event
call on 4/6.
H-B 4/6.*

2. HINCHCLIFFE (IRAQ DESK FCO) SAID ON 30 MAY THAT THERE WAS NO APPRECIABLE DETERIORATION IN THE SITUATION AT PRESENT. THERE HAS HOWEVER BEEN A SEASONAL RESURGENCE OF FIGHTING BETWEEN THE KURDS AND IRAQIS IN THE NORTH.

3. HINCHCLIFFE CONFIRMED THAT A DUTIES LAW WAS PASSED RECENTLY. BRITISH EMBASSY BAGHDAD HAS NOT SEEN AUTHORITATIVE TEXT BUT BELIEVES THAT THE NEW LAW EMPOWERS THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL TO ASSIGN ANYONE TO SPECIFIED DUTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN RETURN FOR REMUNERATION. THE LAW APPLIES ALSO TO ANY FOREIGNER RESIDENT IN IRAQ FOR MORE THAN SIX MONTHS. PENALTIES HAVE BEEN LAID DOWN FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SUCH AN ASSIGNMENT. IN THE CASE OF FOREIGNERS THESE ARE EITHER IMPRISONMENT FOR NOT LESS THAN ONE YEAR AND NOT MORE THAN THREE YEARS OF A FINE OF NOT LESS THAN 1000 DINARS AND NOT MORE THAN 10000 DINARS. IN EITHER CASE THE RESIDENCE PERMIT WOULD BE WITHDRAWN

4. FCO BELIEVE THE LAW IS AIMED AT IRAQ OFFICIALS, IRANIANS, INDIANS AND PAKISTANIS WHO ARE UNWILLING TO LEAVE BAGHDAD TO TAKE UP POSTINGS ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY. AS FAR AS THEY KNOW IT IS NOT AIMED AT WESTERNERS. IT IS CLEAR HOWEVER THAT IN ITS PRESENT FORM THE LAW COULD BE USED AGAINST WESTERNERS IF THE REGIME SO WISHED. THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD HAVE BEEN ASKED TO CLARIFY THE MEANING OF THE LAW AND ADVISE FCO WHETHER ANY REPRESENTATIONS SHOULD BE MADE TO THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT. IN THE MEANTIME NO SPECIAL STEPS FOR PROTECTION OF BRITISH NATIONALS ARE BEING TAKEN. FCO ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY FOREIGNERS OTHER THAN JEWS EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING EXIT VISAS. THEY WILL KEEP US INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

..12

Dr. Cyprian.

The Melbourne architects plan to come to Basra tomorrow to talk about their man in Basra. They could be saved a trip if I rang them to pass on the gist of this and to say
(a) this people should discuss the question with the British Embassy in Basra.
(b) it is this decision whether to keep them in Iraq. At present the position does not mean immediately leaving.

H-B 3/6

CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

2.

I.53683

MIN AND DEPT OF E.A.
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
D.C.O.
P.M.'S

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) AS(JIC) INT SEA DL FAS(2) PACAM
AMSP FAS(3) FAS(4) EAMEC AFME C ICR PIO

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

173/10/1
SECRET

FILE No

DATE 30th May, 1969.

SUBJECT

REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE FROM PROFESSOR H.W.S. PHILP

FOR THE DEPUTY-SECRETARY

Professor Philp, in his letter of 20th May, has asked you two questions, namely:-

- (a) whether he is correct in assuming that the Australian Government would not be anxious to place West Irian students in T.P.N.G. for training, and
- (b) whether we would have any objections to accepting "academically acceptable West Irian students" for training in Australia?

2. The answer to these questions is contained in the attached minute from Sir Paul Hasluck to the Secretary which he wrote after his visit to Indonesia at the beginning of 1967. I would regard this minute as still constituting basic Government policy. You could therefore inform Professor Philp that the Australian Government would not wish to be confronted by requests for assistance to place West Irian students in any educational or training institutes in T.P.N.G. Any requests for training places put to us by the Indonesian Government or the United Nations for the placement of West Irian students in Australia would be treated as normal requests for training and would probably be perfectly acceptable if all the usual requirements are met.

3. You could tell Professor Philp that he may, if he wishes, confirm that Dr Power's understanding of Australian policy on this matter is perfectly correct and is not likely to be varied in the near future.

→ SE Asia (Mr Burgess)

This might be more appropriately filed on your policy file. We have retained copies in Ad Branch

GP 12/6

I did just this, and had a useful general discussion with Philp, who struck me as well worth keeping in touch with.

HWG.
5/6/69

SECRET

(K. C. O. Shann)
First Assistant Secretary
Division III.

SECRET

SECRET

COPYThe Secretary

When I was in Djakarta last week Mr Loveday reported to me that the Indonesian Government had raised with him the question whether we could provide training in Australian territory for persons from West Irian. Mr Loveday, from his own knowledge, had informed them of what he had seen of the facilities available at such institutions as the Lae Technical School.

I informed Mr Loveday that I was quite clear in my mind against any facilities for training being provided in East New Guinea for persons from West New Guinea. If training were to be offered it could be provided in institutions on the Australian mainland.

Subsequently, the same topic was mentioned to me in conversation by the Foreign Minister, Mr Malik and, as I had by that time established considerable frankness in talking with him, I said to him that while we would be quite ready to consider any requests they made for the training in Australia of students or officers from West New Guinea, I was opposed to training them in East New Guinea. I said that since the transfer of administration from the Dutch to the Indonesians, we had tried to behave with the utmost correctness in regard to the activities of any Papuans in exile or any of those who tried to set up dissident movements against Indonesian rule. I do not want East New Guinea to become a centre from which persons from West New Guinea might conduct activities against their own Government and, however carefully the students might be selected for training in the Australian territory, we do not want to run the risk that either students might not wish to return to West New Guinea or that they might come under the influence of other persons in exile from West New Guinea. Therefore, I would personally be opposed for the time being at least, to making facilities available in East New Guinea for the training of persons from West New Guinea. Mr Malik expressed his appreciation of the frankness with which I had spoken and appeared to me to accept the strength of the argument that I presented.

The Department might note my views as policy direction on this matter.

(Signed)

Minister

2nd February, 1967.

CANBERRA.

SECRET



CENTRAL REGISTRY
 School of Education
 MAY 27 10 28 AM '69
 NOM. INDEX. SUBJECT

MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY

NORTH RYDE, NEW SOUTH WALES 2113
 TELEPHONE: 887000
 TELEGRAMS & CABLES: 'MACQUINIV' NORTH RYDE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE:

20th May, 1969. GP

Sir Laurence McIntyre,
 Department of External Affairs,
 CANBERRA,
 A.C.T. 2600.

Dear Sir Laurence,

You may recall that in October of last year I wrote to you and then spoke to you on the telephone about a mission which I was to undertake in Iraq for the United Nations Development Programme. At that stage you were good enough to give me some advice and information. I did not get in touch with you at the end of the mission essentially because it became clear that I would not be prepared to recommend to the Vice-Chancellor that this University should become in any way involved in the project. The subsequent sad events in Liberation Square, Baghdad, served only to reinforce this view.

However, I have now been invited to be a member of another mission which is much more closely related to Australian interests and which may have some political implications on which I would like your advice. The Indonesian Government has asked UNDP for a very large sum of money indeed to assist in the establishment of an educational centre for teacher training, curriculum and textbook development, and educational research. I expect to leave Sydney for Paris for detailed briefing on June 8th or 9th. Of more immediate importance, however, is that yesterday I received a copy of a cable sent by Dr. Thomas J. Power, Jr., Director of FUNDWI, to UNESCO and to UNDP in New York. This cable reads in part: 'Presuming Hugh Philp going Indonesia June for educational planning mission suggest he be routed back repeat back via West Irian order study possible candidacies university Tsenderawasih teacher trainees for placement Macquarie University Sydney which I visited recently. This in context that no repeat no West Irians will be accepted for placement TPNG but Australian authorities willing assist on continent. Obvious also that each fellowship foreseeable future have to be hand tailored.' The remainder of the cable is taken up with suggested travel arrangements for me at the end of the mission to Indonesia.

Rp with pps.

LHM:R.
 24/5/69

1..2.

Sir Laurence McIntyre

- 2 -

20th May, 1969.

I have discussed this confidentially with the Vice-Chancellor, who agreed with me that I should get in touch with you. I think that I would need to know before going to West Irian whether or not Dr. Power's statement in the cable is in accordance with Australian Government policy and whether academically acceptable West Irian students would also be politically acceptable for training in Australia. 146 147.

I would be prepared to come to Canberra at any time suitable to you either on the Monday, Tuesday or Friday during the week commencing May 26th, or on the Monday or Tuesday (June 2nd or 3rd) of the following week. Alternatively, this may be something on which you could brief me by telephone.

I should be grateful for your advice.

Yours sincerely,



H. W. S. PHILP
Professor of Education and Head of School

Mr. Hasting
CONFIDENTIAL

FOLIO NO.

~~DRAFT~~

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE
LONDON

File 173/10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

We have been approached by Melbourne firm of architects over safety of their employees on assignment as consultants in Iraq. These have sent messages (via Kuwait) about growing insecurity of foreigners in Iraq. They are particularly concerned by a recent decree which they claim subjects foreigners to conscription for work on Iraqi Government projects.

2. Latest reports received here on Iraq suggest increasing instability and unpredictability of the Al-Bakr regime. Its anti-foreign moves seem however to have been directed so far against Jews and Iranians, and we have had no indications that Westerners might now be in danger.

3. Grateful for F.C.O. assessment of situation in Iraq and details of any measures taken or contemplated for protection of British nationals. *Have there been any problems in obtaining exit visas.*

J.W.C.

J.W.C. Cumes

173/10/1

28/5/69

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No

DATE 28th May, 1969

SUBJECT

IRAQ

FOR Mr Kintley. *W. H. Kintley*

A Mr Stephenson of Stephenson and Turner, an architectural firm in Melbourne (phone 266611), rang on 28/5. His firm has architectural consultants in Iraq, some resident in Basra. Recent messages said that these people were being constrained, by fear of imprisonment if they sent word from Iraq, to go to Kuwait to send out word about what they regarded as a deterioration in the situation. They were particularly concerned about a recent decree by the revolutionary committee in Iraq, issued as a result of Arab/Israeli and Iraqi/Iranian tension, saying that foreigners were subject to conscription by the government to work on projects other than those on which they were normally engaged. If foreigners were, as a result of this, asked by their employees to leave, there was the complication that they had to get exit visas.

2. Mr Stephenson asked whether these messages might be alarmist, and whether his employees in Iraq could and should put themselves under the protection of a British Embassy. He proposed to come to Canberra on Wednesday, 4th June (11.00 a.m.) to discuss the question. I said I might call him back before that time.

3. It seems to me that one could say:

- (a) the decree may well be aimed mainly against Jews and possibly Iranians;
- (b) Mr Stephenson's employees should in any event discuss their situation with the British Embassy and/or local consulate, and get their views on the decree;
- (c) the question whether they should be recalled is for their employers who would take account of the worth of the work they are doing in Iraq.

4. However, it would be worth while, if we have no information on present conditions in Iraq and on the decree, asking the British for their assessment by telegram. Please draft such a telegram.

H.A.
(H.A. Dunn)

173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

CD

O. 41526

29/5/69

TOD 29.2003 LT

TO

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

6028 CONFIDENTIAL

FOR EXTERNAL.

WE HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY MELBOURNE FIRM OF ARCHITECTS OVER
SAFETY OF THEIR EMPLOYEES ON ASSIGNMENT AS CONSULTANTS IN IRAQ.

THESE HAVE SENT MESSAGES (VIA KUWAIT) ABOUT GROWING
INSECURITY OF FOREIGNERS IN IRAQ.

THEY ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY A RECENT DECREE WHICH THEY
CLAIM SUBJECTS FOREIGNERS TO CONSCRIPTION FOR WORK ON IRAQI
GOVERNMENT PROJECTS.

2. LATEST REPORTS RECEIVED HERE ON IRAQ SUGGEST INCREASING
INSTABILITY AND UNPREDICTABILITY OF THE AL-BAKR REGIME.

ITS ANTI-FOREIGN MOVES SEEM HOWEVER TO HAVE BEEN DIRECTED
SO FAR AGAINST JEWS AND IRANIANS, AND WE HAVE HAD NO INDICATIONS
THAT WESTERNERS MIGHT NOW BE IN DANGER.

3. GRATEFUL FOR F.C.O. ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN IRAQ AND DETAILS
OF ANY MEASURES TAKEN OR CONTEMPLATED FOR PROTECTION OF BRITISH
NATIONALS.

HAVE THERE BEEN ANY PROBLEMS IN OBTAINING EXIT VISAS.

E.A.(173/10/1)
D.C.O.
P.M.'S

SEC FAS(1) FAS(2) UN FAS(3) FAS(4) EAMEC AFME
C AND P L AND T LA ICR PIO

TEHERAN BEIRUT

Commune like Protection Iraq.

PA

30 + 10

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

LW

I.49351

21/5/69

TOD 20.1655 LT

FROM

TOR 21.0346 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

8722 CONFIDENTIAL

FOR IMMIGRATION REPT BEIRUT 31

YOUR 5246 (BEIRUT 284) AND BEIRUT'S 498 TO YOU REGARDING
EMIGRATION FROM IRAQ.

FOREIGN OFFICE HAVE CABLED BAGHDAD TO CLARIFY THAT
MR OWEN IS TO TRAVEL ON AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT AND
TO APPLY FOR VISA IN BEIRUT.

THEY WILL ADVISE US BY TELEPHONE WHEN REPLY RECEIVED
FROM BAGHDAD.

IF ARABIC INTERPRETER IS LEBANESE, AN IRAQ VISA WOULD NOT
BE NECESSARY FOR HIM.

FOREIGN OFFICE ADVISE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY
SO FAR AS CLERICAL ASSISTANCE IS CONCERNED AND FOR BAGHDAD TO
ARRANGE INTERVIEWS AND MEDICALS PRIOR TO MR OWEN'S ARRIVAL.

THE FEEL THAT WHEN PASSPORT QUESTION HAS BEEN CLARIFIED
THESE MATTERS CAN BE FINALISED DIRECT BETWEEN BEIRUT AND
BAGHDAD.

WILL CABLE FURTHER IMMEDIATELY ADVICE RECEIVED FROM
FOREIGN OFFICE.

IMMIGRATION
E.A.
D.C.O.
P.M'S

File
173/10/1

FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME ICR PIO



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

KAL

I.43211

19/5/69

TOD 05.1809 LT

FROM

TOR 05.0659 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

File 173/10/1

7718 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY
FOR DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION MELBOURNE
FROM CALO.

C.A.2512

FOR ADG (IR).

YOUR 4838 RESPONSE MY 7198.

NO SUBSTANTIVE REPLIES TO OUR NOTES OF 17TH OCTOBER AND
15TH JANUARY WERE RECEIVED IN THIS OFFICE OTHERWISE YOU WOULD
HAVE BEEN INFORMED THEIR CONTENTS.

UK/BOAC HAVE HAD NO TROUBLE WITH IRAQIS UNTIL LAST WEEK.

BOAC LAND AT IRAQI AIRPORTS AND IRAQI AIRWAYS OPERATE TO
LONDON AND SIMILAR APPLIES TO GERMAN AND NETHERLANDS AIRLINES
I UNDERSTAND.

UK, HOWEVER, HAVE HAD SITUATION DEVELOP WHERE IRAQI AIRWAYS
HAVE OPERATED WITHOUT PERMISSION INTO ABU DHABI THIS LAST
WEEK AND AIRCRAFT WAS TURNED AROUND MUCH TO ANNOYANCE OF HIGH-
POWERED IRAQI DELEGATION BOARD.

THEY UNDER IMPRESSION LOCAL RULER AT ABU DHABI HAD GRANTED
VERBAL PERMISSION.

RULER DENIES THIS AND POINTED OUT THAT HMG CONTROL LANDING
AND TRAFFIC RIGHTS THAT TERRITORY.

WILL KEEP INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS FROM UK SIDE AS LOCAL
POLITICAL SITUATION IRAQ APPEARS TO BE SOMEWHAT TURBULENT AT
THIS TIME WITH HAND OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER BEHIND LATEST
EMBARRASSMENT ABU DHABI AUTHORITIES.

D.C.A. (T/T)

FAS(3) ER FAS(4) EAMEC E. AFME.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

AP

0.35632

23/5/69

TOD #3.0112 LT

TO

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON....5246

REPEATED

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT....284

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

ADDRESSED LONDON 5246, REPEATED BEIRUT 284.

YOUR 7919 - IRAQ.

PROCEDURES SUGGESTED AND TRAVEL ON AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMATIC
PASSPORT ARE ACCEPTABLE THIS OFFICE.

HOWEVER TELEGRAM NO. 395 FROM F.C.O. TO BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION
CANBERRA, INDICATED BRITISH AMBASSADOR, BAGHDAD, FAVOURED ISSUE
BRITISH PASSPORT.

WOULD APPRECIATE, THEREFORE, EARLIEST CONFIRMATION THAT FOREIGN
OFFICE IS AGGEEABLE MR. MALLETT'S PROPOSALS, WHICH WE PREFER.

2. SUGGESTION THAT THERE IS NEED FOR ARABIC INTERPRETER
RAISES QUESTIONS OF SELECTION AND TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS AND WE ARE
ASKING BEIRUT FOR THEIR VIEWS, AS I PRESUME FROM YOUR CABLE
THERE IS NO SOLUTION OFFERING IN BAGHDAD ITSELF.

THE SHORT PERIOD OF OPERATIONS WILL ALSO MAKE SELECTION
INTERPRETER DIFFICULT.

TO BEIRUT ONLY.

3. PLEASE LET US KNOW IF PROPOSALS ARE SATISFACTORY TO YOU

.../2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM
-2- 0.35632

AND ALSO ADVISE AS FAR AS AVAILABILITY SUITABLE ARABIC INTERPRETER
FROM YOUR AREA IS CONCERNED.

IMMIG (C)
E.A.
D.C.O.
PM'S

A/SEC FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME(ACTION) ICR PIO

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

BKP

I.44377

9/5/69

TOD 07.1932 LT

FROM

TOR 08.1018 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
LONDON.

7919. CONFIDENTIAL.

File 173/10/1

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 7919 REPEATED BEIRUT 25

FOR IMMIGRATION
FROM CHIEF MIGRATION OFFICER LONDON

YOUR 4279 EMIGRATION FROM IRAQ.

MR J. MALLETT OF MIGRATION AND VISA DEPARTMENT FOREIGN AND
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, TOGETHER WITH MR A MINASSIAN BRITISH VICE
CONSUL AT BAGHDAD CALLED HERE THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS PROPOSED
VISIT OF MR KEITH THOMAS OWEN TO BAGHDAD.

THE FIRST POINT RAISED WAS QUESTION OF INTERPRETER.

UNLESS MR OWEN IS FLUEN IN ARABIC, IT IS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL
THAT HE TAKE WITH HIM AN ARABIC INTERPRETER, AS EMBASSY WILL
NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE THESE FACILITIES AND WITHOUT WHICH IT WILL
NOT BE POSSIBLE TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS.

WITH REGARD TO MR OWEN'S VISA IT IS NOT REPEAT NOT FELT
NECESSARY FOR APPLICATION TO BE MADE BY THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN
BAGHDAD BUT THAT THE VISA SHOULD BE APPLIED FOR BY OUR
EMBASSY AT BEIRUT ON THE BASIS OF AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE
BRITISH EMBASSY BY MR OWEN THE EXACT REASON FOR HIS VISIT SHOULD
NOT BE STATED.

APPARENTLY A NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM OTHER COMMONWEALTH
COUNTRIES VISIT BAGHDAD FROM TIME TO TIME FOR VARIOUS REASONS
AND HAVE NO TROUBLE IN OBTAINING VISAS GIVING THE REASON FOR
VISIT AS SUGGESTED ABOVE.

MR MALLETT HAS PROMISED TO CONFIRM THAT THIS IS THE WAY THE
FOREIGN OFFICE WOULD PREFER THE VISA APPLICATIONS TO BE MADE.

IT IS FELT THAT IT WOULD HELP IF MR OWEN TRAVELLED WITH A
DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT.

.../2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

-2-

I.44377

THE OTHER POINT RAISED WAS THAT IRAQI PASSPORTS ARE NORMALLY VALID ONLY FOR "LOCAL" JOURNEYS E.G. LEBANON, TEHRAN AND KUWAIT, PERSONS WHOSE AUSTRALIAN VISAS HAVE BEEN APPROVED ARE RELUCTANT TO REQUEST AN EXTENSION OF GEOGRAPHICAL VALIDITY FROM THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES.

THIS IS OVERCOME BY THE APPROVED APPLICANTS PROCEEDING TO A COUNTRY TO WHICH IT IS EASY FOR THEM TO TRAVEL WHERE EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO HAVE THEIR PASSPORTS MADE VALID FOR AUSTRALIA BY THE LOCAL IRAQI REPRESENTATIVE.

THEY THEN PRESENT THEMSELVES AT THE AUSTRALIAN OR BRITISH EMBASSY THERE AND ASK FOR THE APPROVAL FOR VISA ISSUE TO BE OBTAINED FROM BAGHDAD.

THE BRITISH EMBASSY HAS NO OBJECTION TO THIS ARRANGEMENT CONTINUING.

MR MINASSIAN MENTIONED THAT THE THE 2,000 JEWISH POPULATION ARE BEING STEADILY PERSECUTED AND ARE TOO FRIGHTENED TO COME NEAR THE BRITISH EMBASSY FOR FEAR OF ARREST BY THE IRAQI SECURITY GUARDS.

HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT THE PRESENT BACKLOG HAD BEEN REDUCED FROM 300 TO 200 CASES..

IMMIGRATION

E.A.
D.C.O.
P.M.'S

A/SEC FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME(ACTION) ICR PIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

716/55/12

7-5-69.

IRAQI REFUSAL TO ALLOW QANTAS OVERFLIGHTS

MR. SHANN

c.c. Dr. Connolly
Mr. Connolly

→ File 173/10/1

.....
I am attaching a copy of a minute by Mr. Miles Connolly on the question of Iraq/Australia air services. The examination contained in the minute has been prompted by the refusal of the Iraqi authorities to grant Qantas overflights of that country.

2. I am suggesting to D.C.A. that the next step might be for a further note to be sent to the Iraqis through London, arguing our request on the basis of the provisions of the International Air Services Transit Agreement, to which both countries are parties. I am sanguine that this further approach will produce the desired result. However, it would put the ball back into the Iraqi court and could serve as a pretext for a visit by an External Affairs officer to Baghdad if this were later judged to be desirable.

D.C.A. are being requested to draft an appropriate note for clearance with us.

Am Corkery

*See Shaffy
to me 7/5*

B
(L. Corkery)

B 7/5

→ *Mr. Kiffley*
(Copy of Submission sent to Mr. Houston, M.E.)
M.E.

We should keep this in mind in anything we do or say in connection with the M.E. situation. P.M.s should be made aware of it - pls suggest to ER that copies of these papers be sent to them. Re draw the reference to re-routing via Moscow to attention of Messrs Hill & Gadden.

2/ 7/5

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DMC/bz

FILE No 716/515/2

DATE 6th May, 1969

SUBJECT

IRAQI REFUSAL TO ALLOW QANTAS OVERFLIGHTS

FOR MR. CORKERY

Background:

Qantas flights to Europe on the "Kangaroo Route" have always crossed the Middle East (except during times of serious conflict) using the airspace of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.

2. Until 31st August, 1967, Qantas understood that it had landing and transit rights through Iraqi territory by virtue of an annual licence which had been re-issued annually since 1949 by the Iraqi authorities. Qantas had used landing rights at Basra up to 1949, and agreed to the renewal of the licence believing landing rights in Iraq would be a long-term proposition. However, the licence was not renewed after August, 1967, and D.C.A. did not make representations.

3. The Iraqi authorities, although desiring a formal bilateral agreement, were evidently satisfied with the annual licence arrangement. They appear to have interpreted it to mean that a formal agreement would be signed if either party expressed the desire to establish an air link between the two countries. D.C.A. never expressed disagreement with this interpretation, although no attempt was ever made to discuss the matter with the Iraqis. As both countries were signatories to the International Air Services Transit Agreement, signed at Chicago between 1944 and 1946, D.C.A. always believed that we had the freedom to fly across Iraqi airspace and to make technical landings if necessary.

4. These varying interpretations were tested during 1968 when on two occasions Qantas planes crossed Iraqi territory. A protest note was subsequently lodged with the Australian High Commission, London.

5. Our reply Note to the Iranians informed them that Qantas wished to regularise the situation and route flights across Iraq between Istanbul and Bahrain regularly (to avoid using Syrian airspace). The Iraqis were informed that such

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flights were to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the International Air Services Transit Agreement, noted earlier.

6. After two reminder notes and protracted delays, the Iraqi authorities finally advised that our request for permission to overfly Iraqi airspace had not been obtained. This suggests that the Iraqis do not intend honouring the "Chicago Agreement".

7. Before acknowledging receipt of the Note, our High Commission, London, has asked us for comments and advice on whether we wish to lodge a formal protest with the Iraqi authorities.

General Considerations:

8. Australia's relations with the Arab countries in the field of aviation generally are not good. Consequently, any further deterioration must be viewed seriously. In addition to the Iraqi problem, we are faced with similar potential situations in both Syria and Iran.

- (a) Negotiations are currently being conducted with the Iranian authorities, at their request, for a revised Aviation Agreement. To date, the Iranian terms have been "completely unacceptable" to D.C.A. and Qantas, and it is quite possible that the final outcome will not be to our advantage.
- (b) Qantas overflights of Syria airspace have only been permitted on the understanding that the whole question of overflights would be reconsidered when the new Damascus airport was operational (scheduled to be opened in March, 1969). Qantas fears that the Syrians may renew an earlier demand that a certain proportion of airline flights using Syrian airspace must land at Damascus. (This was one reason why they wanted to use Iraqi airspace as an alternative, and it was this Syrian policy which caused Qantas to terminate flights via Beirut in 1955.)
- (c) We understand that other major airlines using Iraqi airspace have not been subjected to the same problem as Qantas, presumably because they already have air agreements with Iraq or are politically more acceptable.

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- (d) In the last two years, the Arab countries have made a determined effort to obtain revenue from foreign airlines in return for all concessions. Because of this, Qantas was forced to enter into a special financial arrangement with the U.A.R. or lose the use of Cairo airport.

Conclusion:

9. Although political questions do play a role in Arab attitudes to civil aviation matters, e.g. the threats made when Qantas was considering opening an office in Tel Aviv, there is insufficient evidence to link the current Iraqi problems with politics.

10. The Department of Civil Aviation suspect that the Iraqis are merely trying to obtain some financial advantage from Australia in return for the concession we have requested.

Recommendations:

11. We could arrange for a further note to be sent to the Iraqi authorities through our High Commission, London, in which we could ask them to reconsider their decision, in view of the fact that both countries are signatories to the International Air Services Transit Agreement.

12. On the presumption that this will fail to elicit the required response, D.C.A. have agreed that we consider sending a Diplomatic officer to Iraq to find out exactly what the Iraqi's want. In 1967, Qantas tried to send its representative in Beirut but they refused to speak to anyone not representing the Australian Government. Mr. Peter Henderson, the Counsellor at the High Commission in London, might be visiting Beirut officially during June, 1969, and it may be possible for him and an officer from D.C.A. to visit Iraq. There is no possibility in the immediate future of sending an officer from either Beirut or Cairo for staffing reasons, and sending an officer from Iran would probably not be wise due to the current poor relations between Iran and Iraq.

13. In 1965, the Iraqi authorities wanted to send a delegation to Australia to discuss an Aviation Agreement. At that stage, neither Qantas nor D.C.A. were interested and the visit was post-

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poned indefinitely. If it is decided that an officer should visit Baghdad, his negotiating position would be circumscribed by the fact that D.C.A. does not want to negotiate with Iraq, but merely wants to have Qantas flights across Iraq approved while giving nothing in return. If it is agreed that an officer should be sent to Baghdad, an understanding will have to be reached with D.C.A. on exactly what can be fruitfully discussed.

14. If the problem is not satisfactorily settled after discussion with the Iraqi authorities, we could take it to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for consideration. D.C.A., however, are not in favour of this course of action.

15. In view of the growing possibility that the Qantas "Kangaroo Route" to Europe could be seriously interrupted in the Middle East area, the need for Australia to actively explore an alternative route via Russia is becoming essential.

D. Miles Connolly
(D. Miles Connolly)

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MJP

I.43211

6/5/69

TOD 05.1809 LT

FROM

TOR 06.0659 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

7718 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRIORITY

FOR DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION MELBOURNE
FROM CALO

C.A.2512

FOR ADG (IR).

File 173/10/1

YOUR 4838 RESPONSE MY 7198.

NO SUBSTANTIVE REPLIES TO OUR NOTES OF 17TH OCTOBER AND 15TH JANUARY WERE RECEIVED IN THIS OFFICE OTHERWISE YOU WOULD HAVE BEEN INFORMED THEIR CONTENTS.

UK/BOAC HAVE HAD NO TROUBLE WITH IRAQIS UNTIL LAST WEEK.

BOAC LAND AT IRAQI AIRPORTS AND IRAQI AIRWAYS OPERATE TO LONDON AND SIMILAR APPLIES TO GERMAN AND NETHERLANDS AIRLINES I UNDERSTAND.

UK, HOWEVER, HAVE HAD SITUATION DEVELOP WHERE IRAQI AIRWAYS HAVE OPERATED WITHOUT PERMISSION INTO ABU DHABI THIS LAST WEEK AND AIRCRAFT WAS TURNED AROUND MUCH TO ANNOYANCE OF HIGH-POWERED IRAQI DELEGATION BOARD.

THEY UNDER IMPRESSION LOCAL RULER AT ABU DHABI HAD GRANTED VERBAL PERMISSION.

RULER DENIES THIS AND POINTED OUT THAT HMG CONTROL LANDING AND TRAFFIC RIGHTS THAT TERRITORY.

WILL KEEP INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS FROM UK SIDE AS LOCAL POLITICAL SITUATION IRAQ APPEARS TO BE SOMEWHAT TURBULENT AT THIS TIME WITH HAND OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER BEHIND LATEST EMBARRASSMENT ABU DHABI AUTHORITIES.

D.C.A. (T/T)

FAS(3) ER FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME

CONFIDENTIAL

*Place an
Syria certificate file.*

716/51/1/1/7

>173/10/11 Pink

5th May, 1969.

The Australian Embassy,
BEIRUT

QANTAS OVERFLIGHTS OF IRAQ AND SYRIA

(Your memorandum 409, file no. 51/2 refers)

We have been advised by our High Commission in London that the Iraqi authorities have refused permission for Qantas Kangaroo flights between Bahrain and Istanbul to use Iraqi air space or make technical stop-overs.

2. The Department of Civil Aviation have pointed out that Qantas has the right to make overflights of Iraqi territory as both countries are signatories to the International Air Services Transit Agreement, otherwise known as the Chicago Convention. It would appear however, that the Iraqi authorities do not intend to honour the Agreement.

3. The Department of Civil Aviation considers that there is little choice but to ask the Iraqi's to reconsider their attitude. They believe however, that in the absence of any proposal to negotiate an Agreement (the last annual licence to use Iraqi air space lapsed in 1967) or pay charges, (a system which has evidently been popular among the Arabs in the last eighteen months), there is little chance of an agreement being obtained.

4. We also suspect that there may be political motives behind the Iraqi attitude. For example, our recent attitude on Iraq's hanging of alleged Israeli spies may have aroused resentment.

5. We would appreciate any views you may have on this matter, and particularly information which may be available to you on whether other airlines using Iraqi air space have been subject to similar restrictions.

6. We are also anxious to know whether the Syrian authorities have shown any indication that they may expect Qantas to land on their new airport which in your memorandum 409, you said would be completed on 8th March, 1969.

7. A copy of this memorandum is being sent to London.

The Australian High Commission,
LONDON

(D. Miles Connolly)

For your information.

(D. Miles Connolly)

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

AMT

0.32927

3/5/69

TOD 3.0223

TO

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

4838

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

FOR CALO.

IRAQ AIR SPACE.

YOUR 7198.

DID IRAQI EMBASSY SEND SUBSTANTIVE REPLIES TO YOUR NOTES
OF 17TH OCTOBER, AND 15TH JANUARY.
IF SO PLEASE SEND TEXTS.

ADVICE WOULD ALSO BE APPRECIATED ON WHETHER OTHER AIRLINES
E.G. U.K. HAVE BEEN TREATED IN SAME MANNER AS QANTAS.

E.A. (716/55/5/2)
D.C.A. (M)
D.C.O.
P.MS

A/SEC FAS(3) ER(A) FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

DJS

I.40570

30/4/69

TOD 28.1925 LT

FROM

TOR 29.0837 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

7198 CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT OF CIVIL AVIATION MELBOURNE
FROM CALO

CA2504
FOR ADG(IR)

FOLLOWING NOTE RECEIVED FROM EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF
IRAQ TODAY APRIL 28TH:-


"THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS
TO THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION AND WITH REFERENCE TO THE HIGH
COMMISSION'S NOTES OF 17 OCTOBER 1968 15 JANUARY 1969 AND 15
APRIL 1969 REGRETS TO INFORM IT THAT PERMISSION FOR QANTAS
INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE TO OVERFLY IRAQI TERRITORY ON ITS
SCHEDULED SERVICES ON THE SECTOR BETWEEN BAHREIN AND ISTANBUL HAS
NOT BEEN OBTAINED.

THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ AVAILS ITSELF OF THIS
OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION THE
ASSURANCES OF ITS HIGHEST CONSIDERATION"

BEFORE ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF THE NOTE WOULD APPRECIATE
ANY COMMENT YOU MAY HAVE TO OFFER ON CONTENTS IRAQI NOTE
PARTICULARLY IF YOU WOULD WISH FORMAL PROTEST TO BE MADE TO
IRAQI EMBASSY ON THEIR REPLY TO OUR 17 OCTOBER 15 JANUARY AND
15 APRIL NOTES.

CIVIL AVIATION (T/T)
E.A.
D.C.O.
P.M'S

SEC FAS(3) ER FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

→ FILE

FILE No 173/10/1

DATE

15 APR 1969


SUBJECT

Ministerial Correspondence - Iraq

FORThe Acting Minister:

.....

Attached for your consideration is a draft
reply to a letter dated 1st April from Mr A.
Peacock, M.P.



(J.W.C. Cumes)
Acting First Assistant Secretary
Division IV.



~~EA/EC Branch~~
~~J.M. Kirtley~~

nuu



173/11/24 173/10/1
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

CENTRAL RECORDS
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
318 POST OFFICE PLACE
MELBOURNE, VICTORIA 3000
TEL 32 2211 663-2211 663-2211

APR 8 11 43 AM
April 1, 1969

NOM. INDEX. SUBJECT

The Hon. G. Freeth M.P.
Minister for External Affairs
Parliament House
CANBERRA, A.C.T. 2600

Dear Mr. Freeth,

I have been specifically requested to write to you by a constituent, Mr. Robert Billings of 38 Mont Victor Road, Kew, to ask if it would be possible for the Australian Government to make representations to other governments so that a concerted objection could be made to the authorities in Baghdad regarding the Iraq atrocities.

Mr. Billings has also asked me to mention that he was gratified that our Government objected to the atrocities but felt further protests should be made in order that no more slaughter occurs to the citizens of that city.

Yours sincerely,

Andrew Peacock
Andrew Peacock M.P.
Member for Kooyong

*Dept. to draft reply
pls.
AS 3/4*

MIN-16

Acting

CANBERRA A.C.T. 2600.

16 APR 1969

Dear Mr Peacock,

On behalf of Mr Freeth, who is absent overseas, I acknowledge receipt of your letter of 1st April, concerning representations made to you by a constituent, Mr Robert Billings of 38, Mont Victor Road, Kew, Victoria, concerning the recent public hangings in Iraq.

As Mr Billings is aware, the Australian position in this matter has been made plain in messages addressed by the Prime Minister to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the President of the Security Council. Similar expressions of concern and abhorrence at the actions of the Government of Iraq have been made by many Governments, international organizations and prominent personalities. While it is not clear to what extent the Government of Iraq will be responsive to these protests, that Government can indeed be in no doubt as to the depth of international feeling.

As mentioned above, other Governments, international organizations and prominent personalities have already, of their own initiative, made their concern and abhorrence known to the authorities in Iraq. I do not believe therefore that in present circumstances it would be useful or appropriate for Australia to take the further action which Mr Billings has suggested.

Sincerely yours,

A.F.

ALLEN FAIRHALL.

Mr A.S. Peacock, M.P.,
Commonwealth Parliament Offices,
318, Post Office Place,
MELBOURNE VIC. 3000.

→ *File* 173/10/1

15 APR 1969

Ministerial Correspondence - Iraq

The Acting Minister:

....

Attached for your consideration is a draft
reply to a letter dated 1st April from Mr A.
Peacock, M.P.

(J.W.C. Cumes)
Acting First Assistant Secretary
Division IV.

EAMEC Branch
J.M. Kirtley:ga

175/10/8

RILE 173/10/1

25th March, 1969

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA A.C.T.

Attention: Mr Brouwer

.....
With reference to your minute of 17th
March, 1969, we attach the draft of a suggested reply
from the Prime Minister to the President of the Executive
Council of Australian Jewry.

(J.M. Kirtley)
for the Secretary.

The Australian Government has already expressed its deep concern at the trials and mass executions in Iraq and its hope that there will be no repetition. The Government holds firmly to the view that the melancholy process of action and retaliation and the inflaming of public passions in the Middle East should be brought to an end and that an atmosphere should be created which will conduce to the early establishment of a just and lasting peace in the area. The Government will use appropriate occasions to give further expression to these views.

-:-

558/11/4
914/3
173/10/1

24th March, 1969.

File 173/10/1

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION WITHOUT NOTICE - IRAQ.

~~THE SECRETARY.~~

...

Attached for your approval is a minute to the Minister concerning a question without notice asked by Mr. Whitlam on 18th March about the Australian communication to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Iraq executions. In replying to Mr. Whitlam the Minister said that he would treat his question as being on notice and get him a detailed reply.

2. The reply has been prepared by the United Nations Branch.

(P.N. Hutton)
Public Information Officer.

United Nations Branch.
J.D. Petherbridge/RMR

Mr. Hutton

Approved by Minister 24/3. UN has copy.

25/3

558/11/4

914/3

173/10/1

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION WITHOUT NOTICE - IRAQ.

FOR THE MINISTER

... I recommend the attached further reply to Mr. Whitlam's question without notice on 18th March about the Prime Minister's communication to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Iraq executions.

... 2. I am attaching a copy of Resolution 728 (XXVIII) of the Economic and Social Council which is referred to in this reply, together
... with New York's telegram No. 213 which refers to the action which was taken in accordance with it.

(J. Hlasell)
Secretary.

QUESTION WITHOUT NOTICE.

Mr. Freeth: On 18th March the Honourable the Leader of the Opposition asked me a number of questions about the Prime Minister's communication with the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the recent public executions in Iraq. In reply to his question I said that I would treat it as being on notice and obtain for him a detailed reply. I have now obtained the following information:-

The message of the Right Honourable the Prime Minister was conveyed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in a letter dated 2nd February, 1969, from the Australian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mr. P. Shaw.

The Secretary-General replied to Mr. Shaw in a note dated 17th February, 1969, which stated that this communication had been dealt with in accordance with paragraph 2(B) and (E) of resolution 728 (F) (XVIII) of the Economic and Social Council relating to communications concerning human rights.

The effect of this was that the substance of the Prime Minister's message was brought to the notice of the Commission on Human Rights, and a copy was sent to the Government of Iraq.

→ FILE

File No. 173/10/1

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Mr John McCullough, Kraft Cheese

on 6th March, 1969

Officers Present L.J. Arnott

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

Mr McCullough called at his own request following a recent visit to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States.

2. His principal purpose was to bring to our attention a comment made by his Company's Agent in Bagdad, an Iraqi named Mr Douglas Toma. Mr McCullough did not visit Bagdad on this occasion but arranged instead for Mr Toma to meet him in Kuwait. It seems that the Prime Minister's statements on 2nd and 3rd February apparently received publicity in Iraq and Mr Toma had asked Mr McCullough whether anything could be done to persuade the Government to refrain from making further statements which conflicted with our stated position of neutrality and non-involvement in the Middle East situation.

3. Mr McCullough said that he was fully conscious that commercial considerations had to be subordinated to political policies. However he thought he should mention the incident if only because import licences for the coming year were due to be issued soon. He referred to the fact that licences for imports from Australia had been withheld for six months in 1967. Last year the Company's sales of cheese to Iraq exceeded \$1 million.

Note: Australia's annual export trade with Iraq is approximately 12½ million dollars.

DISTRIBUTION:

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Secretary
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Legal Adviser
A/S Div. 7

Pac. & Am. Br.
D.N. Br.
Admin. Br.
E.A.M.E. Br.
D.L. Br.

S. & S.E.A. Br.
E.R. Br.
Finance Br.
C. & P. Br.
E. & T.A. Br.

M.T. Br.
Com. Rel.
Sydney Office
Inf. Br.

Ex. Commis. Br.
Melbourne Office
Antarctic Division

FOLLOWING POSTS:

ACTION:

Report prepared by

(L.J. Arnott)

INWARD CABLEGRAM 16515

HRM

20/2/69

TOD 19.1645LT

FROM

TOR 20.0917LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

UN.213 CONFIDENTIAL

File 173/10/1

IRAQI EXECUTIONS.

WE DISCUSSED YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 154 WITH UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR SPECIAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS, ROLZ-BENNETT, TODAY 19TH FEBRUARY.

2. HE EXPLAINED THAT ACTION HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL UNDER PARAGRAPH 2(E) OF ECOSOC RESOLUTION NO. 728F REGARDING COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS, IN THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD SENT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN FULL THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTERS MESSAGE AS CONTAINED IN OUR LETTER OF 2ND FEBRUARY TO U THANT.

3. ROLZ-BENNETT EXPLAINED THAT THE MESSAGE TO IRAQ HAD BEEN SENT IN FULL BECAUSE OF THE PRECEDENTS UNDER WHICH MESSAGES FROM A GOVERNMENT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING ANOTHER GOVERNMENT WERE ALWAYS SENT ON TO THE OTHER GOVERNMENT.

THE PROVISIONS IN 2(B) AND 2(E) ABOUT NOT DIVULGING THE IDENTITY OF THE AUTHOR OF A COMMUNICATION EXCEPT WHEN THEY HAVE NO OBJECTION WERE TAKEN AS APPLYING ONLY IN RELATION TO INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS WHICH HAD TO BE PROTECTED FROM DISCRIMINATION OR VICTIMISATION BY A GOVERNMENT WITHIN WHOSE AUTHORITY THEY MIGHT LIE.

THE PRIME MINISTERS MESSAGE WAS REGARDED NOT AS A COMMUNICATION FROM AN INDIVIDUAL BUT FROM A GOVERNMENT.

4. IN RESPECT OF 2(B), ROLZ-BENNETT SAID THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD LAST MONTH COMPILED A CONFIDENTIAL LIST OF COMMUNICATIONS WHICH HAS BEEN SENT TO THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

THE SECRETARIAT WAS COMPILING AN ADDENDUM TO THIS LIST WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A BRIEF REFERENCE TO THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTERS MESSAGE OF 2ND FEBRUARY.

THE LIST WOULD BE PRODUCED IN GENEVA AS A RESTRICTED PAPER AND GIVEN ONLY TO MEMBERS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION.

5. I SAID TO ROLZ-BENNETT ON 2ND FEBRUARY, AND I REPEATED AGAIN TO HIM TODAY 19TH FEBRUARY, THAT I HAD BEEN UNDER NO INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT THE DISTRIBUTION WHICH THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WANTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE OF THE PRIME MINISTERS MESSAGE.

I REMINDED HIM THAT ACCORDINGLY I HAD ASKED HIM ON 2ND FEBRUARY NOT TO CIRCULATE OUR MESSAGE AS A DOCUMENT TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE U.N. WITHOUT FURTHER ADVICE FROM US, AND I SAID THAT THAT REMAINED OUR POSITION.

...../2



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

-2-

I.16515

ON THE OTHER HAND, AS YOU ARE AWARE FROM OUR TELEGRAM 204 OF 14TH FEBRUARY, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL HAS HAD CIRCULATED TO ALL MEMBERS, AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT, A LIST WHICH QUOTES FROM THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTERS MESSAGE ABOUT THE EXECUTIONS. SHAW .

PRIME MINISTER
MIN. FOR E.A.
SIR JAMES PLIMSOLL
MR. C.L. HEWITT

SEC	DEP SEC	FAS(1)	AS(JIC)	INT	DL	FAS(2)	
UNQ	PACAM	AMSP	PPO	FAS(3)	FAS(4)	EAMEC	E
AFME	C	ICR	PIO				

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

CRN

0.12934

20/2/69

TOD 19.1950LT

TO

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

154 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

IRAQI EXECUTIONS

YOUR TELEGRAM NO.205

WE SHOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW WHAT IS THE PRACTICAL EFFECT
OF THE ACTION WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS TAKEN.

DOES THIS MEAN THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S
MESSAGE HAS BEEN COMMUNICATED CONFIDENTIALLY TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION AND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ WITHOUT ATTRIBUTION TO
HIM OR TO AUSTRALIA?

2. WE ASSUME FROM YOUR MESSAGE THAT YOU WERE NOT CONSULTED BY
THE SECRETARIEAT BEFORE THIS ACTION WAS TAKEN.

THIS WOULD APPEAR TO BE A BREACH OF ESTABLISHED PRACTICE BUT
WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS.

PRIME MINISTER.
MIN. FOR E.A.
SIR. JAMES PLIMSOLL.
MR. C.L. HEWITT.

File 173/10/1

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) AS(JIC) DL INT FAS(2) UN PACAM
AMSP PPO FAS(3) FAS(4) EAMEC AFME ICR PIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

HJP

I.15905

19/2/69

50D 18.1215 LT

FROM

TOR 19.0422 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

UN.205 CONFIDENTIAL

IRAQI EXECUTIONS.

YOUR TELEGRAM 86 AND OUR TELEGRAM 136.

2. THE FOLLOWING NOTE DATED 17TH FEBRUARY WAS RECEIVED TODAY
(18TH FEBRUARY) FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN REPLY TO MY LETTER
OF 2ND FEBRUARY CONVEYING TO HIM THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME
MINISTER CONCERNING THE EXECUTIONS IN IRAQ :

"THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS PRESENTS HIS
COMPLIMENTS TO THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRALIA TO THE
UNITED NATIONS AND HAS THE HONOUR TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT OF
HIS LETTER OF 2 FEBRUARY 1969 REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAQ.

IN THIS CONNEXION, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WISHES TO INFORM
THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE THAT HIS COMMUNICATION HAS BEEN DEALT
WITH IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 2(B) AND (E) OF RESOLUTION
728 F (XXVIII) OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL RELATING TO
COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS."

SHAW

PRIME MINISTER
MIN.FOR E.A.
MR C.L.HEWITT
SIR JAMES PLIMSOLL

File 173/10/1

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) AS(JIC) INT DL FAS(2) PACAM AMSP FAS(3)
FAS(4) EAMEC AFME ICR PIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

AMT

I.15238

16/2/69

TOD 14.1740 LT

FROM

TOR 16.0244 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

UN204

RESTRICTED

File 173/10/1

IRAQ EXECUTIONS.

YOUR TELEGRAM 131.

WE RECEIVED ONLY YESTERDAY 13TH FEBRUARY SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT S/8997 DATED 7TH FEBRUARY, CONSISTING OF THE TEXT OF A LETTER DATED 6TH FEBRUARY FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TOGETHER WITH AN ATTACHED "LIST OF SOME OF THE WORLD-WIDE CONDEMNATIONS - FROM VIRTUALLY EVERY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF THE WORLD - OF THE BARBARIC EXECUTIONS IN BAGHDAD".

THE LETTER WAS CIRCULATED AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT AT ISRAEL'S REQUEST.

2. THE ATTACHED LIST QUOTES AMONG OTHERS POPE PAUL, A SPOKESMAN OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE PRIME MINISTER, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF BELGIUM, CANADA, FINLAND, MEXICO, NORWAY, THE PHILIPPINES, SWEDEN, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES.

3. THE COMPLETE QUOTATION FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE IS AS FOLLOWS -

"I WISH TO EXPRESS THE DEEP CONCERN OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA AT THE RECENT TRIALS AND MASS PUBLIC EXECUTIONS IN BAGHDAD WHICH WERE CONTRARY TO THE PROPER DICTATES OF HUMANITY.

THE TIMING AND MANNER OF THE HANGINGS HAVE BEEN CONDEMNED BY PEOPLES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

IT IS THE SINCERE HOPE OF MY GOVERNMENT THAT THERE WILL BE NO REPETITION OF THIS SPECTACLE WHICH WAS TO REPUGNANT TO THE CONSCIENCE OF MANKIND".

MIN AND DEPT OF E.A.
MIN AND DEPT OF DEFENCE
D.C.O.
P.MS

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) AS(JIC) INT FAS(2) UN(A) PACAM
AMSP PPO FAS(3) FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME(A) ICR PIO

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

LW

O.10991

14/2/69

TOD 13.2222LT

TO

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

131 CONFIDENTIAL

IRAQ EXECUTION
YOUR 174. PLEASE TAKE NO REPEAT NO FURTHER ACTION.

MIN. & DEPT OF E.A.
MIN. & DEPT OF DEFENCE
D.C.O.
P.M'S

SEC DEF SEC FAS(2) UN@ FAS(3) EAMEC AFME ICR P10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



AUSTUNAT
NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAQ EXECUTION

Your 174. Please take no repeat no
further action.

M. G. [Signature]

J.W.C. CUMES

13.2.69.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

AMT

I.13400

12/2/69

TOD 11.1055 LT

FROM

TOR 12.0225 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

UN174 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

IRAQ EXECUTIONS.

YOUR 124.

AS REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAM 137 OF 2ND FEBRUARY, PARAGRAPH 2,
FRENCH AMBASSADOR BERARD IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY, UNDER LETTER OF
3RD FEBRUARY, CIRCULATED COPY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE
TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. IN ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS WE HAVE NOT ASKED THAT THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL DISTRIBUTE TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS COPIES OF PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AS CONVEYED TO
HIM ON 2ND FEBRUARY.

IF YOU WISH THAT THIS BE DONE IT CAN SO BE ARRANGED OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE COULD BE COVERED IN
THE NEXT PRESS CONFERENCE AT U.N. HEADQUARTERS.

SHAW

MIN AND DEPT OF E.A.
MIN AND DEPT OF DEFENCE
D.C.O.
P.MS

Dr. Curran
Mr. Hewitt noted
our request for guidance:
"Leave as is."

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) AS(JIC) INT SEA DL FAS(2) UN
PACAM AMSP PPO FAS(3) FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME(A) ICA PIO

Dr. Curran
would you clear with P.M.'s what
P.M.'s wishes would be?
My own recommendation would be to
circulate it, because it would be useful
to be able to say in answer to letters that
this had been done. *WJG-12/2*

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

LES

0.10436

12/2/69

TOD 11.2035 LT

TO

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

124 CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

IRAQ EXECUTIONS.

PLEASE CONFIRM WHETHER MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO
SECRETARY-GENERAL AND PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BY
NOW BEEN CIRCULATED TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

MIN. AND DEPT E.A.
MIN. AND DEPT DEFENCE
D.C.O.
P.M.'S

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) AS(JIC) INT FAS(2) UN(ACTION) PACAM
AMSP PPO FAS(3) FAS(4) EAMEC AFME(ACTION) ~~C~~ ICR PIO

CAIRO TEL AVIV BEIRUT DAR ES SALAAM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

AMT

I. 13400

12/2/69

TOD 11.1055 LT

FROM

TOR 12.0225 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

UN174 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

IRAQ EXECUTIONS.

YOUR 124.

AS REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAM 137 OF 2ND FEBRUARY, PARAGRAPH 2, FRENCH AMBASSADOR BERARD IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY, UNDER LETTER OF 3RD FEBRUARY, CIRCULATED COPY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. IN ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS WE HAVE NOT ASKED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DISTRIBUTE TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS COPIES OF PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AS CONVEYED TO HIM ON 2ND FEBRUARY.

IF YOU WISH THAT THIS BE DONE IT CAN SO BE ARRANGED OR, ALTERNATIVELY, THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE COULD BE COVERED IN THE NEXT PRESS CONFERENCE AT U.N. HEADQUARTERS.

SHAW

MIN AND DEPT OF E.A.
MIN AND DEPT OF DEFENCE
D.C.O.
P.MS

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) AS(JIC) INT SEA DL FAS(2) UN
PACAM AMSP PPO FAS(3) FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME(A) ICA PIO

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

LES

0.10436

12/2/69

TOD 11.2035 LT

TO

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

124 CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

IRAQ EXECUTIONS.

PLEASE CONFIRM WHETHER MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO
SECRETARY-GENERAL AND PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BY
NOW BEEN CIRCULATED TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

MIN. AND DEPT E.A.
MIN. AND DEPT DEFENCE
D.C.O.
P.M.'S

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) AS(JIC) INT FAS(2) UN(ACTION) PACAM
AMSP PPO FAS(3) FAS(4) EAMEC AFME(ACTION) C ICR PIO

CAIRO TEL AVIV BEIRUT DAR ES SALAAM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

BML

I.10224

3/2/69

TOD 02.1315 LT

FROM

TOR 03.0428 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

UN.137

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL IMMEDIATE
UN.137

MIDDLE EAST.

FOR SECRETARY.

WITH FURTHER REFERENCE TO YOUR TELEGRAMS 85 AND 86 AND MY
TELEGRAM NO. 136 OF TODAY, 2ND FEBRUARY.

2. IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT CIRCULATION WITHIN
UNITED NATIONS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE, I AGREED THIS
MORNING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT TOMORROW,
MONDAY, 3RD FEBRUARY, HE WOULD SEND COPIES OF OUR NOTE TO ALL
MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER LETTER FROM HIMSELF.

WHILE COPIES WILL NOT GO TO ALL OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, NO DOUBT ITS CONTENTS WILL BECOME KNOWN FAIRLY QUICKLY.

IN ANY EVENT I NOTE THAT IT IS INTENDED TO MAKE THE MESSAGE
PUBLIC IN AUSTRALIA ON 3RD FEBRUARY.

3. SPEAKING CONFIDENTIALLY, BERARD SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERN-
MENT HAD BEEN ACTIVE IN THE PAST WEEK IN IMPRESSING ON THE
GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT REPEATING THE TRIALS AND
PUBLIC EXECUTIONS WHICH HAD CAUSED SUCH A REACTION.

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD MADE NO PUBLIC DECLARATION ABOUT
THEIR REPRESENTATIONS TO BAGHDAD SO AS TO AVOID ARAB CHARGES OF
INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY.

4. BERARD SAID THAT HE WAS AWAITING REACTION OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT TO SUGGESTION THAT USSR, USA, UNITED KINGDOM
AND FRANCE SHOULD MEET WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED
NATIONS TO ASSIST AMBASSADOR JARRING AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
TO FIND A SOLUTION FOR A MIDDLE EASTERN SETTLEMENT WHICH JARRING
HAD NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO WORK OUT.

.../2..

INWARD CABLEGRAM

BML

-2-

I.10224

BERARD SAID THAT IT WAS HARDLY LIKELY THAT ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES COULD COME TO ANY AGREEMENT ON THEIR OWN.

THEY WOULD NOT WILLINGLY ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT IMPOSED BY TWO OUTSIDE POWERS AND HENCE THE CURRENT EMPHASIS ON A SETTLEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES.

THE ADVANTAGES OF A FOUR-POWER RATHER THAN A TWO-POWER INTERVENTION WERE THAT IT WAS NOT DESIRABLE TO HAVE A BLACK AND WHITE DIVISION OF INTERESTS BETWEEN THE USSR AND USA IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT A BLURRED ZONE REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF OTHERS WOULD HELP.

BOTH THE RUSSIANS AND THE AMERICANS WERE SCARED OF A POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION INVOLVING THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

5. BERARD SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD THE CAPACITY TO MARCH INTO CAIRO, TO DELIVER BLOWS AGAINST BAGHDAD AND TO SECURE THE BREAKUP OF JORDAN AND LEBANON BUT NONE OF THESE STEPS WOULD BRING SECURITY TO THEMSELVES.

HE EXPRESSED FEARS THAT IF ISRAEL DID NOT OBTAIN A SETTLEMENT NOW THEY WOULD HAVE TO DEAL IN THE FUTURE NOT WITH ESTABLISHED ARAB STATES BUT WITH A WIDESPREAD PALESTINE LIBERATION MOVEMENT DEVOTED TO THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL.

FRANCE HAD ALWAYS SUPPORTED THE INTEGRITY OF ISRAEL AS A NATIONAL STATE AND ITS RIGHTS OF PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS.

THE DANGER NOW WAS THE POSSIBLE DISINTEGRATION OF RESPONSIBLE ARAB GOVERNMENTS.

6. THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE TO FOUR-POWER DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE UN HAD NOT YET BEEN MADE CLEAR AND U THANT WOULD NOT RETURN TO NEW YORK UNTIL 6TH OR 7TH FEBRUARY.

BERARD SAID THAT FOUR POWER TALKS COULD TAKE PLACE IN NEW YORK AT A MISSION OF ONE OF THE FOUR SO AS TO AVOID THE LEAKAGE OF INFORMATION WHICH WOULD NECESSARILY ATTEND MEETING AT UN HEAD-QUARTERS.

SHAW

.../3..

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

BML

-3-

I.10224

PRIME MINISTER
MINISTER FOR E.A.
SIR JAMES PLIMSOLL
MR C. L. HEWITT

SEC	DEP SEC	FAS(1)	AS(JIC)	INT	DL	FAS(2)	
PACAM	AMSP	FAS(3)	FAS(4)	EAMEC	AFME	ICR	P10

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

VMM

0.7741

3/2/69

TOD 031152 LT

TO

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

1162 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

FOR EXTERNAL.

IRAK EXECUTIONS.

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL WAS DELIVERED IN NEW YORK ON SUNDAY 2ND FEBRUARY:

BEGINS -

I WISH TO EXPRESS THE DEEP CONCERN OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA AT THE RECENT TRIALS AND MASS PUBLIC
EXECUTIONS IN BAGHDAD WHICH WERE CONTRARY TO THE PROPER DICTATES
OF HUMANITY.

THE TIMING AND MANNER OF THE HANGING HAVE BEEN CONDEMNED BY
PEOPLES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD INCLUDING SOME IN OTHER ARAB
COUNTRIES.

IT IS THE SINCERE HOPE OF MY GOVERNMENT THAT THERE WILL BE NO
REPETITION OF THIS SPECTACLE WHICH WAS SO REPUGNANT TO THE
CONSCIENCE OF MANKIND AND WHICH CAN ONLY EXACERBATE THE SITUATION
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND INCREASE THE DIFFICULTIES OF SECURING
THE OBJECTIVE FOR WHICH WE ALL ARE STRIVING OF A JUST AND LASTING
PEACE.

YOU MAY BE ASSURED OF OUR SUPPORT FOR YOUR EFFORTS TO AVERT A
REPETITION.

J.G. GORTON.

ENDS -

.../2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

VMM

- 2 -

0.7741

MIN. AND DEPT. E.A
MIN. AND DEPT. DEFENCE
D.C.O
P.M'S

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) AS(JIC) INT FAS(2) UN(A) PACAM
AMSP PPO FAS(3) FAS(4) EAMEC AFME(A) C ICR PIO
UN NEW YORK CAIRO TEL AVIV BEIRUT DAR ES SALAAM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

2 173/10/11

BML

I.10223

3/2/69

TOD 02.1255 LT

FROM

TOR 03.0357 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

UN.136

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

FOR SECRETARY.

REFERENCE YOUR TELEGRAM 85 - MIDDLE EAST.

2. THIS MORNING, SUNDAY, 2ND FEBRUARY, 1969 NEW YORK TIME,
I CONVEYED THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AS CONTAINED IN
YOUR TELEGRAM 86 TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
CURRENTLY AMBASSADOR BERARD OF FRANCE, AND TO ROLZ-BENNETT FOR
TRANSMISSION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
WHO IS EN ROUTE TO ETHIOPIA.

SHAW

PRIME MINISTER
MINISTER FOR E.A.
SIR JAMES PLIMSOLL
MR C. L. HEWITT

SEC
PACAM

DEP SEC
AMSP

FAS(1)
FAS(3)

AS(JIC)
FAS(4)

INT
EAMEC

DL

FAS(2)
AFME ICR

PIO

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

4 173/10/1

AMT

0.7732

2/1/69

TOD 3.0100

TO

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK....85 (IMMEDIATE FOR SUNDAY MORNING, NEW YORK TIME)

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON....350 (FOR INFORMATION)

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
OTTAWA....62 (FOR INFORMATION)

CONFIDENTIAL IMMEDIATE

FOR SHAW FROM PLIMSOLL.

YOU WILL SHORTLY BE RECEIVING A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE EXECUTIONS IN IRAQ.

2. PLEASE HAVE IT DELIVERED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND CONFIRM BY TELEGRAM BY MONDAY MORNING CANBERRA TIME THAT YOU HAVE DONE SO.
IT IS INTENDED TO MAKE THE MESSAGE PUBLIC HERE DURING MONDAY.

PRIME MINISTER
MIN FOR E.A.
MR C L HEWITT
SIR JAMES PLIMSOLL

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) AS(JIC) DL INT FAS(2) PACAM AMSP
FAS(3) FAS(4) EAMEC AFME ICR PIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM 7 173/10/11

CONFIDENTIAL

AMT

0.7733

2/1/69

TOD 3.0100

TO

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

UN86 CONFIDENTIAL IMMEDIATE

PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL.

BEGINS - I WISH TO EXPRESS THE DEEP CONCERN OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA AT THE RECENT TRIALS AND MASS
PUBLIC EXECUTIONS IN BAGHDAD WHICH WERE CONTRARY TO THE PROPER
DICTATES OF HUMANITY.

THE TIMING AND MANNER OF THE HANGINGS HAVE BEEN CONDEMNED BY
PEOPLES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD INCLUDING SOME IN OTHER ARAB COUNTR-
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IT IS THE SINCERE HOPE OF MY GOVERNMENT THAT THERE WILL BE NO
REPETITION OF THIS SPECTACLE WHICH WAS SO REPUGNANT TO THE CON-
SCIENCE OF MANKIND AND WHICH CAN ONLY EXACERBATE THE SITUATION
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND INCREASE THE DIFFICULTIES OF SECURING THE
OBJECTIVE FOR WHICH WE ALL ARE STRIVING OF A JUST AND LASTING
PEACE.

YOU MAY BE ASSURED OF OUR SUPPORT FOR YOUR EFFORTS TO AVERT
A REPETITION.

J.G. GORTON.

THE PRIME MINISTER
THE MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MR C L HEWITT
SIR JAMES PLIMSOLL

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) AS(JIC) INT DL FAS(2) PACAM AMSP FAS(3)
EAMEC AFME ICR P10 FAS(A)

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

173/10/11

2nd February 1969


IRAK EXECUTIONS

Late this afternoon Mr Hewitt told me that the Prime Minister wanted a message sent to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council of the United Nations on the Irak executions. The Prime Minister had given Mr Hewitt the outline of what he wanted to say, and Mr Hewitt was preparing it for me to see.

2. I suggested the inclusion of the following:

"The timing and the manner of the executions have been condemned in many parts of the world. They have not been accorded complete approbation in other Arab countries, and this encourages us to urge that constructive efforts be continued to lay the conditions for some settlement in the Middle East and easing of tensions and to frustrate the extremists".

3. The final text, which was approved by the Prime Minister himself after being cleared with Mr Hasluck, contains part but not all of my suggestion.


(J. Plimsoll)
Secretary

2nd February 1969


IRAQ EXECUTIONS

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"The timing and the manner of the executions have been condemned in many parts of the world. They have not been accorded complete approbation in other Arab countries, and this encourages us to urge that constructive efforts be continued to lay the conditions for some settlement in the Middle East and easing of tensions and to frustrate the extremists".

3. The final text, which was approved by the Prime Minister himself after being cleared with Mr Hasluck, contains part but not all of my suggestion.


(J. Plimsoll)
Secretary

7 173/10/1

2nd February 1969

IRAK EXECUTIONS

Late this afternoon Mr Hewitt told me that the Prime Minister wanted a message sent to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council of the United Nations on the Irak executions. The Prime Minister had given Mr Hewitt the outline of what he wanted to say, and Mr Hewitt was preparing it for me to see.

2. I suggested the inclusion of the following:

"The timing and the manner of the executions have been condemned in many parts of the world. They have not been accorded complete approbation in other Arab countries, and this encourages us to urge that constructive efforts be continued to lay the conditions for some settlement in the Middle East and easing of tensions and to frustrate the extremists".

3. The final text, which was approved by the Prime Minister himself after being cleared with Mr Hasluck, contains part but not all of my suggestion.

J. Plimsoll
(J. Plimsoll)
Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

MJ

I.93283

FROM

DATED 2/11/68
0900 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BEIRUT

REC'd 2/11/68
2100 LT

937 UNCLASSIFIED

FOR TRADE

MARKETING OFFICER REPORTS FROM BAGHDAD NEW IMPORT LICENCES
MOST GOODS WILL BE ISSUED IRAQ AROUND JANUARY FEBRUARY 1969.
STRONGLY RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT ADVERTISES THIS SOONEST IN ALL
POSSIBLE MEDIA INCLUDING OVERSEAS TRADING REQUESTING AUSTRALIAN
SUPPLIERS FOLLOW UP THEIR PREVIOUS CONTACT UPDATING THEIR CANDF
BASRAH OFFERS.

GOOD POSSIBILITIES AND POTENTIAL FOR DIRECT SHIPPING TO
BASRAH.

PRESENT SHIPPING POSSIBILITIES VIA KUWAIT UNKNOWN TO MANY
AUSTRALIANS AND IRAQIS.

SUGGEST YOU OBTAIN RELEVANT SHIPPING INFORMATION FOR INCLUSION
IN LICENCE PUBLICITY RELEASE.

T. & I. (C)
D.C.O.
P.M'S

2/11/68

File 173/10/1

FAS(3) ER FAS(4) AFME

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No. 173/10/1

DATE 16/10/68

SUBJECT Security - Iraq

FOR ¹ On 17/10/1

² File 173/10/1

Iraq has recently shown any greater instability than is normal in the Middle East. The recent two-phase coup d'etat was bloodless. The political plotting which doubtless continues seems to be an internal activity of Baathist and military circles. The Kurdish areas are a perennial problem and a potential source of unrest but even if there were trouble there it would not affect foreign experts working in the non-Kurdish areas of Iraq.

There are no particular factors which are likely to endanger foreign experts, apart from that of the Arab/Israeli dispute. If that came to further hostilities, Iraqi behaviour would be unpredictable, but presumably would be no more dangerous than in June 1967

MUK AFME

14th October, 1968.

NOTE FOR FILE:

MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY : POSSIBLE ASSOCIATION
WITH U.N.D.P. PROJECT IN IRAQ

Professor Philp of Macquarie University rang me this afternoon apropos of his letter to me and my reply, for which he expressed thanks. He said that the real point of his letter had arisen from discussion he had had with Sir Garfield Barwick, who had suggested that Philp talk to External Affairs before becoming committed to the Iraq project. Apparently Sir Garfield's worry had been that the Government might feel that the committal of skilled scientists and technicians and specialised equipment from Macquarie University to a long-term development project in Iraq ran counter to Australia's policy of devoting its relatively scarce development resources to South and South East Asian countries as a general rule.

Professor Philp pointed out that, if the University were to agree to take on the project, the cost would be borne in full by U.N.D.P., and would probably amount to around one-and-a-half million U.S. Dollars. The drain on the University's (and thus Australia's) resources would be reflected mainly in the diversion to the project of skilled man-power. In response to my question, Philp said he calculated that the services of five experts would be required for a period of approximately five years.

Philp said that the University was not yet committed in any way. He himself would be going to the U.S. shortly to discuss the project with U.N.D.P. He would try to avoid any commitment until he had returned to Australia; but he was anxious not to lose the prospect of substantial U.N.D.P. funds for a university project. He hoped, therefore, that he would be able to discuss the matter further with us after his return from the United States.

- ① Mr Bookin
- ② Dr Thompson
- ③ Lile

*In respect, I would
have liked to see Macquarie
expand its efforts nearer home.
What is security situation in Iraq
these days?*

2/..

Mr Kinkley

*See Mr Bookin's question.
What is security situation
in Iraq? 12.15/10*

I said I thought this would a good idea. I added that, speaking personally, I did not believe there would be an unfavourable reaction, at any rate from the Government, if the University decided to take on the Iraq project. It was, of course, true that Australian Government aid funds and resources were, for the most part, directed as a matter of policy towards developing countries in the region closest to Australia. This meant that we generally had to turn down requests for development aid further afield. But as I understood that in the case of the Iraq project the whole of the financial cost was to be borne by U.N.D.P., I did not myself believe that the employment of five university experts on a reputable project in Iraq for five years - provided the University itself could stand the strain - would be an unacceptable drain on skilled man-power. On the contrary, I thought it could be represented as reflecting credit not only on the University, but also on Australia.


(L.R. McLarty)

Secretary

Do you want to see Prof. Philp?

Dr. C. J. ~~Philp~~

Mr. Barker 15/10

Dr. Thompson

His office rang on Friday 11 October
& will ring again Monday 14th.

I shall see him if he comes, &
then let him see some other
J. H. M. 14/10/68

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No


DATE 10th October, 1968.

SUBJECT

IRAQ - PROFESSOR PHILP.

FOR THE ACTING
SECRETARY

A reply to Professor Philp along the lines
of the attached might be appropriate.



(J.W.G. Cumes)
Acting First Assistant Secretary,
Division IV.

*Letter signed. Secretary
to see on return.*

*W.C.
10/10/68*

10th October, 1968.

Dear Professor Philp,

Thank you for your letter of 2nd October, 1968, addressed to Sir James Plimsoll, in which you told us about your mission to Iraq to advise on the establishment, with the assistance of the Special Fund, of a centre for educational research in that country. You mentioned that the School of Education may be asked to assist the Government of Iraq in the establishment of the research centre.

We do not see that there would be any conflict between the mission you propose to undertake and the general policy of the Australian Government in the Middle East. Your mission will of course be within the programmes of the United Nations Development Fund, to which the Australian Government contributes.

We wish your mission every success. Perhaps I should just add, in case there might be any misunderstanding, that we take it, from your letter, that there is no question of any request for direct aid from the Australian Government or any direct Australian Government participation in the project.

Sir James Plimsoll will not be returning from overseas until 14th October, and will be remaining in Australia only a short time before undertaking a further official visit overseas in the latter part of October. In these circumstances, it would be extremely difficult for me to say that he would be free on any of the three dates you have suggested. Perhaps you might like to make arrangements by telephone with his office next week to see either him or some other appropriate senior officer of the department.

Yours sincerely,

L.R. McIntyre
(L.R. McIntyre)
Acting Secretary.

Professor H.W.S. Philp,
Professor of Education and Head of School,
School of Education,
Macquarie University,
NORTH RYDE. N.S.W. 2113.

URGENT
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DR CUMES
FILE NO.
DATE

SUBJECT

FOR

2/10

Our opinion as being
sought.

Rec'd 9/10/2

MR. TROTSKY

I agree

2/10

No Treaty

MR. TROTSKY

9/10

I don't see why Philip
and Magnaine University
shouldn't help as much as
they like. There is no
question of official aid
funds being sought as the
government being involved
at all.

I promised to return
this in the morning, so would
be grateful for your
comments.

2/10

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

URGENT

FILE No. 173/10/1

DATE 8/10/68

SUBJECT

Iraq

FOR Dr Cumes

Mr Bennett and I can see no conflict with official policy in the proposed activities outlined by Prof. Phelps. We have been able to preserve reasonably good relations with Iraq despite the Arab/Israeli dispute, and our interest is in maintaining these — in view of trade, Qantas overflight rights, and our general concern not to alienate the Arab governments. Professor Phelps's assignment would help towards that object.

MUK

AFME



School of Education

**MACQUARIE
UNIVERSITY**

NORTH RYDE NEW SOUTH WALES 2113

TELEPHONE: 887000

TELEGRAMS & CABLES: 'MACQUINIV' NORTH RYDE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE:

2nd October, 1968.

Sir James Plimsoll, C.B.E.,
Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, 2600.

Dear Sir James,

I am writing to you at the suggestion of Sir Garfield Barwick, in his capacity as Chancellor of this University. I have just been invited by the United Nations Development Fund to act as leader of a "feasibility mission" to Iraq to advise on the establishment, with the assistance of the Special Fund, of a Centre for Educational Research in that country. This approach to me is, of course, in my personal capacity but it appears possible that as a consequence of the mission, the School of Education may be invited to assist the Government in the establishment of the Research Centre.

Sir Garfield felt, and with this I would agree, that I should discuss this possibility with you before embarking on the mission, in order to ensure that there was no conflict with general government policy in the Middle East. I am due to leave Australia for Baghdad in about four weeks time, and would be free to come to Canberra during next week or the following week, if this is suitable to you. The best possible dates for me, because of University teaching and other commitments, would be Thursday, 17th October, Thursday 24th or Friday 25th October.

Yours sincerely,

H. W. S. PHILP
Professor of Education and Head of School

Dr. James
For urgent comments +
suggestions as to reply to be
sent to Prof. Philp.
Handwritten
5/10/68

Rec'd 4-10-68

10th October, 1968.

IRAQ - PROFESSOR PHILP.

THE ACTING
SECRETARY A reply to Professor Philp along the lines
of the attached might be appropriate.



(J.W.C. Cumes)
Acting First Assistant Secretary,
Division IV.

Registry

CONFIDENTIAL

Australian Embassy
Beirut.

File No.

Memo No. 168

11th March, 1968.



The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Visit to Iraq by Mr. D.J. Kingsmill.

Attached is a report by Mr. Kingsmill on the visit
which he made to Iraq from 26th February to 4th March, 1968.

2. Copies of this memorandum together with its attachment are being sent to the Australian Embassies in Cairo, Tel Aviv, Paris, and Washington and to the office of the Senior External Affairs Representative at the Australian High Commission in London.

D.J. Kingsmill
(D.J. Kingsmill)
First Secretary.

Mr Knight ER para 10
Mr Hartley
Consular end para 11
Mr Goble - final para
Mr Cotton

File 173/10/1

[Registry: copy should
be filed on 173/2/1]

mm
20/3

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Hartley
mm

CONFIDENTIAL

Report by Mr. D.J. Kingsmill on his visit to Iraq :
26th February-4th March, 1968.

The Australian Freedom From Hunger Campaign has given money for a project which is being organised in Iraq by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organisation. The project is for the development of better wheat and barley seed in the country. On the 29th February, 1968, the President of Iraq, Major-General Abdel Rahman Aref was to lay a foundation stone for a building which will house the machinery which is the main part of the Australian gift. (The machinery will sort, select and package the wheat and barley seed). As the Freedom From Hunger Campaign in Australia was not able to send a representative they asked the Department of External Affairs whether an officer of this embassy could represent them at the ceremony. This gave me an opportunity to talk to foreign representatives in Baghdad about present Iraqi policies and attitudes, and to test the feelings of Iraqi officials towards Australia.

2. Baghdad is in many ways not unlike Cairo. It is a brown and dusty city lining the banks of one of the famous rivers of the ancient world, the Tigris. The first and most striking difference between the two cities is that Baghdad has not yet undergone the rapid modernization which has characterised the more international areas of Cairo and has made that city superficially attractive to look at. Baghdad's main street remains old and narrow, lined by colonnaded buildings of generally no more than two or three storeys. Although a new street (Avenue of the Republic) is being built parallel to the old main street, and when completed will be lined with relatively tall modern buildings, this development has only just begun and the mud hovels through which this new street has been driven are still much in evidence. A new airport is being built at some distance from Baghdad, but although the runways are nearly completed there is as yet no terminal building and it will take some years to have the airport in full operation for international flights. Meanwhile, air traffic into and out of Baghdad uses an old airport which is right beside the town, with only a short runway and with the terminal building right beside the central railway station.

3. Much British influence remains in Baghdad. Manholes in the street were made in Lancashire; red double-decker buses provide the main public transport. Army and police uniforms have a very British air and officers and N.C.O.'s generally carry swagger sticks. Here and there along the streets are bright red pillar boxes from which the mail is still regularly, and, apparently efficiently, collected. As in Britain there are also special light blue pillar boxes for airmail letters. To a visitor coming from Beirut where French influence has remained so strong, perhaps the most notable British relic is the cooking in the hotel.

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As my visit to Iraq was made chiefly in order to represent the Australian Freedom From Hunger Campaign at the ceremony on the 29th February, I was inevitably involved in many of the activities arranged by the U.N. authorities in Iraq for people connected with the project. Little of this was of much importance but my attendance was requested and I felt obliged to give the time. As I was due to leave Baghdad on the morning of 2nd March, and as Friday the 1st was the normal weekend holiday, I had no more than the preceding Tuesday and Wednesday in which to arrange and make calls in the city. The U.N. office were helpful in seeking an appointment with a senior officer of the Protocol Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but they were not successful: clearly the officials in that section were playing the game of protocol and as Australia has no accreditation in Iraq were showing by their procrastination that I had no claim on their time. The need to keep pressing for this appointment and to sit round while waiting for further news of their "progress" in arranging the appointment, reduced even further the time I had available for other calls. Nevertheless, I managed to call on the Papal Pro-Nuncio, Monsignor Maurizio Perrin, the Indian Ambassador Mr. Mahboob Ahmed, the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires Mr. Bo Johnson and, at his request, on the Minister-Counsellor in charge of British interests, Mr. Folke Persson. Finally, with great assistance from the Indian Ambassador, who asked the Director-General of the Foreign Ministry to allow me to talk with somebody in the Political Section of the Foreign Ministry, I was given an appointment on Saturday morning with Dr. Mahmoud Ali Daoud who is the Head of the Political Section and as such the No. 2 in the Ministry. In order to make this call I had to postpone my departure from Saturday morning to the next aircraft out, which was on Monday 4th March. (I had wanted to call on the French and on the Belgians - who handle American interests - but in neither case was it possible to arrange an appointment.)

5. Iraq was not greatly involved in the events of June, 1967 and Iraqi efforts were largely limited to sending troops into Jordan (thus restricting the options open to King Hussein) and to providing aircraft, but rather late. Consequently, Iraqi interest in the present situation in the Arab World takes little account of the territorial problems involved and is centred almost entirely on the problem of the refugees. The Pro-Nuncio warned me during my call that this would be the Iraqi attitude and when I called on Dr. Daoud at the Foreign Ministry, this interview (which was far too short for any really effective discussion of broad problems) was almost entirely given over to a dissertation by Dr. Daoud on the great refugee problem. It was, he said, the greatest problem in all the Arab World, even greater than the need for national development. Each Arab is affected individually and personally by the refugee problem. The numbers had increased enormously since June 1967 and some Israeli actions against the refugees were quite inhumane. (He spoke of napalm attacks and other such activities). I made no mention of the inhumanity in the Arab idea, which has governed their activities since 1948, which insists that refugees must remain refugees despite all attempts to help them out of that servitude. Dr. Daoud said that the Palestine lands must be returned to their Arab owners.

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Israel was ignoring a U.N. resolution and must be made to return to her borders of June 5th, 1967. There can be no negotiation. "If you are occupying my house, I don't talk to you about getting it back". "We Arabs" Dr. Daoud continued "are a great nation; we are not defeated". Dr. Daoud's outlining of the Arab position as it is seen by Iraq was most emotionally presented and allowed of no discussion. It is clear that whatever efforts may be made towards solving other aspects of the Middle East problem, Iraq will always insist on the solution of the refugee problem as a prior consideration: and by a solution of the refugee problem they will mean the return of Arabs to their lands in former Palestine. This is not a position which will permit much negotiation.

6. The Indian Ambassador was very forthcoming and spoke at some length about the position of Iraq in the world. While there has always been rivalry between the Tigris-Euphrates peoples and the peoples of the Nile and this continues even today, President Nasser is for Iraqis as much as for any other Arabs a symbol of Arab resurgence. Such a symbol is essential to Arabs at this time, and there is no other. It is historically new for an Arab leader defeated in battle to be restored to leadership: the normal result of such defeat is for the leader to lose his head. The Indian Ambassador had, however, seen in Baghdad last June what he is convinced was an absolutely spontaneous outburst by the Iraqis in support of President Nasser and shouting for him to reconsider his decision to resign. It seems, continued Mr. Ahmed, that the West will not understand the nature or the depth of the feeling which governs the attitude of most Arabs to President Nasser. This misunderstanding is reflected in the often false and inaccurate press reports in Western newspapers of events in the Arab World. These inaccuracies are based on past experience or on imagined past experience and they severely reduce the options open to some of the Arab countries. Iraq, for example, is not a Communist country - it is Western trained (not only in a military sense but in civilian ways as well) and all its experience is Western. It is in this context that President Aref's recent visit to Paris must be seen. Iraq does not want to give itself to the Eastern Bloc and is anxious to find an adequate balance of some kind somewhere in the Western world. At this particular time France provides the only worthwhile possibility. The Pro-Nuncio made this same point about France providing a balance and he said that Iraq's need for new Western contacts was becoming greater as the influence of the U.S.S.R. in Iraq was increasing. (The Commercial Counsellor of this embassy has pointed out that no major Russian aid project in Iraq has yet been completed and that it is possible to see in Baghdad, still in their crates and unopened, having been there for several years already, a large number of tractors and a complete automatic telephone exchange, all of which originally came from Russia.)

CONFIDENTIAL

At the time of my visit to Baghdad negotiations were under way in the Trucial States for a Union or Federation of those States, together with Bahrain and Qatar. I asked the Indian Ambassador what he thought the Iraqi attitude might be to the establishment of a new Arab State in the Gulf, especially as the idea seemed to be that it should be led by one of the Emirs. Mr. Mahboob Ahmed said that the Gulf had been part of his area until 6 months ago, but that India now had an Ambassador in Kuwait who had taken over this responsibility. From his own experience in the area he felt that Iraq would accept the changes which were being proposed, and this for two reasons: firstly Iraq was not strong enough to oppose the development and secondly, the Iraqis could be confident that the arrangements would preserve the Arab nature of the Gulf, i.e. would strengthen the Arab frontier with Iran. For it is Iran which Iraq sees as the great enemy of the Arab nation in the area. Relations between the two countries had been very bad indeed until the present Iraqi Ambassador at Tehran (who is now being transferred to Delhi) by a great personal effort restored relations to the level where the Shah has agreed to make a State visit to Baghdad. While I was in Baghdad there was an international football match between Iraq and Iran, and although Iran won by one goal to nil this did not cause the kind of riot that might have been expected had relations been less satisfactory. Nevertheless, the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires confirmed that Iraq sees Iran as a far greater enemy than any within the Arab nation itself, and Dr. Daoud told me that the Foreign Ministry has a special section to deal with Iran and Turkey "because of our very long border with them". So I would judge that it is of little importance to Iraq at this time that a new Arab country in the Gulf should be emerging under a "feudal" leader rather than a popular President: the need to strengthen the Arab nation itself is now being regarded as far more important than obedience to any dogmatic principles of Arab nationalism.

8. The Swedish Chargé d'Affaires spoke at some length about the present internal situation in Iraq. President Abdel Rahman Aref appears to have consolidated the hold on the country of the military group which his brother had led to power by overthrowing General Kassem. Mr. Johnson did not think that any threat to the present regime was likely at the present time. The most obvious threat came from Razak who has twice attempted coups in Baghdad, once against the former President Aref and once against former Prime Minister Bazzaz. Razak was imprisoned after his attempted coup against Dr. Bazzaz but he is now free and often receives visits from Army officers at his home. Nevertheless, the present regime must be watching him very closely. When President Abdel Rahman Aref succeeded his brother as President the main internal problem was the fighting between the Iraqi Army and the Kurdish tribesmen in the north of Iraq. President Aref ended the fighting and made several concessions to the Kurds (one of which was to include three Kurds in the Government which he himself formed as Prime Minister). The Kurdish leader, Mustafa Barzani has several times since 1966 declared that he supports the Iraqi State. Some tension still exists but the extent to which the present Iraqi Government is prepared to go in placating the Kurds can be shown by the fact that although all Iraqi newspapers were nationalised last December, Kurdish opposition to this act has resulted in the Kurdish newspaper "Al Taaghi" being removed from the nationalisation controls. It is now the only independent newspaper in all of Iraq. In general then, it appears that Iraq is facing a period of greater calm than it has seen for some time past.

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If peace and calm is the ground in which the seed of progress can best germinate it might be expected that Iraq is on the brink of a period of expansion. In general, however, the people I spoke to in Baghdad felt that it was more a country of decline than of development and they saw no hope of any change in this. The Swedish Chargé d'Affaires has heard it said many times that what was done in 1958 was wrong. Until that time, it is argued, there was much worthwhile planning on a long term basis for the development of Iraq, and much that has been done since 1958 has been the direct fulfillment of plans made earlier. Planning has largely given way to shambles and few people predict that those at present in power were at all likely to improve the situation. If there was one area in which there was some hope it was in the recognition, which the U.N. experts say now exists among the country's leaders, that agriculture is of great importance to the country. Much is now being done to repair the damage to the country's agriculture which resulted from their concentration on other, mainly industrial, activities. The Seed Production and Certification Programme, which was the occasion for my visit, is part of this new interest in agricultural affairs. The U.N. experts told me that the Minister for Agriculture was a very able man and one of the strongest in the present Cabinet.

10. In my conversation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Dr. Daoud I spoke at some length about Iraqi-Australian relations. I pointed out that Australia had been criticised by Iraq for its voting at the Special General Assembly of the U.N. last year and Iraq had taken action to restrict the importation of some Australian goods into the country. While Iraq was, of course, entitled to take whatever action she wished it was unfortunate that since that time there had been little if any contact between the two countries which might lead to a better mutual understanding of the issues involved; although my visit was a private one I had hoped to be able to talk to people in the Foreign Ministry but, as I thought he was aware, this had proved quite difficult. Dr. Daoud replied that he was sorry if there had been any difficulty. He agreed with me that further contact between our two countries was the best way to lead to greater understanding of each other's policies and actions. Perhaps the Australian Government might not want to extend its contacts at an official level because it would not want to offend other interests. (He did not say what he thought these interests might be.) If this was so, unofficial contacts should be established, perhaps by an exchange of university lecturers or by the participation by Australian humanitarian organisations in the work being done for the refugees. I told Dr. Daoud that there was no question of "offending other interests" but that Australia's own interests made it necessary for us to concentrate our efforts in our own region. We were already making a contribution to the work being done for the refugees. Perhaps university contacts might be arranged but this would be no substitute for official contacts at the highest possible level. Would the Iraqi authorities, I asked, be prepared to accept occasional visits to Baghdad by the Ambassador or by me. To this Dr. Daoud replied "yes, willingly." He suggested that whenever we wished to visit Iraq we contact the Iraq Embassy here in Beirut and that all the necessary arrangements could be made.

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Two other aspects of Australian relations in Iraq were brought up by different people while I was there. The Minister-Counsellor at the Swedish Embassy in charge of British interests asked me what could be done for intending migrants to Australia, many of whom had already gone a long way towards completing the necessary procedures. I said that I would put his question to the representatives in Beirut of the Department of Immigration and send him a letter. He was particularly anxious about one man, a Christian from Northern Iraq, who had already sold his house and furniture and was ready to leave. The Department of Immigration in Canberra had given approval for a visa to be issued to him provided he met certain further requirements. The man himself was waiting for me in the lobby of the former British Embassy. I felt obliged to tell him in public and in front of many other Iraqis present in the office that my visit was unofficial, I was not an Immigration officer, I could, during my visit, discuss no aspect of Immigration policy or procedures and I could give him no answer to his enquiry. (I also made it clear to the Swedish authorities that the question of Australian immigration activity in some Arab countries had already caused difficulties and I was not prepared to do anything which might renew these difficulties.) I have since discussed this problem with the Senior Migration Officer in Beirut and it appears that no action of any kind can be taken until arrangements can be made for the usual security checks to be made in Baghdad. This is not likely to happen until the British return to Iraq and it was the view of the Swedish authorities that this is not likely to happen in the immediate future. (I should perhaps point out here that the Pro-Nuncio was anxious to impress on me the difficulties at present being faced by Christians - mostly Assyrian - who live in the Kurdish area in the north of Iraq and who have recently been the victims of some persecution by the Moslem majority in the country. Many of them, he said, are anxious to move out of the country and would like to go to Australia. Again it appears nothing can be done until the British return to Baghdad. The second question which was raised with me while I was there was the question of consular assistance for Australian residents. An Australian working with the U.N. in Iraq told me that there were three Australian families in the country and at least two Australian girls married to local residents. He asked if the Swedish Embassy was looking after Australians as it was looking after the British. I replied that no arrangements of this kind had been made and that as far as I was aware Australians in Iraq had no consular protection of any kind. I would, however, mention this point to the Australian authorities.

12. My visit to Iraq was, I think, the first to that country by an Australian diplomatic officer since Mr. Lavett went there from Cairo in 1964. While my efforts to talk to Iraqi officials met with some obstruction, chiefly I think because of protocol, there is no doubt that a basis has been established for the making of more frequent visits in the future. I think that for so long as we are not accredited in any way in Baghdad there will always be reluctance on the part of some Iraqi officials to speak to us at all frankly. Nevertheless, it is likely that

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Two other aspects of Australian relations in Iraq were brought up by different people while I was there. The Minister-Counsellor at the Swedish Embassy in charge of British interests asked me what could be done for intending migrants to Australia, many of whom had already gone a long way towards completing the necessary procedures. I said that I would put his question to the representatives in Beirut of the Department of Immigration and send him a letter. He was particularly anxious about one man, a Christian from Northern Iraq, who had already sold his house and furniture and was ready to leave. The Department of Immigration in Canberra had given approval for a visa to be issued to him provided he met certain further requirements. The man himself was waiting for me in the lobby of the former British Embassy. I felt obliged to tell him in public and in front of many other Iraqis present in the office that my visit was unofficial, I was not an Immigration officer, I could, during my visit, discuss no aspect of Immigration policy or procedures and I could give him no answer to his enquiry. (I also made it clear to the Swedish authorities that the question of Australian immigration activity in some Arab countries had already caused difficulties and I was not prepared to do anything which might renew these difficulties.) I have since discussed this problem with the Senior Migration Officer in Beirut and it appears that no action of any kind can be taken until arrangements can be made for the usual security checks to be made in Baghdad. This is not likely to happen until the British return to Iraq and it was the view of the Swedish authorities that this is not likely to happen in the immediate future. (I should perhaps point out here that the Pro-Nuncio was anxious to impress on me the difficulties at present being faced by Christians - mostly Assyrian - who live in the Kurdish area in the north of Iraq and who have recently been the victims of some persecution by the Moslem majority in the country. Many of them, he said, are anxious to move out of the country and would like to go to Australia. Again it appears nothing can be done until the British return to Baghdad. The second question which was raised with me while I was there was the question of consular assistance for Australian residents. An Australian working with the U.N. in Iraq told me that there were three Australian families in the country and at least two Australian girls married to local residents. He asked if the Swedish Embassy was looking after Australians as it was looking after the British. I replied that no arrangements of this kind had been made and that as far as I was aware Australians in Iraq had no consular protection of any kind. I would, however, mention this point to the Australian authorities.

12. My visit to Iraq was, I think, the first to that country by an Australian diplomatic officer since Mr. Lavett went there from Cairo in 1964. While my efforts to talk to Iraqi officials met with some obstruction, chiefly I think because of protocol, there is no doubt that a basis has been established for the making of more frequent visits in the future. I think that for so long as we are not accredited in any way in Baghdad there will always be reluctance on the part of some Iraqi officials to speak to us at all frankly. Nevertheless, it is likely that

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

7.

occasional visits to Baghdad could provide us with a useful insight into Iraqi attitudes and policies. The Canadian Ambassador in Tehran is accredited at the same time in Baghdad and he visits Iraq two or three times a year. This arrangement seems perfectly satisfactory to the Iraqis and it gives the Canadian commercial representative an official status in the country. It might be worth our while to consider a similar arrangement, but I suggest that we do nothing about this until after the Ambassador has visited Iraq and has seen whether or not his lack of official status in that country detracts too much from the effectiveness of his visit.

du.

CONFIDENTIAL



AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY

BEIRUT

501/2/1

In reply quote No. 226

Memorandum No.

19th April, 1968.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

File 173/10/1

(original on 173/11/51)

British Representation in Iraq.

You may be interested to know that today's Beirut press announces that the British Ambassador in Cairo, Sir Harold Beeley, is today flying to Baghdad for discussions about the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries. According to the "Daily Star", discussions have been going on in Cairo for some months.

2. It would seem that the discussions have already reached some finality. We have received a letter from a junior Foreign Office official who is now en route from London to Beirut. According to his letter he expects to stay here until about the end of June before going on to Iraq to take up a position in the (by then) newly re-opened British Embassy at Baghdad.

3. The likelihood that the British may soon reopen their embassy in Baghdad would seem to provide some confirmation of the point that we made in the last paragraph of the notes attached to our memorandum No. 221 of 18th April 1968.

4. In the attachment to our memorandum No. 168 of 11th March 1968 we made mention of the difficulties faced by Iraqis who wish to migrate to Australia. Since the closure of the British Embassy in Baghdad after the June 1967 war, there has been nobody in Iraq able to deal with applications for migration to Australia. It may soon be possible for Australia's immigration activities in Baghdad to be resumed.

(D.J. Kingsmill)
First Secretary.



W. A. Wright

With the Compliments

of the

Minister for Trade and Industry

J. V. Dunn
28/2/68

M. Kirtley

PARLIAMENT HOUSE
CANBERRA



KRAFT FOODS LIMITED

EXPORT DIVISION

CABLES: "KRAFTCO" MELBOURNE . . . TELEPHONE: 64 0111
POSTAL ADDRESS: BOX 1673 N, G.P.O. MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA

JMcC:EH:75

26th February, 1968.

Mr. J. V. Quinn,
Department of Trade and Industry,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Dear Joe,

I am writing to thank you for the time which you gave to Ian Martin and me last Thursday and for the arrangements which enabled us to see so many other people about our little problems.

We feel the visit was very worthwhile and we enjoyed very much meeting you and discussing matters broadly with you and Jim Gibbons before we got on to the other members of your Department.


Later in the afternoon we also had a very helpful session with Mr. Arnott and Mr. Bob Cotton of the Department of External Affairs.

Finally, to finish the day, I made an unheralded call on Angus Paltridge and spent a few minutes with him and also met Gordon Mathams at that time.

So you can see the day was very full and we regard it as being very beneficial, so once again I would like to express my thanks for the courtesy and trouble you took in this connection, and ask that you please pass our thanks to the various other people who we had the pleasure of meeting. I look forward to being able to trouble you again at some later date when we have matters to discuss and can make another pilgrimage to Canberra.

Yours Sincerely,
J. McCulloch

Manager - Export Division
KRAFT FOODS LIMITED



File 173/10/1



KRAFT FOODS LIMITED

EXPORT DIVISION

CABLES: "KRAFTCO" MELBOURNE . . . TELEPHONE: 64 0111
POSTAL ADDRESS: BOX 1673 N, G.P.O. MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA

JMcC:EH:75

26th February, 1968.

Mr. L. Arnott,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

M. Kinsley
R. Cotton

Dear Mr. Arnott,

I am writing to thank you and Mr. Bob Cotton for the time and trouble you devoted to Ian Martin and me last Thursday. Between the Department of Trade and yourselves, we had a very valuable day and it was of particular interest to both of us to hear your comments on the Arab world and Iran, which are so important to us and of such immediate interest.

Thank you both very much indeed for your assistance and I hope we may have the opportunity of conferring with you again before too long, possibly after these trips have been made.

Yours Sincerely,
J. McCulloch

John McCulloch
Manager - Export Division
KRAFT FOODS LIMITED

file 173/10/1

INWARD CABLEGRAM

JMH

1.14977

FROM

DATED 22/2/68
1400 LTAUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BEIRUT.REC'D 23/2/68
0346 LT149 UNCLASSIFIED

FROM FORSYTH

YOUR 100

file 173/10/1

KINGSMILL AVAILABLE IF REQUIRED. WILL NEED FULL CABLED BRIEF
PLACE PURPOSE OTHER PARTICIPANTS ETC. ASSUME CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE
WILL ARRANGE FORMAL NOMINATION.

2. BECAUSE FRIDAY IS WEEKEND HOLIDAY THERE, SUGGEST HE HAVE TIME
FOR CONVERSATIONS IN CAPITAL BEFORE FUNCTION BUT THIS WILL NEED
EARLY DECISION BECAUSE SEVERAL DAYS ADVANCE NOTICE NEEDED FOR TRAVEL
BOOKINGS VISAS AND OTHER CLEARANCES.

3. I WOULD LIKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO BE ADEQUATELY UTILISED.

E.A. (2101/3/26)

23/2/68

SEC DEP SEC FAS(2) UN FAS(3) ER AID@ FAS(4)
EAMEC AFME SAS(MS) STAFF PERS

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

MJW

O. 12377

TO

Sent 21/2/68
1143

Australian Embassy
BEIRUT

file 173/10/1

100 RESTRICTED

Freedom from Hunger Campaign

On Thursday 29th the President of Iraq will be attending a ceremony in Northern Iraq, concerning a joint FAO/Freedom from Hunger Seed Improvement Project. The Australian Freedom from Hunger Campaign, which has contributed \$187,000 to the project, has been asked if an Australian representative could be present at the ceremony.

2. We should be grateful for early advice as to whether Ambassador or Kingsmill would be in a position to attend ceremony as Australian representative, if required.

E.A. (2101/3/26)

21/2/68

SEC DEP SEC FAS(3) AID FAS(4) EAMEC AFME ER SAS(MS)

2101/3/26

16th February, 1968

AUSTRALIAN FREEDOM FROM HUNGER CAMPAIGN - IRAQ

MR BRENNAN

Please refer to my minute of 12th February on the above subject.

2. Mr Arnott has recommended that we look into the possibility of Mr Forsyth travelling to the ceremony which is to be held in Northern Iraq on 29th February.

3. Could you let me know please whether he would be available for this visit?

file 173/10/1

L
(L. W. Engledow)
Assistant Secretary

EXTERNAL AID BRANCH

Mr. Kinley
Mr. Catto 19/2



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

FF:

I. 74438.

FROM:

Dated: 9th November, 1967.
1600 LT.

Australian Embassy,
BEIRUT.

Rec'd: 10th November, 1967.
0445 LT.

616. CONFIDENTIAL.

For Trade from Thompson.

Unable to obtain definite commitment from Iraq officials to relax ban on Australian imports including cheese. However, Economic Ministry officials promise to review next few days and will take into consideration our discussions. My impression is we will be favourably treated with partial relaxation and perhaps total. Importers have been urged to re-apply for licences to test impression.

2. Situation in the area generally disturbed and not conducive to free trade. Most business ad hoc. Understand new Ministry shuffle will take place soon.

3. Grain Board placed order for 30,000 tons of corn through Dalgety last week.

4. Report being prepared.

MIN. & DEPT T. & I.
MIN. & DEPT P.I.
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
TREASURER & TREASURY
P.M.'s.

See 173/10/1
10th November, 1967.

SEC DS FAS(1) SEA FAS(3) ICR PIO FAS(4)
EAMEC AFME C ER

CHE 'KF

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY

TELEPHONE 614111

CANBERRA, A.C.T.




The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

20th September 1967
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
'CANBERRA'
21 SEP 1967
File No. 173/10/1
INDEX fairs SUB. INDEX

Attention - Mr. Lavett

No doubt the attached copy of a letter from Iraq which has been sent to us by Ranleigh Ware Pty. Ltd., of South Australia, will be of interest to you.

J. V. Quinn
(J.V. Quinn)
Director,
International Trade Relations
Division

~~Mr. Kunkley~~ Mr. Kunkley
CHECKED BY Mr. Arnold


CABLES AND TELEGRAMS ADDRESS TO 'SECTRADE CANBERRA'

IRAQ STORES CO.
CHIEF OF
GROSS DI - BACK

Baghdad - Iraq

Messrs. Ranleigh Ware Pty. Ltd.,
EDWARDS TOWN,
SOUTH AUSTRALIA.

Baghdad, 11th July 1967



Continued:

Apart from the happy business relations that have existed between our two firms, our people have been great admirers of your country for its rich traditions of justice, honour and freedom.

We therefore were shocked to see your Government forget these traditions in the uncalculated support for aggression and genocide as practised recently by Israel. It may have been too much to expect support for the Arabs side, but your Government's support of the Israeli side so intently and flagrant is beyond belief. It could at least have taken a neutral stand.

Please do not think that we are trying to blame your Government for the Arab military defeat. What we blame it for is the unnecessary support it gave to the subsequent Israeli acts against the Arab civilians in the areas occupied by the Israeli army. They were massacred on mass, those who were not killed were forced at the point of the bayonet to leave their homes and businesses and become refugees, all their property down to the smallest valuables was seized and their homes were destroyed. In certain cases whole Arab villages and towns were razed to the ground. Against all international law and practice, even hospitals, ambulances cars and babies were not left immune. For any Government that has adhered to the United Nations Charter and the Bill of Human Rights to condemn such acts brands that Government in the annals of history. And the fact that the Jews had been victims to such acts perpetrated by the Nazis does not justify them in subjecting the Arabs to similar acts, especially as the Arabs had never persecuted the Jews who had always found refuge in Arab countries when they were being driven out of other places.

This is not a political lecture, but merely intended to let you know why our Government, with the full support of the people, is giving serious consideration to the possibility of stopping all imports from your country. For this purpose, please consider all the orders placed with you as cancelled, except where a letter of credit has been or will be opened or the goods have actually been shipped.

Nevertheless, we are still hopeful that one day better relations will guide the steps of your political leaders, so that normal business relations between our two firms can be resumed.

Very truly yours,

ALT HILMAN AB-ELMEZ
Chairman & General Manager

*Mr. Quinlan
apptd. to this to Enkman
11/8/67*

ARM/BI

*to information
Shulman
7/8/67*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

173/10/1

FH:

I.56317.

FROM:

DATED:

26TH AUGUST, 1967.
1300 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BEIRUT.

REC'D:

27TH AUGUST, 1967.
0344 LT

467. CONFIDENTIAL.

IRAQ TRADE.

YOUR 324.

MARKETING OFFICER SAAD RETURNED FROM BAGDAD 25TH AUGUST AND ADVISES

(1) GOODS OF BRITAIN, UNITED STATES, WEST GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS BANNED BY LAW,
(2) GOODS OF ALL OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH VOTED AGAINST THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT RESOLUTION AT THE SPECIAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY ARE VIRTUALLY (WORD OMITTED) BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, VIZ, IRAQ TRADE PATTERN IS BEING REARRANGED FOR PURCHASE, FIRSTLY, FROM OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, SECONDLY, FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH VOTED FOR NON-ALIGNED, THIRDLY, FROM COUNTRIES WHICH ABSTAINED ON THAT VOTE AND ONLY LASTLY AND WHERE THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE FROM COUNTRIES WHICH VOTED AGAINST THE DRAFT.

2. AUSTRALIAN CHEESE WILL BE REPLACED BY CHEESE FROM FINLAND.
ON THE INSISTENCE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GRAIN BOARD AND BECAUSE THERE IS NO ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE IRAQ WILL STILL BUY AUSTRALIAN WHEAT (ORDER FOR 132,000 TONS WAS RECENTLY PLACED.)
CARS AND SPARES WILL STILL BE (WORD OMITTED) FOR THE POLICE WHO HAVE STANDARDISED ON HOLDENS.

3. SAAD GAINED STRONG IMPRESSION IN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES THAT THE MINISTER AND THE UNDER-SECRETARY ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BOYCOTT POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION MAY SOON BE REPLACED AND THAT SUCH CHANGE MIGHT MEAN MORE FAVOURABLE TREATMENT OF WESTERN TRADE.

.../2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

7

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

FH:

-2-

I.56317

HE WAS TOLD ALSO THAT FRANCE AND ITALY ARE USING ALL MEANS OF PRESSURE BEFORE INCLUDING THE TRADITIONAL MIDDLE EAST MONETARY PERSUASION TO RETAIN THEIR INTERESTS.

4. FROM DISCUSSION WITH SAAD WE GETHER THAT UNLESS CHANGE OF POLICY OCCURS, EVEN A PARTIAL PRESERVATION OF AUSTRALIAN TRADING IN IRAQ WOULD REQUIRE EXPLANATION SATISFACTORY TO IRAQ OF OUR VOTING AT THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL ASSEMBLY.

WE FIND IT DIFFICULT HERE TO SEE WHAT PRESENTATION OR ARGUMENT WOULD BE CONVINCING.

5. SAADS FULL REPORT WILL FOLLOW BY BAG NEXT WEEK.

T. & I.
E.A.
P.M. 'S

27TH AUGUST, 1967.

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) FAS(2) FAS(3) FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME ER

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM *173/10/1*

LES

I.53148

FROM:

Dated: 11th August, 1967.
2330 LT

Australian Embassy,
BEIRUT.

Rec'd: 12th August, 1967.
0909 LT

417 CONFIDENTIAL.

Iraq. Trade.

Your 303 and our 413.

We are arranging for Marketing Officer, Saad to visit
Iraq.

We believe it would be impolitic for him to be there during the conference of Arab economic, finance and petroleum Ministers starting Tuesday 15th August, and also more practical for him to examine situation after that conference. Minister of National Economy, Hamade (see our 412) told me that conference would probably last two to three and at the most four days. Consequently we plan visit should begin about 20th August.

Forsyth.

E.A.
T. & I.
DEFENCE
P.M.'S

13th August, 1967.

SEC DS FAS(1) SEA DL SA FAS(2) UN PACAM AMSP PPO FAS(3)
AS(JIC) INT C&P ICR PIO FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME ER SAS(MS)

BELGRADE CAIRO LONDON MOSCOW NEW YORK(UN) OTTAWA
PARIS TEL AVIV WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

7 173/1011
0.41607.

ERH

TO:

SENT:

21ST JULY, 1967.
2111 LT.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BEIRUT...267.

REPEATED (FOR INFORMATION)

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
CAIRO...326.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON...2465.

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK....689.

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
LONDON...7604.
(FOR EXTERNAL)

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
TEL AVIV...263.

CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

IRAQ - RELATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA.

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE HAS BEEN ADVISED BY AUSTRALIAN MANUFACTURERS REPRESENTATIVE IN BAGHDAD THAT IRAQ HAS PROHIBITED THE IMPORTATION OF AUSTRALIAN PRODUCTS, WITH EFFECT FROM 30TH JULY.

2. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD CHECK ON THIS REPORT.

IF THERE IS SUBSTANCE IN IT, WE SHOULD LIKE TO KNOW IN PARTICULAR-

- (A) WHETHER THE PROHIBITION APPLIES TO ALL AUSTRALIAN GOODS.,
- (B) THE PURPOSE OF THE PROHIBITION.,
- (C) WHETHER ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT HAS BEEN MADE BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT.,
- (D) THE PROSPECT OF OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS TAKING SIMILAR ACTION.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

23RD JULY, 1967.

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) DL FAS(2) UN FAS(3) AS(JIC) INT
ICR PIO FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME ER SAS(MS)
PARIS BELGRADE MOSCOW

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

7

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

7 173/10/11

CONFIDENTIAL

ERH

0.41607.

TO:

SENT:

21ST JULY, 1967.
2111 LT.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BEIRUT...267.

REPEATED (FOR INFORMATION)

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
CAIRO...326.

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MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

23RD JULY, 1967.

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) DL FAS(2) UN FAS(3) AS(JIC) INT
ICR PIO FAS(4) EAMEC E AFME ER SAS(MS)
PARIS BELGRADE MOSCOW

Q

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

CABLE ADDRESS
AUSTUNAT, NEW YORK

TELEPHONE
YUKON 6-7676

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

File No. 351/2. 351/2/3. 409/1 355/8. 17th April 1967

Memo. No. 448

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA A.C.T.



TALK WITH MR KADHIM KHALAF, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS

The following are notes of a talk with Mr Kadhim Khalaf, Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations, on whom I called on 12th April, 1967, in the company of Mr Malcolm Booker from the Department of External Affairs and Mr R.S. Swift from the Department of Territories.

2. In the course of a very frank and good humoured talk Khalaf made the point that while Australia was respected in the Committee of Twenty-four, the majority of members could not understand why on almost every issue we voted negatively and with the small group of colonial powers. Surely there were some issues on which we thought differently and could express a vote in support of the anti-colonial majority.
3. In counter attack, Booker described the situation in Australia and its territories when we were confronted with resolutions passed by the United Nations in terms which were unreal and indeed outrageous. The Australian people believed that their country was a member in good standing of the United Nations. We undertook all our responsibilities, met our obligations, paid our dues, contributed to operations and subscribed largely to voluntary funds. Yet there was no understanding of our problems or of our territories and no appreciation of the way in which we carried out our responsibilities.
4. Khalaf said that Australia had to realise that it was in a different position from most other countries. By fortune or our own efforts we were a stable prosperous community. Other countries including his own had not yet reached that happy state. They were still in a state of chaos and many people thought only through further chaos could conditions improve. There was no ill will towards Australia, only a feeling that we did not understand the problems of the majority.
5. Khalaf argued strongly in favour of Australia agreeing to receiving visiting missions of the Committee of Twenty-four to our territories. He was not suggesting that the Committee of Twenty-four as a whole hold special sessions in our area. The sub-committee dealing with our territories, however, might send a representative group of three or four people to make an independent survey. No matter what Australian representatives said, members of the United Nations would have to be convinced by their own representatives or by someone more impartial than representatives of the administering authority.
6. In reply, it was pointed out that visiting missions of the Trusteeship Council regularly visited Australian territories. There was a mass of written material about them. Our experiences with these visiting missions were not always happy. Certain representatives had come back denying what in fact they had seen and presenting accounts in the United Nations which were simply not true. We therefore had not much

Copy passed to
Mr. [illegible] and
Mr. [illegible] - [illegible]
Copy to Territories

PLEASE DESTROY DUPLICATE COPY
AND ATTACHMENT IF NOT REQUIRED

CHECKED [initials]

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. [illegible] 21-70 rel
Mr. [illegible]
[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

confidence in how certain other representatives would behave going as they would with pre-conceived ideas and coming from countries which had strong doctrinaire views about colonialism. If we were to hand-pick some representatives maybe this might be avoided. Khalaf said that the choice would have to be made by the Committee of Twenty-four.

7. Khalaf also suggested that independent reports by the Secretariat could help. We asked whether Djermakoye would be a man whose report would be respected. He indicated that Djermakoye was too much of a conservative French African. He mentioned, however, the name of Deribbing, the Swede chosen by the Secretary-General to investigate Cambodian-Thai relations.

8. On Puerto Rico, Khalaf argued strongly that the General Assembly could and by inference should re-consider this question. The decision taken at the 8th General Assembly would not have been taken if the membership then had been as now. He rejected our arguments that once a matter had been decided it was dangerous for the General Assembly to re-open it. He remarked that Israel would not have become a member of the United Nations in the circumstances of its present composition.

Patrick Shaw

(Patrick Shaw)

Permanent Representative

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

173/10/1

JAB

I.50710

FROM:

DATED: 5TH OCTOBER, 1966.
1710 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
LONDON.

REC'D: 6TH OCTOBER, 1966.
0222 LT

9823. UNCLASSIFIED.

THE FOLLOWING NOTE NO 2/6 DATED 28TH SEPTEMBER 1966
HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE EMBASSY OF IRAQ.

THE EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ PRESENTS ITS
COMPLIMENTS TO THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION AND HAS
THE HONOUR TO INFORM THEM THAT THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES HAVE
AGREED TO EXTEND THE LICENCE GRANTED TO THE AUSTRALIAN
AIRWAYS TO OPERATE IN IRAQ FOR A FURTHER YEAR TO END ON THE
31ST AUGUST 1967 OR BEFORE THAT DATE SHOULD AN AIR AGREEMENT
BETWEEN AUSTRALIAN AND IRAQ BE CONCLUDED UNDER THE SAME
CONDITIONS AS PREVIOUSLY.

MIN. & DEPT CIVIL AVIATION (MT/T)
E.A.
P.M.'S.

6TH OCTOBER, 1966.

A/SEC FAS(4) EAMEC AFME ER@

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

173/10/1

PJG

I.43261

FROM:

DATED: 25TH AUGUST, 1966
1645 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

REC'D: 26TH AUGUST, 1966
2206 LT

3432 CONFIDENTIAL.

PL 480-IRAN.

ALEXANDER (STATE), ADVISED TODAY THAT IN LIEU OF TALLOW PROPOSAL ADVISED IN OUR 3066, THEY ARE PROPOSING TO EXTEND TO 30TH JUNE, 1967, THE TITLE IV AGREEMENT CONCLUDED IN DECEMBER 1964 WHICH PROVIDED FOR THE SUPPLY OF 10 THOUSAND METRIC TONS OF WHEAT TO PERSI-GAS.

THE POSITION IS THAT PERSI-GAS WERE UNABLE TO TAKE UP THE WHOLE QUANTITY WITHIN THE TIME ORIGINALLY SPECIFIED AND THE AGREEMENT WAS EXTENDED TO FISCAL YEAR 1966.

IMPORT RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AST MARCH, HOWEVER, PREVENTED FULFILMENT OF THE AGREEMENT AND 4 THOUSAND TONS STILL REMAIN TO BE SUPPLIED.

A RECENT DECISION BY THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TO REMOVE THE RESTRICTIONS WILL NOW PERMIT THIS TO BE DONE.

2. PLEASE ADVISE.

MIN. & DEPT T. & I.
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT P.I.
TREASURER & TREASURY
P.M'S DEPT
P.M'S

27TH ~~AUGUST~~ 1966

SEC FAS(1) FAS(2) PACAM AMSP PPO FAS(3) ICR PIO
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

173/10/1

MC:

0:13685

TO:

Sent: 15th April, 1966.
1645

His Excellency Mr Adnan-Al-Panachi,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
BAGHDAD.

EX182. UNCLASSIFIED. PRIORITY.

The Government and people of Australia have been shocked at the news of the untimely death in an air accident of His Excellency, President Abdul Salam Muhammed Arif and the Ministers of the Interior and Industries. Please accept my sympathy in this tragic loss to your country and convey our condolences to the bereaved families.

(J.G. Gorton)
Acting Minister for External Affairs
of the Commonwealth of Australia.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A. (1516/21)
P.M'S DEPT
P.M'S

(Cost \$25.80)

16th April, 1966.



A/SEC FAS(2) FAS(3) C&P@ ICR PIO FAS(4) EAMEC AFME SAS (16)
STAFF

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ROME CONFERENCE OF AUSTRALIAN HEADS OF MISSION IN AFRICA,
APRIL 4, 1966
BACKGROUND PAPER - IRAQ

Iraq is a paradigm case of the upheaval caused by modernizing forces attempting to change traditionally conservative patterns of rule, and offers an example of the most dangerous and destructive way a new political synthesis can be sought even if not yet achieved.

From 1950 to 1958 a traditional government effectively and efficiently destroyed the balance of powers it represented. Devoting a large proportion of its massive oil revenues to the Development Board, the government of Iraq began to create a new Iraq and a new Iraqi alongside their old traditional counterparts. By sending thousands of students abroad to study in Western universities it fostered the growth of a modern component of society, just as by building dams, highways and factories it created a modern component of the economy. But in the process it altered the balance of power among the various sections of society; the land-owner and the tribal leader lost power to the engineer and the entrepreneur. Its failing however was that it refused to allow these new men a responsible and satisfying voice in government. Ultimately, in 1958, the army, as a representative of the modern component of society, seized power and destroyed the traditional government. In the destruction of the government, however, the revolutionaries also destroyed the accepted concept of legitimacy. Consequently since 1958 no Iraqi government has been completely able to drop its guard and to get on with the process of development.

Iraq, like most other countries in the Arab world, has a long history stretching back to three thousand B.C., beginning with the growth of the ancient Semitic civilizations of Sumer, Akkad, Babylon and Assyria. Later the country was a battleground between the Persians and the Greek and Roman empires. Under the Abbasids Iraq enjoyed a period of unequalled brilliance, followed by destruction at the hands of the Mongols and four centuries of neglect under the Ottomans. Iraq was occupied by British forces in the First World War and thereafter became a British mandate. A monarchy was established in 1921, the first king being Feisal I, a member of the Hashemite royal family. In 1930 Iraq became independent and concluded a treaty of alliance with Britain. This was ended in 1955 when both countries joined the Baghdad Pact. Early in 1958 Iraq entered into federation with its sister Hashemite monarchy, Jordan. In July of that year however the monarchy was destroyed by military revolution, the Baghdad Pact was repudiated and the way seemed open for communists to seize power. Communist influence increased rapidly, and General Qassim's attempts to establish and preserve balance between nationalists and communists finally contributed to his downfall in a Baathist coup in 1963. The new government led a determined attack on the communists. In November 1963 a further coup replaced the Baath government by one under the leadership of General Abdul Salem Aref, one of the army leaders of the 1958 revolution and an Arab nationalist of Nasserist sympathies. Since that time Iraq has gradually moved closer to the U.A.R. A proposal for federation was espoused by the U.A.R. and Iraq in 1964, but apart from intermittent meetings of the Unified Political Command which is to effect a union, there is a basic reluctance, on both sides, to move closer to unity too soon.

Under Aref, Statism initially became more pronounced, but latterly there appears to have grown a realization that a liberalization of the economy is necessary to get rid of the inefficiency and economic stagnation which had followed the sweeping nationalization measures. Economically Iraq's potential is great. It has been estimated that the country is capable of supporting double the present population of nearly seven million. There are millions of acres of cultivable land that could be irrigated from the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. Although industry is still in an infant stage new emphasis is being placed on its development. Oil revenue is the major source of the State budget, running at the moment around \$306 million Australian per annum.

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The main hindrance to development continues to be the Kurdish rebellion in the north. Here the régime is on the horns of a dilemma; there is little chance that the Kurds will accept anything less than full independence, which the régime is unwilling to countenance, and there is less chance that the régime can crush the rebellion.

Apart from the Kurdish problem, Iraq's preoccupation is with national development, including the stated aim of restoring constitutional government in the near future.

Australia's interest in Iraq is commercial. With expanding development a parallel expanding market for Australian exports is presented.

Australian Embassy,
Cairo.

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The Embassy of the United Arab Republic presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and has the honour to submit to their attention that the Iraqi Government has requested the United Arab Republic Government to look after the Iraqi interests in Australia.

It would be much appreciated if the Embassy would receive the approval of the Australian Government.

The Embassy of the United Arab Republic avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Canberra, 6th August, 1965.

To the
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

Handwritten notes:
Original with C + P. (file 1515/1/37/3)
who will take necessary
action. CE
13/8

Signature

File 1515/1737/3

28th April, 1965.

Note for File

Consular Representation of Iraq

On 27th April, 1965, Miss Dusting telephoned me from the Minister's Office asking for assistance in solving a problem put to the Minister by his friend, Mr Ferdinand George Medcalf of "Canfield" Serpentine Road, Albany, W.A., and his daughter, Miss Margaret Lois Medcalf of 6 Kintal Road, AppleCross, W.A. Mr and Miss Medcalf propose to visit Baghdad, arriving by BOAC on 15th May and leaving on 18th May.

They had asked the Consul-General of Lebanon in Sydney for visas for Iraq, but he had replied saying that he had been informed by his Government that it no longer took care of the consular interests of Iraq in Australia as from his receipt of a letter from Baghdad in December, 1964.

As the Consul-General of Lebanon had advised Mr and Miss Medcalf to apply to the Embassy of the UAR for their visas they had done so, but had been told that the Embassy had no authority to issue visas for Iraq.

I undertook to see what I could find out about the situation and told Miss Dusting of the existing situation as revealed in the correspondence on this file.

I telephoned Mr Hibri, Consul-General of Lebanon in Sydney and explained the situation to him. He told me that he would help as best he could but that he had received instructions that he could no longer deal with matters relating to Iraq. He said that he would speak to the Ambassador of the UAR.


The Ambassador later telephoned me suggesting that if the passports of Mr and Miss Medcalf were sent to his Embassy he would arrange for their endorsement with visas for entry to Iraq.

It had been agreed between myself and the Consul-General of Lebanon on the one hand, and the Ambassador of the UAR on the other hand, that there was some irregularity in the procedure followed which would result in the UAR Embassy issuing a visa ^{without} having been authorised by this Government to act on behalf of Iraq in Australia, but it was also agreed that this was the only way out of the immediate problem - that steps would be taken, both by the Consul-General and by the Embassy to try to clarify the situation and ensure

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that the relevant parties conveyed due notice to the Australian Government of the transfer of consular representation of Iraq from the Consulate-General of Lebanon to the UAR Embassy.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'M. H. H. H.', is written on the right side of the page. The signature is stylized with a large initial 'M' and a long horizontal stroke.

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Of all the countries of the Middle East, with the exception of Kuwait, which is of course a special case, Iraq is the most fortunate in so far as its natural resources are concerned. The land available to it is sufficient for its moderate population and, in more recent times, it has been found to be the depository of large oil reserves. In the past, Mesopotamia, which it encompasses, has been not only one of the richest areas of the world, but was actually one of the cradles of civilisation. It was here, for example, that the wheel and the plough were invented and even in more recent times, it was one of the main centres of the Arab world. The brilliance of Baghdad in the early Middle Ages is of course still a by-word. The people of Iraq are aware of these things, and, regard themselves openly as a step above the rest of the world around them, as masters, that is, not servants.

2. And yet, today, Iraq is one of the most unstable countries of the area. A traditional exporter of food grains, it now finds need to import them. Significant areas which were previously rich and fertile have fallen into disuse. The standard of living has in recent times barely held its own, and may actually be declining. Even the oil revenues, while larger than they were, have not risen at the rate at which they should have. And finally, the Government of Iraq is making strenuous efforts to form a close alliance with, which could only involve subservience to, Egypt, a country for which most Iraqis feel little but contempt on account of its recent poverty of means and spirit. As if this were not enough, it maintains poor relations with all the countries which surround it, without exception.

3. Iraq is therefore an interesting country to visit and to study, and, even if the short visit I made there from 5th to 10th November scarcely enabled me to dig far beneath the surface, I hope that some of the following impressions which I gained will be of some interest to you.

4. I should say from the outset that I was exceedingly warmly received by the Iraqi authorities (when the Iraqi Embassy in Cairo had apprised of my coming). Arrangements were made to meet me at the airport, I was most courteously greeted at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when I called there and an officer of the Ministry finally came to the airport to see me off. A useful programme of calls within the Ministry was drawn up on my behalf, and I had talks, each of about thirty minutes' duration, with the Director-General of Protocol, Mr. J. Shlach, the Director-General of Public Relations, Mr. A. Sayama, the Director-General of Technical Assistance and Cultural Affairs, Mr. Faidri Al-Qaisi, the Director-General of the Political Department, Mr. A.M. Zaibak, the Director-General of the Economic Department, Dr. T. Altwalli, and the Director of the International Conferences Department, Dr. H. Al-Kadhim. By the nature of things, few of these discussions dug much below the surface, and they could scarcely be expected to in view of the Ministry's relative impotence in matters of higher policy at this time. While, therefore, no startling revelations were forthcoming in the course of my discussions, (with one possible exception in respect of the United Nations which I shall describe later), I found, on comparing notes with other diplomatic officers serving in Baghdad that I had made good progress, by Iraqi standards, and that no more could have been reasonably expected. Over and above this, my discussions were, I think, useful to me in gaining some first-hand impressions of the Iraqi trend of thought, and I hope that I was able, in return, to give some way toward presenting a picture of Australia as an independent, rapidly developing entity which they had not considered, or indeed been in any way aware of before. I should also add at this point that I formed a very favourable first impression of the calibre of the Ministry officials with whom I spoke. As is the case here in Egypt, they seemed fundamentally capable, sharp men, well qualified to state their point of view effectively. Whether they are really typical of the bulk of the people of Iraq or indeed of the type of Government in power here is another matter (as it is in Egypt), and perhaps this is one fundamental cause of the relative impotence of their Ministry.

5. In addition to these officials, I called upon the Foreign Editor of the Iraqi News Agency (the official news source), Mr. Shalib T. Bickur, a Director of the foreign language newspaper "Baghdad News", Mr. Khalil, and, who is also Director of the Foreign Relations Department of the Ministry of

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Culture and Guidance, and I met socially various other Iraqis. Amongst the diplomatic corps I called upon the British Embassy, where I saw the Ambassador, Sir Roger Allen, the Minister-Counsellor, Mr. D.J.S. Robey, the First Secretary (Commercial), Mr. H. St. J.B. Armitage, the Consul, Mr. F.J. Bradshaw, and the Third Secretary, Mr. Eekill; the American Embassy, where I saw the Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. J. Wesley Adams and the First Secretary (Political), Mr. Atkins; the Indian Ambassador, Mr. Sadath Ali Khan; the Pakistan Ambassador, Mr. Sajjad Hyder; the Netherlands Ambassador, Mr. van Kernebeek; the German Ambassador, Dr. Hans Schmidt-Norix and the Japanese Chargé, Mr. Kusunoki Furusawa, besides the First Secretary of the Canadian Embassy in Beirut, who was paying an official call to Baghdad at the same time that I was (his Ambassador being accredited in Baghdad as well as Beirut), Mr. A. Potvin. I met also Australian members of an UTTAB team in Baghdad working on communications matters, led by Mr. J. McGregor of our PMG's Department. Finally, I spoke with a number of visiting British, American and indeed Australian businessmen (the latter being Sir Arthur Stephenson, the Melbourne architect, with Mr. Wilkie, one of his senior officers, whose firm successfully tendered several years ago to build three hospitals in Iraq. None of these has yet been gone ahead with, though there is some talk of the project being revived, and Sir Arthur's firm has not yet been paid for the work it did).

6. The major political force in Iraq is, like so many countries in the area, the Army. Without at least the Army's support, no group can achieve power nor can any Government long remain in power. For this reason, the Army has to be much pandered to, and over recent years, "national defence" has absorbed something of the order of 35% of the national budget. Up to the past few months, the Air Force would have figured prominently in this scheme of things, too, for it was generally regarded as being very "reliable", but the Air Force badly blotted its reputation on 4th September when a plot was uncovered to bomb President Araf (and, though no doubt inadvertently, members of the diplomatic corps as well) as he was leaving the airport en route to the Non-Aligned Conference, and the Air Force has of course been in disgrace ever since. Most units, up to the time I was there, were grounded. So the 70,000-strong Army, previously no doubt dominant enough, has become in the most recent times even more so, within the Service hierarchy and hence politically.

7. It is virtually impossible to know what is the state of political thought in the Army: any signs of opposition are ruthlessly stamped out immediately they are detected and strong security measures therefore need to be taken by would-be plotters. Thus, even Kassam, with his tight system of control, was taken by surprise: everyone knew that something was in the air, that something must in the circumstances happen, that Kassam would be "going", but nobody (outside the small group concerned, presumably) knew when or how it would happen or who would succeed him.

8. I met no-one in Baghdad who doubted that Araf would also soon be moved on, though most hoped that it would be a palace revolution next time and that disorders of the kind which accompanied the fall of Kassam would this time be avoided. But, once again, there was no-one who could suggest, even tentatively, how or when this would come about, and some admitted ruefully that they had been expecting a move for several months, and that they were now not prepared to make any more predictions.

9. Araf's position is indeed something of an enigma. Unexpectedly - more, extraordinarily - he survived the changes of November, 1963, when the Baathist regime, whose figurehead he had after all been, was overthrown, and yet he commands no obvious source of support. Perhaps it was decided to hold on to him as a continuing figure in order to avoid a repetition of the cataclysmic and exhausting events of February, 1963. It is difficult to believe that, if a serious move were made against him now, he would find many friends to stand by his side - too many seem to regard him as something of a buffoon, there is certainly no warmth for him, not even the capacity of a likeable fool, as is to some extent the case with Field Marshal Abdul Hakim Amer in Egypt, (this, at any rate, is the foundation of the possibly over-optimistic hopes of those who anticipate that his departure will be accomplished in a relatively tidy "family" way).

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10. Aref himself is undoubtedly well aware of his risky position, and this is probably the explanation of the efforts he has made to keep himself in the limelight, even at the risk of making something of a fool of himself, as he did at the time of Khrushchev's visit to Egypt last May.

11. A similar desire to keep in the vanguard, and indeed one step in front of the vanguard of the men who overthrew the Baath regime in November, 1963, may also well be the explanation for his at first sight extraordinarily determined espousal of "unionist", indeed, more than that, Nasserist principles; for it would appear that the group who engineered the overthrow of the Baathists, are of this persuasion. It is after all a common persuasion in the Arab world, appealing to emotion and sentiment ("Arab Unity"), professional pride (Nasser was also a soldier), hope of revenge against Israel (best achieved by a united Arab world - a consideration reinforced by the fact that Egypt's Army is of course by far the strongest in the Arab world), some veneer of ideology ("the good of the people") and sheer opportunism (Nasser is the strongest figure in the Arab world: why not hang on to his coat-tails?). This would offer a feasible explanation of the strength of his public statements, and actions, on the subject: quite apart from the nominal audience when he has been addressing, he has been looking over his shoulder also at the group behind him who are really controlling Iraq. It would also explain the extent of Aref's downcast appearance on his return from Cairo after failing to secure immediate full-scale union: not only had he failed to secure an end of his own but, perhaps more important, he had failed to do something that was required of him. The leading Nasserist figures in the Cabinet while I was there were the Minister of Culture and Guidance, Abdel Kerim Farhan, and the then Foreign Minister Sobhi Abdel Hamid, though steps seem to have been taken subsequently to further strengthen its Nasserist complexion (the latter, for example, has been transferred to the key Interior Ministry).

12. If this account is substantially true, then of course Aref's conduct may be regarded as almost wholly opportunistic, motivated largely by considerations of personal security and power. This has tended to be much the case in the Middle East in the past, no matter how the fact may have been wrapped up in ideological verbiage, and there is nothing in Aref's background to indicate that it is not the case now, as well.

13. Since the Iraq Government seems, at least on the face of things, to have been almost prepared to hand Iraq, duly trussed, on a platter to Egypt, it might be a matter of wonder why Egypt, apparently uncharacteristically, did not accept the gift.

14. In the first place, and of prime importance, has undoubtedly been the recognition by Egypt of the unpopularity of Aref's Government and, even more particularly, of the concept of union itself in the country at large. As I have already commented, there is no doubt that the Iraqis generally regard Egyptians with some contempt, and it would indeed be surprising if there were many who favoured closer links with them. Furthermore, while the dominant group in the Army at the moment seems to be Nasserist, there are undoubtedly very many officers who are not - partly because they share the general view of Egypt, partly perhaps because they recognise that, in the event of an Egyptian "take over", the prospects of their own subsequent advancement, as observers with whom I spoke, therefore, were agreed that union with Egypt would be a most unpopular step, and one which could never in practice be carried through. The best and perhaps most authoritative, and, more important, influential view which I heard on the matter (indirectly, though on the best authority) was that of the UAR Ambassador in Baghdad who reported to Cairo a few weeks ago that he estimated that only 10% of the Iraqi people supported union, and that 90% were strongly opposed to it. It is little wonder in these circumstances that Nasser should have held back.

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15. The feelings of one Iraqi, who, though he began by speaking fairly guardedly ended much more frankly, were put to me by Mr. Khalis Azmi of the Ministry of Culture and Guidance and the "Baghdad News". He said that, in his view, there was a great gulf between the two peoples which would render any very intimate association difficult to achieve for a long time. That gulf could be summed up by saying that whereas few Egyptians cared little for politics, Iraqis were very politically minded. Every Iraqi, from top to bottom, he said, was a politician at heart: this was just the opposite problem to that of Egypt. So far as I was able to check, the point which he was seeking to make is valid, though, as was pointed out to me, the fact that Iraqis are politically highly conscious by no means implies that they are also politically sensible; on the contrary, they have a history of haring after political objectives which are either unattainable or, if they are attainable, highly undesirable.

16. Two corollaries seem to follow from this: first of all, that if the UAR forces (estimated variously at 300 to 1,000 men, the latter probably now being nearer the mark) stationed near Baghdad - officially, in order to further Arab unity of arms, but more likely, in actual fact to help underpin Aref's sagging regime - were unwise enough to try to physically intervene in Iraqi affairs, then the chances of very stiff and bloody counter-action by Baghdadis would be exceedingly high, and it is very far from certain that, in view of the numbers involved and the reported state of their morale, the Egyptians would get the best of such an encounter. In the second place, it has been stated officially on several occasions - the most recently, only two days ago - that President Nasser intends to pay a visit to Baghdad in the near future, probably in January to attend the next Unified Political Command meeting which is to be held there. If he does, very serious fears for his safety ought to be felt and it ought to be taken as no mark of cowardice on his part, but of characteristic realism, if, in the end, he finds an excuse not to go.

17. The case of Mr. Khalis Azmi was interesting from another point of view as indicating that Nasserist roots are by no means as deep in the Iraqi administration in even some of its more sensitive positions as one might be led to expect; for, after we had talked for a while, he volunteered to me that, even though he held the position he did, it would not be possible for him to enter Egypt, because he was on the Egyptian "black list" (by which he meant, Visa Warning List). He said that, in 1957, he had written some articles so highly critical of Nasser that the Egyptians had taken deep offence and had debarred him from Egypt. His name remained on the "black list" and he could not see any prospect of its being removed. At least in conversation with me, he seemed quite unconcerned over the prospect.

18. The acquisition of Iraq would have a number of obvious advantages to Nasser - in the first place, of course, it would place in his hands a wonderful new source of foreign exchange, in the oil revenues. It could too have considerable strategic significance, giving him a direct front on to Syria, where the present regime would surely not long withstand the pressure that could thereby be mounted on it, and a direct front on to Kuwait, as well, where the Government is also very much aware of the potential threat to it and has been watching the development of closer UAR-Iraq ties with real and justified alarm. It would also bring him on to the Persian (or rather in this context, Arabian) Gulf, as well as the borders of Saudi Arabia, while Jordan would also almost surely have to trim its sails even more in his favour.

19. In addition, however, it would bring him on to the borders of Turkey and Iran, and there is no question but that these countries would not only be alarmed by such a prospect, but would almost certainly do something to frustrate it. Strongest action could be expected from Iran, whose Shah is already desperately anxious, perhaps to the point of fixation, about the danger of Nasser to him. The most obvious way in which trouble, and serious trouble, could be stirred up for Nasser in Iraq, or for that matter, in any Government of Iraq, would be through the agency of the Kurdish minority in Iraq, whose great borders on both Iran and Turkey, and perhaps amongst the Shias too.

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20. The population of Iraq stands at the moment, according to the best (American) estimates I was able to obtain, at about 8 million. Of these, about 4 million are Shia-Muslims, living for the most part in the southern half of the country, below Baghdad; 1½ million are Sunni-Muslims, living to the north and west of Baghdad; 1½ million are Kurds, living, in the main, in the mountainous areas adjoining Iran and Turkey; 200,000 are Christians, mostly "Assyrians"; 200,000 are Turks; and 200,000 are Persians. It follows from this that the Sunni Arabs who control the country and who have for long provided the Government, the senior Administration and the Army, in fact constitute very much of a minority in the country as a whole. It is therefore not a case of minorities being oppressed by the majority but of a particular minority imposing its will on the majority. For some time, the Shias have apparently been prepared to accept the subservient position into which they have been cast fairly meekly, but, latterly, there have been signs that they have had enough and that they have been demanding concessions. In the Cabinet changes of mid-November, some were apparently taken into the regime, but I suggest it still remains to be seen how far the Shias selected for Cabinet will turn out to either act in that capacity or exercise real authority.

21. In this connection, it is interesting that Aref has taken on to himself something of the mantle of a Sunni revivalist, a kind of missionary zealot. The Indian Ambassador, who is also a Muslim, told me in confidence that he (and, by implication, many other Muslims) thought that the way in which Aref was parading his zeal was absurd, belonging very much to another bygone age, not to the present time. The Ambassador felt that Aref must be either a charlatan or a fool to act so - perhaps a little of each. A consequence of Aref's zeal, however, is that he would be likely to extend concessions to the rival Shia sect only under considerable protest, and then to the minimum extent possible.

22. It is also interesting to speculate, as the Indian Ambassador did, that Aref's missionary zeal could constitute a powerful motive in his efforts to effect a union with Egypt, since, if he could do this, Sunni influence would once more be predominant, beyond all measure of doubt, in Iraq.

23. But while the Shias constitute problem enough, the Kurds, who are not even Arabs even if they are Sunnis, constitute a much more serious problem, indeed a positive menace to the existence of the State, in its present form.

24. Unlike the Iraqis, and most other Arabs for that matter, the Kurds are a truthful, reliable, honourable, self-respecting group. They hold all Arabs - not just Iraqis - in contempt and make little effort to hide that contempt, proven justified in their view, so often on the field of battle. They have in fact proved excellent soldiers, particularly in their mountain habitat. They are likeable, so far as Europeans are concerned, to the extent that a well-known American Archaeologist who had worked in their area, told his son who was taking up a consular post there to be cautious in dealing with them, to be careful, that is, not to be too completely won over to their side, because he would find that "at heart, they're just damned Connecticut Yankees!"

25. Up to the present time, it would appear that the Turks for their part have not been permitting arms or other supplies to be passed over their border to them and that the Iranians have been at most leaving their door only just a bit ajar. This situation could change in the face of a complete take-over of Iraq by Nasser, or of a major breakdown, through any other cause, between Iran and Iraq. The immediate relevance of this is that, in the American view, if the Kurds were reasonably well-armed, they could, particularly in the face of the Iraqi Army's current somewhat demoralised condition, defeat it and perhaps, if they were so minded, reach Baghdad itself. The considerable consequences of this can only be speculated on.

26. Moreover, because of the existence in, or near, Kurdish territory of major Iraqi oil fields and pipelines, it would be possible for the Kurds to inflict major damage to the Iraqi oil industry and the economy as a whole. I was informed at the American Embassy that the Kurds appear to be aware of their power to do this, but have held their hand in the belief that the major Western powers would never stand for interference with these oil supplies but would spring to the aid of the Iraqi Government. In this, the Kurds are entirely

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incorrect, since the Western powers (at any rate, according to the Americans) are extremely unlikely to do anything whatever to assist the type of Government which has been in power in Baghdad since 1958, both for that very reason and because they would not wish to provide arms in the Middle East area which might have the ultimate effect of disturbing the military balance. The immediate relevance of this point is that, on American calculations, the loss of this oil revenue would bring Iraq to its knees in three months.

27. The Kurds, then, possess a potential stranglehold over Iraq, both militarily and economically, and it is a matter for wonder both that successive Iraqi Governments have so signally failed to at least provide the Kurds with an honest deal which might go some way to keeping them quiet (there is an appalling record of broken promises and black treachery on the part of successive Governments) and that Governments have for so long been able to get away with the kind of treatment they have been meting out. Kurdish doubts about Egyptian military aid to, if not dominance in, Iraq have been conveyed by their delegates personally to Nasser in Cairo, and must constitute another motive for an Egyptian "go-slow" policy in Iraq.

28. As I have remarked, relations between Iraq and Iran have been poor, and have recently grown worse as a result of Iranian fear of Egyptian dominance over Iraq, and of Iraqi allegations that the Persians were interfering in Iraqi affairs through the medium of their fellow Shi'as. An outright break appeared possible in the middle of this year following an incident which occurred when the new Iranian Ambassador was presenting his credentials to Aref. In the course of his prepared speech, which the present Iranian Chargé claims was meant to be the usual anodyne thing, the Ambassador remarked on the (alleged) long history of close partnership between the two peoples and went on to say that Iran regarded its next door neighbour with friendly interest on account of the many links which had for so long bound them, including even common religious links. At that, even though the speech was not finished, Aref, trembling with rage, rushed from the room. A terrible scene then ensued between the Ambassador and the Foreign Minister, in which the Foreign Minister said that what the Ambassador had just said was as good as an open confession of Iranian interference in Iraq, to which the Ambassador duly replied that, if Iran really wished to interfere, the Iraq Government could not last a week. The Ambassador left Baghdad by air immediately, and has not been back since.

29. The anecdote, which I got from the Japanese Chargé who was in turn told by the Iranian Chargé who was present at the time, amusing enough in itself, points to the suspicion with which the two countries view each other, the possibilities of trouble arising out of Iraq's multifarious population, and, of course, the silliness of Aref and his entourage.

30. If successive Iraqi Governments have failed signally to weld the peoples of Iraq into a nation, for which they may have some excuse since Iraq was after all originally only an artifact and, if I am right in the foregoing, to a large extent it still is, they have in recent times made an even worse botch of the economy, which at least had a sound basis originally. The heavier tax which Kasseb applied on the export of oil, resulting not in more revenue for the state, but considerably less as customers transferred their business elsewhere, has been repealed on the ground that it was just another of his foolishnesses, but it delivered a blow to the oil industry of Iraq which has resulted in a much slower rate of growth than ought to be the case, and, hence, in a much slower growth in revenue from that source. Moreover, it is typical of some other actions taken by Iraqi Government other than Kasseb's.

31. The most recent example is the nationalisation measures of 15th July, under which banks, insurance companies and leading trading and industrial concerns were unexpectedly taken over. It is still not entirely clear why this action was taken. There are many in Baghdad, including, for example, the Japanese Chargé, who believe that it must have been done as a result of a coup. He points to (i) the firm statement by the Prime Minister only the day before that no such move was contemplated, and (ii) the delay in the arrival on the day on which the announcement was made of that Vice-President Hussein al-Shaefi to attend the National Day Celebrations. Faruqi said that Kasseb of

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Diplomatic Missions had been gathered at the airport early in the morning to greet Shafei, but that after an hour's wait, and much inconsequential shuffling, they had been told to go home again, and Shafei had eventually arrived, unannounced, that evening, in the middle of the official reception. Furusawa argues that there must have been some reason for this, and that arguments over the Nationalisation Decree in the interim must have been it. The fact that it was actually issued and that Shafei arrived later must be more than coincidental. While this theory undoubtedly has attractions, on the whole, without dismissing it altogether, I am inclined to side with the doubters, though this is of course not to say that the Egyptians did not lend a hand, perhaps upon request, in drawing up the measure. In the first place, it seems extremely unlikely that so complete a measure could possibly have been drawn up in the time between the Prime Minister's first statement, at about 2 p.m. on 13th July, and his announcement of the measure at 8.59 a.m. next day, least of all between Shafei's non-arrival at about 7.00 a.m. and the announcement two hours later. Two other explanations are possible: either that he was unaware of the preparations which were being made, which seems incredible, even if he is not by any means at one with the general complexion of the rest of his Cabinet, or, as seems more likely, that he was endeavouring for reasons best known to himself, to put local business interests off their guard, though why he could not have done so more indirectly is hard to see. The second broad reason why I would doubt that the UAR had been directly responsible, by implication contrary to real Iraqi desire, is that such a step would contradict all other evidence on the roles adopted by the respective countries in moving toward an eventual union. It is of course for this latter reason, the real intentions of the UAR, that the point is of most interest.

32. Be this as it may, the fact is that the nationalisation measures have cast gloom over the business world and have injected a further element of doubt and uncertainty and, beyond that, inefficiency into a situation already unsteady enough by any standards. The added inefficiency of course stems from the fact that the removal of the former managers and owners has created a vacuum which there is no real way of filling. In many cases, public servants have been transferred outright to the managerial posts (at greatly increased salaries, incidentally) but there are many instances in which several positions have had to be allocated to the one man. In some instances, the former managers have been kept on as advisers, but in more, they seem to have either been dismissed outright or gone off in a huff. They could certainly not be expected in any event to put their hearts into their down-graded jobs. Foreign businessmen with whom I spoke in Baghdad were generally in despair over the situation which had developed and over the possibility of carrying on ordered business in these circumstances. The effect on an already creaking economy can only be exceedingly adverse.

33. The land reform programme introduced by the first post-Revolution Government has fared no better. As originally promulgated in October, 1958, it provided for the break-up of large estates and the distribution of the land to small peasants and landless labourers in certain fixed lots, depending upon the type of land and the type of watering accorded it. Far from increasing output, however, the programme has had a disastrous effect upon it; for the new owners had neither the skill nor the financial resources nor, in many cases, the desire to work their land properly. The latter might appear to be surprising at first sight, but a number of reasonably well-authenticated stories are known of peasants, who, having at length acquired their land, made it quite clear that from now on they were going to live like landowners and not labourers, and forthwith downed tools.

34. Failure to tend land properly in Iraq over a period is liable to be particularly catastrophic in view of the very low gradient of the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers in Southern Iraq. Thus, although Baghdad is 500 miles from the sea by river, its elevation is only 113 feet, while, forty miles to the west, the Euphrates is only 25 feet higher. As a result, the rivers have inadequate carrying power. Both natural and artificial levees have been built, but it is absolutely essential that positive action be taken to ensure that the channels are constantly kept clear if irrigation, on which the land depends, is to continue. There is also a serious problem in respect of the land itself being irrigated. On account of the dry heat, the rivers lose much water by

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evaporation and tend to become saline, and this means that the water delivered to the fields is also very saline. However, owing to the low-lying level of the land, drainage is difficult, and, unless constant attention is paid to it, deposits of alkali and salt may be left on the land which would thus be rendered altogether unsuited for cultivation. The failure to attend to this very serious problem has taken much land out of production, so that there is a good deal less now than there was ten years ago. This has resulted in Iraq, traditionally a grain exporter, becoming a grain importer with consequent ill effects upon its foreign exchange position.

35. The loss of land compared with the past is even more noteworthy if the present area under cultivation is compared with that in the great days of Ancient Mesopotamia. Modern Iraqis say that the Mongol invasions of the 13th century are the root causes of the decline and indeed, of many more of their land problems, and it is certainly true that the devastation wrought by the Mongols was severe and that grave damage was in fact inflicted on the irrigation system of the times. All the same, one cannot escape the feeling that, if greater energy had been displayed, more could have been done to restore the situation; no-one was able to tell me what had been or was being done to remedy the situation, at least to some extent, wherever possible. There seems to be an element (if no more than an element) of truth in the reply given by the cynics to the question "why do the Arabs always live in the desert?", "There was no desert until they went to live there".

36. Baghdad itself is far from being an attractive city, being dusty, hot in summer and very uneven in architectural quality with traditional, often apparently tumble-down Arab-type dwellings predominating. There seem to be no large stores. All the same, at the time of my visit, the range of goods there seemed to be greater than it is in the more cosmopolitan city of Cairo, and it is evident that Baghdad has still not felt the full effects of the Government's economic policies, which are bound to have an adverse effect on standards just as their counterparts have in Egypt. I understand from residents of Baghdad however that the pinch is already beginning to be felt and I can myself vouch for the growing inefficiency of local services as a result of a break-down which affected all the telephone services in the heart of the city on the first day I was there. The trend is perhaps best summed up in the fact that, as supplements to and where necessary replacements of, the city's present fleet of red London-style double and single decker buses, a considerable number of "Masr" buses are being obtained from Egypt. These have proved unsatisfactory in Cairo itself, to the extent that the local authorities here are themselves importing new buses from abroad. Yet Iraq is to be the recipient of the version which is unacceptable by Egyptian standards.

37. Communications in Iraq are poor, and need desperately to be overhauled. From this point of view, indeed, Baghdad is, and gives the impression very much of being, an isolated city. A new standard gauge railway between Baghdad and Basra is almost completed (with Soviet bloc assistance) but mails and telegraph services are in many cases rudimentary. There is, for example, no air mail service between Baghdad and Basra, air mail to Cairo, or more particularly, for some reason, Beirut, is incredibly slow (two weeks in transit is by no means uncommon), telecommunications facilities are rudimentary by modern standards, and, so far as the outside world is concerned, largely non-existent, and so on. These disabilities must constitute a major brake on economic development. I found the Australian UNRRA team in very low spirits over this and because they had not even been included in the year's budget (though, on the day I left there were signs that something, even if not enough, might be done to provide them with some funds.)

38. The outlook for Iraq's economy is therefore not good. Too much is going on "herance", too many short-trained schemes, which may or may not be ideological in origin, are being attempted on, too few of the really fundamental problems or tackled, and too much reliance is being put, presumably for "political" reasons, on the (very sad) example of Egypt.

39. I have already reported my general impressions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The following is a general account of the more significant points which I discussed while I was there.

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40. It will presumably come as no surprise to hear that little is known or Australia in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that little immediate attention is given to us. The Director-General of the Political Department, Mr. Zaibak, was even unsure of which of his two Sections we should fall under - the Western Section or the Asian, African and Socialist Section. He rather thought the former. (We admitted the odd character of his administrative arrangement, but said that this was under review and would be amended along more sensible lines in the near future, and after that, Australia would almost certainly come within a new Asian Section).

41. Mr. Zaibak rather took me back by remarking conversationally that he thought of Australia as an essentially stagnant country, tied by tight strings still to the United Kingdom. The latter, he thought, could be demonstrated easily enough by reference to the fact that we had the same Head of State, the Queen, carried the British Emblem on our flag, played cricket, wore similar type clothing (I should perhaps say as a matter of personal explanation that those I had on at the time were made in Hong Kong), never seemed to be far removed from Britain in our policies of thinking. (I must stress here that Mr. Zaibak's tone was in no sense offensive: he was merely stating a case, as he saw it, perhaps partly in order to see what I would say.) I told Mr. Zaibak that I thought he was very wrong in his main conclusions. On the question of our alleged stagnation, I outlined briefly to him some of our economic achievements since the war, pointing, as a major example, to our motor vehicle industry, which had even enabled a number of Holdens to find their way to Baghdad (the Police Department there, inter alia, use them). As to the question of our independence, I enlarged on this as forcibly as I could (without, I hope, going so far as to denigrate our major allies and friends, however!) outlining briefly how we had come to stand where we do, suggesting that if we seemed often to be standing alongside close allies, then this could be said of other countries too, not excluding Iraq, whose interests were similar.

42. Mr. Zaibak said that he was surprised to hear of the progress we had been making. He had naturally heard of our immigration programme, which I had mentioned in the context of our economic expansion, but did not realise it was of such a scale. As a matter of fact, he had heard of it rather in connection with what he understood to be a racially exclusive policy. I explained to Mr. Zaibak the main features of our immigration policy, stressing to him our desire not to create a situation in which alien groups, clinging closely together, not mingling much with the rest of the community, not adding much to that community, might develop. I said that our policy certainly had nothing to do with race or colour as such: Australia itself was singularly free of any racial discrimination, and we wanted to keep it so. Mr. Zaibak said that he quite appreciated the points I was making and agreed with the general tenor of my remarks.

43. Our immigration programme came up also in my discussion with the Director of the International Conferences Department, Dr. Kadhim, in the context of our alleged readiness to accept, and indeed encourage, Palestinians to go to Australia. I outlined the position briefly to him, and he received the information without comment. It was clear, however, that the matter is known within the Ministry (if only because it has been discussed in Arab League circles) and I rather thought that his initial mention of it had overtones of criticism behind it. He did not, however, press the matter.

44. The question of a possible Air Agreement between Iraq and Australia, which was apparently under discussion a while ago, was discussed briefly while I was with the Director-General of the Economic Department, Dr. Lutwalli. He said that the Minister at that time had not been too keen on proceeding far or fast, since Iraqi Airways had ordered some De Havilland Trident aircraft for use both Eastwards and Westwards. (I took it that he did not wish to provide them with more competitors.) While the matter was not under active consideration, that particular Minister had gone now and he personally felt that progress might be possible. If we wished to proceed, he wondered where discussions might take place.

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London, Cairo or Baghdad would be possible, though I thought he hinted that his own preference would be Baghdad. (It was at this point that we undertook some discussion, described below, on Australian representation in Iraq.) In reporting this discussion, I would have to add that Dr. Mutwalli in no way urged a resumption of talks: he merely said that Iraq would be prepared to resume discussions, and that some progress might (not certainly would) be possible.

45. The question of the possibility of Australia opening diplomatic relations with Iraq was mentioned to me by three senior officers, including, in particular, the Director-General of Protocol, Mr. Shlash, who has most pleasant memories of Australians whom he met at his most recent posting, Accra, said that it was quite understood that we might not be able to open a full-scale mission in Baghdad, but he wondered whether it might not be possible to at any rate double-accredit our Ambassador from some other post. If we had one in Beirut, this would no doubt be most convenient (it is what the Canadians do) but of course Cairo would be entirely acceptable (he said that he only mentioned Beirut because it was geographically closer). I explained to Mr. Shlash in general terms our ~~general~~ policy on double accreditations but added that I would pass his representations back to you for consideration. I did not of course give him any ground for belief that your reply would be favourable, the general tenor of my remarks being, if anything, rather in the opposite direction. The point was also raised, perhaps even more strongly, by Dr. Mutwalli, who stressed that he would always be glad to see us for discussions of substance in Baghdad, accreditation or not, but who then went on to rather hint that, all the same, we might as well have a representative accredited in Baghdad since this would put things on a better formal basis. This latter point was mentioned to me also by the Pakistan Ambassador, who said that Baghdad was the traditional alternative centre to Cairo in the Middle East, that it might be useful to have some standing there to take full advantage of the eventuality either of Cairo and Baghdad coming even closer together, or of flying apart to opposite extremes again, that it would cost us nothing if we intended to pay visits there from time to time in any case and that it would no doubt be appreciated by the Iraqis. It seems to me that this sums up the case as well as it can be.

46. I discussed at some length the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations with Dr. Kadhim, and it arose indirectly also with the Director-General of Technical Assistance and Cultural Affairs, Mr. Qaisi. The former pressed strongly the case for Communist China, though in fairly standard terms. Speaking picturesquely, he felt that China's unsociable behaviour (which he was prepared to admit) ought to be looked at in the proper context: that is, as rather like the actions of a naughty child who has been cast out from his family circle and then becomes something of a delinquent, breaking light bulbs and so on in the street; only let him back into the house, and all will be well. I commented that, in this case, the child was a very naughty one indeed and that, far from being sure he would behave when he returned home, there seemed a much greater likelihood that he would continue to act the same as before, and indeed, end by burning down the house altogether. I said that he really would have to give some indication that he was prepared to mend his ways first and that he was fit to join the family, and not damage or destroy it. Dr. Kadhim said that one could not really be sure until one tried, and I replied that it might be a little late then. More seriously, I suggested that more weight should surely be given to the views of important countries, in particular the United States, who were strongly opposed to the seating of Communist China. I pointed out how great was United Nations indebtedness to the United States, not only financially speaking, but from the point of view of giving a sense of steadiness and real constructiveness to the Organisation. I said that, in the last resort, the United Nations had managed well enough without Communist China, but could it manage so well if American interest and influence were reduced? Dr. Kadhim said that he could see this well enough, but the United States would really have to bow before reality. He did not seem overly worried about the fate of the people of Formosa if the Communists found for them. He did not appear to have any particular solution of his own to suggest.

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47. Mr. Qaisi, while recalling that Iraq's policy was certainly favourable to Communist China's entry into the United Nations, indicated that, as it happened, the student exchange arrangement concluded between Communist China and Iraq was really not working particularly well, in that, while Chinese students certainly came to study in Iraq, no Iraqis had been found who wished to go to China. This was partly a matter of language, partly because students were dubious about Chinese facilities, partly because they preferred to go to other countries (particularly Europe or the United States) if they could. He said that many students went to the Soviet Union, but he implied strongly that the financial arrangement covering them whereby the Soviet Government paid them allowance in Moscow in rubles but collected the equivalent in hard currency from Iraq was less than perfect (though "understandable" from the Russians' point of view). In a discussion of our own aid programme, he expressed surprise and interest that, in extending aid, we had not found it necessary to conclude formal Cultural Agreements. He said that Iraq invariably did so, no doubt largely because Eastern European countries preferred it that way.

48. Mr. Qaisi explained to me that his Department in the Ministry was responsible for supervising all matters relating to the training of students abroad on the one hand and the receipt of other technical aid in Iraq on the other. There was an inter-Ministry Committee, on which he was the Foreign Ministry representative, which met regularly to consider various suggestions made as to the aid required. These were considered, and given a priority where necessary, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs then undertook the task of seeing what could be done about them, in consultation with the appropriate foreign authorities (generally their Embassies in Baghdad).

49. I discussed with Dr. Kadhim briefly the questions of nuclear free zones and disarmament, on neither of which he had anything substantively new to say. On the former, he said that, whilst the concept was no doubt imperfect, it was a beginning, and a United Nations resolution calling for the establishment of these would serve to keep the issue, and the concern of the small countries about it, much before the eyes of the Great Powers who possessed nuclear devices. This would be the case even if it was merely a matter of discussion, without the adoption of a formal resolution. The point which he made on disarmament was much the same: that is, that it was up to the small, developing countries to keep plugging away in order to bring home to the Great Powers their deep concern and try to secure some progress.

50. On UNCTAD, Dr. Mutwalli said that he did not really expect too much to come out of the forthcoming United Nations session. He thought the developing countries had the numbers in New York to ensure some sort of resolution and this was of course important, because a machinery could be set up which could later be developed. However, he said frankly that he did not have much confidence in "Resolutions" as such and he hardly expected any dramatic developments to stem from this one. What he felt might have to be watched was the possible effects progress in this direction might have on other desirable arrangements, such as the Special Development Fund, which had already been set up.

51. The question of the site of the United Nations Headquarters was raised with me by Dr. Kadhim. He said that he thought that, for whatever reason it had been done, it had been a decided mistake to set the United Nations up in the United States, as indeed, it would have been in the territory of any other Great Power. The nettle of removing it would have to be grasped at some time, and the sooner probably the better. What was the alternative? He thought that the best place, all things considered, would be Cairo. Cairo stood at the geographic hinge between Europe, Africa and Asia, it was the capital of one of the leading countries of the Non-Aligned World, which was very desirable, and it was headed by a Government which, on account of its own considerable efforts, was already universally respected. Such a choice would be both a gesture of goodwill to the developing countries of the world, and a recognition of their growing significance.

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52. I do not know how far Dr. Kadhim's rather startling proposal represented official thinking in Baghdad and how far it was a brain-child of his own. Neither the British nor American Embassies had heard of it before. At any rate, his presentation of his case indicated that a good deal of thought (no matter how misguided) had gone into the matter. One thing that can certainly be said is that Dr. Kadhim's sympathies are pro-Nasser.

53. I raised the problem of Indonesia's "confrontation" of Malaysia briefly with Mr. Zaibak, but he displayed no real knowledge of it (or indeed, if it comes to that, of any of the problems of Asia, his main interest obviously being the "Socialist" side of his Department) and no opinion to offer. I understand, however, that the Iraqis, if required to take a position, would almost certainly do so in favour of the Indonesians, on account of the British involvement in the affair, (the Iraqis on the one hand tending to identify the Indonesians, however illogically, with their own period under British domination and, on the other hand, blaming the Malaysians for quietly accepting British domination), the generally "anti-colonialist" tendencies of Indonesia, over and beyond the United Kingdom's part in it, and the considerable personal efforts being made in Baghdad by the Indonesian Ambassador there. The British Ambassador told me that he was disturbed about these latter, particularly because of some of the highly insulting (to the United Kingdom) public statements being issued by the Indonesian Embassy. However, while these went far beyond the limits of propriety, he felt that it would be a waste of time to complain to the Iraqis, and had therefore not done so.

54. I had some long discussions with the British Consul, Mr. Bradshaw, about applications he had received from residents of Iraq wishing to go to Australia. He said (and his Vice-Consul confirmed) that they seemed to be occupying 25% of the Vice-Consul's time. For example, on 6th November, he had had 15 interviews on the subject (though, admittedly this was exceptional). Mr. Bradshaw said that he had passed a number of applications (involving about 200 families) back to the Immigration authorities, and had been "distressed" not to have received more than a handful of replies. This made things difficult for him, all the more so since one applicant, Mr. Kardagh S. Dikhouka of the Iron Industries Company, New Baghdad Road, Baghdad, who had written direct to Canberra, had received a letter back (Immigration reference 63/31517 of 22nd October) indicating not only that he might be acceptable, but that assistance to the extent of £71.8.6 Australian might be available to enable him to pay his fare. Mr. Bradshaw said that it was unfortunate, first of all, because the Immigration Department reply was inconsistent with another letter they had written (64/45374 of 25th September) to himself indicating that financial assistance would not be available, secondly, because Dikhouka was in no way an outstanding applicant - quite contrary, if anything, compared with many others, whereas those others had usually not heard anything at all, and thirdly, because the news of Dikhouka's reply was bound to become known and a flood might set in. He therefore begged me to see whether the matter could not be looked into and he could not receive some more replies. I undertook to do so.

55. Mr. Bradshaw said that the recent new issue of instructions for British Consular Officers from our Department of Immigration had been most helpful to him, and he had been able to "weed out" a number of cases which would obviously be rejected. He had, however, given some application forms out to what he regarded as "marginal" cases, and he admitted that he had suggested to them that they "try their luck" direct (Dikhouka had been one of these).

56. He said that most of these marginal cases were "white collar" workers, who seemed to be generally excluded under the terms of the new instructions. He considered whether some consideration might not be given to reviewing their plight. As things stood, the Christian minority (mostly Assyrians) had been having an increasingly hard time of it. There were no discriminatory laws such, but things were being made difficult for them. Priority was being given to Moslems securing positions and it seemed that "office instructions" had gone out to branches of the newly-nationalised banks telling them to displace the Christians. The trouble was that most of the minority were in fact "white collar" workers, and quite good ones at that. There were certainly cases deserving of sympathy amongst them.

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57. One difficulty which would have to be faced, however, was the unwillingness of the Iraqi Government to issue exit permits, even though it did not seem to like this particular minority inside Iraq. This would have to be carefully examined.

58. Mr. Bradshaw added that, partly for this latter reason, but even more for reasons of finance and distance, it would be quite impracticable for would-be immigrants to proceed to our new Immigration Office in Beirut to be interviewed or examined. He wondered, in brief, whether an Australian Immigration Officer could not go to Baghdad to review the situation.

59. I have passed all of this on to the Senior Migration Officer in Beirut, who, I understand, is writing to his Department in Canberra about it, recommending that he does in fact visit Baghdad soon. Nevertheless, the above will presumably be of interest to you.

60. To sum up, Iraq presents a sad picture of instability in both the political and economic spheres. To a decisive degree, the latter is due to the unwisdom of policies adopted by Iraqi Governments, not only the present Government or the notorious Government of Kassem, but Governments for some time past. Nor has the country at large displayed that vigour of outlook and effort which is required to surmount the unfortunate legacy of the past.

61. In the political field, Iraq's plight stems partly from this same root cause of human frailty, but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, from the lack of cohesion achieved amongst the diversified people, diversified, that is, in almost every respect - in race, in religion, in culture and in language. Whether these barriers can be broken down only time can tell: the past and present are certainly not favourable auguries. As to the immediate future, the fate of the present Government of Iraq, this, too, would appear to be clouded with doubt. But just how the end might come is difficult to say in view of the tight security arrangements imposed in Iraq by both the Government and any potential opposition. The efficacy of this screen is shown by the fact that none of the observers with whom I spoke in Baghdad was prepared to forecast the changes of Government which occurred immediately after I had gone.

62. The Iraqi authorities' views on Australia tend to be clouded and confused. But they were prepared to give an Australian representative a good hearing and I should hope that, from this point of view alone, the visit which I paid there was worthwhile. Whether you would wish to formalise links between the two countries is now for you to consider.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

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AMM

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TO:

Sent: 26th March, 1965.
2213

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

1436 RESTRICTED.

Your CA350 Visit of Iraqi Civil Aviation Delegation to Australia.

In replying to the Foreign Office would you please inform them that while some years ago Qantas were interested in operating services to points in Iraqi Territory, the operating pattern of their services has changed substantially in recent times and as a consequence they have no immediate plans for operating services to and through Iraq. In these circumstances the Australian authorities would for their part favour a deferment of negotiations closer to the time when either the Australian or the Iraqi airline puts forward definite plans for the establishment of an air link between the two countries. It is our understanding that the Iraqi airline has no immediate plans for operating services to Australia and it, therefore, seems likely that they also might favour deferment of negotiations.

With this background we would be grateful if the Foreign Office could arrange for the British Embassy in Iraq to express orally Australia's attitude on the negotiations to the Iraqi Officials who raised the matter with the object of dissuading the Iraqis from proceeding with their plan to send a delegation to Australia for negotiations. Of course, we would not wish to convey the impression that we are avoiding negotiations at all costs but rather than the suggested deferment might also appeal to the Iraqis and will meet their wishes as the best course in the circumstances.

So far as the proposed visit of the Iraqi Director-General of Civil Aviation to Australia is concerned we would be grateful if the British Embassy would convey to the Iraqi authorities the message that the Australian Aeronautical Authorities would be pleased to discuss with the Director-General matters of mutual interest in the general field of aviation at any time that he can find a suitable opportunity to visit Australia.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.(716/50/5/4)
MIN. & DEPT CIVIL AVIATION
P.M'S

29th March, 1965.

A/SEC FAS(1,2,3,4) LA EAMEC E AMFE ER@



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

173/10/1

CM

I.10966

FROM:

DATED: 17TH MARCH, 1965.
1654

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
LONDON.

REC'D: 18TH MARCH, 1965.
0704

2027 RESTRICTED.

CIVIL AVIATION, MELBOURNE.
CA350. PYMAN FROM CALO.

YOUR 1036.

ADVICE NOW RECEIVED THROUGH FOREIGN OFFICE THAT IRAQI DELEGATION
WOULD LIKE TO VISIT AUSTRALIA 'NEXT MONTH' BUT WISH TO SOUND OUT
AUSTRALIAN REACTION BEFORE SUBMITTING PROPOSAL OFFICIALLY.

GRATEFUL YOUR ADVICE AS TO TERMS OF REPLY TO BE PASSED BACK
THROUGH FOREIGN OFFICE.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (716/55/5/2)
MIN. & DEPT CIVIL AVIATION
P.M's DEPT
P.M's

18TH MARCH, 1965.

A/SEC FAS(1,2,3,4) LA PACAM AMSP C&P EAMEC E AFME ICR ER@
PIO PPO

(F)

RESTRICTED - CIVIL AVIATION

173/10/1
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

PJ.

0.6672.

Sent: 5th March, 1965.
0147.

TO:

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

1036. RESTRICTED.

Your 1622 (CA344).

Visit to Australia of Iraqi Civil Aviation Delegation.

Would you please ensure that the Iraqi Embassy, London is aware that the Australian authorities have not received any advice of a visit by the Director-General of Aviation Iraq and, therefore, have made no plans to receive him. Please explain that the Australian authorities concerned with Air Services negotiations are fully committed for this month. In order that the Australian authorities can be properly prepared for the Iraqi Director-General's visit we suggest that the proposed visit this month be deferred and a mutually acceptable date set. In this regard we would welcome a proposal by the Iraqi authorities.

2. If there is any doubt about prompt transmission of message to Baghdad by Iraqi Embassy suggest you also ask Foreign Office to forward advice through British Embassy, Baghdad.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (716/55/5/2)
MIN. & DEPT CIVIL AVIATION
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

8th March, 1965.

SEC DS FAS(1,2,3,4) LA PACAM AMSP C&P EAMEC E AFME
ICR PIO PPO ER@

RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

(P)

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

173/10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

FD:

0. 6505.

TC

Sent: 5th March, 1965.

Australian Trade Commission,
BEIRUT.

19. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

(London please pass as a Priority message through the British Foreign Office).

Your 32.

We have been in touch with the Wheat Board which has requested that representations should be made in the course of your visit to Iraq to have Wheat Board contracts exempted from Iraqi stamp duty.

We are unaware of the regulations covering the application of the stamp duty and accordingly we are in no position to judge whether the levy is justified or otherwise. We assume, however, that Government contracts are exempt and in view of the reported reaction of the United Kingdom Embassy and the Wheat Board representative who negotiated the current transaction, we are inclined to think that you should take the matter up with the appropriate Iraqi authorities, in order to ascertain the facts and to seek exemption of transactions of this type from the stamp duty if a case can be developed.

In the circumstances we are obliged to leave the actual approach to your discretion and judgement. You should, of course, liaise closely with the British Embassy in Baghdad, who will, presumably, be both able and anxious to assist you in your efforts. If you conclude that an effective case can be sustained you should take the matter up with the appropriate authorities seeking exemption of Wheat Board sales from this duty or, at least, a waiver of the duty on this particular transaction. You will be aware that even the Ministry which negotiated the contract with Williams was unaware of the stamp duty and the Wheat Board was accordingly unable to adjust its price in negotiations to have regard to its imposition.

In your discussions you may make use of the fact that the Australian Wheat Board is constituted under complementary Commonwealth and State legislation and is the sole authority for the marketing of Australian wheat. The Wheat Board does, of course, operate independently of the Commonwealth Government in its marketing operations but it is responsible to the Minister for Primary Industry who may give directions to the Board concerning the performance of its functions and the exercise of its powers.

CONFIDENTIAL

(F)

.../2

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

- 2 -

O. 6505.

MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY(C) (63/5806)
MIN. & DEPT PRIMARY INDUSTRY(C)
P.L.'s.

5th March, 1965.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SEC DS FAS(4) LA EAMEC E AFME ER

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

173/10/1

LJH.

I. 8720.

DATED: 3RD MARCH, 1965.
1542.

FROM:

REC'D: 4TH MARCH, 1965.
0422.

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
LONDON.

1622. RESTRICTED.

FOR CIVIL AVIATION, MELBOURNE.

CA344.

FOR PYMAN FROM C.A.L.O.

YOUR 793.

MESSAGE FROM BRITISH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD, THROUGH FOREIGN
OFFICE, CONFIRMS THAT IRAQUI, DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF VIATION WILL
VISIT AUSTRALIA THIS MONTH.

IT IS CLAIMED VISIT WAS ARRANGED THROUGH IRAQUI EMBASSY IN
LONDON.

THEY HOTLY DENY ANY KNOWLEDGE OF VISIT BUT ARE MAKING
FURTHER ENQUIRIES.

REGRET UNABLE BE MORE SPECIFIC AT THIS STAGE.

CIVIL AVIATION. (T/T)
E.A. (716/55/5/2)
P.M.'s.

4TH MARCH, 1965.

(F)

SEC FAS(1,2,3,4) SAS(MS) AS(JIC) LA EAMEC AFME ICR ER@

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

173/10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

FD: I. 8381.
FROM: Dated: 1st March, 1965.
1615.
Australian Trade Commission, Rec'd: 2nd March, 1965.
BEIRUT. 0713.

32. CONFIDENTIAL.

Most urgent you confer A.W.B. on Williams message concerning situation in Iraq on payment of stamp duty on recent contract.

2. Cable your instructions to me Beirut before 5th March or to British Embassy Iraq before 8th March.

3. In discussion with Williams he stresses importance of following British advice that matter should not be allowed to pass. Must establish that A.W.B. is instrument of Australian Government so that British Embassy can continue to act as channel of communication and liaison for Australian wheat.

4. Presently Iraqi Government contact London Wheat Office through British Embassy. Because they consider that this keeps operation on government to government basis and they always require Embassy seal and signature on contract.

5. British Embassy consider this action as one of witnessing only but Iraqi Government probably consider from a different aspect.

6. Any discussions will be with appropriate Iraqi Minister. Important it be recognised that Iasha only working to instructions from Ministry of Finance.

MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY
MIN. & DEPT P.I.
P.M.'s.

2nd March, 1965.

CONFIDENTIAL

*1 spoke to D. Phillips who said
the problem was that the Aust. Wheat
Board wanted to get the govt. to say
the A.W.B. is a govt. organisation & hence
SEC FAS(4) EAMEC AFME ER*

*To agree to this would embarrass an
Aust. foreign gov't - viz. wheat sales
to China (i.e. the wheat Board
not an official govt. body
above no govt. backing
implied.)*

(F)

173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

FD:

O. 4913.

TO:

Sent: 18th February, 1965.
2355.

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

793. RESTRICTED.

For C.A.L.O.

Report in "Aeroplane" 11th February page 11 refers to visit of Iraq Delegation to Australia towards end of February to negotiate air services agreement. This is first we have heard of visit.

2. Grateful you make urgent enquiries through Foreign Office to establish basis of report.

E.A.(716/55/5/2)
CIVIL AVIATION
P.M.'s.

19th February, 1965.

SEC FAS(1,2,3,4) SAS(MS) AS(JIC) LA EAMEC AFME ICR ER@
PIO

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

173/10/1

INWARD CABLEGRAM

HLD

I.06207

From:

Dated: 15th February, 1965.
1910

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

Rec'd: 16th February, 1965.
1140

506. RESTRICTED.

I.T.U. Meeting, Melbourne.

Embassy of Iraq has informed us that its Government
will not repeat not be represented at meeting.

E.A. (866/22/3)
P.M.G'S DEPT.
P.M'S DEPT.
P.M'S

16th February, 1965.

(F)

RESTRICTED

SEC DS FAS(1,2,3,4) S&SEA M DL INT UN@ PACAM AMSP EA
EAMEC E AFME ICR ER

FILE No. 173/10/1

DATE 30th December, 1964.

SUBJECT

VISIT TO IRAQ

FOR E.R.

E.T.A.

U.N.

D.L.

EUROPE

M. & I.

ADMIN.

EAST ASIA

Attached is a copy of a report by Mr. Lavett (First Secretary, Cairo) of his recent visit to Iraq.

2. The following paragraphs are brought to your particular attention:

(a) E.R. *

Paragraphs 5, 30, 38, 44 & 50

(b) C. & P.Paragraphs 4 & 45; ^{42 & 43} 54-59 (Being passed to Immigration)(c) ADMIN. 1st 21/1

Paragraph 45 - Extract taken for 12/10/23

(d) E.T.A.

Paragraphs 5, 47 & 48

(e) U.N.

Paragraph 5; 46-52

(f) D.L.

Paragraph 6, 14/1

(g) EUROPE

Paragraph 47

(h) EAST ASIA

Paragraphs 46 & 47

(i) M. & I.

Paragraph 53

(Charles Lee)

Africa & Middle East Section

CONFIDENTIAL

Paras 5 & 37 being passed to P.M.G.'s.

* E.R. w/ note
for may care to pass the contents of para. 44 to D.C.A.
Para 44 passed to DCA 11/1

Mr. Ryan 1st
Mr. Hoyle

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAQ

Of all the countries of the Middle East, with the exception of Kuwait, which is of course a special case, Iraq is the most fortunate in so far as its natural resources are concerned. The land available to it is sufficient for its moderate population and, in more recent times, it has been found to be the depository of large oil reserves. In the past, Mesopotamia, which it encompasses, has been not only one of the richest areas of the world, but was actually one of the cradles of civilisation. It was here, for example, that the wheel and the plough were invented and even in more recent times, it was one of the main centres of the Arab world. The brilliance of Baghdad in the early Middle ages is of course still a by-word. The people of Iraq are aware of these things, and, regard themselves openly as a step above the rest of the world around them, as masters, that is, not servants.

2. And yet, today, Iraq is one of the most unstable countries of the area. A traditional exporter of food grains, it now finds need to import them. Significant areas which were previously rich and fertile have fallen into disuse. The standard of living has in recent times barely held its own, and may actually be declining. Even the oil revenues, while larger than they were, have not risen at the rate at which they should have. And finally, the Government of Iraq is making strenuous efforts to form a close liaison with, which could only involve subservience to, Egypt, a country for which most Iraqis feel little but contempt on account of its recent poverty of means and spirit. As if this were not enough, it maintains poor relations with all the countries which surround it, without exception.

3. Iraq is therefore an interesting country to visit and to study, and, even if the short visit I made there from 5th to 10th November scarcely enabled me to dig far beneath the surface, I hope that some of the following impressions which I gained will be of some interest to you.

4. I should say from the outset that I was exceedingly warmly received by the Iraqi authorities (whom the Iraqi Embassy in Cairo had apprised of my coming). Arrangements were made to meet me at the airport, I was most courteously greeted at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when I called there and an officer of the Ministry finally came to the airport to see me off. A useful programme of calls within the Ministry was drawn up on my behalf, and I had talks, each of about thirty minutes' duration, with the Director-General of Protocol, Mr. J. Shlash, the Director-General of Public Relations, Mr. M. Gayara, the Director-General of Technical Assistance and Cultural Affairs, Mr. Fakhri Al-Qaisi, the Director-General of the Political Department, Mr. A.M. Zaibak, the Director-General of the Economic Department, Dr. T. Mutwalli, and the Director of the International Conferences Department, Dr. N. Al-Kadhim. By the nature of things, few of these discussions dug much below the surface, and they could scarcely be expected to in view of the Ministry's relative impotence in matters of higher policy at this time. While, therefore, no startling revelations were forthcoming in the course of my discussions, (with one possible exception in respect of the United Nations which I shall describe later), I found, on comparing notes with other diplomatic officers serving in Baghdad that I had made good progress, by Iraqi standards, and that no more could have been reasonably expected. Over and above this, my discussions were, I think, useful to me in gaining some first-hand impressions of the Iraqi trend of thought, and I hope that I was able, in return, to go some way toward presenting a picture of Australia as an independent, rapidly developing entity which they had not considered, or indeed been in any way aware of before. I should also add at this point that I formed a very favourable first impression of the calibre of the Ministry officials with whom I spoke. As is the case here in Egypt, they seemed fundamentally capable, sharp men, well qualified to put a point of view effectively. Whether they are really typical of the mass of the people of Iraq or indeed of the type of Government in power there is another matter (as it is in Egypt), and perhaps this is one fundamental cause of the relative impotence of their Ministry.

5. In addition to these officials, I called upon the Foreign Editor of the Iraq News Agency (the official news source), Mr. Ghazi N. Silim, a Director of the foreign language newspaper "Baghdad", Mr. Khalis Azmi, who is also Director of the Foreign Relations Department of the Ministry of

copy on 194/10/1
section dealing with
Kuwait

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Culture and Guidance, and I met socially various other Iraqis. Amongst the diplomatic corps I called upon the British Embassy, where I saw the Ambassador, Sir Roger Allen, the Minister-Counsellor, Mr. D.J.B. Robey, the First Secretary (Commercial), Mr. H. St. J.B. Armitage, the Consul, Mr. F.J. Bradshaw, and the Third Secretary, Mr. Hoskill; the American Embassy, where I saw the Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. J. Wesley Adams and the First Secretary (Political), Mr. Atkins; the Indian Ambassador, Mr. Sadath Alikhan; the Pakistan Ambassador, Mr. Sajjad Hyder; the Netherlands Ambassador, Mr. van Karnebeek; the German Ambassador, Dr. Hans Schmidt-Horix and the Japanese Chargé, Mr. Kazuhiko Furusawa, besides the First Secretary of the Canadian Embassy in Beirut, who was paying an official call to Baghdad at the same time that I was (his Ambassador being accredited in Baghdad as well as Beirut), Mr. A. Potvin. I met also Australian members of an UNTAB team in Baghdad working on communications matters, led by Mr. J. McGregor of our PMG's Department. Finally, I spoke with a number of visiting British, American and indeed Australian businessmen (the latter being Sir Arthur Stephenson, the Melbourne architect, with Mr. Wilkie, one of his senior officers, whose firm successfully tendered several years ago to build three hospitals in Iraq. None of these has yet been gone ahead with, though there is some talk of the project being revived, and Sir Arthur's firm has not yet been paid for the work it did).

6. The major political force in Iraq is, like so many countries in the area, the Army. Without at least the Army's support, no group can achieve power nor can any Government long remain in power. For this reason, the Army has to be much pandered to, and over recent years, "national defence" has occupied something of the order of 35% of the national budget. Up to the past few months, the Air Force would have figured prominently in this scheme of things, too, for it was generally regarded as being very "reliable", but the Air Force badly blotted its reputation on 4th September when a plot was uncovered to bomb President Aref (and, though no doubt inadvertently, members of the diplomatic corps as well) as he was leaving the airport en route to the Non-Aligned Conference, and the Air Force has of course been in disgrace ever since. Most units, up to the time I was there, were grounded. So the 70,000-strong Army, previously no doubt dominant enough, has become in the most recent times even more so, within the Service hierarchy and hence politically.

7. It is virtually impossible to know what is the state of political thought in the Army: any signs of opposition are ruthlessly stamped out immediately they are detected and strong security measures therefore need to be taken by would-be plotters. Thus, even Kassem, with his tight system of control, was taken by surprise: everyone knew that something was in the air, that something must in the circumstances happen, that Kassem would be "going", but nobody (outside the small group concerned, presumably) knew when or how it would happen or who would succeed him.

8. I met no-one in Baghdad who doubted that Aref would also soon be moved on, though most hoped that it would be a palace revolution next time and that disorders of the kind which accompanied the fall of Kassem would this time be avoided. But, once again, there was no-one who could suggest, even tentatively, how or when this would come about, and some admitted ruefully that they had been expecting a move for several months, and that they were now not prepared to make any more predictions.

9. Aref's position is indeed something of an enigma. Unexpectedly - more, extraordinarily - he survived the changes of November, 1963, when the Baathist regime, whose figurehead he had after all been, was overthrown, and yet he commands no obvious source of support. Perhaps it was decided to hold on to him as a continuing figure in order to avoid a repetition of the cataclysmic and exhausting events of February, 1963. It is difficult to believe that, if a serious move were made against him now, he would find many friends to stand by his side - too many seem to regard him as something of a buffoon, there is certainly no warmth for him, not even the capacity of likeable fool, as is to some extent the case with Field Marshal Abdul Hakim Amer in Egypt, (this, at any rate, is the foundation of the possibly over-pious hopes of those who anticipate that his departure will be accomplished in a relatively tidy "family" way).

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10. Aref himself is undoubtedly well aware of his risky position, and this is probably the explanation of the efforts he has made to keep himself in the limelight, even at the risk of making something of a fool of himself, as he did at the time of Khrushchev's visit to Egypt last May.

11. A similar desire to keep in the vanguard, and indeed one step in front of the vanguard of the men who overthrew the Baath regime in November, 1963, may also well be the explanation for his at first sight extraordinarily determined espousal of "unionism", indeed, more than that, Nasserist principles; for it would appear that the group who engineered the overthrow of the Baathists, are of this persuasion. It is after all a common persuasion in the Armies of the Arab world, appealing to emotion and sentiment ("Arab Unity"), professional pride (Nasser was also a soldier), hope of revenge against Israel (best achieved by a united Army - a consideration reinforced by the fact that Egypt's Army is of course by far the strongest in the Arab world), some veneer of ideology ("the good of the people") and sheer opportunism (Nasser is the strongest figure in the Arab world: why not hang on to his coat-tails?). This would offer a feasible explanation of the strength of his public statements, and actions, on the subject: quite apart from the nominal audience when he has been addressing, he has been looking over his shoulder also at the group behind him who are really controlling Iraq. It would also explain the extent of Aref's downcast appearance on his return from Cairo after failing to secure immediate full-scale union: not only had he failed to secure an end of his own but, perhaps more important, he had failed to do something that was required of him. The leading Nasserist figures in the Cabinet while I was there were the Minister of Culture and Guidance, Abdel Kerim Farhan, and the then Foreign Minister Sobhi Abdel Hamid, though steps seem to have been taken subsequently to further strengthen its Nasserist complexion (the latter, for example, has been transferred to the key Interior Ministry).

12. If this account is substantially true, then of course Aref's conduct may be regarded as almost wholly opportunistic, motivated largely by considerations of personal security and power. This has tended to be much the case in the Middle East in the past, no matter how the fact may have been wrapped up in ideological verbiage, and there is nothing in Aref's background to indicate that it is not the case now, as well.

13. Since the Iraq Government seems, at least on the face of things, to have been almost prepared to hand Iraq, duly trussed, on a platter to Egypt, it might be a matter of wonder why Egypt, apparently uncharacteristically, did not accept the gift.

14. In the first place, and of prime importance, has undoubtedly been the recognition by Egypt of the unpopularity of Aref's Government and, even more particularly, of the concept of union itself in the country at large. As I have already commented, there is no doubt that the Iraqis generally regard Egyptians with some contempt, and it would indeed be surprising if there were many who favoured closer links with them. Furthermore, while the dominant group in the Army at the moment seems to be Nasserist, there are undoubtedly very many officers who are not - partly because they share the general view of Egypt, partly perhaps because they recognise that, in the event of an Egyptian "take over", the prospects of their own subsequent advancement, as Iraqis if not non-Nasserists, would be seriously compromised. All the observers with whom I spoke, therefore, were agreed that union with Egypt would be a most unpopular step, and one which could never in practice be carried through. The best and perhaps most authoritative, and, more important, influential view which I heard on the matter (indirectly, though on the best authority) was that of the UAR Ambassador in Baghdad who reported to Cairo a few weeks ago that he estimated that only 10% of the Iraqi people supported union, and that 90% were strongly opposed to it. It is little wonder in these circumstances that Nasser should have held back.

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15. The feelings of one Iraqi, who, though he began by speaking fairly guardedly ended much more frankly, were put to me by Mr. Khalis Azmi of the Ministry of Culture and Guidance and the "Baghdad News". He said that, in his view, there was a great gulf between the two peoples which would render any very intimate association difficult to achieve for a long time. That gulf could be summed up by saying that whereas few Egyptians cared little for politics, Iraqis were very politically minded. Every Iraqi, from top to bottom, he said, was a politician at heart: this was just the opposite problem to that of Egypt. So far as I was able to check, the point which he was seeking to make is valid, though, as was pointed out to me, the fact that Iraqis are politically highly conscious by no means implies that they are also politically sensible; on the contrary, they have a history of haring after political objectives which are either unattainable or, if they are attainable, highly undesirable.

16. Two corollaries seem to follow from this: first of all, that if the UAR forces (estimated variously at 300 to 1,000 men, the latter probably now being nearer the mark) stationed near Baghdad - officially, in order to further Arab unity of arms, but more likely, in actual fact to help underpin Aref's sagging regime - were unwise enough to try to physically intervene in Iraqi affairs, then the chances of very stiff and bloody counter-action by Baghdadis would be exceedingly high, and it is very far from certain that, in view of the numbers involved and the reported state of their morale, the Egyptians would get the best of such an encounter. In the second place, it has been stated officially on several occasions - the most recently, only two days ago - that President Nasser intends to pay a visit to Baghdad in the near future, probably in January to attend the next Unified Political Command meeting which is to be held there. If he does, very serious fears for his safety ought to be felt and it ought to be taken as no mark of cowardice on his part, but of characteristic realism, if, in the end, he finds an excuse not to go.

17. The case of Mr. Khalis Azmi was interesting from another point of view as indicating that Nasserist roots are by no means as deep in the Iraqi administration in even some of its more sensitive positions as one might be led to expect; for, after we had talked for a while, he volunteered to me that, even though he held the position he did, it would not be possible for him to enter Egypt, because he was on the Egyptian "black list" (by which he meant, Visa Warning List). He said that, in 1957, he had written some articles so highly critical of Nasser that the Egyptians had taken deep offence and had debarred him from Egypt. His name remained on the "black list" and he could not see any prospect of its being removed. At least in conversation with me, he seemed quite unconcerned over the prospect.

18. The acquisition of Iraq would have a number of obvious advantages to Nasser - in the first place, of course, it would place in his hands a wonderful new source of foreign exchange, in the oil revenues. It could too have considerable strategic significance, giving him a direct front on to Syria, where the present regime would surely not long withstand the pressure that could thereby be mounted on it, and a direct front on to Kuwait, as well, where the Government is also very much aware of the potential threat to it and has been watching the development of closer UAR-Iraq ties with real and justified alarm. It would also bring him on to the Persian (or rather in this context, Arabian) Gulf, as well as the borders of Saudi Arabia, while Jordan would also almost surely have to trim its sails even more in his favour.

19. In addition, however, it would bring him on to the borders of Turkey and Iran, and there is no question but that these countries would not only be alarmed by such a prospect, but would almost certainly do something to frustrate it. Strongest action could be expected from Iran, whose Shah is already desperately anxious, perhaps to the point of fixation, about the danger of Nasser to him. The most obvious way in which trouble, and serious trouble, could be stirred up for Nasser in Iraq, or for that matter, in any Government of Iraq, would be through the agency of the Kurdish minority in Iraq, whose area borders on both Iran and Turkey, and perhaps amongst the Shias too.

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20. The population of Iraq stands at the moment, according to the best (American) estimates I was able to obtain, at about 8 million. Of these, about 4 million are Shia-Moslems, living for the most part in the southern half of the country, below Baghdad, 1½ million are Sunni-Moslems, living to the north and west of Baghdad, 1½ million are Kurds, living, in the main, in the mountainous areas adjoining Iran and Turkey, 200,000 are Christians, mostly "Assyrians", 200,000 are Turks, and 200,000 are Persians. It follows from this that the Sunni Arabs who control the country and who have for long provided the Government, the senior Administration and the Army, in fact constitute very much of a minority in the country as a whole. It is therefore not a case of minorities being oppressed by the majority but of a particular minority imposing its will on the majority. For some time, the Shias have apparently been prepared to accept the subservient position into which they have been cast fairly meekly, but, latterly, there have been signs that they have had enough and that they have been demanding concessions. In the Cabinet changes of mid-November, some were apparently taken into the regime, but I suggest it still remains to be seen how far the Shias selected for Cabinet will turn out to either act in that capacity or exercise real authority.

21. In this connection, it is interesting that Aref has taken on to himself something of the mantle of a Sunni revivalist, a kind of missionary zealot. The Indian Ambassador, who is also a Moslem, told me in confidence that he (and, by implication, many other Moslems) thought that the way in which Aref was parading his zeal was absurd, belonging very much to another bypast age, not to the present time. The Ambassador felt that Aref must be either a charlatan or a fool to act so - perhaps a little of each. A consequence of Aref's zeal, however, is that he would be likely to extend concessions to the rival Shia sect only under considerable protest, and then to the minimum extent possible.

22. It is also interesting to speculate, as the Indian Ambassador did, that Aref's missionary zeal could constitute a powerful motive in his efforts to effect a union with Egypt, since, if he could do this, Sunni influence would once more be predominant, beyond all measure of doubt, in Iraq.

23. But while the Shias constitute problem enough, the Kurds, who are not even Arabs even if they are Sunnis, constitute a much more serious problem, indeed a positive menace to the existence of the State, in its present form.

24. Unlike the Iraqis, and most other Arabs for that matter, the Kurds are a truthful, reliable, honourable, self-respecting group. They hold all Arabs - not just Iraqis - in contempt and make little effort to hid that contempt, proven justified in the view, so often on the field of battle. They have in fact proved excellent soldiers, particularly in their mountain habitat. They are likeable, so far as Europeans are concerned, to the extent that a well-known American Archaeologist who had worked in their area, told his son who was taking up a consular post there to be cautious in dealing with them, to be careful, that is, not to be too completely won over to their side, because he would find that "at heart, they're just damned Connecticut Yankees!"

25. Up to the present time, it would appear that the Turks for their part have not been permitting arms or other supplies to be passed over their border to them and that the Iranians have been at most leaving their door only just a bit ajar. This situation could change in the face of a complete take-over of Iraq by Nasser, or of a major breakdown through any other cause, between Iran and Iraq. The immediate relevance of this is that, in the American view, if the Kurds were reasonably well-armed, they could, particularly in the face of the Iraqi Army's current somewhat demoralised condition, defeat it and perhaps, if they were so minded, reach Baghdad itself. The considerable consequences of this can only be speculated on.

26. Moreover, because of the existence in, or near, Kurdish territory of major Iraqi oil fields and pipelines, it would be possible for the Kurds to inflict major damage to the Iraqi oil industry and the economy as a whole. I was informed at the American Embassy that the Kurds appear to be aware of their power to do this, but have held their hand in the belief that the major Western powers would never stand for interference with these oil supplies but would spring to the aid of the Iraqi Government. In this, the Kurds are entirely

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incorrect, since the Western powers (at any rate, according to the Americans) are extremely unlikely to do anything whatever to assist the type of Government which has been in power in Baghdad since 1958, both for that very reason and because they would not wish to provide arms in the Middle East area which might have the ultimate effect of disturbing the military balance. The immediate relevance of this point is that, on American calculations, the loss of this oil revenue would bring Iraq to its knees in three months.

27. The Kurds, then, possess a potential stranglehold over Iraq, both militarily and economically, and it is a matter for wonder both that successive Iraqi Governments have so signally failed to at least provide the Kurds with an honest deal which might go some way to keeping them quiet (there is an appalling record of broken promises and black treachery on the part of successive Governments) and that Governments have for so long been able to get away with the kind of treatment they have been meting out. Kurdish doubts about Egyptian military aid to, if not dominance in, Iraq have been conveyed by their delegates personally to Nasser in Cairo, and must constitute another motive for an Egyptian "go-slow" policy in Iraq.

28. As I have remarked, relations between Iraq and Iran have been poor, and have recently grown worse as a result of Iranian fear of Egyptian dominance over Iraq, and of Iraqi allegations that the Persians were interfering in Iraqi affairs through the medium of their fellow Shias. An outright break appeared possible in the middle of this year following an incident which occurred when the new Iranian Ambassador was presenting his credentials to Aref. In the course of his prepared speech, which the present Iranian Chargé claims was meant to be the usual anodyne thing, the Ambassador remarked on the (alleged) long history of close partnership between the two peoples and went on to say that Iran regarded its next door neighbour with friendly interest on account of the many links which had for so long bound them, including even common religious links. At that, even though the speech was not finished, Aref, trembling with rage, rushed from the room. A terrible scene then ensued between the Ambassador and the Foreign Minister, in which the Foreign Minister said that what the Ambassador had just said was as good as an open confession of Iranian interference in Iraq, to which the Ambassador duly replied that, if Iran really wished to interfere, the Iraq Government could not last a week. The Ambassador left Baghdad by air immediately, and has not been back since.

29. The anecdote, which I got from the Japanese Chargé who was in turn told by the Iranian Chargé who was present at the time, amusing enough in itself, points to the suspicion with which the two countries view each other, the possibilities of trouble arising out of Iraq's multifarious population, and, of course, the silliness of Aref and his entourage.

30. If successive Iraqi Governments have failed signally to weld the peoples of Iraq into a nation, for which they may have some excuse since Iraq was after all originally only an artifact and, if I am right in the foregoing, to a large extent ~~it~~ still is, they have in recent times made an even worse botch of the economy, which at least had a sound basis originally. The heavier tax which Kassem applied on the export of oil, resulting not in more revenue for the State, but considerably less as customers transferred their business elsewhere, has been repealed on the ground that it was just another of his foolishnesses, but it delivered a blow to the oil industry of Iraq which has resulted in a much slower rate of growth than ought to be the case, and, hence, in a much slower growth in revenue from that source. Moreover, it is typical of some other actions taken by Iraqi Government other than Kassem's.

31. The most recent example is the nationalisation measures of 14th July, under which banks, insurance companies and leading trading and industrial concerns were unexpectedly taken over. It is still not entirely clear why this action was taken. There are many in Baghdad, including, for example, the Japanese Chargé, who believes that it must have been done as a result of UAR pressure. He points to (i) the firm statement by the Prime Minister only the day before that no such move was contemplated, and (ii) the delay in the arrival on the day on which the announcement was made of UAR Vice-President Hussein el Shafei to attend the National Day Celebrations. Furusawa said that Heads of

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Diplomatic Missions had been gathered at the airport early in the morning to greet Shafei, but that after an hour's wait, and much inconsequential shuffling, they had been told to go home again, and Shafei had eventually arrived, unannounced, that evening, in the middle of the official Reception. Furusawa argues that there must have been some reason for this, and that arguments over the Nationalisation Decree in the interim must have been it. The fact that it was actually issued and that Shafei arrived later must be more than coincidental. While this theory undoubtedly has attractions, on the whole, without dismissing it altogether, I am inclined to side with the doubters, though this is of course not to say that the Egyptians did not lend a hand, perhaps upon request, in drawing up the measure. In the first place, it seems extremely unlikely that so complete a measure could possibly have been drawn up in the time between the Prime Minister's first statement, at about 2 p.m. on 13th July, and his announcement of the measure at 8.59 a.m. next day, least of all between Shafei's non-arrival at about 7.00 a.m. and the announcement two hours later. Two other explanations are possible: either that he was unaware of the preparations which were being made, which seems incredible, even if he is not by any means at one with the general complexion of the rest of his Cabinet, or, as seems more likely, that he was endeavouring for reasons best known to himself, to put local business interests off their guard, though why he could not have done so more indirectly is hard to see. The second broad reason why I would doubt that the UAR had been directly responsible, by implication contrary to real Iraqi desire, is that such a step would contradict all other evidence on the roles adopted by the respective countries in moving toward an eventual union. It is of course for this latter reason, the real intentions of the UAR, that the point is of most interest.

32. Be this as it may, the fact is that the nationalisation measures have cast gloom over the business world and have injected a further element of doubt and uncertainty and, beyond that, inefficiency into a situation already unsteady enough by any standards. The added inefficiency of course stems from the fact that the removal of the former managers and owners has created a vacuum which there is no real way of filling. In many cases, public servants have been transferred outright to the managerial posts (at greatly increased salaries, incidentally) but there are many instances in which several positions have had to be allocated to the one man. In some instances, the former managers have been kept on as advisers, but in more, they seem to have either been dismissed outright or gone off in a huff. They could certainly not be expected in any event to put their hearts into their down-graded jobs. Foreign businessmen with whom I spoke in Baghdad were generally in despair over the situation which had developed and over the possibility of carrying on ordered business in these circumstances. The effect on an already creaking economy can only be exceedingly adverse.

33. The land reform programme introduced by the first post-Revolution Government has fared no better. As originally promulgated in October, 1958, it provided for the break-up of large estates and the distribution of the land to small peasants and landless labourers in certain fixed lots, depending upon the type of land and the type of watering accorded it. Far from increasing output, however, the programme has had a disastrous effect upon it; for the new owners had neither the skill nor the financial resources nor, in many cases, the desire to work their land properly. The latter might appear to be surprising at first sight, but a number of reasonably well-authenticated stories are known of peasants, who, having at length acquired their land, made it quite clear that from now on they were going to live like landowners and not labourers, and forthwith downed tools.

34. Failure to tend land properly in Iraq over a period is liable to be particularly catastrophic in view of the very low gradient of the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers in Southern Iraq. Thus, although Baghdad is 500 miles from the sea by river, its elevation is only 113 feet, while, forty miles to the west, the Euphrates is only 25 feet higher. As a result, the rivers have inadequate carrying power. Both natural and artificial levees have been built, but it is absolutely essential that positive action be taken to ensure that the channels are constantly kept clear if irrigation, on which the land depends, is to continue. There is also a serious problem in respect of the land itself being irrigated. On account of the dry heat, the rivers lose much water by

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evaporation and tend to become saline, and this means that the water delivered to the fields is also very saline. However, owing to the low-lying level of the land, drainage is difficult, and, unless constant attention is paid to it, deposits of alkali and salt may be left on the land which would thus be rendered altogether unsuited for cultivation. The failure to attend to this very serious problem has taken much land out of production, so that there is a good deal less now than there was ten years ago. This has resulted in Iraq, traditionally a grain exporter, becoming a grain importer with consequent ill effects upon its foreign exchange position.

35. The loss of land compared with the past is even more noteworthy if the present area under cultivation is compared with that in the great days of Ancient Mesopotamia. Modern Iraqis say that the Mongol invasions of the 13th century are the root causes of the decline and indeed, of many more of their land problems, and it is certainly true that the devastation wrought by the Mongols was severe and that grave damage was in fact inflicted on the irrigation system of the times. All the same, one cannot escape the feeling that, if greater energy had been displayed, more could have been done to restore the situation; no-one was able to tell me what had been or was being done to remedy the situation, at least to some extent, wherever possible. There seems to be an element (if no more than an element) of truth in the reply given by the cynics to the question "Why do the Arabs always live in the desert?", "There was no desert until they went to live there".

36. Baghdad itself is far from being an attractive city, being dusty, hot in summer and very uneven in architectural quality with traditional, often apparently tumble-down Arab-type dwellings predominating. There seem to be no large stores. All the same, at the time of my visit, the range of goods there seemed to be greater than it is in the more cosmopolitan city of Cairo, and it is evident that Baghdad has still not felt the full effects of the Government's economic policies, which are bound to have an adverse effect on standards just as their counterparts have in Egypt. I understand from residents of Baghdad however that the pinch is already beginning to be felt and I can myself vouch for the growing inefficiency of local services as a result of a break-down which affected all the telephone services in the heart of the city on the first day I was there. The trend is perhaps best summed up in the fact that, as supplements to and where necessary replacements of, the city's present fleet of red London-style double and single decker buses, a considerable number of "Naar" buses are being obtained from Egypt. These have proved unsatisfactory in Cairo itself, to the extent that the local authorities here are themselves importing new buses from abroad. Yet Iraq is to be the recipient of the version which is unacceptable by Egyptian standards.

37. Communications in Iraq are poor, and need desperately to be overhauled. From this point of view, indeed, Baghdad is, and gives the impression very much of being, an isolated city. A new standard gauge railway between Baghdad and Basra is almost completed (with Soviet bloc assistance) but mails and telegraph services are in many cases rudimentary. There is, for example, no air mail service between Baghdad and Basra, air mail to Cairo, or more particularly, for some reason, Beirut, is incredibly slow (two weeks in transit is by no means uncommon), telecommunications facilities are rudimentary by modern standards, and, so far as the outside world is concerned, largely non-existent, and so on. These disabilities must constitute a major brake on economic development. I found the Australian UNTAB team in very low spirits over this and because they had not even been included in the year's budget (though, on the day I left there were signs that something, even if not enough, might be done to provide them with some funds.)

38. The outlook for Iraq's economy is therefore not good. Too much is going on "defence", too many hare-brained schemes, which may or may not be ideological in origin, are being embarked on, too few of the really fundamental problems of the country, such as the need to bring more land back into production, are being tackled, and too much reliance is being put, presumably for "political" reasons, on the (very sad) example of Egypt.

39. I have already reported my general impressions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The following is a general account of the more significant points which I discussed while I was there.

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40. It will presumably come as no surprise to hear that little is known of Australia in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that little immediate attention is given to us. The Director-General of the Political Department, Mr. Zaibak, was even unsure of which of his two Sections we should fall under - the Western Section or the Asian, African and Socialist Section. He rather thought the former. (He admitted the odd character of his administrative arrangement, but said that this was under review and would be amended along more sensible lines in the near future, and after that, Australia would almost certainly come within a new Asian Section).

41. Mr. Zaibak rather took me back by remarking conversationally that he thought of Australia as an essentially stagnant country, tied by tight strings still to the United Kingdom. The latter, he thought, could be demonstrated easily enough by reference to the fact that we had the same Head of State, the Queen, carried the British Emblem on our flag, played cricket, wore similar type clothing (I should perhaps say as a matter of personal explanation that those I had on at the time were made in Hong Kong), never seemed to be far removed from Britain in our policies of thinking. (I must stress here that Mr. Zaibak's tone was in no sense offensive: he was merely stating a case, as he saw it, perhaps partly in order to see what I would say.) I told Mr. Zaibak that I thought he was very wrong in his main conclusions. On the question of our alleged stagnation, I outlined briefly to him some of our economic achievements since the War, pointing, as a major example, to our motor vehicle industry, which had even enabled a number of Holdens to find their way to Baghdad (the Police Department there, inter alia, use them). As to the question of our independence, I enlarged on this as forcibly as I could (without, I hope, going so far as to denigrate our major allies and friends, however!) outlining briefly how we had come to stand where we do, suggesting that if we seemed often to be standing alongside close allies, then this could be said of other countries too, not excluding Iraq, whose interests were similar.

42. Mr. Zaibak said that he was surprised to hear of the progress we had been making. He had naturally heard of our immigration programme, which I had mentioned in the context of our economic expansion, but did not realise it was of such a scale. As a matter of fact, he had heard of it rather in connection with what he understood to be a racially exclusive policy. I explained to Mr. Zaibak the main features of our immigration policy, stressing to him our desire not to create a situation in which alien groups, clinging closely together, not mingling much with the rest of the community, not adding much to that community, might develop. I said that our policy certainly had nothing to do with race or colour as such: Australia itself was singularly free of any racial discrimination, and we wanted to keep it so. Mr. Zaibak said that he quite appreciated the points I was making and agreed with the general tenor of my remarks.

43. Our immigration programme came up also in my discussion with the Director of the International Conferences Department, Dr. Kadhim, in the context of our alleged readiness to accept, and indeed encourage, Palestinians to go to Australia. I outlined the position briefly to him, and he received the information without comment. It was clear, however, that the matter is known within the Ministry (if only because it has been discussed in Arab League circles) and I rather thought that his initial mention of it had overtones of criticism behind it. He did not, however, press the matter.

44. The question of a possible Air Agreement between Iraq and Australia, which was apparently under discussion a while ago, was discussed briefly while I was with the Director-General of the Economic Department, Dr. Mutwalli. He said that the Minister at that time had not been too keen on proceeding far or fast, since Iraqi Airways had ordered some De Havilland Trident aircraft for use both Eastwards and Westwards. (I took it that he did not wish to provide them with more competitors.) While the matter was not under active consideration, that particular Minister had gone now and he personally felt that progress might be possible. If we wished to proceed, he wondered where discussions might take place.

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London, Cairo or Baghdad would be possible, though I thought he hinted that his own preference would be Baghdad. (It was at this point that we undertook some discussion, described below, on Australian representation in Iraq.) In reporting this discussion, I would have to add that Dr. Mutwalli in no way urged a resumption of talks: he merely said that Iraq would be prepared to resume discussions, and that some progress might (not certainly would) be possible.

45. The question of the possibility of Australia opening diplomatic relations with Iraq was mentioned to me by three senior officers, including, in particular, the Director-General of Protocol, Mr. Shlash, who has most pleasant memories of Australians whom he met at his most recent posting, Accra, said that it was quite understood that we might not be able to open a full-scale mission in Baghdad, but he wondered whether it might not be possible to at any rate double-accredit our Ambassador from some other post. If we had one in Beirut, this would no doubt be most convenient (it is what the Canadians do) but of course Cairo would be entirely acceptable (he said that he only mentioned Beirut because it was geographically closer). I explained to Mr. Shlash in general terms our general policy on double accreditations but added that I would pass his representations back to you for consideration. I did not of course give him any ground for belief that your reply would be favourable, the general tenor of my remarks being, if anything, rather in the opposite direction. The point was also raised, perhaps even more strongly, by Dr. Mutwalli, who stressed that he would always be glad to see us for discussions of substance in Baghdad, accreditation or not, but who then went on to rather hint that, all the same, we might as well have a representative accredited in Baghdad since this would put things on a better formal basis. This latter point was mentioned to me also by the Pakistan Ambassador, who said that Baghdad was the traditional alternative centre to Cairo in the Middle East, that it might be useful to have some standing there to take full advantage of the eventuality either of Cairo and Baghdad coming even closer together, or of flying apart to opposite extremes again, that it would cost us nothing if we intended to pay visits there from time to time in any case and that it would no doubt be appreciated by the Iraqis. It seems to me that this sums up the case as well as it can be.

46. I discussed at some length the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations with Dr. Kadhim, and it arose indirectly also with the Director-General of Technical Assistance and Cultural Affairs, Mr. Qaisi. The former pressed strongly the case for Communist China, though in fairly standard terms. Speaking picturesquely, he felt that China's unsociable behaviour (which he was prepared to admit) ought to be looked at in the proper context: that is, as rather like the actions of a naughty child who has been cast out from his family circle and then becomes something of a delinquent, breaking light bulbs and so on in the street; only let him back into the house, and all will be well. I commented that, in this case, the child was a very naughty one indeed and that, far from being sure he would behave when he returned home, there seemed a much greater likelihood that he would continue to act the same as before, and indeed, end by burning down the house altogether. I said that he really would have to give some indication that he was prepared to mend his ways first and that he was fit to join the family, and not damage or destroy it. Dr. Kadhim said that one could not really be sure until one tried, and I replied that it might be a little late then. More seriously, I suggested that more weight should surely be given to the views of important countries, in particular the United States, who were strongly opposed to the seating of Communist China. I pointed out how great was United Nations indebtedness to the United States, not only financially speaking, but from the point of view of giving a sense of steadiness and real constructiveness to the Organisation. I said that, in the last resort, the United Nations had managed well enough without Communist China, but could it manage so well if American interest and influence were reduced? Dr. Kadhim said that he could see this well enough, but the United States would really have to bow before reality. He did not seem overly worried about the fate of the people of Formosa if the Communists took them over, merely commenting that some solution would no doubt have to be found for them. He did not appear to have any particular solution of his own to suggest.

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47. Mr. Qaisi, while recalling that Iraq's policy was certainly favourable to Communist China's entry into the United Nations, indicated that, as it happened, the student exchange arrangement concluded between Communist China and Iraq was really not working particularly well, in that, while Chinese students certainly came to study in Iraq, no Iraqis had been found who wished to go to China. This was partly a matter of language, partly because students were dubious about Chinese facilities, partly because they preferred to go to other countries (particularly Europe or the United States) if they could. He said that many students went to the Soviet Union, but he implied strongly that the financial arrangement covering them whereby the Soviet Government paid them allowance in Moscow in roubles but collected the equivalent in hard currency from Iraq was less than perfect (though "understandable" from the Russians' point of view). In a discussion of our own aid programme, he expressed surprise and interest that, in extending aid, we had not found it necessary to conclude formal Cultural Agreements. He said that Iraq invariably did so, no doubt largely because Eastern European countries preferred it that way.

48. Mr. Qaisi explained to me that his Department in the Ministry was responsible for supervising all matters relating to the training of students abroad on the one hand and the receipt of other technical aid in Iraq on the other. There was an inter-Ministry Committee, on which he was the Foreign Ministry representative, which met regularly to consider various suggestions made as to the aid required. These were considered, and given a priority where necessary, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs then undertook the task of seeing what could be done about them, in consultation with the appropriate foreign authorities (generally their Embassies in Baghdad).

49. I discussed with Dr. Kadhim briefly the questions of nuclear free zones and disarmament, on neither of which he had anything substantially new to say. On the former, he said that, whilst the concept was no doubt imperfect, it was a beginning, and a United Nations resolution calling for the establishment of these would serve to keep the issue, and the concern of the small countries about it, much before the eyes of the Great Powers who possessed nuclear devices. This would be the case even if it were merely a matter of discussion, without the adoption of a formal resolution. The point which he made on disarmament was much the same: that is, that it was up to the small, developing countries to keep plugging away in order to bring home to the Great Powers their deep concern and try to secure some progress.

50. On UNCTAD, Dr. Mutwalli said that he did not really expect too much to come out of the forthcoming United Nations session. He thought the developing countries had the numbers in New York to ensure some sort of resolution and this was of course important, because a machinery could be set up which could later be developed. However, he said frankly that he did not have much confidence in "Resolutions" as such and he hardly expected any dramatic developments to stem from this one. What he felt might have to be watched was the possible effects progress in this direction might have on other desirable arrangements, such as the Special Development Fund, which had already been set up.

51. The question of the site of the United Nations Headquarters was raised with me by Dr. Kadhim. He said that he thought that, for whatever reason it had been done, it had been a decided mistake to set the United Nations up in the United States, as indeed, it would have been in the territory of any other Great Power. The nettle of removing it would have to be grasped at some time, and the sooner probably the better. What was the alternative? He thought that the best place, all things considered, would be Cairo. Cairo stood at the geographic hinge between Europe, Africa and Asia, it was the capital of one of the leading countries of the Non-Aligned World, which was very desirable, and it was headed by a Government which, on account of its own considerable efforts, was already universally respected. Such a choice would be both a gesture of goodwill to the developing countries of the world, and a recognition of their growing significance.

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52. I do not know how far Dr. Kadhim's rather startling proposal represented official thinking in Baghdad and how far it was a brain-child of his own. Neither the British nor American Embassies had heard of it before. At any rate, his presentation of his case indicated that a good deal of thought (no matter how misguided) had gone into the matter. One thing that can certainly be said is that Dr. Kadhim's sympathies are pro-Nasser.

53. I raised the problem of Indonesia's "confrontation" of Malaysia briefly with Mr. Zaibak, but he displayed no real knowledge of it (or indeed, if it comes to that, of any of the problems of Asia, his main interest obviously being the "Socialist" side of his Department) and no opinion to offer. I understand, however, that the Iraqis, if required to take a position, would almost certainly do so in favour of the Indonesians, on account of the British involvement in the affair, (the Iraqis on the one hand tending to identify the Indonesians, however illogically, with their own period under British domination and, on the other hand, blaming the Malaysians for quietly accepting British domination), the generally "anti-colonialist" tendencies of Indonesia, over and beyond the United Kingdom's part in it, and the considerable personal efforts being made in Baghdad by the Indonesian Ambassador there. The British Ambassador told me that he was disturbed about these latter, particularly because of some of the highly insulting (to the United Kingdom) public statements being issued by the Indonesian Embassy. However, while these went far beyond the limits of propriety, he felt that it would be a waste of time to complain to the Iraqis, and had therefore not done so.

54. I had some long discussions with the British Consul, Mr. Bradshaw, about applications he had received from residents of Iraq wishing to go to Australia. He said (and his Vice-Consul confirmed) that they seemed to be occupying 25% of the Vice-Consul's time. For example, on 6th November, he had had 15 interviews on the subject (though, admittedly this was exceptional). Mr. Bradshaw said that he had passed a number of applications (involving about 200 families) back to the Immigration authorities, and had been "distressed" not to have received more than a handful of replies. This made things difficult for him, all the more so since one applicant, Mr. Kardagh S. Dikhouka of the Iron Industries Company, New Baghdad Road, Baghdad, who had written direct to Canberra, had received a letter back (Immigration reference 63/31517 of 22nd October) indicating not only that he might be acceptable, but that assistance to the extent of £71.8.6 Australian might be available to enable him to pay his fare. Mr. Bradshaw said that it was unfortunate, first of all, because the Immigration Department reply was inconsistent with another letter they had written (64/45374 of 25th September) to himself indicating that financial assistance would not be available, secondly, because Dikhouka was in no way an outstanding applicant - quite contrary, if anything, compared with many others, whereas those others had usually not heard anything at all, and thirdly, because the news of Dikhouka's reply was bound to become known and a flood might set in. He therefore begged me to see whether the matter could not be looked into and he could not receive some more replies. I undertook to do so.

55. Mr. Bradshaw said that the recent new issue of instructions for British Consular Officers from our Department of Immigration had been most helpful to him, and he had been able to "weed out" a number of cases which would obviously be rejected. He had, however, given some application forms out to what he regarded as "marginal" cases, and he admitted that he had suggested to them that they "try their luck" direct (Dikhouka had been one of these).

56. He said that most of these marginal cases were "white collar" workers, who seemed to be generally excluded under the terms of the new Instructions. He wondered whether some consideration might not be given to reviewing their plight. As things stood, the Christian minority (mostly Assyrians) had been having an increasingly hard time of it. There were no discriminatory law as such, but things were being made difficult for them. Priority was being given to Moslems securing positions and it seemed that "office instructions" had gone out to branches of the newly-nationalised banks telling them to dispose of the Christians. The trouble was that most of the minority were in fact "white collar" workers, and quite good ones at that. There were certainly cases deserving of sympathy amongst them.

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COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

TELEPHONE: CANBERRA U 0423.

TELEGRAMS:

SECTRADE, CANBERRA.

PLEASE ADDRESS REPLY TO THE "SECRETARY"

AND QUOTE 12/43/13

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY,

CANBERRA, A.C.T.

TRADE COMMISSIONER - BEIRUT

TOUR OF IRAQ

NOVEMBER 1964

1. Please find attached a report on the above visit for your information.
2. The whole of this report has been classified "RESTRICTED" and discretion should be exercised in disseminating information to firms.

M. Quinlivan
(M. Quinlivan)
Acting Director,
TRADE COMMISSIONER BRANCH

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TRADE COMMISSIONER - BEIRUT

TOUR OF IRAQ

NOVEMBER, 1964.

A. CURRENT POLITICAL STRUCTURE.

The following is a quick run-down on the current political structure in Iraq and should be read in conjunction with Appendix B which details nationalisation moves over the past few months.

1. Under a provisional constitution announced on May 4, 1964, a three-year transitional period is defined after which there will be a permanent constitution and presidential elections. Meanwhile, the President has the power to nominate and dismiss the Premier (currently Lt. Gen. Taher Yahya) and ministers, ratify laws, treaties and other agreements and declare war and peace - subject to the approval of the National Council for the Revolutionary Command (NCRC), a new National Defence Council and the Cabinet. Power still rests mainly with the NCRC and the armed forces, who have strongly backed President Aref since November 18, 1963.

In July 1964 a political organisation called the Arab Socialist Union was formed. This consists of organisations of workers, peasants, students and professional bodies. It is designed to provide a popular base for the regime and work towards union with its sister body in Egypt and the union of Iraq and the UAR. No other political parties are allowed.

2. The main plank of President Aref's foreign policy is union with the UAR. Although the Ba'athist regimes in Iraq and Syria signed a tripartite unity agreement with Egypt on April 17, 1963, this was revoked by President Nasser following the suppression of an attempted Nasserite coup in Syria (July 18, 1963). Subsequently, Iraq and Syria worked towards union on lines already sketched in agreements of November 1961 and June 1962, but this was brought to an abrupt halt when President Aref achieved full power. President Aref's efforts to unite Iraq with the UAR culminated in the signing of an agreement setting up a Joint Presidency Council on May 16. Composed of the president, three members of Cabinet rank and three other representatives from each country, its functions are to study and implement measures to unite the two countries. Special committees have been set up to study the main aspects. So far, the main developments have been the introduction of Arab Socialism and the Arab Socialist Union in Iraq; both steps closely follow Egyptian precedents and are regarded as to the two most important reforms essential before full union can be contemplated. A series of minor agreements has been worked out covering military, economic, judicial and trade cooperation.

3. In addition to the usual ministries, there are various semi-autonomous bodies responsible to ministers or the Council of Ministers collectively but possessing their own budgets (Iraq Republican Railways, Port Authority, Tobacco Monopoly Administration, Fao Dredging Scheme, Higher Agrarian Reform Body, Liquidation of Royal Properties). Since June 1961 these 'annexed budget' organisations have been obliged to deposit their funds with the Ministry of Finance, which regulates drawings.

4. The nationalisation decrees of July 1964 created additional semi-autonomous bodies with considerable powers. They include the General Industrial Organisation, General Insurance Organisation and the General Trade Organisation (grouped under the even more
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powerful Economic Organisation), as well as the General Organisation of Banking, controlling all commercial banks (now state-owned). Semi-government departments include the Oil-Refineries and Oil Products Distribution administrations under the Oil Ministry, the Grain Board, National Insurance Company (now under the General Insurance Organisation), the Iraqi National Oil Company and the National Electricity Administration.

NATIONALISATION AND ITS EFFECT ON IRAQ'S RELATIONS
WITH OTHER ARAB STATES.

1. The Economic Establishment

Dr Kahir al-Din Hasib, Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq, was designated Acting President of the Economic Establishment as well as the President of the General Establishment for Banking. The Economic Establishment has been primarily concerned with setting up and supervising the Industrial, Insurance and Trade Establishments and with compensation of shareholders in nationalized companies. Law No.99 provided that shareholders would be compensated by 3% 15-year negotiable state bonds, but before the end of the quarter Dr. Hasib had promised full "immediate" compensation for the 72% of shareholders who held less than ID.1,000 each and an initial ID.500 payment to larger shareholders. Foreign claims arising out of nationalization were under negotiation.

(a) The Industrial Establishment

The nationalization laws of July 14 brought 27 industrial companies with a total capital of ID.17.3 million, representing some 34% of Iraqi industry (excluding the IPC group) out of the private sector and under the control and supervision of the General Establishment for Industry. Designated companies were immediately taken over, former managers discharged and new ones appointed, and every effort made to maintain production. In several cases increases in production were announced shortly after nationalization and on August 5 the following reductions in prices of products of nationalized factories were announced: Vegetable oils and detergents - 17%; Lux soap - 15%; Bata shoes - 10%.

A charter has been issued for the Industrial Establishment, this charter defines the duties and functions of the boards of directors of the nationalized industrial companies, the duties of the General Industrial Establishment and the powers of the directors general of nationalized industrial firms. The charter also created the following new industrial establishments among which the nationalized industries are to be divided: Spinning and Weaving; Building Materials; Shoes and Leather, Cigarettes; and Foodstuffs and Detergents.

(b) The Trade Establishment

Three Commercial companies with a capital of ID.1.1 million were nationalized and placed under the General Establishment for Trade (GET); shortly thereafter the Government Purchasing Board (GPB), which imports and retails primarily foodstuffs but other commodities as well, was also transferred to GET.

The Trade Establishment proceeded energetically on a socialist path with a series of moves some of which were designed to increase the popularity of the socialist measures and others greatly to increase the role of the public sector in foreign and domestic trade. Early in August the price of sugar was reduced

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along with prices of products of nationalized factories. This was followed by the Government of Iraq restriction of the import of tea to the GPB alone. Next came the announcement of the establishment of a Public Company for the import and distribution of drugs and chemical products under the GET and a new Government of Iraq decision restricting the import of drugs to the new public company. Wheat imports were quietly monopolized by the Government of Iraq and there followed price reductions in certain oil products of Government of Iraq refineries.

On August 31 the Government of Iraq announced that it had decided to restrict the importation of automotive vehicles, auto parts and accessories, tyres and tubes to the trade establishment. Sales of these items would be handled by two of the nationalized commercial companies.

The Economic Establishment has announced price reductions of 10% on all pharmaceuticals imported by the new public drug company. In addition, the President of the General Establishment for Trade outlined a program of increased activity for the GET including the opening of new branches of Orosdi-Back (the nationalized department store), and increase in the number of agent stores distributing GPB products, the construction of warehouses and a cold-storage building, increase in the barter trade and an increase in the export of cement to the Arab Gulf and other areas.

(c) The Insurance Establishment

Law No. 99, 1964 declared that "all insurance and re-insurance companies in Iraq shall be nationalized" and placed all nationalized companies under the General Establishment for Insurance. Some 25 companies (most of them foreign) with a capital of ID.2 million were affected and although foreign insurance companies were not subject to nationalization because they transacted insurance in Iraq through a branch or agency, they were no longer permitted to continue operation since the law impliedly reserved the insurance business to the public sector. Foreign companies were given a year to wind up their business in general branches in Iraq. Negotiations were undertaken with foreign companies concerning the transfer of their portfolios to Iraqi companies.

(d) Government Trading Monopolies

(i) The General Drugs & Chemical Import and Distribution
Co. moved quickly to clear drugs from customs that had been ordered by private distributors and to establish direct contacts with suppliers. Wholesale and retail drug prices were cut 10% by the monopoly on goods ordered by private distributors but cleared from customs and paid for by the monopoly. The public has been promised reductions of 20% to 25% on drugs purchased directly from suppliers by the monopoly; and, as a result, suppliers have been asked for price reductions and favorable credit terms.

Ultimate distribution of drugs remains with private pharmacies (retail stores), which may purchase their stocks either directly from monopoly stores or from monopoly-appointed wholesalers who are given a 3% commission on sales. Shortly afterwards the monopoly issued regulations for the establishment by drug manufacturers of "scientific centres" for their products in Iraq. Several applications from suppliers had been received and approved by the monopoly by the end of September.

Shortages of some drug items have become acute as a result of the Government's ban on imports between March 19, 1964, and the August 13 monopolization of the trade.

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(ii) The African-Iraqi Trading Company and Iraq Import and Distribution Company, the two large trading firms that were nationalized on July 14, were granted a monopoly on importation of motor vehicles, tyres and tubes, spare parts, and accessories on August 31. The former private vehicles importers are being permitted to sell present stocks and monopoly managers are assuming responsibility for some of their unfilled orders. Despite their first warnings to the contrary, the monopolies have not insisted on negotiating formal distributorship agreements with manufacturers prior to placing orders. Meanwhile, the old distributors are confronted with the problem of whether or not to maintain their service facilities, which in the past had not been profitable but had been valuable as sales promotion tools.

On October 1 the monopolies began accepting public applications for the purchase of 1965 model vehicles. Despite sharp demand in the past for popular make passenger cars, the supply of which has been restricted for several years due to import quotas, it is believed that registrations for new cars have been less numerous than expected. The substantial advance payment required when filing applications was one reason for buyer resistance. It was not possible to get a clear picture of future prospects for General Motors Holden.

Dealers in tyres and spare parts have been allowed to utilize previously issued import licences and in some instances the monopolies have authorized additional imports for the original distributors. Monopoly officials have stated that it will only be a matter of time before private importation of such commodities is completely abolished. A responsible monopoly official also indicated that his organization intends to buy spare parts from a restricted number of large suppliers, we could possibly obtain a share in this business by close liaison with the monopoly.

One question troubling suppliers of motor vehicles and allied products is that of promoting the sale of their products in Iraq under a system which designates the government as the sole importer. No satisfactory solution to this problem had been suggested.

(iii) The Government Purchasing Board (GPB) is playing an increasingly important role in the importation and distribution of several basic foodstuffs. This growing organization, which had already monopolized the import of sugar, was given the monopoly of tea imports as well. The GPB also competes with private merchants in the import and local purchase and distribution of rice. In addition to selling through its own retail outlets, the GPB has appointed a large number of privately owned retail stores to sell its products at fixed prices. During the quarter the GPB announced substantial price cuts in sugar, while rice prices rose because of uncertainties about domestic rice production, and rice import policy.

The GPB has been alert to compete with private dealers in popular foodstuffs when significant price rises are noted. For example increases in egg prices moved the GPB to solicit offers from foreign suppliers of ID.50,000 worth of eggs.

(iv) The nationalization of Iraq's largest department store, Orosdi-Back, was popularly interpreted as a measure aimed at the firm's shareholders, who were also important shareholders in some of the nationalized industrial firms. Earlier plans for repair and renovation of Orosdi-Back's Baghdad store on Rashid Street, which was badly damaged by fire last November, have been approved by the General Establishment for Trade.

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(v) The Banking Establishment.

Law No. 100 (1964), one of the nationalization laws promulgated on July 14, 1964, provided for the nationalization of all governmental and non-governmental commercial banks in Iraq and the establishment of "The General Establishment for Banks" to which all nationalized banks were annexed. The Banking Establishment supervises the operation of all nationalized banks, under the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance. Dr. Hasib, Governor of the Central Bank and Acting President of the Economic Establishment, was also appointed President of the Banking Establishment.

Plans have been announced for the amalgamation of the nationalized commercial banks into four banks in addition to the Rafidain Bank, the government commercial bank. Although the amalgamation has not yet formally taken place because audits of the Banks' accounts and other procedures have not yet been completed, managers and boards of directors have been appointed for each of the new groupings which are as follows:

Credit Bank of Iraq - Includes the Federal Bank
of Lebanon

Baghdad Bank - Includes the Arab Bank

Commercial Bank of Iraq - Includes the British Bank of
the Middle East and the
National Bank of Pakistan

Al-Rashid Bank - Includes the United Bank of Iraq and
the Eastern Bank.

2. UAR-Iraqi Economic Cooperation

Increased economic cooperation, trade and exchange of experts and delegations between Iraq and the United Arab Republic have highlighted the past six months.

The permanent Ministers of the Joint UAR-Iraq Presidential Council as well as the UAR-Iraq Economic Coordination Committee (established under Maty 26 Unity Agreement) met in Cairo in late July to plan greater economic coordination between the two countries. The Council of Ministers approved the report of the Joint Committee and the following nine sub-committees were set up to study and propose implementation of its decisions: (1) Customs and Transit; (2) Financial Affairs; (3) Monetary Affairs; (4) Trade Affairs; (5) Agricultural Promotion; (6) Industrial Coordination, Mineral and Oil Wealth; (7) Labour and Social Affairs; (8) Economic Planning; and (9) Communications.

The Undersecretary of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform headed a delegation to Cairo in August to confer with UAR Agrarian Reform Officials and to visit their projects. The UAR Minister of Agrarian Reform scheduled a return visit to Iraq later in the year. The Ministry of Agriculture asked the UAR to help establish a Government of Iraq Cotton Administration, and the UAR sent 17 of a promised 33 agricultural technicians, engineers and specialists to Iraq on August 31 to work in the Ministries of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform.

The Central Bank of Iraq formed a Committee for Economic Unification and Coordination between the two countries composed of the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank and the Bank Directors of Issue, Inspection, Foreign Exchange, Statistics and Research, and Cash. The Governor of the Central Bank announced he would

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go to Cairo October 12 to confer with the UAR Central Bank Governor and plan the unification of the two banking systems and other forms of economic cooperation. It was announced in August that Government of Iraq customs rules would henceforth be the same as those of the UAR, and the Government of Iraq sent the UAR Government full texts of the Government of Iraq income and inheritance tax laws issued in late September.

The UAR opened a trade centre in Baghdad July 22; the Government approved licences to import goods worth up to ID.50,000 for display and sale at the centre; and the press reported that that the centre took orders for up to ID.250,000 in woollen textiles on its opening day. The Government of Iraq took delivery on September 3 of 12 of the 25 Nasr buses which it had reportedly ordered for the Directorate General of Passenger Transportation in Baghdad. The Government of Iraq, meanwhile, announced that it was going to buy its cotton yarn and agricultural implement requirements from the UAR, and the Director General of the Government of Iraq Tobacco Monopoly Administration sent a delegation to the UAR to discuss the sale of Iraqi tobacco to that country. The UAR Arab Foreign Trade Company president visited Baghdad in late July for trade promotion talks, and a UAR contracting company sent a delegation to Kirkuk in late August to investigate a building project there.

Iraqi Economic Relations with Arab States

Iraqi economic relations with Kuwait continued to be active during the period. The Minister of Foreign Affairs visited the Gulf states August 8 - 11 to discuss economic matters and a Kuwaiti water delegation visited Iraq in late September to discuss with Iraqi planning and irrigation officials implementation of the Iraq-Kuwait water agreement. As the period ended, it was announced that a 17-man delegation headed by the Minister of Economics would go to Kuwait October 19 to negotiate a wide range trade and investment agreement.

Iraq's economic relations with the Persian Gulf states were accentuated during the last six months. Accepting invitations reportedly issued to nine Gulf State rulers by President Aref in June, the rulers of the Trucial states of Sharqa and 'Ajman visited Iraq and announcements were made of forthcoming visits of the rulers of Ras al-Khaimah, Dubai, Bahrain, and Qatar. The Government of Iraq Foreign Minister discussed the question of Arab economic aid to the Gulf states at length when he visited Kuwait in August. The Iraqi General Trade Establishment also announced plans to establish trade centres throughout the Gulf area.

In other Arab areas planned Iraqi participation in the Damascus International Trade Fair was cancelled; and the Iraqi government announced that it would provide Yemen with oil products to assist that country's economy during its current civil difficulties.

Iraqi economic relations with the North African Arab states were strengthened. In July a trade agreement was signed with Tunisia.

C. FINANCIAL CONDITION OF IRAQ

The following pages discuss the extent to which activity in the economy of Iraq has moved from the private into the public sector and how much, and show that from now on it will be necessary to channel any promotional effort through Government agencies. While agents will continue to be useful on-the-spot contacts they will be less and less direct buyers of imports.

Local businessmen report that, in general, it has been more difficult for them to obtain credit for normal business operations since the nationalisation of the commercial banks. In addition, the banks require considerably more cash payment for opening Letters of Credit and discounting commercial bills against documents.

With respect to private capital, the Government has been encouraging private investors to continue activity in the private sector of the economy. However, private Iraqi and foreign capital has been reluctant to make large investments in Iraq in the wake of nationalisation, although full compensation for these investments has been promised by the Government.

The nationalisation laws have a direct effect on private companies in Iraq. Law No. 103 requires that limited companies whose paid-in capital is over ID.70,000 must become joint stock companies and that no person may own more than ID.10,000 in paid-up nominal shares in such companies. Law No. 101 requires that 25% of profits of joint stock, limited liability and certain other companies must be allotted to workers and personnel in a prescribed manner. In addition, new income tax laws were promulgated with varying rates which favour the joint stock company over the limited liability company and the limited liability company over a branch, agency or other type of business.

SECTIONAL BREAKDOWN

1. Government Operations.

(a) The explanatory memorandum concerning the Iraqi budget for the fiscal year 1964 was issued during the third quarter. According to this memorandum the real deficit expected for the fiscal year 1963 is ID.25 million and the cumulative deficit (1958-63) expected is ID.61,500,000.

Although the country's gold and foreign exchange holdings were down to ID.103.8 million on August 31st, Dr. Hassib, Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq, stated on October 8th (after the Government had received the third quarter oil payment) that Iraq's foreign exchange holdings were the highest in five years.

The Central Bank of Iraq has issued new regulations authorised under Law No. 87 (1964) modifying the existing foreign exchange regulations. These new modifications provide that adult residents leaving Iraq may obtain up to ID.300 in foreign exchange without prior permission of the Central Bank upon payment of charges specified in the law.

In the international field the Government of Iraq signed an Export-Import Bank loan agreement for \$5.5 million on August 31st to purchase a 67.5 megawatt steam turbine generator from the International General Electric Company.

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The Minister of Agrarian Reform visited the United States to discuss a \$23 million loan for roads and a bridge with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development during August and at the meeting of the IBRD and International Monetary Fund at Tokyo in September it was agreed that Iraq's quota in both the IBRD and the IMF should be increased from \$15 million to \$55 million.

(b) Industry - Public Sector

The Government of Iraq has been active in the industrial sector negotiating some contracts with foreign companies, studying and tendering other projects and inviting consultant proposals or others. Unfortunately little real progress has been made in getting long-considered projects actually under way. There has been some progress on the few projects under way, but no new projects have been announced beyond those already outlined in the old five year plan or projects already approved. The Economic Planning Board is busily engaged assembling and drafting the next Five Year Plan which is expected to include several new projects and to begin in 1965.

The following developments have taken place: After lengthy negotiations a contract was signed on October 7th between the Government of Iraq and Koppers International for feasibility studies and preliminary engineering for a proposed integrated iron and steel plant.

The German firm Didier began construction on the ID.12 million rayon yarn factory (Hindiya) in June 1964; completion is expected in December 1966. The tender issued on May 5th 1964 for the supply, erection, starting up and supervision of operation of an ID.12 million pulp and paper mill at Basra has been extended to December 26, 1964. The Government tentatively selected a contractor to engineer, supply, erect and commission a sulphur Extracting (from natural gas) factory at Kirkuk, but negotiations had not been completed by the end of September. No selection has been announced of a consultant for the chemical fertilizer factory at Basra; proposals had been invited from selected firms in June.

No tender has yet been issued for the proposed tobacco processing plant at Sulaimaniya. The Economic Planning Board has not yet given authorisation to the Ministry of Works and Housing to proceed with the modern slaughter house project in Baghdad.

There have been no recent developments with regard to the proposed ceramic factory at Ramadi; tender documents are expected to be issued by the end of the year. Re-evaluation of the proposed glass factory at Ramadi is continuing.

2. Trade and Commerce

(a) Business Conditions

Except for the activities of the Government import monopolies (discussed below), trade in other than the most essential commodities has come to a virtual standstill during the past six months. Although Iraqi businessmen had anticipated that the May 26th Unity Agreement would result in some Iraqi moves to conform to the U.A.R. pattern in the economic sphere, the nationalisations of July 14th followed by the monopolisation of the tea, drug and motor vehicle and allied products trades nevertheless came as a distinct shock to the business community. Fear was widespread that there would be further surprises to come.

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The market in household appliances was hit especially hard by the late spring and summer events, which came at what would normally have been the best appliance marketing season. Consumers not only postponed purchases of items such as refrigerators and washing machines but also put off payment of bills for past purchases. Large stocks of appliances remained in customs warehouses because dealers could not afford to pay the Letter of Credit balances and import duties necessary to clear them.

It is reported that appliance inventories, including stocks in customs, are sufficient for two normal trading years; if present conditions continue they will last much longer.

The wholesale textile market was dormant until late late September when retailers began to buy for the winter season. Retail sales have been slow and prices have remained generally unchanged although it is reported that wholesalers of cotton, rayon, nylon and silk piece goods have been selling at cost in order to move enough goods to meet overhead expenses and overdraft and promissory note commitments.

The building material market has been extremely dull. Rumours that the Government would reduce rents, increase real estate taxes and/or confiscate large buildings have served to reduce construction starts in the private sector.

(b) Foreign Trade

(i) Policy

The General Establishment for Trade has actively been seeking trade agreements with other countries in order to barter Iraq's surplus dates, cement and asphalt for machinery, foodstuffs and other necessary imports. Barter agreements have been concluded under which Iraq exchanged 25,000 tons of dates for machinery from Czechoslovakia; 10,000 tons of dates for unidentified products from East Germany; and 10,300 tons of dates for tomato paste from Bulgaria. In addition trade agreements have been concluded under which Japan agreed to buy 10,000 tons of dates, the U.S.S.R. 14,000 tons, Communist China 20,000 tons, and Italy 5,000 tons of dates.

(ii) Import Policy

The Ministry of Economics committee that was formed to prepare the 1965 import programme is not expected to complete its work before the end of November. Although motor vehicle import monopoly officials have already stated that ID.2 million will be allotted again in 1965 for importation of passenger cars, it is understood that the Government intends to restrict drastically the importation of luxury items. As a matter of fact, the Directorate General of Imports and Exports issued import licences in August and September only for essential commodities.

(c) Oil Developments

Oil production by the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), the Mosul Petroleum Company (MPC) and the Basra Petroleum Company (BPC) amounted to approximately 15.0 million long tons during the

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third quarter of 1964 while exports by the three companies totalled about 14.5 million tons. Royalties handed to the Government of Iraq at the end of September amounted to ID.34,427,962. Based on production and exports for the first three quarters of 1964, projected oil payments to the Government for the year total approximately ID.120 million. If this proves to be correct, 1964's royalties will be ID.10 million in excess of 1963's record.

(d) Industry - Private Sector.

The nationalisation of 27 private industrial establishments on July 14th 1964 severely inhibited the investment of private capital in new ventures which might later be nationalised. Earlier in the year a few private investors seemed to be prepared to undertake reasonably ambitious projects, but in almost all cases this attitude changed after nationalisation. Thus, for example, pre-nationalisation plans for establishing a shirt factory, a nuts, bolts and nails factory and new soft drink plants in Hilla and Basra were dropped after July 14th. Private investors are cautious not only from fear of further nationalisation, but also because of serious doubts that any profit could be realised in the face of increased income taxes, required distribution of 25% of profits to workers, and restrictions on bank credit.

3. Agriculture

Earlier predictions of a good grain crop this year have proved to be unfounded. Estimates of the yield have dropped steadily and finally levelled off at 600-700,000 tons of wheat and about 450,000 tons of barley. If these estimates are correct, an import requirement for wheat is clearly indicated, and the London Wheat Committee have been informed of this. While barley will probably not be imported, the bad crop would preclude significant exports to traditional markets. While it is still too early to estimate this year's rice production, Ministry of Agriculture officials believe that there is a reasonable chance that the yield will be at least as good as last year's. This expectation is based on Ministry statistics that show that a much larger acreage is devoted to rice this year as well as the fact that the weather has been favourable. A clear picture of rice production will not develop until marketing of the harvest begins. Cotton production is currently estimated to be twice 1963's crop, and confidence within the Government of Iraq is great enough that the Ministry of Economics has authorised the export of cotton. While some exports may materialise, they will probably be minimal. Tobacco production has reportedly been good, and some exports of Oriental leaf are contemplated.

The Iraqi Dates Administration estimates date production this season to be about 400,000 tons. Of this amount, 235,000 will come from the central part of Iraq and the remainder from the Basra region. In this connection, the Dates Administration has announced a number of projects valued at ID.2 million for implementation over the next three years. Among the projects are warehouses and dry storage plants, packing plants, a date syrup factory, an animal fodder factory and cold storage plants. The Government has taken measures to reduce infestation of dates including the refusal to license any packing plant that has not been modernised. Modernisation entails brick and concrete installations with metal roofs rather than the old reed matting,

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earthen floored and wooden walled buildings. Various other measures are to be taken in the field to reduce infestation and improve quality.

All commodities purchased under 1963's Title IV PL-480 agreement between the U.S. and Iraq have arrived. A Title II programme was agreed upon during the past few months under which CARE will supervise the distribution of commodities in northern parts of Iraq where agriculture has been disrupted by Kurdish-Government of Iraq hostilities. The following commodities are to be distributed during a nine-month programme: 16,200 tons of flour, 3,240 tons of bulgar wheat, 2,160 tons of vegetable oil and 440 tons of beans. The first shipment of flour is expected to arrive at Basra some time this month.

Word has been received that the CARE Title III school feeding programme for the coming academic year has been approved at a level of 200,000 recipients, the same as in 1963-64. A total of 12,240,000 lbs. of commodities are included in the new programme.

FMC Corporation representatives arrived in Iraq recently to begin a preliminary survey of possible land reclamation projects in western Iraq as well as a survey of the government rice and cotton farms. Representatives of Hawaiian Agronomics Company International (HAI) also arrived in September to negotiate a management contract for the proposed Amara Sugar can project (plantation, factory, refinery), but an agreement has not been reached so far.

The Government of Iraq has moved ahead recently on a number of large irrigation projects. Tenders were advertised on stages of the Kirkuk irrigation scheme and the Dalmaj irrigation project. Plans were announced to invite consultants for the proposed upper Euphrates dam at Haditha (estimated cost ID.50 million) as well as for the Himreen (Middle Diyals) Dam (ID.6 million). No announcement has yet been made on the choice of a consultant for the Eski Mosul Dam on the Tigris. Proposals from a number of consultants have been received and are under study by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. An Iraqi mission headed by the Minister of Agrarian Reform went to the U.S. in August for consultations with the IBRD. Upon his return the Minister announced that irrigation projects had been discussed but details were not provided. In general, the Government of Iraq is showing determination to implement irrigation and drainage projects and more tenders may be expected in the near future.

4. Economic Indicators (SEE FOLLOWING PAGES)

4. Economic Indicators

	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	1st Qtr. <u>1964</u>	2nd Qtr. <u>1964</u>	3rd Qtr. <u>1964</u>
(a) Oil Production: (Long tons)	48,065,764	48,214,537	55,576,950	16,369,604	13,231,147	15,036,437

Source: Iraq Petroleum Company, Baghdad

(b) Building Licenses: (Private)	18,034	18,040	18,149	3,689	5,811	n/a
Estimated Cost (ID million)	23.9	22.0	21.2	5.3	7.7	n/a

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning

(c) Balance of Trade: (ID million)						
Imports	145.6	129.6	114.0	34.9	n/a	n/a
Oil Exported	223.0	223.7	259.0	n/a	n/a	n/a
Other Exports	<u>7.9</u>	<u>19.3</u>	<u>16.7</u>	4.2	n/a	n/a
Balance	+ 85.3	+ 113.4	+161.7			

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning

	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1/64</u>	<u>2/64</u>	<u>3/64</u>	<u>4/64</u>	<u>5/64</u>	<u>6/64</u>	<u>7/64</u>	<u>8/64</u>
(d) Prices											
Wholesale Index* (1939 = 100)	486.6	475.1	496.0	533.7	538.2	534.8	529.1	517.2	509.1	—	—
Consumer's Index (Unskilled worker in Baghdad) (Jan. 1958 = 100)	99.56	100.13	104.09	108.05	108.55	106.39	105.03	104.22	103.36	102.79	103.08
Discontinued as of 30.6.64											

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning

(e) Finance	(In Millions of Iraqi dinars)										
	12/61	12/62	12/63	1/64	2/64	3/64	4/64	5/64	6/64	7/64	8/64
Currency in Circulation	78.9	83.8	101.5	100.5	103.6	101.0	99.7	98.9	97.4	100.7	102.2
Private deposits w/commercial banks	52.3	61.0	59.0	60.7	62.5	64.6	64.0	n/a	61.3	57.6	n/a
Gov't deposits w/commercial banks	13.6	11.5	12.1	12.5	12.0	12.0	12.9	n/a	13.1	12.9	n/a
Foreign Assets and Gold	87.0	78.9	116.5	137.6	125.7	145.9	n/a	118.6	103.3	116.8	103.8
Public Debt	36.5	58.9	79.8	—	—	81.6	—	—	—	—	—

Source: Quarterly Bulletin, No. 49, Central Bank of Iraq.

D. AUSTRALIAN TRADE WITH IRAQ

1. Australia already has substantial trade in Iraq in the following commodities: wheat; processed cheese; motor cars; and it is vital that the interests of this already existing business should be watched closely during the current changes in the commercial pattern.

(a) Wheat

There appears to be an immediate prospect for the sale of 30-50,000 tons of wheat to the Iraqi Government. Iraq is required to purchase 200,000 tons of wheat on commercial terms under a P.L.480 agreement signed in 1963 and we have so far obtained all the business, with sales totalling 138,000 tons - the next purchase which will be concluded in the next month will bring this commercial requirement almost to an end, and if further P.L.480 agreements are concluded, which is by no means certain, we could expect a fall-off in our wheat trade with Iraq over the next 12 months, after conclusion of the next sale.

(b) Processed Cheese

Current business is in excess of £A200,000 and 1963/64 was a record year for this commodity. However there are rumours that the Iraqi Government is considering the manufacture of cheese and this could seriously damage prospects. However the economy has had difficulty digesting the changes so far and it may be that there will be change for 12 months or so. The alternatives appear to be -

1. The Iraqi Government will nationalise Iraq Development Limited (Spinney's) who handle the bulk of the business and take over the import of cheese itself - which might not seriously affect prospects.
2. The Government will begin manufacture of cheese and ban foreign imports which would completely destroy the business.
3. The present situation will continue indefinitely.

Of the three possibilities (1) is the more likely and could happen within six months.

(c) Motor Cars

Holden have had considerable success in this market, but the nationalisation of their agent makes their position somewhat obscure. The avowed intention of the Government is to ban imports from countries other than the UAR but this will not happen during 1964/65 and it is probable that Holden will continue to enjoy a similar share in the market.

2. Other Commodities with Prospects

When considering prospects for other commodities the question of shipping was borne in mind - present shipping facilities would not be enough to encourage growth in general trade. Prospects in commodities which would provide good base cargo for encouraging shipping diversion were therefore sought. The search was encouraging. We could, provided supplies are available, make sales of zircon and rutile to

electrode and welding equipment manufacturers. Initial sales would be of the order of 50 - 100 tons shipments and the rapid expansion of this enterprise and the likelihood of government restrictions on imports will see a steady increase.

Sales of galvanised sheets, steel and tinplate would also be useful base-cargo, though the difficulty of obtaining supplies of these commodities is appreciated.

Inquiries were also received for milk powder and jams. An Australian dairy produce representative is currently visiting Iraq and this should clarify the situation insofar as milk powder is concerned. Butter cannot be imported because of a government preference for Danish butter alone.

Jams to Iraqis mean AJC and until they change their attitude to agencies there is little prospect of a real increase in volume.

Other specific enquiries were:

(a) Pure Solid Caustic Soda (Na OH)

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Specification</u>	<u>Current Supplier</u>	<u>Current prices when available</u>
60,000 lbs.	Purity 99% in iron drums 160-240 kilos nett weight.	U.S.	£Stg.18-20/ton C & F Basrah

(b) D.D.T. Benzin Hexachloride

200 - 300 tons	2.6% gamma isomer	Western Europe	£Stg.45/ton C & F Basrah
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(c) Nitrogenous Fertilisers

50 tons	21 nitrogen content white granules	W.Germany	£Stg.18-20/ton C & F Basrah
50 tons	nitrogen + P ² O ₅ 20 + 20 pinkish granules or grey granules	"	"
50 tons	nitrogen + P ² O ₅ +K 15 + 15 + 7 pinkish granules or grey granules	"	"

All deliveries in paper or jute bags of 50 kilos.

(d) Citric Acid

<u>Amount</u>	<u>Specification</u>	<u>Current Supplier</u>	<u>Current Market when available</u>
5-10 tons per shipment on a regular monthly basis.	Crystal form in 50 kilo wooden kegs	Western Europe	£Stg.205/ton C & F Basrah
"	Granulated form	"	£Stg.250/ton C & F Basrah

... /

(e) Galvanised Sheets

<u>Amount</u>	<u>Specification</u>	<u>Current Supplier</u>	<u>Current Market when available</u>
Unspecified	24-32 gauge (U.S. measure)	Have been sold in this market from Australia by Bydgood Larsson & Co. U.K.	£Stg.75/ton C & F Basrah

(f) Cold Rolled Sheets

100 tons per shipment on a regular basis	Slightly oiled 18-20 Birmingham gauge	Belgium	£Stg.46 per ton C & F Basrah
--	---------------------------------------	---------	---------------------------------

(g) Merchant Bars

100 ton shipments on a regular basis.	Angles, flats squares	U.K. and Germany	Base price £Stg.39 per ton and allowance for sizes and bends.
---------------------------------------	-----------------------	------------------	---

These enquiries were received from different agency sources but for ease of handling we should concentrate offers on S. Kaloustian, Minir Abbas Building, South Gate, Baghdad, who showed a real ability to handle government buyers and has a competent administrative set-up/

Agricultural Machinery

In Iraq, as elsewhere in the Middle East, there is a real opportunity for the sale of Australian agricultural machinery including discs, ploughs and cultivators in knocked down condition and tractors.

Summary

From the foregoing it will be seen that we could with real effort, attain a foothold in the Iraqi market provided we can get sufficient cooperation from exporters.

E. AGENTS IN IRAQ

The following agents would be useful contacts for
Australians in the commodities listed against their names.

Edward T. Marrow (he is an Iraqi Basrah, Iraq national)	foodstuffs and general merchandise
Hamdi Drug Stores Company w.l.l. P.O. Box 2110, Baghdad	chemicals and pharmaceuticals
Spinneys (Iraq) 1948 Limited, Selim Bldg., Rashid Street, (P.O. Box 76), Baghdad. (Branches in Basrah, Alwiya and Masbah)	foodstuffs
Baghdad Markets Company Nidhal Street, Karradah Baghdad	foodstuffs
Salloumi Stores Sa'adun Street (near Baghdad Hotel) Baghdad	foodstuffs
Sarkis Kaloustian Munir Abbas Building South Gate, Baghdad	Engineering products Steel
Dhia Aziz Yhamni Damirji Building Bank Street, Baghdad	Engineering products Steel
Nissan Thomas Enterprises Roxy Building Rashid Street, Baghdad	Engineering products Steel
Al Falah Company w.l.l. Semiramis Hotel Square Rashid Street, Baghdad	Agricultural machinery

CONFIDENTIAL

→ 173/10/1
~~214/10/6/2~~
~~194/10/1~~

6th January, 1964.

MR. LAVETT'S VISIT TO IRAQ AND KUWAIT

MR. LEE

Copies of Mr. Lavett's report of his visit to Kuwait and Iraq were filed on the political general files (194/2/1 and 173/2/1) and also on the Australia Relations General files (194/10/1 and 173/10/1) prior to circulation. Extracts were also put on other relevant files (i.e. economic general, migration in the Middle East).

....

2. Attached are memoranda to Immigration, Defence and Trade and Industry and to Cairo for Mr. Bullock's signature. You will note I have said in the memorandum to Cairo that visits should be at fairly regular intervals. I am not sure what Mr. Rowland has in mind when he agrees that periodic visits should be made - whether they should be six-monthly, annually or every two years. If the visits are considered to be valuable presumably the more frequently they are made the more useful they will be. Contacts once made can be maintained. At the same time, however, I wonder whether, by going frequently to certain countries, we might not be questioned by the local authorities as to why we do not open a mission. Moreover can Cairo afford to make too frequent periodic visits?

Africa & Middle East
D.F. Ritchie

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

~~173/10/1~~
~~173/10/1~~
~~173/10/1~~

Memorandum No. I

4th January, 1965.

The Australian
Embassy,
CAIRO.

Visits to Kuwait and Iraq

(Your memorandum 755 of 11th December, 1964)

Thank you for your useful reports on your visit to Kuwait and Iraq. These we found interesting. They have been distributed widely in the Department and are being forwarded to Defence, Immigration and Trade and Industry.

We think that the visit was useful and are glad that you were able to thrash the Immigration question out with the authorities in Kuwait itself. We have asked Immigration for comments on your report and have endorsed your view specifically that no further recruiting mission should go to Kuwait in the foreseeable future.

On the question of dual accreditation, we do not expect that the presently held policy will change. We agree that periodic visits in the area should be kept up and in order to maintain links and be really effective they should be at reasonably regular intervals.

In general we feel that in the time available you managed to see a number of people and put some useful points across. The information contained in the reports about the countries themselves was also useful.

We will write to you again after all relevant sections in the Department and other Departments have had the opportunity to comment.

dm

(J. R. Rowland)
Acting Senior Assistant
Secretary

→ Mr. Bullock

- There are some points
in this report to
consider, I think.

dm

CONFIDENTIAL

(F)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~173/10/1~~
173/10/1

30th December, 1964.

The Secretary,
Department of Immigration,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Visit to Kuwait and Iraq

..... Attached for your information are
extracts from a report by Mr. Lavett, First
Secretary in Cairo, of his visit to Kuwait and
Iraq in November, 1964. Relevant paragraphs
have been sidelined.

CL
(Charles Lee)
for the Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL



173/10/1
CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum No. 761

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
CAIRO

File 3.11
2.1.6

15th December, 1964.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Australian Representation in Iraq

On reading through once again paragraph 45 of the note on Iraq forwarded under cover of our memorandum 755 of 11th December, it has occurred to me that I may have given the impression that the suggestion by the Director-General of Protocol on the possibility of our opening a mission in Baghdad was rather more formal than was in fact the case. While, as a result of an expression of hope by him that we would "think about it" (or words to that effect), I did say that I would refer the matter back to you, I would be quite confident that no further reply, formal or informal, would be required or expected unless, of course, you wished to proceed further with the matter, in which case the conversation could no doubt be recalled. I trust that I have not occasioned you any undue concern on the point.

(J.L. Lavett)
First Secretary.

(F)

Original

on 2/4/10/6/2

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

173/10/1

173/10/1

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
CAIRO

Memorandum No. 755
File 3.11

11th December, 1964.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Visits to Iraq and Kuwait

.....
Attached for your information are reports which I have prepared on the visits which I paid to Baghdad and Kuwait in the first half of November. As far as I know these were the first such by one of our officers.

2. There is little more that I would wish to add at this stage to what I have written in the reports. However, I would draw your attention to the fact that, in neither case was there much clear understanding of our fundamental characteristics and policies, and that this lack had led to some misinterpretations which could be positively harmful to our relations with countries in the area. It seems to me that more than our relations with the countries immediately concerned would be involved, since highly controversial matters of the kind likely to come into question would almost certainly, as in the case of Palestine migration, come up at Arab League meetings of one kind or another.

3. I therefore suggest that it is important for us to keep in touch from time to time with these countries, to establish reasonably warm links and at least some understanding of us and of our intentions in this area in particular and in the world at large. This can best be done by periodic visits, and I recommend that the present system be maintained.

*Original
214/10/6/2*

J
(J.L. Lavett)
First Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL



173/10/1

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
GARDEN CITY
CAIRO

CONFIDENTIAL

In reply quote No. 64.1.1

Memorandum No. 702

20th November, 1964

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Palestinian Immigration

The question of Australia's readiness to accept Palestinian refugees as immigrants evidently continues to be a live one in Arab countries, even though it would appear that, at least for the time being, no formal action is being contemplated by the Arab League itself.

2. When I was in Beirut on 13th November, the Senior Migration Officer there, Mr. W.E. Law, told me that the Head of the Political Department in the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had called him to the Ministry two or three days earlier to discuss the issue. He had made it clear to Mr. Law that the Lebanon was determined to adhere strictly to Arab policies in this field and that unless the Lebanese Government were given an undertaking that our Migration Office would refrain from processing applicants of Palestinian origin, then the Office would no longer have any standing so far as his Government was concerned. In effect, this presumably meant that it would not be permitted to operate at all and in the circumstances Mr. Law felt that he had no alternative, for the sake of the other work which his office proposed to do, but to give the undertaking. He has written a full report to his Department in Canberra on the subject and I suggest that you obtain a copy from them.

3. That Kuwait's attitude remained as intransigent as appeared in the Ambassador's interview with the Kuwaiti Ambassador in Cairo on 17th October (see our telegram 242 of 19th October) came out in the course of a long discussion which I had with the Director of the Political Department in the Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 12th November. He himself introduced the subject, stating frankly that it had "seriously disturbed relations" between Kuwait and Australia. He said that the Kuwaiti Government could not understand why Australia, a country of over 11,000,000 people, had come to send an Immigration team to Kuwait, a country of only 400,000 people without any particular population pressures, unless there had been some ulterior motive. That motive could surely only lie in a desire to "suck away" Palestinian hence to frustrate Arab policies on the Palestine issue as a whole.

4. In rebuttal, I explained (once again) to Mr. Ibrahim that the despatch of our team had been the result only of a sudden flood of applications for visas received by the British Embassy. The British Embassy had been unable to handle these and had asked for our assistance. There had been no question of our endeavouring to attract Palestinians or for that matter other immigrants in Kuwait; the sudden interest had been quite spontaneous. I suggested that newspaper articles of which we had heard, and activities of unscrupulous or at any rate ill-informed travel agents (and elsewhere) may have had something to do with it. I described Ibrahim the scope of our immigration programme as a whole and explained that our current activities in the Middle East must be considered in the context of this, and not in isolation, as part of some alleged plot. I said that other questions aside, it should surely be evident that Australia was prepared to agree to compromise its own security by accepting out-migrants in respect of fundamental issues such as its defence policy or the size of its own population, that is, its immigration policy. I stressed that we had no desire to involve itself in the controversial Palestinian

Original 1531/121

2.

exemplified this by pointing out that, at the present time, Australia maintained only one diplomatic mission in the Arab world which, I could assure him, was already fully occupied with other affairs without seeking to intervene in this one as well.

5. After a discussion on the subject along these lines lasting the best part of an hour, Mr. Ibrahim said that he could appreciate the points that I had made to him and that he was prepared to accept the position that I had put to him. In response to my firm enquiry as to whether there was any aspect of the matter which he would like clarified, either now or later in writing, he said that there was not and that he was "quite satisfied". This of course represented a fundamental modification of his original position, and, from this point of view alone, it seems to me that my visit to Kuwait was not only desirable but indeed positively essential. At the same time, while I should hope to have succeeded in establishing our bona fides, I think it highly unlikely that Kuwait would be prepared to modify the attitude which they had adopted on the question as a whole until other Arab countries do so.

6. Understandably enough, since the question has not arisen in immediate form there, the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs by no means seemed as anxious about our activities in this field as has been the case in the Lebanon and Kuwait. Nonetheless, I was asked about it, and the Iraqis are evidently well aware of the problem. No comment was made following my explanation of my views.

7. I shall of course be submitting fuller reports on my visits to Baghdad and Kuwait in the near future. It seemed to me, nevertheless, that you might wish to have some account of this aspect separately, since you will presumably wish to watch the subject closely in view of its obvious political implications for us in the area as a whole. We for our part are most anxious to be kept informed of any developments, and we should be grateful for your assistance in this direction.

(J.L. Lavett)
Secretary of Affairs A.I.

173/10/1

YOUNG REFERENCE

BOX 41, POST OFFICE, COOGEE, N.S.W., AUSTRALIA
CABLES: ATOMCOM, SYDNEY — TELEPHONE: 665-1271

16th November, 1964

~~664/1880~~
664/1887

Dear Lloyd,

I refer to our recent conversations regarding the value to Western interests of Mr. Baqir Hasani, Special Adviser to the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency.

In 1961, Mr. Hasani was Governor for Iraq on the I.A.E.A. Board of Governors and in 1962 he was elected Chairman of the Board. In 1963 he was appointed to the position he now holds. It is believed that prior to entering his country's diplomatic service, Mr. Hasani was a Senior Officer in the Iraq Finance Ministry, where he came under the influence of British Treasury thinking.

Australian delegations have found him to be consistently friendly in political terms and that he works continuously for harmonious relationships generally and particularly between the African States and the West. On a number of occasions, Mr. Hasani has intervened to "tone down" more extravagant or unreasonable demands generated by African States or by the Arab League States. His general approach is to try to bring African and Arab views more into line with Western attitudes and plans. Additionally, Mr. Hasani has also been a frequent source of information regarding projected but as yet unrevealed African or Arab proposals or tactics in the Board.

I hope that this note may be of some use to you.

Yours sincerely,

(A.D. Thomas)

Head, International Relations.

Dr. L.D. Thomson,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Handwritten notes on a piece of paper:

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Handwritten: Handwritten
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Handwritten: Handwritten
Handwritten: Handwritten
Handwritten: Handwritten

6

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PJ.

I.34513.

Dated: 19th October, 1964.
0228.

FROM:

Rec'd: 20th October, 1964.
0624.

Australian Embassy,
CAIRO.

246. CONFIDENTIAL.


Your memorandum 334 of 9th October.

Propose that Lavett visit Bagdad week in November. It occurs to us that it might also be worth while for him to visit Kuwait at that time to further explain to authorities there aspects of our Immigration Programme of which they are apparently still suspicious (my telegram 242).

Grateful for your advice whether you would like this done.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A. (214/10/6/2)
P.M.'S

20th October, 1964.



CONFIDENTIAL

SEC FAS(1,2,3,4) SAS(MS) EAMEC AFME@ INF PIO ADMIN



Pol 127/11

Commonwealth Relations Office

173/10/1

C. L. E. / Eg.
00000

With the Compliments
of

P. Jones

30.9.64

British High Commission
Canberra

R
PTING H.C.)
M
ber, 1964)

Saving, Kuala Lumpur No. 205 Saving,
63 Saving, Freetown No. 83 Saving,

MENTATION

ad have received a Note from the
t the United Arab Republic
ection of Iraqi interests in
iplomatic missions or consulates.

hat in Australia, Malaysia, Nigeria,
Cyprus, Freetown, Tanganyika (who have no missions in Iraq) there are
U.A.R. missions but no Iraqi missions.

3. If you see no objection please pass the information in
paragraph 1 above to Commonwealth authorities.

① L. Patchie
② L. Patchie (C+P)
C. Smith A. D. Nelson

(F)

173/10/1

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

TO: CANBERRA
KUALA LUMPUR
LAGOS
NICOSIA
FREETOWN (ACTING H.C.)
DAR ES SALAM

(Dated 24th September, 1964)

No. 130 }
No. 205 }
No. 122 } SAVING UNCLASSIFIED
No. 63 }
No. 83 }
No. 163 }

Addressed Canberra No. 130 Saving, Kuala Lumpur No. 205 Saving, Lagos No. 122 Saving, Nicosia No. 63 Saving, Freetown No. 83 Saving, Dar es Salaam No. 163 Saving.

IRAQI REPRESENTATION

1. The British Embassy in Baghdad have received a Note from the Iraq Foreign Ministry stating that the United Arab Republic have been entrusted with the protection of Iraqi interests in places where there are no Iraqi diplomatic missions or consulates.
2. Our present information is that in Australia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Cyprus, Freetown, Tanganyika (who have no missions in Iraq) there are U.A.R. missions but no Iraqi missions.
3. If you see no objection please pass the information in paragraph 1 above to Commonwealth authorities.

① L. Ritchie
② L. Ritchie (CTP)
copy sent to A. A. Nelson

(F)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

173
24/10/1

PJ.

I. 2+221.

FROM:

Dated: 22nd July, 1964.
1700.
Rec'd: 23rd July, 1964.
0818.

Australian Trade Commission,
BEIRUT.

21. UNCLASSIFIED.

Your 13.

I have interviewed the Chairman and Foreign manager of the Arab Bank Amman.

Their drastic advice to the National Bank based on experience after nationalisation of Syria where exchange transfer to cover prior commitments is still not fully authorised.

Chairman has communicated with Iraq President privately to secure guarantee that Central Bank of Iraq will remit the value of documents to pay the Australian Banks without delay.

Amman expects to cable Australian correspondent by the end of the week regarding arrangements covering goods already shipped or otherwise committed.

I understand other banks have advised their correspondents that commitments prior to July 14th will be met.

MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY(C-S-M)
MIN. & DEPT PRIMARY INDUSTRY(C-M)
TREASURER & TREASURY
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M.'S DEPT
E.P.I.C.(S)
SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT
P.M.'S

23rd July, 1964.

(F)

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) EAMEC E AFME INF ER@ MR ARNOTT
PIO

173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

MKN.

I. 25095

Dated 30th July, 1964.
1630

FROM:

Rec'd 31st July, 1964.
0728

Australian Trade Commission.
BEIRUT.

23

UNCLASSIFIED.

My telegram 21.

Arab Bank Amman advises that Iraq position resolved
and they have cabled amended instructions to their Australian
correspondent.

MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY (C-S-M)
MIN. & DEPT PRIMARY INDUSTRY (C-M)
TREASURER & TREASURY
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M.'s DEPT
E.P.I.C.(S)
SHIPPING & TRANSPORT
P.M.'s.

SEC FAS (1,2,4,) AS(3) EAF&ME E AFME INF P10 ER@ MR ARNOTT

F✓

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

173/10/1

SRD

I. 23768

Dated: 17th July, 1964
1544

FROM:

Rec'd: 18th July, 1964
0417

Australian Trade Commission,
BEIRUT.

20. UNCLASSIFIED.

Your 13.

Adviser here states Arab Bank attitude appears surprising and unacceptable as recognised banking practices make Head Office responsible for all branch commitments. Understand Arab Bank, Beirut meeting Iraq commitments made before July 14th.

Amman closed today, but I am proceeding there Saturday-Sunday to define position.

MIN. & DEPT T. & I. (C)(S) (M)
A/MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)(M)
TREASURER & TREASURY
A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
E.P.I.C. (S)
SHIPPING & TRANSPORT
P.M.'s DEPT
P.M.'s

18th July, 1964

F

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) EAMEC E AFME PIO INF ER@
MR ARNOTT

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

173/10/1

AM

TO:

O.18401

Australian Trade Commission,
BEIRUT.

Sent: 16th July, 1964
2030

13. UNCLASSIFIED. PRIORITY.

Kraft Australia have shipment on Chakdina due Basvah 22nd August worth £62,000. £10,000 negotiated under idemnity remainder letter of credit with recourse. Following Iraqi nationalisation of Banks Kraft have received from National Bank Australia text of cable from head office Arab Bank Amman reading -

"All authorised signatures Arab Bank Branches in Iraq are cancelled. Do not pay any cheques, bank drafts, travellers cheques, payment on orders, issued by Arab Bank Branches in Iraq regardless date of issue. Do not debit Baghdad Branch account with any amounts unless Arab Bank Head Office Amman authorises you. Do not pay value of documents unconfirmed credits presented to you as from July 14th. If goods on confirmed or unconfirmed credits already shipped please ask shipping company cable ship unload goods to country of origin. Do not send documents of credits confirmed by you to Iraq. Please ask the beneficiaries of confirmed credits whose documents not yet presented to you to stop shipment and await your instructions."

National Bank feels this a panic move by Arab Bank and hopes situation settles down. Arab Bank Baghdad branch raised letter of credit involved. Please ascertain position Amman and Baghdad. What possibility of Arab Bank changing its position before arrival of ship. Is now nationalised Arab Bank Baghdad making alternative arrangements for payment for goods already shipped. Kraft have cabled agents Iraqi Development W.L.L. Baghdad but reply not expected before Monday 20th. Would expect them to still require goods. Making inquiries here whether other exporters also affected. Therefore appreciate general report on situation as well as on Kraft problem.

MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY (C-S-M)
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C-M)
TREASURER & TREASURY
N.D.
A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M.'s. DEPT
E.P.I.C. SYDNEY
SHIPPING & TRANSPORT
P.M.'s.

(Cost £32-8-0)

16th July, 1964

(F)

SEC FAS(1,2,4) AS(3) EAMEC E AFME INF PIO ER@ MR ARNOTT

173/10/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

MH

I.8157

FROM:

Dated: 10th March, 1964.

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

Rec'd: 11th March, 1964.
0550

1529. RESTRICTED.

From External.

Air Agreement - Australia and Iraq.

Your telegram 4290.

Iraqi Embassy now advises that, owing to heavy pressure of work, Ministry of Communications would prefer negotiations to be conducted in Baghdad.

Eastman.

MIN. & DEPT CIVIL AVIATION (41/40/1(3))
MIN. & DEPT E.A. (716/51/1/7) (715/55/5/4)
P.M.'S.

11th March, 1964.

SEC FAS(1,2,4) LA S&SEA DL INT PACAM AMSP EAMEC E AFME
INF ER PIO

RESTRICTED

173/10/1
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

DW

I.28817

FROM.

DATED. 21ST OCTOBER, 1963.
1744

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
LONDON.

REC'D. 22ND OCTOBER, 1963.
0316

5608. RESTRICTED.

FROM EXTERNAL.

YOUR TELEGRAM 4290 AND OUR 5535.

IRAQ-AUSTRALIA TRANSPORT AGREEMENT.

IRAQI EMBASSY HAS TODAY CABLED BAGHDAD TO ASCERTAIN WHEN
DELEGATION INTENDS PROCEED MELBOURNE.

WE WILL ADVISE WHEN REPLY RECEIVED.

HOWEVER, UNLIKELY ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE COMPLETED TO ENABLE
ARRIVAL BY END THIS MONTH.

2. OUR ENQUIRIES SUGGEST NO CONNECTION BETWEEN
IRAQI INITIATIVE FOR COMPLETION OF AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT AND
OUR LATEST REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF QANTAS PERMIT.

CERTAINLY, WE WERE ASSURED THAT GRANTING OF LATTER IS NOT
CONDITIONAL ON CONCLUSION OF SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT.

MIN. & DEPT CIVIL AVIATION(41/40/1(3))(T/T)

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (716/51/1/7)
(716/55/5/Y)

P.M's.

22ND OCTOBER, 1963.

SEC FAS(1.2.4) LA S&SEA DL INT PACAM EAMEC E INF AFME ER@

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

:GS

0.23036

TO:

Sent: 17th October, 1963
1830

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

4290. RESTRICTED.

Your 5269.

Please forward urgently full text of Iraq communication. In view of lapse of time since our approaches on this matter, latest response of Iraq authorities somewhat unexpected, but Australian authorities nevertheless agreeable to entering into negotiations. Negotiations could take place in Melbourne at end of this month on the assumption that they would take no more than three to six days. Alternatively negotiations late in November or early December would be suitable. Grateful if you could discuss with the Iraq Embassy and advise.

Reference our 3305 concerning Qantas permit. We would be interested to learn whether renewal has been granted and if possible whether there is any connection between this matter and willingness of Iraq authorities to enter at this time into air services negotiations.

MIN.&DEPT CIVIL AVIATION(41/40/1(3))

A/MIN.&DEPT E.A.(716/51/1/7)
(715/55/5/4)

P.M.'s

18th October, 1963

SEC FAS(1, 2, 4) LA S&SEA DL INT AMSP EAMEC PACAM E AFME
INF ER@

173/10/1

RESTRICTED RESTRICTED RESTRICTED

I. 27155.

FROM:

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
LONDON.

5269. RESTRICTED.

FROM EXTERNAL.

PROPOSED IRAQ-AUSTRALIAN AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT.

REFERRING TO NOTE COPIED TO YOU IN OUR MEMORANDUM NO. 115 FOR 24TH JANUARY 1961, IRAQ EMBASSY HAS ADVISED THAT IRAQ GOVERNMENT "IS WILLING TO REACH AN AGREEMENT BY SENDING A DELEGATION TO AUSTRALIA DURING THE MONTH OF OCTOBER, 1963".

MIN. & DEPT CIVIL AVIATION.
A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M.'s.

5TH OCTOBER, 1963.

In ~~State~~ ^{8/10} ~~10/17~~
 he traveled he made
 a trip in 1908
 8/10

SEC FAS(1, 2, 4) AS(3) AS(JIC) S&SEA M&I M INT PACAM
AMSP EAMEC E AFME ER@

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

173/10/1

:GS

0.18140

TO:

Sent: 19th August, 1963
1756

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.

3305. RESTRICTED.

From Civil Aviation.

Renewal of Qantas Iraqi permit.

Please present note containing following substantive paragraphs to Iraqi Embassy:

"...has the honour to refer to the Embassy's note No. 2/10/2255 of 16th November, 1962, advising that the Qantas permit had been extended for a further period of one year ending 31st August, 1963.

The Australian authorities were most appreciative of the action then taken by the Government of the Republic of Iraq to extend the permit.

The High Commission has been instructed by the Australian authorities to apply for a renewal of the permit for a further period."

MIN.&DEPT CIVIL AVIATION(41/401(3))
E.A.
P.M.'s

20th August, 1963

SEC FAS(1, 2, 4) EAMEC E AFME ER LA

INWARD CABLEGRAM

LJH-

I. 19888.

DATED: 25TH JULY, 1963.
1935.

FROM:

REC'D: 26TH JULY, 1963.
1255.AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.1984. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.P.L. 480 - IRAQ.

FURTHER TO OUR 1905, LA MACHIA OF STATE TODAY ARRANGED FOR IRAQ DESK OFFICER (BLAKISTON) TO COVER THE POLITICAL FACTORS BEYOND THE P.L. 480 PROPOSALS.

BLAKISTON GAVE A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE DELICATE SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED IN IRAQ OVER THE LAST FEW MONTHS, AND SAID THAT SINCE THE ASSASSINATION OF KASSAM, THE U.S. HAD TAKEN INITIATIVE TO CULTIVATE STRONGER AND MORE POSITIVE TIES WITH IRAQ.

HE SAID THE U.S. WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO OFFER IMMEDIATE DIRECT AID AND THE TITLE IV PROPOSAL WAS BEING USED AS THE FIRST TANGIBLE EXPRESSION OF U.S. INTENTIONS TO SUPPORT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT.

FOR THIS REASON THE PROPOSAL HAS STRONG BACKING FROM THE ADMINISTRATION AND BLAKISTON SAID THAT THE POLITICAL MOTIVES AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DEAL MADE IT IMPERATIVE FOR THEM TO PROCEED.

WE BELIEVE, AS A RESULT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, THAT THERE ARE STRONG AND VALID POLITICAL REASONS BEHIND THE U.S. INTENTIONS.

2. LA MACHIA AGAIN EMPHASIZED THAT ECONOMICALLY, THERE WAS A STRONG CASE FOR ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ UNDER A TITLE IV PROGRAMME AND RECAPITULATED THE SUPPORTING DATA COVERED IN OUR 1905.

HE SAID STATE HAD RUN INTO CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY WITH OTHER AGENCIES BEFORE FIXING THE PROPOSED COMMERCIAL QUOTA AS HIGH AS 200,000 TONS.

3. IT APPEARS TO US THAT THE OVERRIDING MOTIVES BEHIND THE PROPOSALS ARE POLITICAL AND THE ADMINISTRATION IS DETERMINED TO PROCEED.

WE CONSIDER THAT THE COMMERCIAL QUOTA LEVEL OF 200,000 TONS IS PROBABLY AS HIGH AS WE CAN EXPECT.

THIS CONSULTATION HAS GIVEN US A FURTHER OPPORTUNITY TO REGISTER OUR CONCERN OF THE ERODING EFFECTS SUCH PROPOSALS HAVE ON OUR COMMERCIAL MARKETS, AND IN OUR DISCUSSIONS TODAY WE EXPRESSED ANXIETY LEST THE PRESENT PROPOSED AGREEMENT MIGHT LEAD TO OTHERS WITH MORE DAMAGING EFFECTS.

4. VAN VLIET, OF THE CANADIAN EMBASSY SAID THAT OTTAWA HAS NOT RAISED ANY OBJECTIONS, BUT VAN VLIET WILL REFRAIN FROM CONVEYING THIS REACTION TO STATE UNTIL OUR POSITION IS CLEAR.

5. STATE HAS ASKED THAT WE LET THEM KNOW YOUR REACTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

..2/.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

MEH

O. 15511

TO:

Sent: 26th July, 1963
1810

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

1782. RESTRICTED.

Your 1984 - PL480 - Iraq.

In view your paragraph 3, we do not wish to raise
further objection.

MIN. & DEPT TRADE (C)
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
A/MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M's DEPT
P.M's

28th July, 1963

① 173/10/1

SEC A/Ss ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E AP&ME INF
DL IC